Evaluating the Prospects of Regime Change in Iran
72/100
Verdict
Mixed
Mostly Reliable Analysis — Credible Framework, but Materially Outdated and Understated on Casualty Figures
This is a think-tank commentary (RSIS/NTU, authored by Huzeir Ezekiel Dzulhisham) analysing regime-survival strategies during the Iranian protest wave that began in late December 2025.
✓ 17 checks out
✕ 6 disputed
? 10 unverified
Full analysis The complete summary ⌄
This is a think-tank commentary (RSIS/NTU, authored by Huzeir Ezekiel Dzulhisham) analysing regime-survival strategies during the Iranian protest wave that began in late December 2025. Targeted research confirms the core factual scaffolding: the protests were triggered by the rial's collapse and economic freefall (protests began in Tehran on 28 December 2025 and ran through mid-January 2026); Khamenei's January 2026 accusation that protesters were acting 'to please the president of the United States' is a near-verbatim match to reporting of his 9 January 2026 speech; Iran's UN ambassador Amir Saeid Iravani did formally accuse Washington of interfering in Iran's internal affairs (letter to the UN Security Council, 10 January 2026); the Starlink/jamming dynamic, the 8 January 2026 internet blackout, the August 2025 creation of the Defence Council chaired by President Masoud Pezeshkian, and the 1953 Operation Ajax and 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom references all check out. Two material weaknesses drive the score down. First, the casualty claim ('conservative estimates indicate more than 2000 people have been killed') is far below dated, reputable estimates: activists reported at least 6,126 killed by 27 January 2026, Iran's own government conceded 3,117, and Amnesty International described January 2026 as the deadliest repression period in decades of its research, with wider estimates ranging into the tens of thousands. Second, the piece is now substantially overtaken by events: Ali Khamenei — treated throughout as the sitting Supreme Leader — was killed on 28 February 2026 in US–Israeli strikes, after which an Interim Leadership Council (Pezeshkian, Mohseni-Eje'i, Arafi) assumed the Leader's duties. Secondary weaknesses include an imprecise account of the PMOI/MEK's alignment with Saddam Hussein (the MEK relocated to Iraq in 1986 and aided Baghdad's war effort; it did not meaningfully 'support' the 1980 invasion), an unsupported appeal to 'consensus among Iranian scholars', an unverified claim that Iran's western provinces host the majority of its military bases and missile sites, and a contestable assertion that Reza Pahlavi has 'little' support inside Iran, given survey work indicating roughly a third of respondents are strong supporters. Analytical tone is measured and low-emotion; the main bias is framing/selection (structural-resilience determinism and minimisation of repression scale) rather than rhetorical manipulation. All embedded hyperlinks were stripped from the supplied text, so the author's own sourcing could not be audited — a significant transparency limitation.
What checked out (17)
- Widespread unrest in Iran was triggered by the collapse of the rial and economic freefall: protests began in Tehran on 28 December 2025 and continued through mid-January 2026, following sharp devaluation since the June 2025 12-day conflict with Israel (Britannica, 2 January 2026; https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iranian-Protests).
- The rial's collapse is documented: it slid to a record low of more than 1.3 million to the US dollar in mid-December 2025, less than two weeks after breaching 1.2 million, raising fears of higher food prices (AP via PBS NewsHour, 15 December 2025; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/irans-currency-plummets-to-new-low-sparking-fears-of-higher-food-prices).
- Severe food-price inflation is corroborated: reported 2026 figures include roughly 112.5 per cent for food items and about 140 per cent for bread and cereals, while the IMF projects overall Iranian inflation near 69 per cent for 2026 (Zamaneh Media, 7 May 2026; https://en.radiozamaneh.com/38038/ ; RFE/RL, 26 June 2026; https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-bread-economy-poor-us-war/33788675.html).
- Water and drought stress affecting Tehran is verified: Iran faced its worst water crisis in decades in November 2025 after a fifth consecutive drought year, with Tehran at risk of a 'Day Zero' (Al Jazeera, 2 June 2026; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/2/how-the-war-has-made-irans-water-crisis-worse ; MIT Eltahir Research Group, 6 December 2025; https://eltahir.mit.edu/news/why-tehran-is-running-out-of-water/).
- The Khamenei quotation is accurate in substance and wording: on 9 January 2026 he said protesters were 'ruining their own streets ... in order to please the president of the United States' (NPR, 9 January 2026; https://www.npr.org/2026/01/09/nx-s1-5672276/protests-iran-internet-shutdown-casualties-trump-supreme-leader).
- Iran's UN ambassador accused the United States of interfering in Iran's internal affairs, condemning US 'illegal behavior' and coordination with Israel in a letter to the Security Council (PressTV via GlobalSecurity.org, 10 January 2026; https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2026/01/iran-260110-presstv06.htm ; CNN live coverage, 13 January 2026; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-protests-trump-01-13-26).
- The 1953 Operation Ajax reference is historically sound: the CIA officially acknowledged its role in the coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in August 2013, with further declassification in 2017 (GlobalSecurity.org; https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/ajax-1953.htm ; Foreign Policy, 20 June 2017; https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-later-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/).
- The 2009 Green Movement scale claim is supported at the upper bound: demonstrations were estimated at up to three million in Tehran protesting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's declared election victory (USIP Iran Primer; https://iranprimer.usip.org/index.php/blog/2011/jun/07/green-movement-past-and-future).
- Pro-regime rallies including one attended by President Masoud Pezeshkian are confirmed: state media showed Pezeshkian attending a pro-government rally in Tehran on 12 January 2026 (Al Jazeera, 12 January 2026; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/12/irans-fm-says-protests-became-bloody-to-give-trump-intervention-excuse ; CNN, 12 January 2026; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-protests-01-12-26).
- Connectivity restriction as a coercive tool is verified: a nationwide internet blackout began on 8 January 2026 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Internet_blackout_in_Iran), and Starlink service was degraded by military-grade jamming and GPS spoofing, with reported packet loss of roughly 30–80 per cent (University of Virginia School of Law, 21 January 2026; https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/202601/amid-turmoil-iran-us-company-plays-pivotal-role ; Rest of World, 20 March 2026; https://restofworld.org/2026/iran-starlink-internet-shutdown/ ; Times of Israel, 14 January 2026; https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-appears-to-jam-starlink-after-shutting-down-comms-networks/).
- US facilitation of Starlink access is corroborated: reporting attributed to the Wall Street Journal states around 6,000 terminals were moved into Iran from January 2026 in a direct US effort to restore connectivity for protesters (Jerusalem Post, 13 February 2026; https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-886555).
- Narges Mohammadi's 2021 imprisonment is accurate as stated: she was arrested on 16 November 2021 and detained, receiving further sentences thereafter (OMCT, 16 October 2022; https://www.omct.org/en/resources/statements/iran-narges-mohammadi-sentenced-to-11-years-and-nine-months-in-prison ; Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, 21 May 2026; https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/DFP/Countries/Iran/Narges-Mohammadi).
- The Defence Council claim is essentially correct on origin and chairmanship: the SNSC announced the Defence Council on 3 August 2025, chaired by President Pezeshkian and including two representatives of the Supreme Leader to the SNSC (INSS, 26 August 2025; https://www.inss.org.il/publication/snsc-changes/ ; Iran International; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508054597 ; IranWire, 4 August 2025; https://iranwire.com/en/news/143740-iran-forms-defense-council-amid-military-losses-and-leadership-reshuffle/).
- The Soleimani succession example is accurate: Esmail Qaani has commanded the Quds Force since 2020 as Qasem Soleimani's successor (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esmail_Qaani).
- The 2002 nuclear revelation attribution is broadly supported: the NCRI held an August 2002 Washington press conference disclosing the Natanz and Arak sites (Iran Watch primary document repository, December 2002; https://www.iranwatch.org/library/ncri-info-2-top-secret-nuclear-sites-12-02 ; NCRI-US retrospective; https://www.ncrius.org/ncri-us-conference-examines-tehrans-nuclear-agenda-on-the-20th-anniversary-of-natanz-revelation.html).
- The 2022 'Woman, Life, Freedom' characterisation is accurate: protests followed the death in morality-police custody of Jina Mahsa Amini, arrested over mandatory hijab rules (UN OHCHR; https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/04/justice-and-accountability-woman-life-freedom-protests).
- Pro-Pahlavi chanting during the 2026 protests is documented, including monarchist slogans on Iranian streets and rallies abroad (FDD, 27 January 2026; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/01/27/why-iranians-support-reza-pahlavi/ ; FIU News, 23 January 2026; https://news.fiu.edu/2026/the-rise-of-reza-pahlavi-iranian-opposition-leader-or-opportunist).
Disputed claims 6 claims ⌄
- MATERIALLY UNDERSTATED / SUPERSEDED: 'Conservative estimates indicate more than 2000 people have been killed.' Dated reputable sources place the toll far higher: activists counted at least 6,126 killed by 27 January 2026 while the Iranian government itself put the figure at 3,117 (NPR, 27 January 2026; https://www.npr.org/2026/01/27/nx-s1-5689793/6-126-iran-crackdown-protests-death-toll); Amnesty International documented massacres primarily on 8–9 January with the toll rising into the thousands and called January 2026 the deadliest repression period in decades of its research (https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2026/01/what-happened-at-the-protests-in-iran/); further reporting cites estimates that could surpass 30,000 (Euronews, 27 January 2026; https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/27/iran-protests-death-toll-could-surpass-more-than-30000-reports-claim). Even allowing for a mid-January writing date, the figure is an order of magnitude below contemporaneous ranges and should not be presented as the current baseline.
- DISPUTED / IMPRECISE: 'The PMOI ... supported Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980.' The MEK broke with the Islamic Republic in the early 1980s and its leadership left France for Iraq in 1986, after which it aided Saddam Hussein's war against Iran (Congressional Research Service; https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48433 ; START/University of Maryland; https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/mujahedin-e-khalq-mek.html ; CFR; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek). The alignment postdates the 1980 invasion by several years; the compressed chronology is inaccurate, even though the reputational consequence described (low domestic legitimacy) is widely reported.
- DISPUTED / CONTESTABLE: That Reza Pahlavi has 'little' support within Iran. Survey work cited in January 2026 indicates his social base was stable between 2022 and 2025, with roughly one-third of respondents strong supporters and another third strongly opposed (The Conversation, 13 January 2026; https://theconversation.com/iran-protests-2026-our-surveys-show-iranians-agree-more-on-regime-change-than-what-might-come-next-273198). Polling inside Iran is methodologically fragile, so this is 'disputed' rather than 'false'.
- DISPUTED / IMPRECISE: That the Defence Council 'is composed of military generals'. Reporting describes a body chaired by the President and including the heads of the three branches, two representatives of the Supreme Leader, the intelligence minister, the chief of the general staff and service commanders — a mixed civil-military composition (INSS, 26 August 2025; https://www.inss.org.il/publication/snsc-changes/ ; IranWire, 4 August 2025; https://iranwire.com/en/news/143740-iran-forms-defense-council-amid-military-losses-and-leadership-reshuffle/).
- SUPERSEDED BY EVENTS (not false at time of writing, but no longer accurate as presented): the article's treatment of Ali Khamenei as the sitting Supreme Leader and its assessment that decapitation is 'highly unlikely' to change Iran's political system. Khamenei was killed on 28 February 2026 in US–Israeli strikes on Tehran (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Ali_Khamenei), triggering a leadership crisis in which an Interim Leadership Council of Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i and Ayatollah Alireza Arafi temporarily assumed the Leader's duties pending selection of a successor (The Conversation, 23 June 2026; https://theconversation.com/how-does-iran-go-about-selecting-a-new-supreme-leader-and-who-is-in-the-running-277249). Notably, the article's structural-resilience thesis is partly vindicated (no immediate collapse) and partly falsified (decapitation did occur and produced a succession crisis).
- CONTEXT CORRECTION: The characterisation of the PMOI as simply 'Marxist' is contested; the organisation's origins are usually described as Islamic-Marxist and it now presents itself as a secular, pro-democracy movement, so the flat label is an oversimplification (CFR; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek).
Unverified claims 10 claims ⌄
- UNVERIFIED: The specific food-price inflation percentage ('nearly [X] per cent') cannot be checked because the figure and its hyperlink were stripped from the supplied text; independent 2026 figures range from roughly 69 per cent headline inflation to 112–140 per cent for food and bread, so the intended number is indeterminate.
- UNVERIFIED: The claim that pro-regime rallies were 'reported in seven cities'. Rallies including senior officials are confirmed in Tehran, but no dated source located specifies exactly seven cities.
- PARTLY SUPPORTED / UNVERIFIED AS STATED: That current protests are 'concentrated' in Iran's western provinces. Western and Kurdish-majority provinces (Kermanshah, Ilam, Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, Lorestan) were focal points of strikes and lethal repression (https://theconversation.com/irans-protests-have-spread-across-provinces-despite-skepticism-and-concern-among-ethnic-groups-273276), but the unrest reportedly reached more than 400 cities plus around 100 locations in Tehran, which undercuts a west-centric concentration claim (Stimson Center, 27 January 2026; https://www.stimson.org/2026/why-the-latest-iran-protests-started-in-the-tehran-bazaar/).
- UNVERIFIED AND LIKELY OVERSTATED: That the western provinces host 'the majority' of Iran's military bases and missile development sites. Open sources place known underground 'missile cities' in Kermanshah but also in Semnan, around Tehran and near the Gulf (Jerusalem Post, 4 February 2026; https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-885573). No dated source supports a majority claim.
- UNVERIFIED: That there is 'consensus among Iranian scholars' that the Artesh or the IRGC is best positioned to succeed the current regime. This is an appeal to authority with no attributed survey, poll or literature review; no supporting source was located.
- UNVERIFIED: The attribution 'conservative estimates indicate more than 2000 people have been killed' — the estimating body is unnamed and the stripped hyperlink prevents provenance checking.
- UNVERIFIED (LOW PRIORITY, HISTORICALLY PLAUSIBLE): Specific operational details of 2009 Basij night raids conducted with a well-organised network of civilian informants, and pre-emptive occupation of public spaces. These are consistent with the documented record but were not independently confirmed within this research cycle.
- UNVERIFIED: That the regime's use of 'military-grade signal jamming' is the reason 'widespread internet access has not been restored'. Jamming and spoofing are documented, but the causal monopoly implied here is contested by analyses stressing terrestrial shutdown, terminal seizures and spectrum enforcement (TechPolicy.Press, 5 February 2026; https://www.techpolicy.press/what-irans-internet-shutdown-reveals-about-starlink/).
- UNVERIFIED / ANALYTICAL FORECAST: That protests 'may lose momentum in the face of a determined regime' and that the regime will remain able to distribute power across overlapping organisations. This is prediction, not a checkable fact, and has been complicated by subsequent events.
- UNVERIFIED AS FRAMED: The comparison to 'leadership decapitation strategy like those in Venezuela and Iraq'. The referent cases are not specified, making the analogy unfalsifiable as written.
Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄
Confidence
Medium-High (0.78) — Confidence is raised by the fact that the article's highest-impact checkable claims — the Khamenei quotation, the Iravani accusation, the rial's record low, the water crisis, the internet blackout and Starlink jamming, the Defence Council's creation and chairmanship, the Soleimani-Qaani succession, and the 1953 and 2022 historical anchors — were each confirmed against dated sources, several of them primary or institutional (Amnesty, OHCHR, CRS, UK Commons Library, UN media, declassified-material repositories). Confidence is tempered by four factors: (1) all embedded hyperlinks were stripped, so the author's own evidence base and one key numeral could not be examined; (2) casualty statistics inside Iran are contested, gathered during a months-long blackout, and politically instrumentalised, so the magnitude of the understatement is itself uncertain even though its direction is not; (3) some very recent developments (February–June 2026) were corroborated partly through tertiary encyclopaedic entries pending fuller primary documentation; and (4) several of the article's most consequential propositions are forecasts or attributions of scholarly consensus that are not empirically adjudicable, and are therefore recorded as Unverified rather than scored as accurate or inaccurate.
Search journal
Iran protests 2026 Rial collapse deaths
- https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iranian-Protests
- https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2026/01/what-happened-at-the-protests-in-iran/
- https://www.npr.org/2026/01/27/nx-s1-5689793/6-126-iran-crackdown-protests-death-toll
Iran rial collapse 2025 record low inflation food prices
- https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/irans-currency-plummets-to-new-low-sparking-fears-of-higher-food-prices
- https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/06/30/irans-inflation-spiral-deepens-as-rial-slides-and-tensions-rise
- https://www.iranintl.com/en/202512280124
Khamenei statement January 2026 protesters United States president
- https://www.npr.org/2026/01/09/nx-s1-5672276/protests-iran-internet-shutdown-casualties-trump-supreme-leader
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- https://www.timesofisrael.com/khamenei-calls-trump-a-criminal-blames-him-for-protest-casualties-and-damage/
Iran Defence Council formed 2025 Pezeshkian Khamenei representatives
- https://www.inss.org.il/publication/snsc-changes/
- https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508054597
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Assassination of Ali Khamenei February 2026
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Ali_Khamenei
- https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Ali_Khamenei
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iranian_leadership_crisis
Starlink terminals Iran protests 2026 United States jamming
- https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-886555
- https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/202601/amid-turmoil-iran-us-company-plays-pivotal-role
- https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-appears-to-jam-starlink-after-shutting-down-comms-networks/
Narges Mohammadi imprisoned status 2026
- https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/DFP/Countries/Iran/Narges-Mohammadi
- https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/iran/iran-additional-prison-sentences-against-narges-mohammadi
- https://www.npr.org/2026/05/11/g-s1-121365/nobel-laureate-mohammadi-transferred-to-a-tehran-hospital
Iran UN ambassador Iravani US interfering internal affairs 2026 protests
- https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2026/01/iran-260110-presstv06.htm
- https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-protests-trump-01-13-26
- https://media.un.org/unifeed/en/asset/d354/d3540435
Tehran water crisis drought 2025 running out of water
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- https://eltahir.mit.edu/news/why-tehran-is-running-out-of-water/
- https://water.fanack.com/iran-water-crisis-economic-collapse-protests/
Iran internet shutdown protests January 2026 Starlink jamming
- https://restofworld.org/2026/iran-starlink-internet-shutdown/
- https://www.techpolicy.press/what-irans-internet-shutdown-reveals-about-starlink/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Internet_blackout_in_Iran
MEK People's Mojahedin Iran Saddam Hussein alliance 1980s Iraq relocation history
- https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48433
- https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/mujahedin-e-khalq-mek.html
- https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek
MEK 2002 revealed Natanz secret nuclear programme NCRI press conference
- https://www.iranwatch.org/library/ncri-info-2-top-secret-nuclear-sites-12-02
- https://www.ncrius.org/ncri-us-conference-examines-tehrans-nuclear-agenda-on-the-20th-anniversary-of-natanz...
- https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/201274/ncri-did-not-discover-natanz/
2009 Green Movement three million protesters Tehran mayor estimate
- https://iranprimer.usip.org/index.php/blog/2011/jun/07/green-movement-past-and-future
- http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/green-movement
- https://www.newsweek.com/whats-changed-iran-since-green-movement-presidential-election-1913321
Reza Pahlavi support inside Iran polling 2026 protesters chanting
- https://theconversation.com/iran-protests-2026-our-surveys-show-iranians-agree-more-on-regime-change-than-w...
- https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/01/27/why-iranians-support-reza-pahlavi/
- https://news.fiu.edu/2026/the-rise-of-reza-pahlavi-iranian-opposition-leader-or-opportunist
pro-government rallies Iran January 2026 cities Pezeshkian attended
- https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-protests-01-12-26
- https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/12/irans-fm-says-protests-became-bloody-to-give-trump-intervention-excuse
- https://www.stimson.org/2026/why-the-latest-iran-protests-started-in-the-tehran-bazaar/
- https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10462/
Narges Mohammadi arrested November 2021 Evin prison sentence
- https://www.omct.org/en/resources/statements/iran-narges-mohammadi-sentenced-to-11-years-and-nine-months-in-prison
- https://www.omct.org/en/resources/statements/iran-narges-mohammadi-gets-additional-eight-year-prison-sentence
- https://pen.org/individual-case/narges-mohammadi/
Iran protests January 2026 death toll 2000 killed early estimates Hengaw
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_Iran_massacres
- https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/27/iran-protests-death-toll-could-surpass-more-than-30000-reports-claim
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massacres_during_the_2025%E2%80%932026_Iranian_protests
Iran food inflation percent 2026 protests bread prices increase
- https://en.radiozamaneh.com/38038/
- https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-bread-economy-poor-us-war/33788675.html
- https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-food-crisis
Iran 2026 protests geographic spread western provinces Kurdistan Kermanshah
- https://theconversation.com/irans-protests-have-spread-across-provinces-despite-skepticism-and-concern-amon...
- https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/middle-east-news/where-does-kurdistan-stand-in-irans-recent-protests/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Kurdish_rebellion_in_Iran
Esmail Qaani Quds Force commander 2026 status
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esmail_Qaani
- https://www.gsn-online.com/news-centre/key-players/iran-esmail-qaani
- https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bkjqzyo9wg
Iran Defense Council members composition August 2025 heads of three branches IRGC commanders
- https://www.inss.org.il/publication/snsc-changes/
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- https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508054597
Iran June 2026 political situation Interim Leadership Council new supreme leader
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- https://theconversation.com/how-does-iran-go-about-selecting-a-new-supreme-leader-and-who-is-in-the-running-277249
- https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-889149
1953 Iranian coup Operation Ajax CIA Mossadegh declassified
- https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/ajax-1953.htm
- https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-later-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/
Iran missile bases locations western provinces Kermanshah underground missile cities
- https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-885573
- https://english.noonpost.com/p/rans-underground-missile-cities-how
- https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2023/iran-230702-sputnik01.htm
2022 Mahsa Amini Woman Life Freedom protests crackdown death toll hijab
- https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/04/justice-and-accountability-woman-life-freedom-protests
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- https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2025/12/09/the-toll-of-irans-women%E2%80%91led-rights-movement-a-psycholo...
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## SYNOPSIS
_Iran has faced the most severe protests since the collapse of the Iranian Rial in 2025. The main question now is what strategies will the regime use to survive?_
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Source: [Unsplash](
## COMMENTARY
In recent weeks, Iran has seen widespread unrest triggered by the collapse of the Iranian Rial currency and [nearly]( per cent inflation in food prices. There are reports of electricity and water shortages, aggravated by a longstanding [drought]( parts of Tehran, the capital city, running short of water. Conservative estimates [indicate]( more than 2000 people have been killed.
The country’s regional influence has apparently weakened and with the high possibility of another Israeli attack. The critical question now is: What strategies will the Iranian government use to survive, and who is best positioned to take over if the government falls?
### Survival Strategies
To suppress protests, the Iranian authorities usually rely on two strategies: de-legitimisation and coercion.
First, the regime characterises protestors as foreign agents, and protest movements as the work of Israel and the United States. In January 2026, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei [stated]( protestors were trying “to please the president of the US”, while Iran’s United Nations ambassador [accused]( US of “interfering in Iran’s internal affairs”.
These statements are designed to invoke the widely perpetuated [history]( Operation Ajax, the 1953 US-organised coup against democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, which led to the installation of the US-allied Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
By linking the protests to foreign interference, the strategy de-legitimises calls for regime change and hopes to obtain the support of neutral constituents and, by extension, mobilise nationalism against perceived threats to Iranian sovereignty.
During the 2009 Green Movement Protests, nearly three million Iranians [protested]( election of conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, while pro-regime [rallies]( by hundreds of thousands demonstrated against the opposition. In the current protests, pro-regime rallies have been [reported]( seven cities, including one [attended]( Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.
Second, coercive measures are key to the regime’s suppression of protests. The official depiction of protests as foreign-based existential threats limits willingness for negotiation and intensifies the degree of coercion deployed. When a protest occurs, depending on the severity, the Iranian security authorities typically [restricts]( speeds, even cutting internet access altogether, to prevent coordination among protestors and the spread of protests.
While the use of Starlink satellite internet has been made [accessible]( protestors by the US, the regime has [reportedly]( military-grade signal jamming to restrict access to Starlink, which explains why widespread internet access has not been restored.
To suppress protests, the Iranian security forces [mobilises]( special units of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces([LEF]( Units), and the Basij (Organisation for the Mobilisation of the Oppressed), a paramilitary force under the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
During the 2009 Green Movement protests, security forces used [well-documented]( to disperse protestors, and [occupied]( pre-emptively to forestall protests. The Basij conducted [night raids]( anti-regime leaders and supporters, with the help of a well-organised network of civilian informants.
Similar intimidation tactics were [used]( diffuse the 2022 Woman, Life and Freedom protests that saw thousands protesting against repressive religious laws, particularly the requirement of the headscarf for women.
The effectiveness of the two strategies helps explain why the regime has endured mass protests for decades.
### Weak Political Opposition
Regime change has not occurred in Iran because there is also no viable alternative political movement. Still, protests have taken place, mobilising thousands around popular issues such as rising costs of living and religious repression.
Widespread dissatisfaction does not automatically transform into revolutionary political movements. These require catalysts such as charismatic leadership and coercive capabilities that can directly challenge the legitimacy of government and its use of violence against citizens.
Many influential opposition Iranian leaders are either exiled or imprisoned, most notably Nobel Laureate Narges Mohammadi, jailed in 2021, while the theocratic rulers retain coercive control through the IRGC and the Basij.
Moreover, the most organised opposition groups have little legitimacy within Iran. The Marxist People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) and its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, [gained]( attention by revealing the existence of Iran’s secret nuclear programme in 2002. The PMOI [has]( domestic support within Iran, as it supported Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran in 1980.
Alternatively, there are the Monarchists who aim to restore Reza Pahlavi, son of the deposed Shah of Iran. Despite the high level of support from overseas Iranians, many of whom previously supported the late Shah, Pahlavi has reportedly [little]( within Iran.
Older Iranians remember the Pahlavi monarchy’s authoritarian rule, with its systematic repression under the SAVAK secret police. Furthermore, US and Israeli [support]( Reza Pahlavi [reinforces]( Iranian regime’s narrative of foreign powers colluding to undermine Iranian sovereignty.
While protestors in recent public demonstrations have reportedly chanted Pahlavi’s name, this has been interpreted as [attempts]( antagonise and delegitimise the current regime, and a [nostalgia]( economic stability that existed under the Shah [rather]( genuine support for the return of monarchical system.
### Structural Resilience
The decentralised political structure of the present government in Iran also allows it to absorb direct shocks. This explains why, despite the severity of Israel’s assassinations of key military and political figures, the regime did not collapse.
While the theocratic Supreme Leader of Iran holds ultimate authority, political power is institutionally separated among the Presidency and the Supreme National Security Council with clear chains of succession to ensure continuity of government.
After the so-called 12-Day War with Israel in 2025, the Iranian Defence Council was [formed]( It is composed of military generals, headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian and two representatives appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The Council was designed to ensure rapid crisis [response]( continuity of government, even in the absence of Supreme Leader Khamenei.
Thus, it is highly unlikely that a leadership decapitation strategy like those in Venezuela and Iraq could change Iran’s political system. Case in point was the 2020 US assassination of IRGC General Qasem Soleimani, which did not cripple the IRGC as Soleimani was quickly replaced by General Esmail Qaani.
### Dangerous Scenarios
While the Iranian government could theoretically endure current protests, the most dangerous scenarios involve regime fragmentation, the defection of a military general, IRGC commander or even the mass defection of disillusioned soldiers.
During the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the final straw that brought down the Pahlavi Dynasty was the [mass defection]( soldiers and generals, which crippled the Pahlavi government’s coercive capacity to suppress protests.
Indeed, there is consensus among Iranian scholars that either of Iran’s national military, the _Artesh_ or the IRGC, is best positioned to succeed the current regime due to their institutionalised control over Iran’s weapons and financial resources.
Another dangerous scenario would be if protestors managed to obtain weapons by capturing a military base. Most of the current protests are [concentrated]( Iran’s Western provinces, which incidentally also [host]( majority of Iran’s military bases and missile development sites. Possession of weapons could shift the balance of power in favour of protestors, but could potentially lead to civil war.
### What Happens Now?
Yet it must be recognised that the present Iranian theocratic republic has been highly resilient, having endured economic crises, wars, protests, and foreign attacks since 1979. While the current protests are exceptional in scale and speed, they may lose momentum in the face of a determined regime which is still able to distribute power across overlapping organisations united in the common goal of retaining control.
## About the Author
_Huzeir Ezekiel Dzulhisham is a Senior Analyst in the Dean’s Office at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore._