The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The IRGC is one of the most powerful organizations in Iran, conceived as the principal defender of the 1979 revolution, and now a critical link to Islamist militant groups violently opposed to Israel and the United States. * Created after the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps answers directly to the Supreme Leader. * The IRGC supports militant groups in Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Yemen. This “axis of resistance” aims to rid the region of Western and Israeli influence. * The Corps’ reported role in brutal crackdowns on protesters in January 2026 sparked international outrage, leading the European Union and other major bodies to condemn the group and designate it a terrorist organization. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is one of the most powerful and feared organizations in Iran, playing central roles in the country’s projection of power, internal security, and economy. It has also drawn mounting scrutiny and condemnation from world powers like the United States and European Union, most recently for taking part in a bloody suppression of mass protests in early 2026. Following the 1979 revolution, Iran’s clerical leaders created the IRGC outside—and as a counterweight to—the country’s traditional armed services, which they distrusted. Today, it reports directly to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and its size and powers have expanded immensely. Among its many prominent military duties, the corps operates Iran’s formidable ballistic missile arsenal and oversees the Quds Force, an expeditionary arm that partners with Iran’s various regional affiliates, including Hamas and Hezbollah. As of 2026, Israel was still engaged in hostilities with both of these militant groups, in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, respectively. The IRGC is also highly influential in Iran’s national politics. Many corps veterans have moved on to senior government roles, including in the cabinet, parliament, and provinces. The corps has meanwhile enriched itself with billions of dollars by running illicit commercial and financial networks around international sanctions. Many regional experts expect the IRGC to play a pivotal role in selecting a successor to the aging Khamenei, which could further consolidate the group’s power and increase barriers to political reform. ## Why was the IRGC established? The IRGC was founded in the immediate aftermath of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s fall in 1979, as leftists, nationalists, and Islamists jockeyed to set the course of the revolutionary republic. While the interim prime minister controlled the government and state institutions such as the army, many clerics and disciples of Iran’s founding [supreme leader]( "supreme leader"), Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, organized counterweights to those inherited institutions. Among them was the IRGC, which operated beyond the bounds of the law and the judiciary. Answering to the supreme leader, its command structure bypasses the elected president. The guards were conceived as a “people’s army,” helping consolidate the revolution as Khomeini instituted a state based on the concept of _velayat-e faqih_, or guardianship of the jurist. The aim was to set up Iran as a constitutional republic, enveloped in a [theocratic structure]( "theocratic structure"). Khomeini intended for the IRGC to protect the new regime from a coup d’état, such as the one in 1953 that [ousted the democratically elected government]( "ousted the democratically elected government") of Mohammed Mossadeq and restored the shah to power. ## How is the IRGC organized? The Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) transformed the IRGC into more of a conventional fighting force, with a command structure similar to that of Western militaries. Now highly institutionalized, it remains a force parallel to that of Iran’s regular armed forces, with upward of 190,000 troops under its command, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). [Around half]( "Around half") of these personnel are conscripts. The IRGC’s branches include: * ground forces based across Iran’s 31 provinces and Tehran, which number more than 150,000 troops; * the Basij paramilitary force, which claims it can mobilize some six hundred thousand volunteers; * naval forces, separate from the naval branch of Iran’s regular military, which have some twenty thousand sailors and are charged with patrolling Iran’s maritime borders, including the Strait of Hormuz, through which about one-third of the world’s seaborne crude oil passes each year; * an air force of fifteen thousand personnel, also separate from a parallel branch of the regular military, which runs Iran’s ballistic missile program; and * a cyber command, which works with IRGC-affiliated businesses on military and commercial espionage, as well as propaganda distribution, according to IISS (its precise relationship with state-affiliated hackers is unclear). ## What is the IRGC’s foreign policy role? The IRGC began sponsoring nonstate armed groups in the region in the 1980s, first deploying in the Iran-Iraq War. The Quds Force emerged as the IRGC’s de facto external affairs branch, and it has developed [ties with armed groups]( "ties with armed groups") from Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Yemen, and elsewhere, providing them with training, weapons, money, and military advice to project Iran’s power abroad. Some of these groups frequently operate independently of Iran and each other, but Tehran views them as part of an anti-West “axis of resistance” under its sway. Experts say Iran has attempted to strengthen cooperation within this alliance in recent years. By fostering these groups, Tehran has sought to export its revolution and deter aggression from Western countries and its [perennial enemy Israel]( "perennial enemy Israel"). The Lebanese movement [Hezbollah]( "Hezbollah"), for example, shares Iran’s hostility toward the United States and Israel, which occupied southern Lebanon when the group was founded. The 1983 bombings of the U.S. embassy and the U.S. Marine Corps and French paratrooper barracks in Beirut, as well as the assassinations of various regime opponents, have been attributed to Iran and its proxies, namely, Hezbollah. Additionally, Western and Middle Eastern intelligence officials have tied the IRGC to the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, though Tehran says it wasn’t involved. The IRGC’s involvement in Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003 became a particular source of contention between Tehran and Washington. In 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush [accused the Quds Force]( "accused the Quds Force") of providing Shiite Muslim militants with roadside bombs to kill American forces, though experts inside and outside the U.S. government questioned whether such orders came from Tehran directly. The Donald Trump administration [blamed the IRGC]( "blamed the IRGC") for the killings of 608 U.S. troops in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. Following the 2011 regionwide uprisings commonly known as the Arab Spring, the Quds Force deployed to Syria. Iran initially claimed the operatives were carrying out a limited mission defending Shiite shrines but later acknowledged that the force was helping Syrian President Bashar al-Assad suppress unrest among the Sunni majority population. As the discontent [turned to civil war]( "turned to civil war"), the Quds Force served not just as military advisors, but also on the front lines, fighting alongside Syrian regime forces, Lebanese Hezbollah militants, and Afghan refugees serving in IRGC proxy militias. Meanwhile, after the Arab uprisings similarly sparked a [civil war in Yemen]( "civil war in Yemen"), the IRGC channeled intelligence support, training, and weapons to Yemen’s Houthis to help the rebel movement against the combined forces of the country’s government and Iran’s rival Saudi Arabia. Iranian officials expanded the Quds Force’s presence in both Iraq and Syria in response to the rise of the Islamic State group. They warned that if the Sunni Muslim militant organization wasn’t defeated there, it would march on Tehran. In Iraq, popular mobilizations of tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen soon eclipsed the national army. Many of these militias pledged loyalty to Iran’s supreme leader and were led by commanders who [worked with the Quds Force]( "worked with the Quds Force") against the U.S. occupation in the prior decade. The official who led the mobilization, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, held both Iraqi and Iranian citizenship and had served as a Quds Force officer. The mobilization provided the ground forces that rolled back the Islamic State; the United States provided air power, effectively making the guards and U.S. forces tacit partners. That alliance proved short lived—with the Islamic State largely defeated by 2019, U.S.-Iran hostilities resumed. The following January, a U.S. drone strike killed Muhandis and powerful Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, who had cultivated Iran’s many partnerships with regional armed groups. Washington sought to stifle the guards’ influence in Iraq, which had [come to rely on Iran]( "come to rely on Iran") for security, energy, and trade. Iran and its allies vowed revenge, and Tehran-backed groups ramped up attacks on U.S. coalition forces in Iraq and Syria, with one rocket attack [wounding dozens of personnel]( "wounding dozens of personnel") in 2021. The ties between the IRGC and its regional network have been increasingly apparent since October 2023, when Hamas perpetrated the deadliest attack on Israel in its history. The incursion immediately raised questions about whether Iran was involved, some of which [remain unresolved]( "remain unresolved"). Supreme Leader Khamenei said publicly that Iran had no role in the October 7 attack, but some experts say that Tehran was [likely aware]( "likely aware") of an impending offensive, and that it had helped facilitate it through its decades of support for the Palestinian fighters. In the ensuing Israel-Hamas conflict, the IRGC has provided arms and other assistance to help its partners in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen attack Israeli targets in solidarity with Hamas. Iran and Israel exchanged a series of strikes throughout 2024, marking Tehran’s first direct attack on Israeli territory. Iran cited retaliation for allegations that Israel bombed Iran’s embassy in Syria and for assassinating IRGC, Hamas, and Hezbollah leaders that year. This escalation raised fears that the conflict in the region would boil over further, but Israel and its allies were largely able to neutralize Iran’s attacks. The Biden administration charged three men in early November as part of an alleged IRGC [plot to kill a U.S. journalist]( and critic of the Khamenei regime in New York. One of the defendants is also believed to have been tasked by the corps to assassinate Trump. Israel’s most recent strikes on Iran, in June 2025, were intended to destroy the “heart of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program,” Israeli Prime Minister [Benjamin Netanyahu said]( Major General Hossein Salami, head of the IRGC, was the [most senior]( military leader killed in the strikes, which also took out several other military commanders and nuclear scientists. These strikes escalated tensions between the two regional powers, with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi [calling them]( a “declaration of war.” However, the conflict has not significantly escalated since then. Meanwhile, there have been [reports]( of satellite imagery showing Iran already rebuilding its damaged nuclear sites. ## What is the IRGC’s domestic role? The IRGC has also become a central player in Iran’s domestic politics, evolving into what CFR’s Ray Takeyh has called [the most important organization]( "the most important organization") in the country. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—who led the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War—has appointed former IRGC commanders to top political posts, and [former guards in parliament]( "former guards in parliament") tend to advocate a hard-line foreign policy, as well as support for developing a civilian nuclear program. Because the IRGC marches in lockstep with the supreme leader’s policy positions, its powers at times seem to outshine that of Iran’s president, who does not control any of the armed forces and has relatively few powers of his own. (Only men have been president, and whether Iranian law requires this is unclear.) Although the president has sway over domestic policy—he controls the national budget, for example—his influence over foreign policy is limited. The organization’s influence is still superseded by that of Khamenei, with whom the IRGC shares a mutually beneficial relationship, experts say. “Since Khamenei became supreme leader in 1989, five Iranian presidents (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi) have come and gone, but none has brought meaningful or lasting change to Iran’s power structure—or its internal or external conduct,” [wrote Karim Sadjadpour]( "wrote Karim Sadjadpour"), an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in July 2024. “Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard—which he commands—have grown more powerful over the decades and dominate the country’s byzantine political institutions, as well as the judiciary, media and surveillance state. Social repression and endemic governmental corruption, mismanagement and incompetence have remained constant, regardless of who is president.“ In 2007, the Basij was brought under the direct command of the IRGC, a reorganization some analysts attributed to a renewed focus on perceived internal threats to the regime. In June 2009, the IRGC allegedly helped fix the presidential election in Ahmadinejad’s favor. Amid subsequent mass demonstrations alleging fraud, human rights groups documented the Basij [attacking protesters]( "attacking protesters"). Thousands were detained, and many reformist politicians and activists imprisoned. Experts say the IRGC’s heavy hand in politics and its continued willingness to harm Iranians make it unpopular among the public. The organization took a hit to its reputation after it mistakenly shot down a passenger plane flying over Iran’s air space in January 2020, killing all 176 people on board. Most of them were Iranians. In addition, the Basij and broader IRGC have been [accused of beating]( shooting, [sexually assaulting]( and [torturing Iranians]( participating in the “Women, Life, Freedom” antigovernment protest movement that erupted in Iran in late 2022. The surprise election of Masoud Pezeshkian as president in August 2024, following Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash, seemed to offer Iran’s reformists a glimmer of hope. But antigovernment protests broke out again at the end of 2025, and quickly ballooned into nationwide demonstrations that grew violent by January 2026. The IRGC and Iranian regime met these protesters with extreme force, with even Khamenei publicly [announcing]( that the clashes had killed “thousands of people.” The violence in Iran has drawn condemnation from global onlookers; the European Union is the latest to list the IRGC as a terrorist organization as a result of the guards’ role in the crackdowns. ## How deeply is the IRGC involved in Iran’s economy? Among the political interests the guards defend is an economic empire: according to a [2020 report]( "2020 report") from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “the IRGC has become the most powerful controller of all important economic sectors across Iran.” The IRGC first [became an economic player]( "became an economic player") [PDF] when it was charged with rebuilding infrastructure destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War, and the corps has since expanded into many other industries, including banking, shipping, manufacturing, and consumer imports. Political clout secures IRGC-affiliated companies no-bid contracts from the state to service the oil sector and develop infrastructure. These economic activities enrich IRGC officials and fund its activities, such as weapons acquisition, covert operations abroad, and Iran’s nuclear program. They also support veterans and the families of killed IRGC members. Public works projects developing Iran’s rural regions build the IRGC goodwill it lacks in urban areas and provide work for Basij volunteers. When floods devastated rural areas in western Iran in April 2019, volunteer guards took a [leading role]( "leading role") in relief efforts. In Syria, the IRGC has spearheaded [Iranian reconstruction projects]( "Iranian reconstruction projects"). The IRGC also participates in massive black markets. Some analysts say that the spate of U.S. sanctions has [benefited the IRGC]( "benefited the IRGC") at the expense of Iran’s public and broader economy; as Iranian businesses have been cut off from licit finance and trade, the IRGC has had greater black-market opportunities. With the U.S. reimposition of oil sanctions lifted under the 2015 [Iran nuclear agreement]( "Iran nuclear agreement"), the IRGC has smuggled oil, mostly to China, and [generated millions of dollars]( "generated millions of dollars") for the Quds Force and Hezbollah. ## Recommended Resources