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The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period._ _**Note**: ISW-CTP will pause publishing weekend updates starting on August 15, 2026. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however._ ## Key Takeaways 1. Russia has continued to provide direct military support to Iran through weapons and weapons components transfers.NBC News reported on August 18 that Russia has transferred drone components, ammunition, and TNT explosives to Iran via the Caspian Sea as of July 2026, citing a European government document that NBC obtained and that an unspecified Western official verified. 2. Russia’s drone component transfers to Iran are indicative of the active military support that Russia has provided Iran and its drone program in recent months. Iran has reportedly used “Russian-enhanced versions” of Shahed drones and Russian targeting intelligence to attack US forces and assets during the war, according to US intelligence officials. 3. The Emirati Defense Ministry stated that Iran launched two ballistic missiles at the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on August 18. The Emirati Defense Ministry added that its air defenses detected one ballistic missile that fell outside Emirati territorial waters and another that landed within them.Iranian regime media denied responsibility for the attack. 4. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s recently released list of preconditions for discussing militia disarmament with the Iraqi federal government indicates that Islamic Resistance in Iraq militias have no intention of disarming. 5. Members of the Iraqi Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee reportedly failed to reach a consensus on Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Zaydi’s request for the committee to draft a law to restrict weapons to the state. ## Toplines **Russia has continued to provide direct military support to Iran through weapons and weapons components transfers.**NBC News reported on August 18 that Russia has transferred drone components, ammunition, and TNT explosives to Iran via the Caspian Sea as of July 2026, citing a European government document that NBC obtained and that an unspecified Western official verified.[1] NBC added that Iran uses TNT in its ballistic missile warheads and drones, citing Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.[2] The document and the official reported that over two dozen Russian ships have carried deliveries to Amirabad Port in Iran’s Mazandaran Province via the Caspian Sea.[3] Iran and Russia have historically used the Caspian Sea to trade military and non-military goods.[4] Israel struck sites in Bandar Anzali, including facilities to disrupt Russian shipments of military equipment to Iran, earlier in the war.[5] Ukraine more recently struck several sanctioned cargo vessels in the Caspian Sea on July 25 that Russia reportedly used to transport military cargo between Russia and Iran.[6] This evidence of Russia’s drone component transfers to Iran is indicative of the active military support that Russia has provided Iran and its drone program in recent months. Iran has reportedly used “Russian-enhanced versions” of Shahed drones and Russian targeting intelligence to attack US forces and assets during the war, according to US intelligence officials.[7] Russia has also directly assisted with Iran’s attacks on US forces and bases during the war by providing Iran with “advanced drone tactics.”[8]The _New York Times (NYT)_ reported on August 11 that Iran has learned and adopted drone tactics it observed in the Russia-Ukraine War to better evade US air defenses.[9] Regime media highlighted the _NYT_ report on August 18.[10] ## US and Partner Military Operations _Nothing significant to report._ ## **Iranian Strike Campaign** _Assessed Iranian War Aims:_ * _Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz_ * _Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war_ * _Restore deterrence vis-_ à _-vis the United States and its regional partners_ * _Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states_ **The Emirati Defense Ministry stated that Iran launched two ballistic missiles at the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on August 18.[11]**The Emirati Defense Ministry added that its air defenses detected one ballistic missile that fell outside Emirati territorial waters and another that landed within them.[12]Iranian regime media denied responsibility for the attack.[13] It is unclear at the time of writing whether Iran intended to attack a target within Emirati territory or a target in Emirati territorial waters, such as a vessel. Iran has attacked Abu Dhabi National Oil Company tankers near the Emirati coast in recent days.[14] Iran has typically fired cruise missiles and drones to target vessels, however. Iran may have also attempted to attack the UAE to deter the UAE from assisting with US efforts to secure freedom of navigation in the strait, as it has previously.[15] []( "Iranian Attacks on Commercial Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz between August 17, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and August 18, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET")[]( **Iran likely attacked two vessels in the Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to consolidate its control over the waterway.** United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 18 that an unspecified actor fired an unspecified projectile that struck a vessel that was transiting the strait through Omani territorial waters.[16] UKMTO separately reported on August 17 that an unspecified actor struck the Liberian-flagged _Minoan Dignity_ with an unspecified projectile on August 15 as the vessel transited the strait through Omani waters. The attack killed one crew member.[17] Iran has repeatedly struck vessels using Omani waters in order to coerce vessels and shipping companies to transit the strait through Iranian territorial waters.[18] It is unclear at this time whether the Iranian attacks on commercial vessels are related to the Emirati Defense Ministry’s announcement about Iranian ballistic missile launches. ## US-Iran Negotiations _Nothing significant to report._ ## Iranian Domestic Affairs _Nothing significant to report._ ## Lebanon _Nothing significant to report._ ## Iraq **The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s recently released list of preconditions for discussing militia disarmament with the Iraqi federal government indicates that Islamic Resistance in Iraq militias have no intention of disarming.****[19]**The preconditions include a complete and “genuine” US withdrawal from Iraqi territory and assurances that the United States does not return to Iraq, the “liberation” of Iraqi political and economic decision-making from US “hegemony,” the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Iraq, and disbanding the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga due to their US-Israeli alignment.[20] The Islamic Resistance of Iraq includes Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, all of which are among the closest Iraqi militias to Iran and have been the most kinetically active in recent months.[21] These militias have continuously refused to disarm and likely recognize that the Iraqi federal government will not be able to implement all of their demands, which suggests that the militias made these demands without any intention to disarm.[22] **The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also condemned Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s “provocative and irresponsible” actions, in reference to recent Iraqi federal government attempts to crack down on the militias.[23]**Iraqi authorities have closed 71 “fake” headquarters of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and raided a likely Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba base in recent weeks, for example.[24] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes multiple Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[25] The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service also arrested a Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba reconnaissance unit leader in Dhi Qar Province on August 17.[26] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported on August 17 that Iraqi authorities handed the militia leader over to PMF authorities following threats from the militias.[27] Previous Iraqi administrations, particularly under former Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi, have conducted limited crackdowns on militia activity, but Iran’s infiltration of Iraqi government institutions and the relative strength of the Iraqi militias have limited the scale of such efforts. Kadhimi tried multiple times to arrest militia members but would later release them due to militia pressure, for example.[28] **A member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing, Sadiqoun, falsely claimed on August 18 that Iraqi militias’ current capabilities are limited to “simple weapons.”**[29] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted numerous missile and drone attacks against US and partner forces in Iraq and the region throughout the war.[30] The Sadiqoun member’s comments follow reports of Iraqi militias circumventing the federal government’s disarmament efforts, including by handing over inoperable weapons.[31] **Members of the Iraqi federal government’s Jurf al Sakhr Committee reportedly conducted a field visit to several villages in the area to review security conditions and interview local farmers.[32]**An informed source told Iraqi media on August 18 that the committee includes representatives from the PMF in addition to other governmental ministries and security institutions.[33] Farmers living in the al Saidan, al Jir, and al Uwaysat villages demanded the renewal of temporary agricultural land contracts and the return of displaced families, according to Iraqi media.[34] The source noted that the committee will complete its investigation into Jurf al Sakhr and submit a report to Zaydi within 10 days.[35] Kataib Hezbollah and other Iraqi militias liberated Jurf al Sakhr from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) control in late 2014 and displaced the area’s predominantly Sunni residents.[36] The militias continue to exercise control over Jurf al Sakhr and do not permit civilians or government officials to enter the area.[37] The committee’s visit follows reports that Zaydi may be planning an operation to encircle and enter Jurf al Sakhr if the militias do not comply with the Iraqi government’s September 30 disarmament deadline.[38] **Members of the Iraqi Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee reportedly failed to reach a consensus on Zaydi’s request for the committee to draft a law to restrict weapons to the state.[39]**Zaydi met with the committee on August 17.[40] Zaydi has mentioned presenting such a law to parliament in recent days.[41] Iraqi media reported on August 17 that disagreement among committee members prevented the committee from reaching a consensus on the disarmament law, but that the federal government would draft the law and submit it to Parliament for discussion and approval.[42] A member of the Sunni Azm Alliance heads the committee, which also includes parliamentarians from various parties, such as Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun political wing.[43] Iraqi media also reported that unspecified parliamentarians who are not affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias held separate meetings to discuss the law.[44] The parliamentarians reportedly discussed which weapons would be referenced in the law, possible mechanisms to address weapons depots, the possible integration of disarmed groups into other security institutions, and security guarantees that the government can provide militias to convince them to hand over their weapons.[45] It remains unclear how Zaydi’s draft law differs in intent or practice from existing Iraqi laws that forbid armed groups from operating in Iraq. **A Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) parliamentarian and member of Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee told Iraqi Kurdish media on August 18 that the Iraqi federal government is expected to submit the PMF draft law to Parliament within the next two weeks.[46] It is unclear if the parliamentarian is referring to the PMF Retirement and Service Law or the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.**The PUK parliamentarian said that the Iraqi federal government is sending the draft law to Parliament to address demands from some armed groups within the PMF.[47] Zaydi separately directed the head of Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee on August 12 to complete its review of the PMF draft law for presentation to Parliament, according to Iraqi media.[48] The “PMF draft law” may refer to two recent draft laws that address the PMF but were recently withdrawn from Parliament for various reasons. Former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew the PMF Retirement and Service draft law from Parliament in March 2025.[49] The draft law would have reportedly required around 3,500 PMF leaders, including Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, to retire due to their age.[50] Sudani also withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority draft law from Parliament in August 2025, reportedly due to US pressure.[51] The Popular Mobilization Authority draft law would have likely increased Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the PMF.[52] It is unclear if parliamentary committees have revised either of these draft laws. Parliamentary committees must review and approve draft laws before Parliament as a whole can discuss and vote on the laws.[53] Both laws may be undergoing the legislative process given that Zaydi and the PUK parliamentarian appear to be referencing distinct draft laws. Zaydi’s order for the parliamentary committee to complete its review of a PMF draft law implies that the federal government already re-submitted the draft law. The PUK parliamentarian remarked nearly a week after Zaydi’s order that the federal government is soon expected to submit a PMF draft law to parliament, however.[54] ## Arabian Peninsula **The Houthis claimed that they launched drones targeting an oil refinery in Jizan, Saudi Arabia, on August 18.[55]**A Houthi military source told Houthi media on August 18 that the Houthis attacked the Saudi Aramco oil refinery in Jizan in retaliation for Saudi military overflights in Houthi-controlled parts of Saada and Hajjah governorates, northwestern Yemen.[56] The Houthis have claimed four attacks on the Jizan refinery since the Houthis began targeting Saudi oil infrastructure on July 24.[57] Saudi Arabia has not confirmed the attack at the time of writing.[58] ISW-CTP continues to assess that the Houthis are attacking Saudi oil infrastructure primarily to raise Saudi political and economic costs to an untenable level and compel Saudi leaders to terminate military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.[59] The Houthi Council of Ministers reiterated on August 17 the Houthis’ demands that Saudi Arabia cease all military operations in Yemen, lift its blockade on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, pay Houthi officials’ salaries, and pay the Houthis war reparations for Saudi and Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG)-aligned military operations in Yemen.[60] The Houthis seek to force Saudi Arabia to surrender and accept these demands by attacking Saudi oil infrastructure, Saudi vessels transiting the Bab al Mandeb Strait and Red Sea, and other Saudi assets.[61] []( "Claimed Houthi Attacks on Saudi Oil Infrastructure between August 17, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and August 18, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET")[]( Endnotes [1] [2] ; [3][]( [4] ; [5] ; ; dot co.il/pzm-soldiers/Article-2eae2aaae860d91026.htm; [6] dot com/post/81090; ; [7] ; ; [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] ; [16] [17] ; [18] ; [19] [20] [21] dot net/english/categories/iraq/958915 ; ; ; ; [22] dot net/english/categories/iraq/958915 ; ; ; ; [23] [24] dot com/ar/أمـن/الداخلية-العراقية-تعلن-غلاق-71-مقرا-وهميا-للحشد-الشعبي ; dot com/ar/ أمـن/محاصرة-مقر-فصيل-شيعي-مسلح-في-طراف-بغداد ; [25] [26] dot com/ar/أمـن/مكافحة-ال-رهاب-يعتقل-حد-برز-قادة-حركة-النجبا-في-ذي-قار [27] [28] ; [29] dot com/708710/ [30] [31] dot net/442723; dot net/443607; dot net/444587; dot co.uk/politics/العراق-لماذا-تتم-عملية-حصر-سلاح-الفصائل-سراً [32] dot com/ar/سیاسة/ول-دخول-حكومي-لـ-جرف-الصخر-منذ-سنوات-لجنة-الزيدي-تتفقد-وضاع-الناحية [33] dot com/ar/سیاسة/ول-دخول-حكومي-لـ-جرف-الصخر-منذ-سنوات-لجنة-الزيدي-تتفقد-وضاع-الناحية [34] dot com/ar/سیاسة/ول-دخول-حكومي-لـ-جرف-الصخر-منذ-سنوات-لجنة-الزيدي-تتفقد-وضاع-الناحية [35] dot com/ar/سیاسة/ول-دخول-حكومي-لـ-جرف-الصخر-منذ-سنوات-لجنة-الزيدي-تتفقد-وضاع-الناحية [36] [37] [38] [39] dot com/708217/ [40] dot com/708217/ [41] dot com/708217/ [42] dot com/708217/ [43] dot com/news/iraqi-pm-seeks-parliamentary-backing-monopolise-weapons ; dot com/news/iraq-arrests-senior-pmf-figure-amid-disarmament-push ; dot com/51249/ ; dot com/amp/en/Iraq/Baghdad-unveils-2026-2029-cabinet-agenda-covering-14-sectors [44] dot com/708217/ [45] dot com/708217/ [46] dot net/sorani/categories/iraq/1867965 ; [47] dot net/sorani/categories/iraq/1867965 [48] dot tv/news/localnews/572909/موعد-إحالة-قانون-الحشد-الشعبي-إلى-مجلس-النواب [49] dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86 [50] dot net/398498/ [51] dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/270820253 [52] ; dot net/Library/Files/Uploaded%20Files/07/NewFolder/175%20175%20175%20(1).pdf [53] dot iq/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A/ [54] dot iq/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A/ [55] dot ye/ar/news3767867.htm [56] dot ye/ar/news3767867.htm [57] dot ye/ar/news3767867.htm ; 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