_The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and \_The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute\_ are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period._ _**Note**: ISW-CTP will pause publishing weekend updates starting on August 15, 2026. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however._ ## Key Takeaways 1. The United States is targeting Iran’s sanctions-evasion networks to deepen Iran’s economic isolation and strengthen international sanctions enforcement. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced Operation Economic Outcast on August 24 aimed to “foreclose every other [financial] option available to the Iranian regime.” Bessent added that US officials are engaging with their international counterparts to emphasize that every country has a defined timeline to shut down problematic activities with Iran that the US Treasury has identified. These economic steps come as the Iranian economy continues to deteriorate. 2. The Iranian regime is attempting to find routes to alleviate economic pain while simultaneously trying to deter and prepare for potential social unrest in response to compounding economic pressure. 3. Regime officials and outlets are issuing threats against foreign states, likely to deter them from complying with the US economic campaign against Iran. 4. The Iraqi federal government and some Iranian-backed militias are likely attempting to reach an agreement to integrate militia elements operating outside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into recognized PMF units. 5. The Houthis struck a Saudi oil tanker roughly 950 kilometers north of Yemen in the northern Red Sea on August 24. The strike demonstrates the Houthi ability to launch anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) further than 500km, assuming the Houthi claim is accurate. ISW-CTP has not observed any open-source reporting that confirms that the Houthis possess an ASBM with a range exceeding 500 kilometers. ## Toplines **The United States is targeting Iran’s sanctions-evasion networks to deepen Iran’s economic isolation and strengthen international sanctions enforcement.**US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced Operation Economic Outcast on August 24 aimed to “foreclose every other [financial] option available to the Iranian regime.”[1] Bessent stated that the United States will block every potential source of revenue that funds the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian regime.[2] The US Treasury Department sanctioned 60 entities, individuals, and vessels on August 24 that enable the regime to procure illicit nuclear and missile technology, conduct cyber operations, and generate oil revenue, for example.[3] Bessent stated that the regime ultimately relies on countries that continue to fund Iran despite the risk funding Iran poses.[4] Bessent emphasized that countries can no longer operate in the ambiguity surrounding Iran’s activities.[5] Bessent added that US officials, including military officials, are engaging with their international counterparts to emphasize that every country has a defined timeline to shut down problematic activities with Iran that the US Treasury has identified.[6] He warned that US Treasury officials “will do so unilaterally” if governments fail to act within these specified timeframes.[7] Bessent replied that “no one is above sanctions” in response to a question about the United States sanctioning the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for its economic ties with Iran — China imported around 90 percent of Iranian oil exports before the US blockade.[8] These economic steps come as the Iranian economy continues to deteriorate. The Iranian rial fell to a record low of 2.02 million rials to one US dollar on August 24 in anticipation of Bessent’s announcement.[9] Inflation has reached approximately 66 percent. Iranians have experienced a steep decline in their purchasing power and business prospects, according to Iranians speaking to the _New York Times_ on August 22.[10] The rial’s depreciation and the effects of the US naval blockade on the regime’s ability to generate revenue through exports, as well as the regime’s reported foreign currency shortages, likely put immense economic pressure on the domestic Iranian population, including Iranian security forces, who are on a government salary.[11] Bessent addressed Iranian soldiers in his August 24 announcement, stating that “as more of your paychecks stop or are just delayed, ask where your commanders are leading your country, to triumph or to ruin.”[12] Bessent notably compared Iranian security forces’ situation in enforcing a regime crackdown on internal dissent to the falling of the Berlin Wall “when ordinary soldiers decided to not shoot on their own people.”[13] Bessent’s plea to Iranian security forces follows his comments on August 20 that the new policy will set the conditions for ”regime collapse.”[14] **The Iranian regime is attempting to find routes to alleviate economic pain while simultaneously trying to deter and prepare for potential social unrest in response to compounding economic pressure.**The regime is seeking alternative methods to alleviate economic pressure and generate revenue amid the looming economic crisis. Iranian Central Bank Governor Abdol Nasser Hemmati and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf discussed preserving and expanding economic ties between Iran and Iraq with Iraqi government officials and economic experts in Iraq from August 16 to 19.[15] These efforts come amid reports that Iraq and other regional countries are preparing land-based transregional pipelines to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz and weaken Iran’s influence over international energy markets.[16] Iran is also attempting to establish alternative land routes to continue to export its petroleum products amid the US naval blockade.[17] Iranian officials are also attempting to reassure the Iranian public of Iran’s economic situation, likely in response to regime concerns about the potential for internal unrest. Hemmati claimed on August 24 that previous sanctions on Iran led to a decline in purchasing power but noted that “hardship is not the same as collapse.”[18] Hemmati claimed that Iran has no problem supplying foreign exchange currency to import basic goods.[19] Hemmati admitted to Iranian state TV on August 19 that Iran is facing foreign currency reserve shortages as well as heavy reconstruction costs, however.[20] A Tehran Chamber of Commerce member told an IRGC-affiliated outlet on August 24 that Iranian traders have already shifted their business from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the PRC after the UAE announced on August 18 that it would halt all trade and financial transactions with Iran.[21] ISW-CTP previously assessed that the UAE’s decision would further weaken Iran’s already deteriorating economy by restricting both its access to essential imports and its ability to repatriate export revenues and circumvent sanctions.[22] The regime’s messaging appears intended to project resilience and reassure domestic audiences. The regime is simultaneously preparing for the possibility of renewed social unrest, which is consistent with its longstanding approach to suppressing dissent rather than addressing the underlying economic grievances that drive the unrest. The regime’s brutal crackdown on the Iranian population in December 2025 and January 2026 effectively suppressed the protest movement for the time being.[23] The regime will likely employ a similar response in the event of renewed protest activity. IRGC, Basij Mohammad Rasollah Corps, and Law Enforcement Command — the regime’s key institutions responsible for protest crackdowns commanders from Tehran Province — met on August 23 and announced an upcoming internal security exercise, “Janfada” [self-sacrifice], with 313,000 personnel to “bolster security.”[24]The regime likely chose 313,000 to invoke a religious reference, as 313 holds symbolic significance in Shia Islam — 313 individuals are meant to accompany Imam Mahdi upon his return.[25] The exercise likely serves to demonstrate to the domestic population the regime’s capacity for mass mobilization within Iran. The regime seeks to project strength, control, and its latent capacity to suppress its people. Iranian exercises have traditionally served to signal capability and resolve rather than to train forces.[26] **Regime officials and outlets are issuing threats against foreign states, likely to deter them from complying with the US economic campaign against Iran.**Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei threatened on X on August 23 to designate any country that complies with US sanctions as an enemy.[27] Iranian military action would be consistent with Iran’s previous use of force against countries to drive them away from the United States.[28] An outlet affiliated with the Supreme Leader’s Office reinforced Rezaei’s threat on August 23 and warned that Iran would launch retaliatory attacks against the interests of such states.[29] The op-ed published an image of metal cages over reported Emirati fuel storage tanks, which is an implicit Iranian threat against Emirati energy infrastructure.[30] The UAE is the only Gulf country to have announced the severing of financial ties with Iran at the time of this writing.[31] **The Iraqi federal government and some Iranian-backed militias are likely attempting to reach an agreement to integrate militia elements operating outside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into recognized PMF units.** The director of an unspecified Shia Coordination Framework leader’s office leaked on August 24 that the Zaydi government and unspecified framework members had reached an agreement under which the militias would surrender their weapons to the PMF.[32] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-affiliated parliamentarian said in a media statement on August 24 that disarmament discussions between the Iraqi government and militias will focus on integrating militia fighters into the PMF.[33] The Iraqi media discussions suggest that this move would, in effect, mean that the Iranian-backed militia-controlled PMF would accept the weapons from Iranian-backed militias operating outside the state. It is not clear how exactly individual fighters would be “integrated” into the PMF, but some militias have fighters operating both inside and outside state auspices.[34] **This reported plan comes as some Shia Coordination Framework members have urged the Iraqi government to postpone the September 30 disarmament deadline, possibly to allow time for the Iraqi parliament to pass the PMF Service and Retirement Law**.[35] A framework source told Iraqi media on August 23 that the process of transferring militia weapons to PMF-controlled warehouses would only begin after US forces leave Iraq and parliament approves the PMF Service and Retirement Law.[36] Zaydi’s September 30 deadline for disarmament currently corresponds with the planned withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq.[37] An informed framework source told Iraqi media on August 23 that the framework will refer the PMF Service and Retirement draft Law to the Parliament Security and Defense Committee in the coming days.[38] The exact text of the current draft PMF Service Law is not public, but the framework source stated that the draft law guarantees PMF members’ rights and covers PMF ranks, career progression, retirement mechanisms, as well as the PMF’s “general structure.”[39] Parliamentary committees must review and approve draft laws before Parliament can convene and vote on the laws, which can take several weeks, if not months.[40] ## US and Partner Military Operations _Nothing significant to report._ ## **Iranian Strike Campaign** _Assessed Iranian War Aims:_ * _Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz_ * _Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war_ * _Restore deterrence vis-_ à _-vis the United States and its regional partners_ * _Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states_ ## US-Iran Negotiations _Nothing significant to report._ ## Iranian Domestic Affairs _See topline section._ ## Lebanon **The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has identified “significant gaps” in Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s efforts to secure pilot zones in southern Lebanon, according to Israeli military sources speaking to Saudi media on August 24.[41]**The sources added that the LAF has only conducted “partial” searches of the pilot zones and has not yet searched private property for Hezbollah weaponry.[42] Hezbollah frequently conceals its materiel in civilian homes and private property to prevent Lebanese authorities from seizing the group’s weapons and in order to deter adversaries from striking the group’s assets by placing them in civilian areas.[43] LAF sources told Saudi media in early August that the Lebanese judiciary had not authorized the LAF to search private homes and property pursuant to the government’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah.[44] ISW-CTP continues to assess that LAF efforts to disarm Hezbollah in the pilot zones in southern Lebanon will likely fail if the Lebanese government does not ensure that military forces have the will and authorities to search private property to confiscate Hezbollah materiel.[45] Limited LAF efforts to secure pilot zones come amid stalled US-mediated Israel-Lebanon negotiations. These talks have stalled in part due to disagreements between the two delegations over the location of future pilot zones and selection of a third-party country to verify the LAF’s disarmament progress.[46] The Lebanese government reportedly refused in mid-August to set a date for the next round of negotiations due to Israel’s refusal to expand the pilot zone program.[47] Lebanese ministerial sources reiterated to Lebanese media on August 23 that Israel and Lebanon have still not set a date for the next meeting.[48] ## Iraq **Iranian-backed Iraqi actors likely pressured Iraqi authorities on August 24 to release four Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) members that Iraqi security forces had arrested earlier that day.**A security source told Kurdish media that Iraqi security forces arrested PMF General Staff member Akram Abu Jaafar and three other PMF members in Baghdad City on August 24.[49] Iraqi authorities released Abu Jaafar and the other detained PMF officials to the PMF soon after their arrest, according to the PMF Media Department Director.[50] This incident comes after several Iranian-backed actors pressured the Iraqi government into surrendering an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-affiliated PMF official to the PMF hours after the Counter Terrorism Service arrested the official in early August 2026.[51] **Iraqi national security adviser to the prime minister Qassem al Araji announced on August 23 that Iraq submitted a proposal to Iran and Saudi Arabia to establish an unspecified unified security coordination council.[52]**Iran and Saudi Arabia have not responded to this proposal at the time of this writing. The details of the Iraqi proposal also remain unclear. ## Arabian Peninsula **The Houthis struck a Saudi oil tanker roughly 950 kilometers north of Yemen in the northern Red Sea on August 24.[53] The strike is part of an effort to enforce the Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia.** Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea announced on August 24 that the Houthis fired a ballistic missile at Saudi oil tanker _AMZAN_ off the coast of Yanbu, Saudi Arabia.[54] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) similarly reported that a projectile struck an oil tanker, almost certainly the _AMZAN,_ 63 nautical miles west of Yanbu on August 24.[55] The strike is part of a broader Houthi effort to incapacitate the Saudi oil industry by disrupting supply chain nodes, including oil refineries, pipelines, and tankers, across Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea and raise Saudi political and economic costs to an untenable level to compel Saudi Arabia to end its kinetic campaign against the Houthis and accede to Houthi demands.[56] The Houthis’ demands to end the conflict include that Saudi Arabia lift its blockade on Houthi ports and airports, cease all military activity in Yemen, pay the Houthis war reparations, and fund Houthi salaries.[57] The strike also demonstrates the Houthi ability to launch ASBMs further than 500km, assuming the Houthi claim is accurate. The _AMZAN_ was at least 950 kilometers north of the Saudi-Yemeni border at the time of the attack, making it the furthest confirmed Houthi attack on a Saudi vessel since the Houthis began to enforce their blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20.[58] ISW-CTP has not observed any open-source reporting that confirms that the Houthis possess an ASBM with a range exceeding 500 kilometers.[59] The Houthis could have drastically decreased the warhead weight or taken other technical measures to improve the range of their ASBM. They could also have employed a drone and not a ballistic missile. ISW-CTP cannot determine from the open source what specific steps the Houthis took to target the _AMZAN_ at this range. []( "Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea between August 21, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and August 24, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET")[]( [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] dot ir/news/86240378/ [12] [13] [14] [15] dot ir/news/86240378/; dot net/449248/ ; dot com/ar/سیاسة/خلال-استقباله-قاليباف-اميدي-ي-كد-موقف-العراق-الداعم-ل-نها-الصراعات-وحفظ-سيادة-الدول; dot com/news/247007/CBI-chief-pays-visit-to-Iraq-to-broaden-trade-cooperation; [16] ; ; [17] ; [18] dot ir/fa/news/5891581/ [19] dot ir/fa/news/5891581/ [20] dot ir/news/86240378/ [21] dot ir/N_bourbouri/1787566511934683428; [22] [23] [24] dot ir/fa/news/857247/ [25] dot ir/fa/news/857247/; [26] [27] [28] [29] dot ir/others-report?id=63478 [30] dot ir/others-report?id=63478 [31] [32] dot com/en/35620 [33] dot net/en/story/934749/iran-presses-iraq-against-disarming-armed-groups-sources-say [34] [35] dot com/ar/سیاسة/وداعا-لـ30-يلول-ا-تلاف-المالكي-يلمح-لت-جيل-موعد-نزع-سلاح-الفصا-ل ; dot net/449347/ [36] dot com/ar/سیاسة/توافق-شيعي-سلاح-الفصا-ل-لى-مخازن-الحشد-مع-قرار-قانون-الخدمة-والتقاعد [37] dot com/en/Report/Iraq-s-September-30-weapons-deadline-leaves-terms-of-disarmament-unresolved [38] dot com/ar/سیاسة/توافق-شيعي-سلاح-الفصا-ل-لى-مخازن-الحشد-مع-قرار-قانون-الخدمة-والتقاعد [39] dot com/ar/سیاسة/توافق-شيعي-سلاح-الفصا-ل-لى-مخازن-الحشد-مع-قرار-قانون-الخدمة-والتقاعد [40] dot iq/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A/ [41] dot net/2026/08/24/نزع-سلاح-حزب-الله-تحت-الاختبار-واسرائيل-ترصد-فجوات [42] dot net/2026/08/24/نزع-سلاح-حزب-الله-تحت-الاختبار-واسرائيل-ترصد-فجوات [43] ; ; dot il/en/mini-sites/israels-war-on-the-northern-front/hezbollah-weapons-in-civilian-areas ; [44] dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5302325-التحديات-الميدانية-والخروقات-الإسرائيلية-يصعبان-مهمة-الجيش [45] [46] dot com/lebanon/politics/282150/إسرائيل-تشن-غارات-عقب-إطلاق-صواريخ-من-لبنان-النهار-في-تغطية-مباشرة#google_vignette ; ; ; dot com/lebanon/337415/إعلام-عبري-تأخير-تحديد-موعد-الجولة-المقبلة-من-المفاوضات-بين-إسرائيل-ولبنان ; dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5307284-نتنياهو-يفرض-شروطه-بالنار-على-جنوب-لبنان [47] dot com/lebanon/337415/إعلام-عبري-تأخير-تحديد-موعد-الجولة-المقبلة-من-المفاوضات-بين-إسرائيل-ولبنان [48] [49] dot net/en/story/934677/senior-pmf-official-three-members-arrested-in-baghdad [50] dot net/449891/ [51] dot net/449191/ ; dot net/449222/ ; dot com/ar/أمـن/القضا-العراقي-يبر-قياديا-بالحشد-من-تهمة-اغتيال-ضابط-المخابرات-نبراس-الفيلي [52] dot tv/news/politics/573957/العراق-يقدم-مقترحاً-إلى-إيران-والسعودية-لإنشاء-مجلس-تنسيقي-موحد [53] ; [54] [55] ; [56] [57] ; ; dot ae/20260723/أنصار-الله-تحدد-شرطين-لإنهاء-التصعيد-مع-السعودية-1115450869.html [58] [59] ; ; dot org/houthi-anti-ship-ballistic-missiles/