_The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and \_The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute\_ are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period._ _**Note**: ISW-CTP will pause publishing weekend updates starting on August 15, 2026. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however._ ## Key Takeaways 1. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is intensifying economic pressure on Iran to discourage Iranian efforts to control or disrupt navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE announced on August 18 that it would halt all trade and financial transactions with Iran. The announcement comes after the UAE accused Iran of launching missiles from Iranian territory toward the UAE on August 18. 2. The UAE has previously supported US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait, which suggests that the UAE’s decision is part of a broader effort to raise the costs of Iran’s attempts to control or disrupt maritime traffic. 3. The UAE’s decision will further weaken Iran’s already deteriorating economy by restricting both its access to essential imports and its ability to repatriate export revenues and circumvent sanctions. Roughly one-third of Iran’s imports have come from the UAE, and the largest proportion of Iranian imports in the last five years come from the UAE have made the UAE. 4. Iran will likely respond to the UAE’s decision with greater military and economic pressure against the UAE rather than abandon its efforts to secure greater control over the Strait of Hormuz. ISW-CTP previously also assessed that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major Ahmad Vahidi’s faction — whom ISW-CTP continues to assess is driving regime decision-making — may be willing to accept some economic costs and the risk of renewed war if doing so enables them to achieve their core objectives, including Iranian control over the strait. 5. Increasing Emirati alignment with the United States will also drive longer-term hostility between the UAE and Iran. It is not clear the extent to which the Iranian regime decisionmakers have internalized the ramifications of long-term hostility with the UAE, given the economic relationship between the two states. 6. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is under pressure from both the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors over Iraqi militia disarmament but appears to be responding primarily to militia pressure at this time. Zaydi reportedly planned to increase security measures and deploy a special Iraqi Counter Terrorism unit near Jurf al Sakhar, south of Baghdad, to monitor the movement of people and vehicles, and would not lead to a raid or a military incursion into the militia’s key site. 7. Iran has also dispatched senior Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, to Baghdad in recent days to discourage conflict between the Iraqi federal government and the militias. These officials are also discouraging disarmament. []( "Iran Update Map, August 19, 2026")[]( ## Toplines **The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is intensifying economic pressure on Iran to discourage Iranian efforts to control or disrupt navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.** The UAE announced on August 18 that it would halt all trade and financial transactions with Iran.[1] The announcement comes after the UAE accused Iran of launching missiles from Iranian territory toward the UAE on August 18.[2] The UAE later said the missiles unsuccessfully targeted vessels to disrupt ”maritime navigation.”[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei denied that Iran launched these attacks.[4] Iran has recently attacked tankers near the Emirati coast.[5] The UAE has previously supported US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait, which suggests that the UAE’s decision is part of a broader effort to raise the costs of Iran’s attempts to control or disrupt maritime traffic.[6] The timing of the UAE‘s decision also suggests that the UAE may seek to influence ongoing Iran-Oman negotiations over the future management of the strait. The Associated Press reported on August 18, citing two regional officials, that the Trump administration told Oman that it opposes elements of the yet-to-be-announced Iran-Oman agreement, including joint Iranian-Omani management of the strait’s exit route.[7] An Iranian analyst close to the regime separately stated on August 18 that the UAE is playing a significant role in increasing US pressure on Oman over the agreement.[8] The UAE’s decision may, therefore, also seek to prevent any Iran-Oman arrangement that grants Iran any control over navigation through the strait. **The UAE’s decision will further weaken Iran’s already deteriorating economy by restricting both its access to essential imports and its ability to repatriate export revenues and circumvent sanctions.****Roughly one-third of Iran’s imports have come from the UAE, and the largest proportion of Iranian imports in the last five years come from the UAE have made the UAE.[9]**The UAE also serves as a critical hub for Iran’s shadow-banking and sanctions-evasion networks through which Iran generates significant revenue.[10] Approximately 80 percent of Iran’s imported foreign exchange reportedly comes through the UAE.[11] Cutting this channel will exacerbate Iran’s pre-existing foreign-currency shortages and make it more difficult for the regime to finance both imports and exports.[12] An Iranian sanctions-focused analyst assessed on August 19 that the impact will be particularly significant amid the ongoing US naval blockade on Iran because trade between Iran and the UAE occurs beyond the US naval blockade line in the Persian Gulf, and thus, the UAE likely provided Iran with an important channel for obtaining goods despite the blockade.[13] The UAE’s decision will compound the economic pressure that the blockade has already imposed on Iran. **Iran will likely respond to the UAE’s decision with greater military and economic pressure against the UAE rather than abandon its efforts to secure greater control over the Strait of Hormuz.** Iran will likely view the UAE’s actions as both an immediate economic threat and a broader challenge to its core objectives, which include controlling the strait. Iran could seek to impose costs on UAE shipping or territorial security to demonstrate the consequences of opposing Iranian efforts to control or disrupt navigation through the strait. Such actions would be consistent with Iran’s repeated use of force against Gulf states to compel them to accept Iranian demands since the start of the US-Iran war in February 2026. ISW-CTP previously also assessed that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major Ahmad Vahidi’s faction — whom ISW-CTP continues to assess is driving regime decision-making — may be willing to accept some economic costs and the risk of renewed war if doing so enables them to achieve their core objectives, including Iranian control over the strait.[14] Increasing Emirati alignment with the United States will also drive longer-term hostility between the UAE and Iran. It is not clear the extent to which the Iranian regime decisionmakers have internalized the ramifications of long-term hostility with the UAE, given the economic relationship between the two states. **The resulting economic pressure on Iran from the UAE’s decision will nevertheless likely increase regime concerns about domestic unrest, but it is unclear whether those concerns will compel Vahidi’s faction to make meaningful concessions.** The UAE supplies almost 37 percent of Iran’s essential goods imports (which are not prohibited under the US blockade and sanctions), which makes the loss of access to trade with the UAE particularly significant to the domestic Iranian population.[15] The Emirati decision to impose economic penalties on Iran comes after Iranian officials and media have expressed growing concern in recent weeks about deteriorating economic conditions and the potential for domestic unrest.[16] The regime already appears to be pursuing multiple measures to mitigate these risks rather than reconsider its core demands, however. Iran has taken initial steps to increase access to foreign currency and strengthen alternative economic relationships, including with Tajikistan, although the effectiveness of these efforts remains unclear.[17] The regime is also simultaneously preparing for potential unrest, which is consistent with its longstanding approach to suppressing dissent rather than addressing the underlying economic grievances that drive the unrest.[18] **Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is under pressure from both the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors over Iraqi militia disarmament but appears to be responding primarily to militia pressure at this time.**Qatari-owned regional media reported on August 19 that Zaydi’s plan to increase security measures and deploy a special Iraqi Counter Terrorism unit near Jurf al Sakhar, south of Baghdad, was only to monitor the movement of people and vehicles and would not lead to a raid or a military incursion into the militia’s key site.[19] This is a reversal from previous reporting, which claimed that Zaydi was preparing for Iraqi security forces to retake Jurf al Sakhar.[20] Kataib Hezbollah has refused to allow the Iraqi government to exercise sovereignty over Jurf al Sakhr for over a decade and has used the area to store weapons and launch attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region, including in March and April.[21] Conducting an operation to retake the area would require significant planning, mobilization, and coordination among Iraqi security forces. It would also be a notable move in favor of US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias. Zaydi’s hesitation to follow through on this operation demonstrates how much influence Iranian-backed Iraqi actors retain over Zaydi’s government. **The recently reported plan to only “monitor” Jurf al Sakhr indicates that Iranian-backed actors, including the militias and leaders within the ruling Shia Coordination Framework, have coerced Zaydi into responding to their directives rather than complying with US pressure to rein in the militias.** Zaydi initiated the government’s disarmament campaign and set September 30 as the deadline for the campaign’s completion. Zaydi initiated the campaign and set this deadline in part due to US pressure on Baghdad, which included offers of additional US funding and investment in Iraq if Zaydi is successful.[22] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including those that are closest to Iran and that have been the most kinetically active in recent months, continue to refuse to disarm and resist government efforts to rein them in.[23] The Iraqi militias are also circumventing and delaying the government’s disarmament efforts, including by handing in inoperable or small amounts of weapons.[24] Many Iranian-backed actors pressured the Iraqi government into surrendering a Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader over to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)–which contains a number of Iranian-backed militias–after Iraqi authorities arrested the leader earlier in August.[25] The Supreme Judicial Council then dropped his charges.[26][27] Pressure from Iranian-backed actors similarly thwarted former Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi’s attempts to crack down on the militias.[28] Members of the framework are reportedly concerned about the government’s recent attempts to crack down on the militias and the potential for armed confrontation between the militias and the government. Some framework members are even attempting to negotiate settlements between the federal government and the militias that have included “weapons management” proposals and delaying government demands to disarm until after US forces leave Iraq.[29] Zaydi’s September 30 deadline currently corresponds with the planned withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq.[30] **Iran has also dispatched senior Iranian officials to Baghdad in recent days to discourage conflict between the Iraqi federal government and the militias. These officials are also discouraging disarmament.** Iraqi sources told Saudi media on August 19 that Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf relayed Iranian proposals to unspecified Iraqi officials that aimed to avoid a confrontation between the federal government and the militias.[31] Iran also reportedly proposed “freezing” or hiding heavy weapons and transferring weapons to Iran until the militias reach a political settlement.[32] Zaydi’s supposed previous plan to send Iraqi security forces to Jurf al Sakhr reportedly prompted IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani’s recent visit to Baghdad on August 10, during which he urged militia leaders to avoid armed confrontation with the government and to reach a settlement to avoid handing militia weapons to the state.[33] ## US and Partner Military Operations _Nothing significant to report._ ## **Iranian Strike Campaign** _Assessed Iranian War Aims:_ * _Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz_ * _Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war_ * _Restore deterrence vis-_ à _-vis the United States and its regional partners_ * _Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states_ _See topline section._ ## US-Iran Negotiations _Nothing significant to report._ ## Iranian Domestic Affairs **Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei made several new appointments within the judiciary on August 19 amid renewed concern in the regime over domestic unrest.[34]**It is unclear why the regime has decided to reshuffle and promote these officials. The judiciary’s official media outlet reported that Ejei made at least 23 judiciary appointments to the Supreme Judicial Council and across several provincial judiciaries on August 19.[35] The appointments included new heads of various divisions within the Supreme Judicial Council, such as chief justice, deputy judiciary chief, prisons organization head, and social affairs and crime prevention minister.[36] The regime, including nonjudicial bodies, may be engaged in this judiciary reshuffle to prepare to prosecute anti-regime elements. Ejei stated on August 17 that Iranian officials must remain vigilant against foreign infiltration and attempts to undermine national unity. Ejei separately stated on August 17 that he ”personally received recommendations“ for judiciary appointments from IRGC and Intelligence Ministry officials.[37] It is unclear if Ejei had recommended these appointees and then the IRGC and/or Intelligence Ministry officials approved these appointees or vice versa, but it is nevertheless notable for extra-judicial bodies to make recommendations for judiciary appointments. It also remains unclear if Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei was involved in deciding these appointments. Ejei’s August 17 statement and August 19 appointments come after Mojtaba appointed former IRGC Intelligence Organization Head Hossein Taeb as Basij commander on August 10 and tasked Taeb to use the Basij to increase surveillance of Iran’s population.[38] ISW-CTP assessed that Taeb’s appointment may, in part, reflect the regime’s anticipation of potential unrest amid mounting economic pressure due to Taeb’s previous roles in brutal protest suppression.[39] ## Lebanon _Nothing significant to report._ ## Iraq **Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf probably continued Iranian efforts to cement Iraqi economic dependence on Iran during meetings with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on August 19.**Iraqi and Iranian media reported that Ghalibaf arrived in Baghdad on August 19 and has meetings with various Iraqi officials and political blocs, including Zaydi and the Shia Coordination Framework, until August 21.[40] Ghalibaf said that Iran is “one” with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias during a joint press conference with Iraqi First Deputy Parliament Speaker Adnan Faihan, who is a member of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political bloc.[41] Ghalibaf also said during the conference that his visit to Iraq accompanies Iranian efforts to create a “new regional order” in the Middle East without “foreign interference,” referring to the United States.[42] Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al Halbousi requested that Iran grant Iraq a “special status” under which Iraq could export oil through the Strait of Hormuz during a meeting with Ghalibaf on August 19.[43] Iraqi media previously reported that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed prospects of Iranian permission for Iraqi oil tankers to transit the Strait with militia and framework leaders in Baghdad on August 10.[44] Iranian Central Bank Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati also visited Baghdad on August 16 and 17 to discuss an agreement that would facilitate “commercial and financial transactions” between Iraq’s and Iran’s central banks, which Iran could use to receive Iraqi payments for safe passage through the strait.[45] These discussions come amid Iraqi consultations with the United States and other regional governments to develop pipelines and overland oil export corridors from Iraq to the Mediterranean and Red Sea that would bypass the strait.[46] Such infrastructure projects challenge Iran’s long-term leverage over the global economy by offering regional oil producers alternatives to exporting fuel through the strait, which would reduce the waterway’s importance to global commerce if completed. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran seeks to draw Iraq away from pursuing alternative oil export routes and maintain Iran’s long-term leverage by discussing the possibility of a deal to export Iraqi oil through the strait.[47] Any Iranian offer to provide safe passage for Iraqi tankers would also legitimize Iran’s illegal efforts to codify its domination of the strait by requiring Iraq to recognize Iranian control over the waterway. Ghalibaf also discussed other economic initiatives with Iraqi officials on August 19, including reviving cross-border railways and developing Iraqi-Iranian “border markets,” in a meeting with Iraqi President Nizar Amedi.[48] These trade initiatives combined intend to cement Iraq’s economic and political dependence on Iran by requiring Iraq to rely on Iranian terms to export Iraqi oil, which accounts for up to 90 percent of Iraqi government revenues, and expand cross-border economic activity.[49] **Ghalibaf also likely discussed Iranian Kurdish opposition activity in Iraq, which the Iranian regime continues to be concerned about, during his meetings with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on August 19.**Iranian state media reported on August 19 that Ghalibaf will discuss border security and counterterrorism issues with Iraqi leaders during his visit to Iraq.[50] Iranian leaders consider Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan a counterterrorism concern and a threat to the regime in Tehran.[51] Iran has repeatedly demanded that the Iraqi government dismantle Iranian Kurdish opposition militia bases in Iraqi Kurdistan and remove the militias from the vicinity of the Iran-Iraq border since 2021.[52] Iranian forces have also frequently attacked anti-regime Kurdish militias in Iraqi Kurdistan during the Spring 2026 War.[53] The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) more recently accused Iran of conducting a drone attack on KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s office and the KRG’s intelligence chief’s residence in Erbil on August 17.[54] Iranian officials subsequently denied Iran’s involvement.[55] **An Iraqi militia with a political wing, probably referring to either Asaib Ahl al Haq or Kataib al Imam Ali, handed over 20 Iranian-made fixed-wing drones to the Iraqi government on August 19, according to a senior Iraqi official speaking to UK-based Saudi media.[56]**Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali both have political wings and announced their willingness to disarm on July 2, differing from more militias more closely aligned with Iran that have refused to disarm thus far.[57] The Iraqi official said that unspecified US officials attended the handover and that the Iraqi federal government is specifically focused on collecting drones and “cross-border” missiles from the militias, instead of conventional weapons like artillery or small arms.[58] Militias have predominantly used drones and rockets to attack US positions in Iraq and reportedly Gulf states since the start of the war.[59] An unspecified militia leader told Saudi media that the militia that handed over weapons to the Iraqi federal government on August 19 gave drones that could target Israel.[60] The unspecified militia leader claimed that the Iraqi militias have most of the same weapons that the Iraqi army possesses.[61] It will be difficult for the Iraqi federal government to verify the level of disarmament for the militia cooperating with the government or any other militia due to the covert nature of the Iraqi militias, including those within the PMF, however. ## Arabian Peninsula _Nothing significant to report._ [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] ; [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ; [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] ; ; [18] ; ; [19] dot co.uk/politics/جرف-الصخر-اختبار-أوّل-صعب-لخطة-حصر-السلاح-في-العراق [20] dot co.uk/politics/الزيدي-يتحرك-لإنهاء-ملف-جرف-الصخر-وإبعاد-المليشيات-عنها ; dot net/arab-and-world/iraq/2026/08/11/العراق-الزيدي-يتمسك-بحصر-السلاح-ويبحث-السيطرة-على-جرف-الصخر [21] dot com/en/14420 ; [22] ; dot com/news/us-sends-dollar-shipment-iraq-threatens-sanctions; dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-اميركا-تشترط-تفكيك-الفصا-ل-مقابل-تحرير-30-مليار-دولار-من-موال-صدام [23] dot net/english/categories/iraq/958915 ; ; ; ; [24] dot co.uk/politics/العراق-لماذا-تتم-عملية-حصر-سلاح-الفصائل-سراً ; dot net/442723/ [25] [26] dot net/449191/ ; dot net/449222/ ; dot com/ar/أمـن/القضا-العراقي-يبر-قياديا-بالحشد-من-تهمة-اغتيال-ضابط-المخابرات-نبراس-الفيلي ; dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5308585-الحشد-يمنع-التحقيق-مع-مسؤول-شبكة-تهريب-صواريخ-ومسيّرات [27] [28] ; [29] dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-دارة-السلاح-بدلا-من-نزعه-تسوية-شيعية-على-طاولة-الزيدي-والفصا-ل ; dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-ال-طار-التنسيقي-يدفع-بالعامري-والحكيم-لمنع-الصدام-مع-الفصا-ل [30] dot com/en/Report/Iraq-s-September-30-weapons-deadline-leaves-terms-of-disarmament-unresolved [31] dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5308866-قاليباف-يناقش-في-بغداد-خطة-إيرانية-لـإخفاء-سلاح-الفصائل [32] dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5308866-قاليباف-يناقش-في-بغداد-خطة-إيرانية-لـإخفاء-سلاح-الفصائل [33] dot com/32845 ; dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-قا-ني-يرسم-خطا-حمر-في-بغداد-لا-حصر-لسلاح-الفصا-ل-ولا-صدام-مع-الدولة ; dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-قا-ني-في-بغداد-لبحث-سلاح-الفصا-ل-ومسار-تصدير-النفط-عبر-هرمز [34] dot ir/fa/news/4913759/ [35] dot ir/fa/news/4913759/ [36] dot ir/fa/news/4913759/ [37] dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-62/4289054-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DA%98%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%BA%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AE%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%AF ; [38] [39] [40] dot com/ar/سیاسة/قاليباف-يصل-لى-بغداد-في-زيارة-رسمية [41] dot com/ar/سیاسة/من-بغداد-قاليباف-يشيد-بـ-المقاومة-العراقية-تخطت-الحدود-وباتت-قوة-قليمية ; dot iq/en/2026/05/03/first-deputy-speaker-congratulates-the-asaib-ahl-al-haq-movement-on-the-23rd-anniversary-of-its-founding-and-praises-its-role-in-protecting-sovereignty-and-state-building/ [42] dot com/ar/سیاسة/من-بغداد-قاليباف-يشيد-بـ-المقاومة-العراقية-تخطت-الحدود-وباتت-قوة-قليمية [43] dot net/449248/ ; dot com/ar/سیاسة/خلال-استقباله-قاليباف-اميدي-ي-كد-موقف-العراق-الداعم-ل-نها-الصراعات-وحفظ-سيادة-الدول [44] ; dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-قا-ني-في-بغداد-لبحث-سلاح-الفصا-ل-ومسار-تصدير-النفط-عبر-هرمز [45] dot com/news/247007/CBI-chief-pays-visit-to-Iraq-to-broaden-trade-cooperation [46] ; ; [47] [48] [49] ; dot com/en/Economy/Oil-generates-four-fifths-of-Iraq-s-revenue-through-May [50] dot com/news/247089/Iran-s-Ghalibaf-arrives-in-Baghdad-for-talks [51] ; [52] ; ; [53] dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/مسي-رات-يرانية-تستهدف-مقرات-حزب-كومله-قرب-السليمانية ; ; [54] ; dot com/arab-world/5308020-iraqi-kurdistan-prime-minister-condemns-iranian-drone-attack-targeting-his [55] ; ; dot almayadeen.net/news/politics/erbil-attack-another–false-flag—iran-not-involved–source?utm_source=mango-searchx&utm_medium=title_and_relatives&utm_campaign=iran [56] dot co.uk/politics/خاص-تفاصيل-تسليم-فصيل-عراقي-مسيرات-وصواريخ-بحضور-أميركي [57] ; dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%83-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD ; dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A [58] dot co.uk/politics/خاص-تفاصيل-تسليم-فصيل-عراقي-مسيرات-وصواريخ-بحضور-أميركي [59] [60] dot co.uk/politics/خاص-تفاصيل-تسليم-فصيل-عراقي-مسيرات-وصواريخ-بحضور-أميركي [61] dot co.uk/politics/خاص-تفاصيل-تسليم-فصيل-عراقي-مسيرات-وصواريخ-بحضور-أميركي