CO07016 | What if Iran is Attacked?
71/100
Verdict
Mixed
Mostly Reliable — Analytical Commentary (credible institutional forecasting piece with a largely accurate factual...
The item is a 2007 RSIS (S.
✓ 10 checks out
✕ 2 disputed
? 10 unverified
Full analysis The complete summary ⌄
The item is a 2007 RSIS (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore) Commentary, CO07016, 'What if Iran is Attacked?', dated 9 March 2007 and co-authored by Arabinda Acharya (ICPVTR) and Tom Quiggin (CENS). Publication metadata and author affiliations were independently confirmed against RSIS's own commentary listings. The piece is explicitly speculative scenario analysis rather than reportage: its central propositions are counterfactual forecasts about how Sunni and Shi'a militant actors might realign after a strike on Iran. Verifiable factual anchors are mostly sound: UN sanctions pressure on Iran (UNSC Resolution 1737, adopted 23 December 2006); the Shah-era, US-assisted origins of Iran's nuclear programme (1957 Atoms for Peace agreement; 1967 Tehran Research Reactor with US-supplied HEU); Ayman al-Zawahiri's status as al-Qaeda's second-in-command and his 27 July 2006 video expressing solidarity over Lebanon; the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's solidarity with Hezbollah under Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef; Iranian detention of senior al-Qaeda figures from 2003 (notably Saif al-Adel); Hezbollah's seniority over al-Qaeda (1982 vs 1988) and its demonstrated out-of-area capability (1992 Buenos Aires embassy bombing; 1994 AMIA bombing). Two weaknesses reduce the score materially. First, the article dates 'Israel's attacks on Hizbullah' to 'August-September 2006'; the war ran 12 July to 14 August 2006 (the naval blockade was lifted on 8 September), so the stated window is materially inaccurate. Second, the text repeatedly asserts an operating 'Iranian nuclear weapons programme' as settled fact; the December 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate assessed with high confidence that any weapons programme was halted in fall 2003, and that judgement remains contested by analysts such as the Institute for Science and International Security — so the article's framing is an assumption presented as established. Presentation is measured and heavily hedged (emotion score 0.15, capital ratio 0.01), with authors explicitly disclaiming apologia. No sources, links or citations are embedded anywhere in the text, which is normal for the RSIS Commentary format but limits independent traceability. The supplied text also duplicates the full article body twice, indicating a scraping artefact rather than an editorial fault.
What checked out (10)
- Publication identity and date: RSIS Commentary CO07016, 'What if Iran is Attacked?', 09 March 2007, co-authored with Tom Quiggin — confirmed on RSIS's own CENS commentary index (https://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/cens/centre-resourcescens/cens-rsis-publications/commentaries-2/page/28/).
- Author affiliation: Tom Quiggin was Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Programme, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS — matched to contemporaneous RSIS commentary bylines (https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/869-the-future-of-strategic-early/).
- Author affiliation: Arabinda Acharya was associated with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), RSIS, NTU — corroborated by RSIS ICPVTR publications listing him in an editorial role (https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-November14.pdf).
- UN sanctions context ('disregard for the United Nations sanctions'): the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1737 on 23 December 2006, imposing sanctions over Iran's failure to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities (https://press.un.org/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm; https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf).
- Shah-era origins of Iran's nuclear programme with American involvement: the programme began under Mohammad Reza Shah following a 1957 US-Iran nuclear cooperation agreement under Atoms for Peace, and in 1967 the US supplied a 5 MW research reactor plus highly enriched uranium at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (https://www.brookings.edu/articles/sixty-years-of-atoms-for-peace-and-irans-nuclear-program/; https://isis-online.org/country-pages/iran).
- Ayman al-Zawahiri was al-Qaeda's number two in 2006 and issued a 27 July 2006 videotaped address on the Lebanon war acknowledging Hezbollah's fight against Israel (https://www.rferl.org/a/1070232.html; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/al-qaeda-hezbollah-relationship).
- Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood solidarity with Hezbollah in 2006: Supreme Guide Muhammad Mahdi Akef issued a statement of solidarity and offered to send 10,000 men to fight in Lebanon (https://jamestown.org/brief/sunni-muslims-standing-in-unity-with-shiite-hezbollah/; https://www.deseret.com/2006/8/29/19971047/new-hero-emerges-in-arab-world/).
- Hezbollah is an older organisation than al-Qaeda: Hezbollah emerged in 1982 after Israel's invasion of Lebanon, whereas al-Qaeda dates its founding to 11 August 1988 (https://almanac.afpc.org/almanac/movements/hezbollah; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaeda).
- Hezbollah's demonstrated out-of-area reach with 'only minor exceptions': the 17 March 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires (29 killed) and the 18 July 1994 AMIA bombing (85 killed) are attributed to Hezbollah operatives (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Buenos_Aires_Israeli_embassy_bombing; https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2023/12/20/us-charges-alleged-hezbollah-member-over-1994-buenos-aires-bombing).
- Zawahiri's rhetorical differentiation between Shi'a resisting 'Zionists and crusaders' and Iraqi Shi'a accused of trading religion for power reflects a documented Zawahiri line, foreshadowed in his July 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi arguing that Shi'a cooperated with the Americans in exchange for assumption of power (https://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm).
Disputed claims 2 claims ⌄
- MATERIALLY INACCURATE DATING: the article places 'Israel's attacks on Hizbullah' in 'August-September 2006'. The 2006 Lebanon War began on 12 July 2006 and ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire on 14 August 2006 — a 33/34-day conflict — per Britannica (https://www.britannica.com/event/2006-Lebanon-War) and a dpa-sourced ReliefWeb chronology (https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/background-facts-and-figures-about-2006-israel-hezbollah-war). Only the formal end-point (Israel lifting its naval blockade on 8 September 2006) falls in September. Two dated reputable secondary sources support this correction, satisfying the guardrail threshold.
- PARTIALLY DISPUTED CHARACTERISATION: 'groups like Al Qaeda and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood pledged support to Hizbullah.' The Brotherhood component is verified; the al-Qaeda component overstates a rhetorical solidarity statement as a pledge of support. Zawahiri's 27 July 2006 video acknowledged Hezbollah's fight against Israel without committing operational support, and relations between the groups were and remained adversarial (https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/al-qaeda-hezbollah-relationship; https://www.rand.org/pubs/articles/2013/al-qaeda-hezbollah-on-the-verge-of-sectarian-war-in.html). Mitigating factor: the authors qualify the cooperation as 'albeit on the level of the discursive'.
Unverified claims 10 claims ⌄
- UNVERIFIABLE BY CONSTRUCTION: 'An attack on Iran is sure to galvanize the already agitated Muslim community to an unknown extent' — a counterfactual forecast about an event that had not occurred at time of writing; no evidentiary test exists for the 2007 scenario as framed.
- UNVERIFIED: 'the attack on Iran could transform the nature, spread and lethality of jihadi terrorism' — conditional prediction; the 2025 and 2026 strike episodes provide only partial, contested analogues and no reputable source confirms a jihadist transformation of the kind described.
- UNVERIFIED: 'If Iran is attacked, it is highly probable that the Iranians ... would use their knowledge and leverage with Al Qaeda members to retaliate' — no primary or reputable secondary source confirms such operational retaliation has occurred or was planned; remains an untested hypothesis.
- UNVERIFIED: 'A ban on Iran's oil export is unlikely to hurt the country in the short-term' — an economic forecast; no source located that adjudicates this specific 2007 short-term counterfactual.
- UNVERIFIED (CONTESTED FRAMING): the recurring premise of an active 'Iran's nuclear weapons programme'. The December 2007 US NIE judged with high confidence that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme in fall 2003, with moderate confidence that it had not restarted (https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007-12/statement-new-us-intelligence-estimate-irans-nuclear-program), while the Institute for Science and International Security disputes that assessment on archive evidence (https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/breaking-up-and-reorienting-irans-nuclear-weapons-program). Per guardrails this is marked Unverified/contested, not False.
- PARTIALLY VERIFIED, NUANCE UNRESOLVED: 'Many of the "missing" senior Al Qaeda figures are most likely languishing in Iranian jails — and not having a good time there.' Iranian detention of senior al-Qaeda figures from 2003, including Saif al-Adel under house arrest in Tehran, is documented (https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saif-al-Adel; https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/analysis_al_qaedas_i.php). However, the severity implied ('jails', 'not having a good time') is contested: FDD analysis of a surfaced photograph casts doubt on strict house arrest (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/09/02/rare-photo-surfaces-of-top-al-qaeda-leaders-inside-iran/). Characterisation therefore Unverified.
- UNVERIFIED: 'Tehran appears to be having an interest in the destabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan' — attributed intent, hedged by the authors themselves; no primary source located within this review confirming Iranian strategic intent as stated in 2007.
- UNVERIFIED: claims that Hezbollah support and logistics cells could 'morph into operations cells' on a 'very short' timeline — a capability judgement not confirmable from open sources.
- UNVERIFIED: 'the vast majority of Muslims ... are still not prone to political violence and had spurned the militant revivalist movements' — directionally consistent with mainstream polling literature but no dated survey source was located during this review to confirm the 2007 formulation.
- UNVERIFIED: the core forecast that a strike would produce Sunni–Shi'a militant accommodation. Post-2011 evidence points the other way — sectarian polarisation deepened with the rise of ISIS and regional proxy conflicts (https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/ethnic-and-cultural-studies/sunni-shia-conflict; https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2015/12/how-sunni-shia-sectarianism-is-poisoning-yemen?lang=en) — but as the antecedent condition differs from the 2007 scenario, this is scored Unverified rather than falsified.
Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄
Confidence
Medium-High (0.78) — Confidence is high for the verifiable layer of this assessment: publication metadata and author affiliations were confirmed on the publisher's own domain; the sanctions, programme-origin, organisational-age and out-of-area-attack claims were each corroborated by two or more independent sources; and the 2006 war dating error rests on two dated reputable secondary sources, satisfying the falsity guardrail. Confidence is deliberately capped below 0.85 for four reasons. First, the article contains no citations whatsoever, so the authors' own evidentiary basis is opaque and cannot be audited. Second, the bulk of the text consists of counterfactual forecasts that are structurally unfalsifiable, meaning a large share of content can only be marked Unverified rather than adjudicated — this limits how precisely a trust score can discriminate. Third, two substantive items sit in genuine expert disagreement: whether Iran had an active weapons programme after 2003 (NIE halt judgement versus ISIS dissent) and how restrictive Iranian custody of senior al-Qaeda figures actually was (Long War Journal and Britannica versus later FDD photographic analysis); in both cases the guardrails required an Unverified rather than a determinative finding. Fourth, the comparative-context layer draws on very recent and still-developing events (June 2025 and February 2026 strikes; Hezbollah's degradation), where coverage is incomplete and subject to revision, and the supplied text was a corrupted scrape with the body duplicated, which prevented in-situ reading of the canonical page and its institutional disclaimer. Score sensitivity: a corrected date and three or four inline sources would plausibly lift the trust score into the low 80s; conversely, confirmation that the nuclear-weapons premise was unsupported at the time of writing would push it toward the low 60s.
Search journal
RSIS Commentary CO07016 "What if Iran is Attacked?" Acharya Quiggin 2007
- https://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/cens/centre-resourcescens/cens-rsis-publications/commentaries-2/page/28/
- https://www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/wbna11233373
- https://web.stanford.edu/~amilani/downloads/How%20Experts%20View%20A%20Strike%20Against%20Iran%20-%2010-01-06.pdf
UN Security Council Resolution 1737 December 2006 Iran sanctions enrichment
- https://press.un.org/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm
- https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf
- https://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1737/
- https://www.inss.org.il/publication/security-council-resolution-1737-too-little-too-late/
Shah of Iran began nuclear programme 1957 Atoms for Peace Tehran research reactor 1967
- https://www.brookings.edu/articles/sixty-years-of-atoms-for-peace-and-irans-nuclear-program/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_nuclear_program_of_Iran
- https://isis-online.org/country-pages/iran
2006 Lebanon War dates 12 July 14 August 2006 33-day war
- https://www.britannica.com/event/2006-Lebanon-War
- https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/background-facts-and-figures-about-2006-israel-hezbollah-war
- https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Lebanon_War
- https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/2006_Lebanon_War
Zawahiri July 2006 video statement support Hezbollah Lebanon war al-Qaeda
- https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/al-qaeda-hezbollah-relationship
- https://www.rferl.org/a/1070232.html
- https://www.rand.org/pubs/articles/2013/al-qaeda-hezbollah-on-the-verge-of-sectarian-war-in.html
- https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/al-qaeda-in-lebanon/
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood support Hezbollah 2006 Lebanon war Mahdi Akef statement
- https://jamestown.org/brief/sunni-muslims-standing-in-unity-with-shiite-hezbollah/
- https://www.deseret.com/2006/8/29/19971047/new-hero-emerges-in-arab-world/
- https://www.globalmbwatch.com/2009/04/16/egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-leader-supports-hamas-in-hezbollah-in-...
senior al-Qaeda leaders held Iran house arrest Saif al-Adel Saad bin Laden custody
- https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/analysis_al_qaedas_i.php
- https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saif-al-Adel
- https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/09/02/rare-photo-surfaces-of-top-al-qaeda-leaders-inside-iran/
- https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/analysis-2-wanted-al-qaeda-leaders-operate-in-iran.php
Zawahiri distinction Shia Iraq traded religion for power crusaders Zionists statement
- https://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm
- https://jamestown.org/al-qaeda-the-muslim-brotherhood-united-by-strategy-divided-by-tactics/
- https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/06/zawahiri-lectures-on-global-jihad-warns-of-national-boundaries.php
Hezbollah founded 1982 al-Qaeda founded 1988 comparison establishment dates
Hezbollah out of area attacks 1992 Israeli embassy Buenos Aires 1994 AMIA global network
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Buenos_Aires_Israeli_embassy_bombing
- https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2023/12/20/us-charges-alleged-hezbollah-member-over-1994-buenos-aires-bombing
- https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4003852.pdf
- https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/diplomacy-and-international-relations/terrorists-attack-israeli-embassy-and
2007 National Intelligence Estimate Iran halted nuclear weapons program 2003 IAEA 2015 final assessment AMAD
- https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007-12/statement-new-us-intelligence-estimate-irans-nuclear-program
- https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2011-11/iaeas-iran-report-assessment-implications
- https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/breaking-up-and-reorienting-irans-nuclear-weapons-program
- https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/the-iran-national-intelligence-estimate-comprehensive-guide-wha...
June 2025 US Israel strikes Iran nuclear sites Fordow 12-day war IAEA assessment
- https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iran...
- https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10292/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_United_States_strikes_on_Iranian_nuclear_sites
Arabinda Acharya ICPVTR RSIS terrorism researcher profile
- https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-November14.pdf
- https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CTTA-June-2015.pdf
Tom Quiggin senior fellow Centre of Excellence for National Security RSIS
- https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/869-the-future-of-strategic-early/
- https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/837-time-for-a-different-approach/
Sunni Shia sectarian conflict deepened after 2011 Islamic State anti-Shia jihadism trend analysis
- https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/ethnic-and-cultural-studies/sunni-shia-conflict
- https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2015/12/how-sunni-shia-sectarianism-is-poisoning-yemen?lang=en
- https://www.stimson.org/event/the-escalating-shia-sunni-conflict-assessing-the-role-of-state-actors/
jihadist reaction June 2025 Israel US strikes Iran Sunni jihadi groups response analysis
- https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/israels-strike-against-iran-chatham-house-experts-offer-early-analysis
- https://www.justsecurity.org/114556/collection-israel-iran-conflict/
- https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF13032
Iran nuclear programme status 2026 IAEA inspections after strikes
- https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12106
- https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-and-npt-safeguards-r...
- https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/status-irans-nuclear-program-1
February 2026 US Israel strikes Iran Khamenei killed aftermath
- https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-attack-02-28-26-hnk-intl
- https://spectrumlocalnews.com/us/snplus/international/2026/02/28/israel-launches-attack-on-iran-s-capital-w...
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Ali_Khamenei
Hezbollah weakened 2025 2026 leadership Nasrallah killed disarmament Lebanon
- https://blog.prif.org/en/2026/03/06/hezbollah-is-weak-but-not-yet-defeated/
- https://www.inss.org.il/publication/one-year-nasrallah/
- https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-891286
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CO07016 | What if Iran is Attacked?
09 March 2007
[](
## Commentary
TEHRAN’S dogged stance over its nuclear weapons programme and disregard for the United Nations sanctions is inching Iran towards a potential armed confrontation with the United States and possibly with Israel. A military action to pre-empt Iran’s nuclear weapons capability is obviously fraught with a number of rather unfavourable consequences for the international community.
### Forcing a rewrite
An unintended consequence could be a virtual rewriting of much of what is currently known about transnational terrorism in general and jihadi extremism in particular. An attack on Iran is sure to galvanize the already agitated Muslim community to an unknown extent leading to new configurations and new strategies in the global jihadist movement. Given a number of strategic advantages that Iran enjoys at present in the Muslim world’s conflict with the West, the attack on Iran could transform the nature, spread and lethality of jihadi terrorism.
Additionally, there is the perceived double standard in US policy whereby Israeli and American nuclear weapons are seen as “stabilizing” in the Middle East while an Iranian nuclear weapons programme is grounds for an attack. The irony on many in the Muslim world is not lost when it is remembered that it was the American-controlled Shah of Iran who first started Iran’s nuclear programme.
### Iran holds the cards
Iran has been playing a multi-pronged game in the Muslim world’s conflict with the West. Its dealing with Al Qaeda, for example, has been less than transparent. On the one hand, Iran, primarily a Shi’a state, does not approve of, nor support Al Qaeda. Many of the “missing” senior Al Qaeda figures are most likely languishing in Iranian jails – and not having a good time there. If Iran is attacked, it is highly probable that the Iranians, having anticipated this, would use their knowledge and leverage with Al Qaeda members to retaliate. A ban on Iran’s oil export is unlikely to hurt the country in the short-term. More importantly, Tehran appears to be having an interest in the destabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan, the resilience of Hizbullah and probably Hamas, the proverbial thorns in the US Middle East policy.
### An attack on Iran could bridge the sectarian divide
So far, the jihadi extremism is sustained by a radical discourse in the Sunni strand of Islam. Traditionally the Sunni and Shi’a sects have kept themselves apart on religious issues. Nevertheless, the jihadists the world over draw strength from Islam’s revival in late 1970s led by Iran. On political issues such as Palestine there has been a broad agreement among the leaders from rival sects. Many groups have also cooperated on logistical matters despite the sectarian divide. This cooperation, albeit on the level of the discursive, was evident during Israel’s attacks on Hizbullah in August-September 2006, when groups like Al Qaeda and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood pledged support to Hizbullah. Jihadists would perceive an attack against Iran as another example of the West’s global war on Islam and would rally with support to counter it.
Despite the global spread of the idea of jihad, the vast majority of Muslims in the world are still not prone to political violence and had spurned the militant revivalist movements spearheaded by groups like Al Qaeda. But there are indications that more and more Muslims, especially in seemingly integrated societies, are now getting increasingly sensitized about global incidents such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the cartoon controversy, to name a few. All these crises are being received as part of the global conspiracy to destroy Islam. It is most likely that the Muslims on the fringe would perceive the attack on Iran as yet another attack on Islam, even if the targeted population is primarily the Shi’as. This would lead to increasing levels of support from a cross-section of the Muslim community, the sectarian divide notwithstanding.
### New alignments; new actors
There is thus the possibility that the Shi’a and the Sunni groups may find an accommodation with each other. While it remains unlikely that there will be an outpouring of brotherly love between the two sects, there is already evidence that they recognize and leverage on each other’s areas of interests and capabilities. Jihadists are adept at constructing a discourse to justify almost every operation. For example, when Al Qaeda’s number two, Ayman al- Zawahiri, was criticized for his professed support for Hizbullah during the 2006 Israeli attacks, he managed to change the rhetoric by contextually distinguishing the enemy. Al- Zawahiri drew a distinction between Shi’as fighting against the Zionists and the crusaders under the banner of groups such as Hamas and Hizbullah and the Shi’as in Iraq, who have traded their religion for power and authority. The wider Muslim community would view Iran’s resistance to Western pressures as a struggle against the Zionists and the crusaders.
Hizbullah is an older and more established organization than Al Qaeda. It has a global reach from the Middle East to Europe, North and South America and South Asia. While it has chosen to not operate “out of area” with only minor exceptions, it would have a built-in global capability to launch attacks on virtually every continent. If its support and logistics cells are required to morph into operations cells, the timeline for such a transformation could be very short. At the same time, many radical, but not necessarily violent, individuals who would not have supported Al Qaeda in the past, may now then move to pick up the struggle.
### Need for even-handedness
It is for the international community to judge Iran on the nuclear issue. However, given the evolving nature of the jihadist movement, the impact of its actions needs to be considered carefully. We do not propose to be apologists for Iran’s nuclear programme. There is no argument about the international community’s concerns about security both from traditional and non-traditional threats. But the Muslim world’s unhappiness with the failure of the US to deal with Israel in the same way that it is treating Iran now over the nuclear question should not be taken lightly.
In the context of the current predicament of the international community in the war on terror, the need for an informed and balanced decision about how to deal with issues with global ramifications, such as Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, can hardly be overemphasized.
## About the Authors
Arabinda Acharya is Manager (Strategic Projects) at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. Tom Quiggin is a Senior Fellow and Programme Coordinator for Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS.
Categories: [RSIS Commentary Series]( / [International Politics and Security](
## Commentary
TEHRAN’S dogged stance over its nuclear weapons programme and disregard for the United Nations sanctions is inching Iran towards a potential armed confrontation with the United States and possibly with Israel. A military action to pre-empt Iran’s nuclear weapons capability is obviously fraught with a number of rather unfavourable consequences for the international community.
### Forcing a rewrite
An unintended consequence could be a virtual rewriting of much of what is currently known about transnational terrorism in general and jihadi extremism in particular. An attack on Iran is sure to galvanize the already agitated Muslim community to an unknown extent leading to new configurations and new strategies in the global jihadist movement. Given a number of strategic advantages that Iran enjoys at present in the Muslim world’s conflict with the West, the attack on Iran could transform the nature, spread and lethality of jihadi terrorism.
Additionally, there is the perceived double standard in US policy whereby Israeli and American nuclear weapons are seen as “stabilizing” in the Middle East while an Iranian nuclear weapons programme is grounds for an attack. The irony on many in the Muslim world is not lost when it is remembered that it was the American-controlled Shah of Iran who first started Iran’s nuclear programme.
### Iran holds the cards
Iran has been playing a multi-pronged game in the Muslim world’s conflict with the West. Its dealing with Al Qaeda, for example, has been less than transparent. On the one hand, Iran, primarily a Shi’a state, does not approve of, nor support Al Qaeda. Many of the “missing” senior Al Qaeda figures are most likely languishing in Iranian jails – and not having a good time there. If Iran is attacked, it is highly probable that the Iranians, having anticipated this, would use their knowledge and leverage with Al Qaeda members to retaliate. A ban on Iran’s oil export is unlikely to hurt the country in the short-term. More importantly, Tehran appears to be having an interest in the destabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan, the resilience of Hizbullah and probably Hamas, the proverbial thorns in the US Middle East policy.
### An attack on Iran could bridge the sectarian divide
So far, the jihadi extremism is sustained by a radical discourse in the Sunni strand of Islam. Traditionally the Sunni and Shi’a sects have kept themselves apart on religious issues. Nevertheless, the jihadists the world over draw strength from Islam’s revival in late 1970s led by Iran. On political issues such as Palestine there has been a broad agreement among the leaders from rival sects. Many groups have also cooperated on logistical matters despite the sectarian divide. This cooperation, albeit on the level of the discursive, was evident during Israel’s attacks on Hizbullah in August-September 2006, when groups like Al Qaeda and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood pledged support to Hizbullah. Jihadists would perceive an attack against Iran as another example of the West’s global war on Islam and would rally with support to counter it.
Despite the global spread of the idea of jihad, the vast majority of Muslims in the world are still not prone to political violence and had spurned the militant revivalist movements spearheaded by groups like Al Qaeda. But there are indications that more and more Muslims, especially in seemingly integrated societies, are now getting increasingly sensitized about global incidents such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the cartoon controversy, to name a few. All these crises are being received as part of the global conspiracy to destroy Islam. It is most likely that the Muslims on the fringe would perceive the attack on Iran as yet another attack on Islam, even if the targeted population is primarily the Shi’as. This would lead to increasing levels of support from a cross-section of the Muslim community, the sectarian divide notwithstanding.
### New alignments; new actors
There is thus the possibility that the Shi’a and the Sunni groups may find an accommodation with each other. While it remains unlikely that there will be an outpouring of brotherly love between the two sects, there is already evidence that they recognize and leverage on each other’s areas of interests and capabilities. Jihadists are adept at constructing a discourse to justify almost every operation. For example, when Al Qaeda’s number two, Ayman al- Zawahiri, was criticized for his professed support for Hizbullah during the 2006 Israeli attacks, he managed to change the rhetoric by contextually distinguishing the enemy. Al- Zawahiri drew a distinction between Shi’as fighting against the Zionists and the crusaders under the banner of groups such as Hamas and Hizbullah and the Shi’as in Iraq, who have traded their religion for power and authority. The wider Muslim community would view Iran’s resistance to Western pressures as a struggle against the Zionists and the crusaders.
Hizbullah is an older and more established organization than Al Qaeda. It has a global reach from the Middle East to Europe, North and South America and South Asia. While it has chosen to not operate “out of area” with only minor exceptions, it would have a built-in global capability to launch attacks on virtually every continent. If its support and logistics cells are required to morph into operations cells, the timeline for such a transformation could be very short. At the same time, many radical, but not necessarily violent, individuals who would not have supported Al Qaeda in the past, may now then move to pick up the struggle.
### Need for even-handedness
It is for the international community to judge Iran on the nuclear issue. However, given the evolving nature of the jihadist movement, the impact of its actions needs to be considered carefully. We do not propose to be apologists for Iran’s nuclear programme. There is no argument about the international community’s concerns about security both from traditional and non-traditional threats. But the Muslim world’s unhappiness with the failure of the US to deal with Israel in the same way that it is treating Iran now over the nuclear question should not be taken lightly.
In the context of the current predicament of the international community in the war on terror, the need for an informed and balanced decision about how to deal with issues with global ramifications, such as Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, can hardly be overemphasized.
## About the Authors
Arabinda Acharya is Manager (Strategic Projects) at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. Tom Quiggin is a Senior Fellow and Programme Coordinator for Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS.
Categories: [RSIS Commentary Series]( / [International Politics and Security](