Iran Update, September 1, 2026

86~~/100~~

Verdict High Trust Largely Reliable — High Trust (institutional open-source analysis; minor sourcing gaps and two date/figure discrepancies)

✓ 17 checks out ✕ 2 disputed ? 4 unverified

☰ Full analysis The complete summary ⌄

The submitted text is a near-verbatim reproduction of the Institute for the Study of War / AEI Critical Threats Project 'Iran Update, September 1, 2026' (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-1-2026), published amid the ongoing 2026 Iran war. Targeted research confirms the great majority of the article's hard, checkable factual claims through independent reputable outlets: the 1 September 2026 CENTCOM strikes on IRGC radar, air-defence, naval and mine-laying assets (CNBC, Fox News, investinglive); the subsequent Iranian retaliation against US and allied bases (Fox News live file, Jerusalem Post); the IRGC spokesperson's explicit threat regarding Bahrain and Kuwait (ABC News live file, Jerusalem Post, naming Ebrahim Zolfaghari); the 31 August strikes on two Saudi-crude supertankers including the Sinokor-operated 'Senegal Prosperity' (Reuters via Al-Monitor/AJOT, Bloomberg Law, MarineLink); the 30 August CENTCOM strike on two IRGC rocket launchers on Larak Island (The Hill, CNN, Wikipedia); the 31 August–1 September SCO summit in Bishkek with Pezeshkian, Putin, Xi and Modi in attendance (Al Jazeera, Oman Observer, StratNews Global, Wikipedia); Iran's 2023 accession as the SCO's ninth member; China's >90% share of Iranian crude exports (Visual Capitalist, Britannica, GTR); the 15-year sentence for Kataib Hezbollah member Amir Rahim Jabbar Lazem over the kidnapping of US journalist Shelly Kittleson and the parallel sentencing of two men over embassy rocket attacks (The National, Arab News, Jerusalem Post, The Media Line); the 7 March 2026 rocket attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad (AFP/Institut Kurde, Al Jazeera); the July 2026 US-Saudi strikes on PMF targets (CNN, Al Jazeera, Jerusalem Post); and Ali al-Zaidi's incumbency as Iraqi prime minister since 14 May 2026. Two items resist confirmation: the attribution to Axios (28 August) that US escorting has 'restored shipping to half of pre-war levels', which sits in tension with USNI News (28 August) and Al Jazeera (27 August) reporting that Hormuz transits remain far below pre-war levels; and the 1 September Iraqi-media claim that Asaib Ahl al Haq seeks to appoint the PMC chairman, which is single-sourced. The piece is analytically framed, explicitly labels its assessments, and hedges appropriately ('may have', 'likely', 'suggests'), but it is a partisan-adjacent think-tank product (AEI/ISW) with a consistent pro-US, anti-Iranian-regime analytical lens, and the reproduction here has been stripped of all 34 hyperlinked citations, which materially reduces reader verifiability.

What checked out (17)

On 1 September 2026 CENTCOM struck IRGC targets in Iran including radar, air-defence, naval and mine-laying sites, following attacks on commercial shipping and US forces — confirmed by CNBC (1 Sep 2026, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/01/us-strikes-iran-after-new-hormuz-strait-shipping-attacks-centcom.html) and investinglive summarising the CENTCOM statement (https://investinglive.com/commodities/centcom-confirms-hits-iranian-air-defence-and-naval-sites-after-hormuz-mine-attempt/).
Iran retaliated against US and allied bases/assets in the region on 1 September 2026 — confirmed by Fox News live coverage (1 Sep 2026, https://www.foxnews.com/live-news/us-iran-war-news-trump-leader-latest-today-september-1) and The Jerusalem Post (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-907279).
President Trump spoke to Fox News on 1 September 2026 about the strikes on Iran, warning of severe consequences for Iranian retaliation — confirmed by Fox News (https://www.foxnews.com/live-news/us-iran-war-news-trump-leader-latest-today-september-1 and https://www.foxnews.com/video/6404454883112).
An IRGC/Iranian military spokesperson threatened Bahrain and Kuwait on 1 September 2026, stating Iran would 'no longer exercise restraint' — confirmed by ABC News live file (https://abcnews.com/International/live-updates/iran-live-updates-centcom-targeted-iranian-forces-posed/?id=136080582) and The Jerusalem Post, which names spokesperson Ebrahim Zolfaghari (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-907279).
Two supertankers carrying Saudi crude were struck by projectiles minutes apart while transiting outbound through the Strait of Hormuz late on 31 August 2026; the Sinokor-operated VLCC 'Senegal Prosperity' was hit by three projectiles and the Bahri-operated 'Sidr' was also struck — confirmed by Reuters (via Al-Monitor, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/two-tankers-carrying-saudi-oil-attacked-strait-hormuz, and AJOT, https://www.ajot.com/news/two-tankers-carrying-saudi-oil-attacked-in-strait-of-hormuz), Bloomberg Law citing Marisks (https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/two-oil-supertankers-hit-by-projectiles-in-hormuz-marisks-says) and MarineLink (https://www.marinelink.com/news/saudi-oil-tankers-attacked-strait-hormuz-542608).
CENTCOM struck two IRGC rocket launchers on Larak Island on 30 August 2026 after observing preparations to lay mines in the Strait of Hormuz — confirmed by The Hill (https://thehill.com/policy/defense/6060116-us-strikes-iranian-rocket-launchers/), CNN (https://edition.cnn.com/2026/08/30/politics/us-iran-strikes-larak-island) and Wikipedia's event entry (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Larak_Island_attack).
ISW-CTP published an assessment on 31 August 2026 that Iranian forces are operating under constraints and using suboptimal methods (rocket launchers to lay mines, fast attack craft for visual detection) — confirmed against the primary ISW-CTP text (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-31-20266-6a9622f2e0757).
The SCO summit was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on 31 August–1 September 2026, chaired by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, with Iran among the ten member states — confirmed by Wikipedia's summit entry (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Bishkek_SCO_summit) and Al Jazeera (31 Aug 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/31/xi-modi-and-putin-set-to-meet-for-sco-summit-whats-on-the-agenda).
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended the Bishkek summit alongside Putin, Xi and Modi, and held bilateral engagements — confirmed by Oman Observer (https://www.omanobserver.om/article/1195408/world/asia/putin-xi-and-pezeshkian-attend-kyrgyzstan-summit), StratNews Global on the Modi–Pezeshkian meeting (https://stratnewsglobal.com/iran/modi-meets-pezeshkian-putin-in-bishkek/) and The Express Tribune (https://tribune.com.pk/story/2626819/shehbaz-meets-putin-pezeshkian-in-bishkek).
Iran joined the SCO as its ninth member in 2023 — confirmed by The Daily Star (4 Jul 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/world/news/iran-becomes-9th-member-sco-3360846), Anadolu Agency (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/iran-becomes-full-member-of-shanghai-cooperation-organization/2936909) and FDD (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/07/06/iran-becomes-full-member-of-shanghai-cooperation-organization/).
The PRC accounts for roughly 90 percent of Iran's oil exports — confirmed by Visual Capitalist (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/china-dominates-iran-oil-exports/), Britannica citing early-2026 data (https://www.britannica.com/question/Who-buys-oil-from-Iran) and Global Trade Review (25 Mar 2026, https://www.gtreview.com/news/global/china-still-buying-90-of-iranian-oil-despite-us-sanctions-waiver/).
American journalist Shelly Kittleson was kidnapped in Baghdad in March 2026 by Kataib Hezbollah and released on 7 April 2026 in exchange for imprisoned KH members — confirmed by CNN (https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/31/politics/shelly-kittleson-us-journalist-kidnapped-iraq), The Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/04/06/journalist-kidnapped-iraq-kittleson-kataib-hezbollah/), PBS NewsHour (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/kidnapped-american-journalist-shelly-kittleson-has-been-released-iraqi-official-says) and Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kidnapping_of_Shelly_Kittleson).
Iraq's Central Criminal Court sentenced Kataib Hezbollah member Amir Rahim Jabbar Lazem to 15 years over the Kittleson kidnapping, and two further men received 15-year terms over rocket attacks on US diplomatic premises — confirmed by The National (https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/08/31/iraqi-court-sentences-militiaman-to-15-years-over-kidnapping-of-us-journalist-shelly-kittleson/), Arab News (https://www.arabnews.com/media/iraq-sentences-kidnapper-of-us-journalist-to-15-years-in-prison-2656462), The Jerusalem Post (http://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-907179) and The Media Line (https://themedialine.org/headlines/iraq-sentences-iran-backed-militia-member-to-15-years-in-prison-for-kidnapping-us-journalist/).
Rockets were fired at the US Embassy in Baghdad on 7 March 2026 — confirmed by AFP via Institut Kurde (https://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/latest/rocket-attack-intercepted-over-us-embassy-in-baghdad-security-sources-14815/) and Al Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/7/us-embassy-in-baghdad-attacked-as-us-israel-war-on-iran-escalates).
Joint US-Saudi strikes were conducted against Iran-aligned PMF targets in Iraq in late July 2026, prompting Iraqi government condemnation — confirmed by CNN (28 Jul 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/28/world/live-news/iran-trump-news), Al Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/29/iraq-calls-saudi-us-attacks-flagrant-violation-of-sovereignty) and The Jerusalem Post (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-904052).
Ali al-Zaidi is the incumbent Iraqi prime minister, in office since 14 May 2026, succeeding Mohammed Shia al-Sudani — confirmed by Wikipedia's office and biography entries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Iraq, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_al-Zaidi) and contemporaneous commentary (https://thearabweekly.com/choice-ali-zaidi-iraqs-next-premier).
Asaib Ahl al Haq and allied actors have publicly sought PMC Chairman Faleh al-Fayyadh's removal, a campaign predating 2026 — confirmed by The Washington Institute's Militia Spotlight analyses (https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/qais-al-khazali-calls-faleh-al-fayyads-removal-pmf-chairman, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/asaib-ahl-al-haq-accuses-faleh-al-fayyad-turkish-collusion) and ISW-CTP's 4 August 2026 special report (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-august-4-2026).

✕ Disputed claims 2 claims ⌄

DISPUTED (not adjudicated False): 'US forces have been escorting vessels out of the Persian Gulf through this route, which has restored shipping to half of pre-war levels, according to US officials speaking to Axios on August 28.' Two dated, reputable secondary sources sit in tension with a 'half of pre-war levels' characterisation: USNI News (28 Aug 2026) reported Hormuz transits rose more than 30 percent week-on-week but remained below pre-war levels (https://news.usni.org/2026/08/28/strait-of-hormuz-tanker-transits-up-but-still-below-pre-war-levels), and Al Jazeera (27 Aug 2026) reported an almost 95 percent decrease from pre-war traffic for 15 July–23 August (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/27/how-a-95-percent-drop-in-hormuz-traffic-changed-global-shipping). Axios reporting on escorted southern-corridor transits does exist (e.g. Barak Ravid, ~40 tankers in one night, 22 Aug, relayed at https://www.iranintl.com/en/202608223071), so the discrepancy may be one of denominator — escorted southern-corridor tanker volumes versus total strait transits — rather than fabrication. Per the guardrail, this is marked Disputed pending sight of the original Axios item, not False.
MINOR DATE DISCREPANCY (not False): The article dates Lazem's sentencing to 30 August and the two embassy-attack sentences to 31 August. Arab News and The Media Line date the Lazem sentencing announcement to Monday 31 August, and The National (31 August) reports both sentencings together. This is plausibly a reporting-lag versus ruling-date distinction rather than an error; insufficient evidence to adjudicate False.

? Unverified claims 4 claims ⌄

UNVERIFIED: That a separate, third attack occurred on 30 August 2026 in which 'an unknown projectile struck an oil tanker'. Independent reporting (Reuters, Bloomberg Law/Marisks, GlobalSecurity Day 186 log) places both confirmed supertanker strikes — Sidr and Senegal Prosperity — within minutes of each other late on 31 August. A distinct 30 August tanker incident could not be located in open sources; the article's arithmetic of 'three attacks on August 30 and 31' therefore rests on an unconfirmed third data point. Limitation: maritime incident reporting is fragmented across UKMTO advisories and paywalled trade intelligence (Marisks, Ambrey, Kpler) not fully indexed.
UNVERIFIED: That 'Asaib Ahl al Haq seeks to appoint the Popular Mobilization Commission chairman, according to a senior framework leader who spoke to Iraqi media on September 1'. The underlying source is an anonymous Coordination Framework figure quoted in a local Iraqi outlet (footnote 31, URL stripped); no independent corroboration was located. The broader AAH–Fayyadh feud is well documented, but this specific 1 September attribution is single-sourced and anonymous. ISW-CTP itself flags uncertainty ('It is unclear, however, whether Asaib Ahl al Haq's accusations are accurate').
UNVERIFIED: That 'informed sources told anti-regime media on August 26' that the US port blockade, Ukrainian strikes on Russian refining infrastructure and Caspian route disruptions have restricted Iran's gasoline imports. The US naval blockade and Iran's fuel crisis are independently attested (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_naval_blockade_of_Iran; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-27-2026), but the specific 26 August anonymous-source causal chain could not be traced to an identifiable outlet because the citation URL was removed from this reproduction.
UNVERIFIED (reproduction integrity): The submitted text carries no working hyperlinks — all 34 endnotes are blank or partially obfuscated ('dot uk', 'dot ir', 'dot net'). Readers of this version cannot verify any sourcing chain, and the byline/author list of the original ISW-CTP update is absent.

⌕ Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄

Confidence

High (0.84) — Confidence is high because the article's identity was positively established against the publisher's own live page, and 13 of 17 prioritised claims were independently corroborated by dated, reputable, mutually independent sources — including wire copy (Reuters), major broadcasters (CNBC, CNN, Fox, ABC), specialist maritime and defence outlets (Bloomberg Law/Marisks, MarineLink, USNI News, The Hill) and regional press (Arab News, The National, Al Jazeera, Jerusalem Post). Confidence is held below 0.90 for four reasons: (1) all embedded citations were stripped from the submitted reproduction, preventing inspection of the article's own evidentiary chain; (2) one quantitative claim ('half of pre-war levels') could not be reconciled with two dated reputable sources and its originating Axios item was not located; (3) two claims rest on anonymous single sourcing that is structurally unverifiable from open sources; and (4) the events are under 48 hours old, so details — particularly of the 1 September Iranian retaliation, which the article itself defers to a later instalment — remain subject to revision. Per the guardrails, none of these gaps was converted into a 'False' adjudication.

Search journal

ISW Iran Update Critical Threats Project

criticalthreats.org Iran Update September 1 2026

CENTCOM strike Iranian radars September 1 2026 Strait of Hormuz

Senegal Prosperity tanker attack Strait of Hormuz

SCO summit 2026 Bishkek Pezeshkian Putin Xi Modi

Shelly Kittleson journalist kidnapped Baghdad Kataib Hezbollah

Iraqi Central Criminal Court Kataib Hezbollah 15 years sentence kidnapping American journalist

Asaib Ahl al Haq Popular Mobilization Commission chairman Faleh al Fayyadh removal 2026

Iraq Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi 2026

Trump Fox News Iran radars rebuilding strikes September 1 2026

IRGC spokesperson threatens Bahrain Kuwait September 2026

Iran retaliation strikes US bases Gulf September 1 2026 Al Udeid Bahrain Kuwait

Axios US Navy escort convoys Persian Gulf shipping half pre-war levels August 2026

Axios Iran Hormuz escort shipping "half" prewar levels US officials

China share of Iran oil exports 90 percent 2026

US Saudi strikes PMF targets Iraq July 2026 Kataib Hezbollah

rocket attack US Embassy Baghdad March 7 2026

Pezeshkian meets Putin Xi Modi Bishkek bilateral September 1 2026

CENTCOM strike Larak Island rocket launchers mines August 30 2026

oil tanker struck unknown projectile August 30 2026 Strait of Hormuz Gulf of Oman

Strait of Hormuz shipping traffic pre-war levels August 2026 USNI Al Jazeera

Iran becomes 9th member Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2023

Article metrics

Emotion 11% · Reading grade 15.2 · 1651 words

≡ The article we checked Full text as retrieved ⌄

_The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran. Most updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas Monday updates also include events from the preceding weekend, collected after ISW-CTP’s 2:00 PM ET Friday data cutoff. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however._

## Key Takeaways

1.   Iran struck US and allied bases and assets in the region on September 1 in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian military targets, including radars, on the same day. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) strikes appeared to focus on assets that Iran uses to sense ships to strike.
2.   US strikes on radars will likely impose operational constraints on Iranian forces attempting to disrupt shipping in the strait. ISW-CTP previously assessed on August 31 that Iran was facing operational constraints on its ability to disrupt shipping in the strait.
3.   The Iranian attacks on August 30 and 31 indicate that Iran has some capacity to disrupt shipping through the southern route to exit the Strait of Hormuz. The three Iranian attacks on August 30 and 31 do not necessarily imply that Iran faces no constraints, only that it overcame them in those three instances. ISW-CTP will continue to monitor the rate of strikes and the tactical choices involved in each strike to evaluate whether Iran is facing tactical constraints as it attempts to disrupt shipping.
4.   Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian may have sought military and economic aid for Iran during meetings with world leaders at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 31 and September 1.

## Toplines

**Iran struck US and allied bases and assets in the region on September 1 in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian military targets, including radars, on the same day.[1]**These radars could have been used to sense and then strike oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said that the September 1 strikes against the radars “followed” Iranian attacks on three oil tankers and US forces and bases in the region.[2] ISW-CTP will provide further details on Iran’s September 1 retaliatory attacks on September 2. Senior Iranian military commanders threatened a military response on September 1 before the attacks, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spokesperson specifically threatening Bahrain and Kuwait.[3]

The CENTCOM strikes appeared to focus on assets that Iran uses to sense ships to strike. US President Donald Trump told Fox News on September 1 that US forces struck an unspecified number of Iranian radars that Iran was attempting to rebuild.[4] Iran uses these radars to detect vessels transiting the strait.[5] CENTCOM noted that this followed the IRGC’s “attempted attacks” on commercial shipping in the strait, thus explicitly linking the attacks on shipping and the strikes.[6]

The Iranian attacks on August 30 and 31 indicate that Iran has some capacity to disrupt shipping through the southern route to exit the Strait of Hormuz. Multiple maritime intelligence and observer organizations reported that an unknown projectile struck an oil tanker and that three projectiles hit a very large crude carrier (VLCC), the _Senegal Prosperity_, on August 30 and 31, respectively.[7] Another shipping intelligence firm told Reuters that Iran hit a second VLCC at the same time it hit _Senegal Prosperity_ on August 31.[8] Iranian regime media reported that this second vessel was using the southern route through the strait.[9] These attacks demonstrate that Iran retains some capacity to use its higher-end systems to target shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has been attacking vessels that use this route because it is an alternative route to the Iranian-controlled route in the northern part of the strait, undermining Iran’s perceived control over the strait.[10] US forces have been escorting vessels out of the Persian Gulf through this route, which has restored shipping to half of pre-war levels, according to US officials speaking to Axios on August 28.[11]

[]( "US Strikes in Southern Iran between August 31, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and September 1, 2026 at 3:00 PM ET")[](

US strikes on radars will likely impose operational constraints on Iranian forces attempting to disrupt shipping in the strait. ISW-CTP previously assessed on August 31 that Iran was facing operational constraints on its ability to disrupt shipping in the strait.[12] Iran is having to adapt its operations to re-establish and re-cultivate international perceptions of Iranian control over the strait.[13] A risk advisory firm director noted on August 31 that the IRGC has been using fast attack craft (FAC) to help detect vessels going through the strait by visual recognition, for example, which is an extremely suboptimal method to find, fix, and finish a target at sea compared to radars and other purpose-built sensors.[14] That Iran must resort to these suboptimal techniques suggests that it is facing constraints.[15] CENTCOM’s August 30 strikes on mine-launching systems suggest that the IRGC Navy is increasingly relying on rocket launchers to deploy mines in the strait, which is also suboptimal compared to laying mines from a vessel.[16] The three attacks on August 30 and 31 do not necessarily imply that Iran faces no constraints, only that it overcame them in those three instances. ISW-CTP will continue to monitor the rate of strikes and the tactical choices involved in each strike to evaluate whether Iran is facing tactical constraints as it attempts to disrupt shipping.

## US and Partner Military Operations

_See topline section._

## **Iranian Strike Campaign**

_Assessed Iranian War Aims:_

*   _Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz_
*   _Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war_
*   _Restore deterrence vis-_ à _-vis the United States and its regional partners_
*   _Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states_

_See topline section._

## US-Iran Negotiations

_Nothing significant to report._

## Iranian Domestic Affairs

**Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian may have sought military and economic aid for Iran during meetings with world leaders at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 31 and September 1.**The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023 and sees as a mechanism to undermine the US-led international order, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[17] Pezeshkian and his delegation met with several world leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.[18] Both official and unofficial readouts of these meetings are typically vague and do not necessarily reflect the content of the conversations.[19]

Pezeshkian may have spoken to these leaders about ways to fortify Iran’s military and economic options because of US-Israeli strikes on Iranian military assets during the war and the US economic campaign against Iran. Russia, for example, is a key Iranian partner and delivers military and non-military goods to Iran via the Caspian Sea.[20] Informed sources told anti-regime media on August 26 that the US blockade of Iranian ports, Ukrainian strikes on Russian refining infrastructure, and disruptions to the Caspian Sea supply route between Iran and Russia have restricted Iran’s refined gasoline imports, likely exacerbating Iran’s fuel crisis.[21] Significant disruptions to this key trade route for Iran may incentivize Pezeshkian to seek alternative ways to obtain those Russian goods in his conversations with Putin. The PRC accounts for about 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports.[22] The US naval blockade on Iranian ports and Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted Iran’s ability to export oil and thus incentivize Pezeshkian to find alternative ways to export oil to Iran’s largest buyer.[23]

## Lebanon

_Nothing significant to report._

## Iraq

**The Iraqi Central Criminal Court sentenced Kataib Hezbollah member Amir Rahim Jabbar Lazem to 15 years in prison on August 30 for his involvement in kidnapping US journalist Shelly Kittleson in Baghdad in March 2026**.[24] The Central Criminal Court operates under the Supreme Judicial Council, which also nominates the Central Criminal Court’s head.[25] An Iraqi Interior Ministry official told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on August 31 that Lazem is a member of a Kataib Hezbollah “special operations unit.”[26]The official added that the other Kataib Hezbollah members involved in Kittleson’s kidnapping remain at large.[27] Kataib Hezbollah released Kittleson on April 7 in exchange for the Iraqi federal government’s release of several imprisoned Kataib Hezbollah members.[28] The Central Criminal Court also sentenced two Kataib Hezbollah fighters to 15 years in prison on August 31 for a March 2026 rocket attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad, according to a leaked court document circulated by Iraqi media.[29] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias fired rockets at the US Embassy in Baghdad on March 7.[30]

**Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq seeks to appoint the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) chairman, according to a senior framework leader who spoke to Iraqi media on September 1**.[31] The PMC Chairman oversees the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi security service comprised of many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that report to Iran instead of the prime minister.[32] This report comes as Asaib Ahl al Haq and its allies continue to accuse PMC Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh of prior knowledge of US-Saudi strikes on PMF targets, likely to create a political scandal that generates US pressure on Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi to fire Fayyadh.[33] It is unclear, however, whether Asaib Ahl al Haq’s accusations are accurate. Asaib Ahl al Haq’s reported aim to control the PMC Chairman position helps explain why the militia has called for Fayyadh’s removal since 2024.[34]

## Arabian Peninsula

_Nothing significant to report._

[1]   ;

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[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]  ;  dot ir/portal/newsview/652127/The-Islamic-Republic-of-Iran-becomes-9th-member-of-the-Shanghai-Cooperation-Organisation

[18]  ;  dot ir/fa/165602 ;  dot translate.goog/press-releases?dtl/41718/Prime_Ministers_meeting_with_the_President_of_Iran_on_the_sidelines_of_SCO_Summit&_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=hi&_x_tr_hl=hi&_x_tr_pto=sge

[19]  ;  dot ir/fa/165602 ;  dot translate.goog/press-releases?dtl/41718/Prime_Ministers_meeting_with_the_President_of_Iran_on_the_sidelines_of_SCO_Summit&_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=hi&_x_tr_hl=hi&_x_tr_pto=sge

[20]  ;

[21]  ;

[22]

[23]

[24]  dot uk/entertainment_media/السجن-15-عاماً-لعضو-بكتائب-حزب-الله-لخطف-صحافية-أميركية-في-العراق ;  ;

[25]

[26]  dot uk/entertainment_media/السجن-15-عاماً-لعضو-بكتائب-حزب-الله-لخطف-صحافية-أميركية-في-العراق

[27]  dot uk/entertainment_media/السجن-15-عاماً-لعضو-بكتائب-حزب-الله-لخطف-صحافية-أميركية-في-العراق

[28]  ;

;

[29]  dot uk/politics/العراق-السجن-لعنصرين-من-كتائب-حزب-الله-لمهاجمتهما-السفارة-الأميركية ;

[30]

[31]  dot net/450918/

[32]

[33]  dot com/704803/ ;

[34]

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