Eight Months of Hormuz Shipping Data: A Wartime Timeline

1. [Home]( 2. [Guides]( 3. Shipping timeline By the hormuz.data-tracking.net editors · Last updated 26 October 2026 · Data through 26 October 2026 This tracker has been polling AIS positions across the Strait of Hormuz every 30 minutes since **8 March 2026**, detecting each vessel that completes a crossing between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. That gives us an unusual dataset: a continuous, independently measured record of how shipping through the world's most important oil chokepoint behaved through a war. This page walks through it month by month — including the honest caveats about what changed in our own measurement along the way. **Read this first:** every number below is an AIS-derived lower bound. Ships that transit with transponders off, or whose signals are lost to [GPS/AIS jamming]( are not counted. Month-to-month changes mix three things: real traffic shifts, reporting quality, and two marked upgrades to our own detection rules. We flag the methodology changes explicitly below. ## The monthly record | Month | Completed crossings | Detected outbound oil | ≈ per day | | | | | | | March 2026 (from Mar 8) | 158 | 23.7 M bbl | 1.0 M | | April 2026 | 406 | 37.9 M bbl | 1.3 M | | May 2026 | 409 | 41.6 M bbl | 1.3 M | | June 2026 | 714 | 101.1 M bbl | 3.4 M | | July 2026 | 793 | 151.3 M bbl | 4.9 M | | August 2026 | 648 | 90.6 M bbl | 2.9 M | | September 2026 | 639 | 41.2 M bbl | 1.4 M | | October 2026 (to Oct 26) | 590 | 29.8 M bbl | 1.1 M | This table, every figure quoted in the commentary below and the attack list further down are generated from the live database each time the page is served, exactly as the [monthly statistics]( are. The wording of the commentary is editorial. Oil volume is estimated per outbound crude/product/chemical tanker crossing as deadweight × 95% load factor × 7.33 barrels per tonne — the method is described on the [methodology page]( Full breakdowns by vessel type, flag and tanker are in the [monthly statistics archive]( ## March–May: baseline building The first three months establish the floor. Detection rules were young (March is also a partial month), and coverage of smaller traffic — dhows, tugs, service vessels — improved steadily. Detected oil flow settled around 1.3 M bbl/day over April and May: already a fraction of the ~20 M bbl/day that transited before the war, consistent with a strait operating far below its pre-war norm, with much of the remaining trade carried by vessels that do not advertise themselves on AIS. ## June–July: the detected peak June and July show the highest measured activity of the year: 714 and 793 completed crossings, with detected outbound oil peaking at 151.3 M bbl in July — about 4.9 M bbl/day, still only 24% of pre-war seaborne flow. Two caveats belong to this period. First, our fleet-data enrichment matured in late May, so more tankers carried the deadweight figures needed to count toward volume. Second, from **12 July** our upstream AIS source largely stopped serving positions in the western strait (the traffic lanes and Bandar Abbas anchorages) — raw crossing detections collapsed for two weeks until we shipped compensating detection rules on **27 July** and backfilled 194 crossings that the gap had hidden. July's total is honest, but it is a reconstruction of a badly jammed month, not clean data. ## Mid-July onward: jamming becomes the story Widespread GPS/AIS interference linked to the conflict has degraded position reporting across the strait since mid-July: vessels appear misplaced, delayed, or vanish mid-transit. Our detection compensates by inferring transits from zone transitions and anchorage behaviour rather than requiring a clean track, and the drop in _detected_ traffic from July to August partly reflects reporting quality, not only real flows. The [jamming guide]( explains the mechanics and what spoofed tracks look like. ## August onward: settling lower August recorded 648 crossings and 90.6 M bbl detected outbound (~2.9 M bbl/day), and October to date runs at 1.1 M bbl/day. Against the ~20 M bbl/day pre-war baseline that is a decline of **–93% to –94%** (the dashboard's headline comparison uses a rolling seven-day average, so it moves around the same range). Whether the true figure is quite that stark is unknowable from AIS alone — dark tankers move unknown volumes — but the direction and rough magnitude of the collapse are corroborated by the pattern across every vessel class we track. For scale, outbound LNG carriers numbered 9 in June, 5 in July, 2 in August, 12 in September and 5 in October to date. ## Latest reported attacks Attack reports from UKMTO over the last 30 days, newest first. Each is marked where it was reported on the [live map]( and the [24-hour replay]( UKMTO names no vessel, so none of these can be tied to a ship in our records. * **22 Oct 2026, 17:15 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO WARNING 181-26 ATTACK Incident Date: 22 OCT 2026 Incident Time: 1715UTC UKMTO has received a time-late report of an incident 7NM northeast of Limah, Oman. UKMTO-181 * **21 Oct 2026, 01:45 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO WARNING 179-26 - ATTACK Incident Date:21 Oct 2026 Incident Time:0145UTC Local Authorities UKMTO has received a report of an incident 11NM west of Bukha, Oman. UKMTO-179 * **21 Oct 2026, 01:45 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO WARNING 179-26 - ATTACK Incident Date:21 Oct 2026 Incident Time:0145UTC Local Authorities UKMTO has received a report of an incident 11NM west of Bukha, Oman. UKMTO-28082035 * **20 Oct 2026, 18:30 UTC** · Northern Arabian Gulf · Tanker — UKMTO WARNING 180-26 - ATTACK Incident Date:20 Oct 2026 Incident Time:1830UTC Source: Master UKMTO has received a time late report of an incident 30NM southeast of Al Faw, Iraq. UKMTO-180 * **18 Oct 2026, 01:00 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tug — UKMTO WARNING 177-26 - ATTACK Incident Date: 18 OCT 2026 Incident Time: TBC UKMTO has received a report of an incident northeast of Khor Fakkan, UAE. UKMTO-177 * **17 Oct 2026, 10:30 UTC** · Gulf of Aden · Tanker — The skiff fired two shots at the tanker whose armed Security Team fired two warning shots at the small skiff which forced them to alter course. UKMTO-176 * **16 Oct 2026, 19:22 UTC** · Persian Gulf · Tanker — The Master of a tanker has reported being attacked by an RPG from a small boat, resulting in damage to the aft port quarter. UKMTO-175 * **16 Oct 2026, 09:00 UTC** · Persian Gulf · Tanker — UKMTO has received a time-late report of an incident 68NM northeast of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia of a tanker stuck by an unknown projectile. UKMTO-174 * **14 Oct 2026, 14:21 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Cargo — A 19,000 tonne Container ship was struck by an unknown projectile whilst conducting an outbound SoH transit. UKMTO-173 * **14 Oct 2026, 14:10 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Cargo — A 50,000 tonne Container ship was struck by an unknown projectile whilst conducting an inbound SoH transit. UKMTO-172 * **13 Oct 2026, 19:04 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — A verified source has reported that a tanker was struck by an unknown projectile. UKMTO-171 * **13 Oct 2026, 18:59 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Cargo — A verified source has reported that a container ship was struck by an unknown projectile. UKMTO-170 * **12 Oct 2026, 18:53 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — A verified source has reported that a crude oil tanker has been struck by an unknown projectile whilst conducting an outbound transit. UKMTO-169 * **12 Oct 2026, 18:23 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — A verified source has reported that a Products Tanker has been struck by an unknown projectile whilst conducting an outbound transit. UKMTO-168 * **12 Oct 2026, 18:18 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Cargo — UKMTO has received a time-late report from a verified source that a container vessel was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting inbound through of the Strait of Hormuz. UKMTO-167 * **12 Oct 2026, 15:48 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO WARNING 166-26 - ATTACK Incident Date:11 Oct 2026 Incident Time:TBC Source Verified UKMTO has received a time late report of an incident in the Strait of Hormuz. UKMTO-166 * **11 Oct 2026, 20:50 UTC** · Gulf of Oman · Tanker — Update 001: UKMTO has reclassified this incident as an attack following confirmation that the tanker was struck by an Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle (UAV). UKMTO-165 * **11 Oct 2026, 20:50 UTC** · Gulf of Oman · Tanker — Update 001: UKMTO has reclassified this incident as an attack following confirmation that the tanker was struck by an Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle (UAV). UKMTO-28082036 * **11 Oct 2026, 13:02 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — The CSO reported a tanker transiting outbound had been struck on the port side by an unidentified projectile, resulting in damage to the vessel. UKMTO-164 * **10 Oct 2026, 19:20 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — The Master of an outbound tanker reports being struck on the port side by an unknown projectile, causing a fire on board. UKMTO-162 * **09 Oct 2026, 12:46 UTC** · Southern Arabian Gulf · Tanker — UKMTO has received reports from multiple sources that the vessel has been struck by an unknown projectile causing a fire which has since been extinguished. UKMTO-160 * **07 Oct 2026, 19:00 UTC** · Central Arabian Gulf · Tanker — UKMTO WARNING 158-26 - ATTACK Incident Date: 07 OCT 2026 Incident Time: 1900 UKMTO has received a report of an incident 51NM north of Madinat ash Shamal, Qatar. UKMTO-158 * **06 Oct 2026, 17:09 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO has received a time-late report from a verified source, that a crude oil tanker was struck by an unknown projectile on the 06 OCT2026, while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. UKMTO-159 * **05 Oct 2026, 22:30 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO 157-26 - ATTACK Incident Date: 05 OCT 2026 Incident Time: TBC UKMTO has received a time-late report of an incident within the Strait of Hormuz. UKMTO-157 * **05 Oct 2026, 17:56 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — The Master of a tanker reports being struck by an unknown projectile, causing a fire in the engine room of which the crew are fighting. UKMTO-156 * **04 Oct 2026, 19:07 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO 154-26 - ATTACK Incident Date: 04 OCT 2026 Incident Time: 1907UTC UKMTO has received a time-late report of an incident within the Strait of Hormuz. UKMTO-154 * **04 Oct 2026, 14:30 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO 153-26 - ATTACK Incident Date: 04 OCT 2026 Incident Time: 1716UTC UKMTO has received a time-late report of an incident within the Strait of Hormuz. UKMTO-153 * **04 Oct 2026, 07:45 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO WARNING 150-26 - ATTACK Report Date: TBC Report Time: TBC Issue Date: 04 Oct 2026 Source Master UKMTO has received a report of an incident within the Strait of Hormuz. UKMTO-150 * **03 Oct 2026, 14:00 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO 155-26 - ATTACK Incident Date: 03 OCT 2026 Incident Time: TBC UKMTO has received a time-late report of an incident within the Strait of Hormuz. UKMTO-155 * **02 Oct 2026, 23:11 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — The Master of a crude oil tanker has reported being struck by an unknown projectile on the port side. UKMTO-149 * **02 Oct 2026, 15:43 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO WARNING 148-26 - ATTACK Report Date:02 Oct 2026 Report Time:1122 UTC Issue Date:02 Oct 2026 Source Master UKMTO has received a report of an incident within the Strait of Hormuz. UKMTO-148 * **01 Oct 2026, 20:00 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — UKMTO has received a third-party report of a tanker being stuck by an unknown projectile while transiting the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in a fire. UKMTO-147 * **30 Sep 2026, 09:39 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — A verified source has reported that a Tanker has been struck by an unknown projectile. UKMTO-146 * **30 Sep 2026, 09:33 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — A verified source has reported that a tanker transiting inbound has been struck by an unknown projectile. UKMTO-145 * **30 Sep 2026, 09:28 UTC** · Strait of Hormuz · Tanker — A verified source has reported that a crude oil tanker has been struck on the port side by an unknown projectile. UKMTO-144 Source: UKMTO (ukmto.org), Crown copyright, Open Government Licence v3.0. ## What this dataset is good for * **Trend, not census:** the bias (AIS-visible traffic only) is roughly stable within any few-week window, so short-run swings are meaningful even when levels are undercounted. * **Vessel-class signals:** tanker classes respond differently to risk — the [tanker classes guide]( explains who carries what. * **Live verification:** every number here can be recomputed from the [live dashboard]( and its free JSON API.