The Ambiguity Spiral in Iran: How Washington’s Lack of Clarity Leads to Escalation

87~~/100~~

Verdict High Trust Largely Accurate — Expert Opinion/Analysis (High Trust, with minor factual imprecisions)

✓ 18 checks out ✕ 5 disputed ? 7 unverified

☰ Full analysis The complete summary ⌄

The submitted text is verifiably an opinion/analysis essay, 'The Ambiguity Spiral in Iran', by Erik Lin-Greenberg, published in Foreign Affairs on 31 July 2026 and republished by the Center for a New American Security (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/ambiguity-spiral-iran ; https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/the-ambiguity-spiral-in-iran). Targeted research confirms the core factual scaffolding: the 2026 Iran war began on 28 February 2026 with joint US-Israeli strikes (US code name Operation Epic Fury) that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the opening hours; a two-week ceasefire was agreed on 7-8 April; a 14-point memorandum of understanding was signed by Trump and President Pezeshkian in mid-June; and fighting/tit-for-tat strikes over the Strait of Hormuz followed in late June and July. Distinctive verifiable specifics — Trump's 'whole civilization will die tonight' threat, the Kharg Island seizure threat and walk-back, the 20 percent Hormuz toll and its withdrawal, the MOU's 'best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels' clause, Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi's 'vague arrangements' statement, the 'trifled with us'/'love tap' remarks, and the 68 percent Washington Post-Ipsos figure — all match primary documents or multiple reputable outlets. Three minor imprecisions were identified: (a) the article says Trump declared the strait 'must be free to everyone', whereas he framed open access as applying to all countries except Iran; (b) 'thousands of missiles and drones' compresses reporting of hundreds of missiles plus thousands of drones; (c) the framing that Iran 'began shooting at commercial vessels' at end-June understates that Iranian attacks on shipping had been occurring since March, resuming/intensifying after the MOU. One quotation (CENTCOM 'not seek escalation') could not be independently confirmed in its May context and is marked Unverified rather than false. The piece is explicitly argumentative and prescriptive; its causal and counterfactual claims (e.g., that clarity would have produced Iranian restraint) are interpretive and not empirically verifiable. Presentation is measured, low in emotive language, and consistent with think-tank/academic commentary, but it is US-policy-centric and should not be read as neutral reportage.

What checked out (18)

Article provenance: the text is 'The Ambiguity Spiral in Iran' by Erik Lin-Greenberg, Foreign Affairs, 31 July 2026, republished by CNAS (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/ambiguity-spiral-iran ; https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/sharper-drones).
Trump threatened to destroy Iranian civilization and then agreed to a ceasefire: on 7 April 2026 he warned on Truth Social that 'a whole civilization will die tonight', and a two-week ceasefire was announced on 8 April (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/04/07/trump-iran-bombing-civilization-war-crime/ ; https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/04/iran-president-trumps-apocalyptic-threats-of-large-scale-civilian-devastation-demand-urgent-global-action-to-prevent-atrocity-crimes/ ; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-threat-whole-civilization-will-die-iran-war-deadline-hormuz-rcna267059 ; https://www.npr.org/2026/04/07/nx-s1-5776560/trump-has-backed-down-from-his-threat-to-wipe-out-irans-civilization).
Trump floated seizing Kharg Island, Iran's main oil export terminal, on 11 June 2026, then softened, telling Fox News he was unsure America 'has the stomach' to take it (https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2026/06/11/trump-says-us-will-seize-kharg-island-and-other-oil-infrastructure-points.html ; https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/11/us-will-seize-and-control-irans-kharg-island-and-other-key-oil-facilities-trump-says ; https://www.newsweek.com/trump-kharg-island-iran-oil-threat-12061754).
Trump proposed a 20 percent toll/'reimbursement fee' on cargo transiting the Strait of Hormuz on 13 July 2026 and scrapped it the following day (https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/13/trump-iran-hormuz-strait-charge-reimburse.html ; https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5967519-trump-scraps-strait-toll/ ; https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/7/14/piracy-will-trumps-20-percent-hormuz-toll-find-takers).
The US military operation against Iran is code-named Operation Epic Fury and began on 28 February 2026, with stated objectives of destroying Iran's missiles and production, destroying its navy, severing proxy support, and preventing a nuclear weapon (https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/operation-epic-fury-decisive-american-power-to-crush-irans-terror-regime/ ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-legal-adviser/2026/04/operation-epic-fury-and-international-law ; https://media.defense.gov/2026/Mar/16/2003899496/-1/-1/1/OPERATION-EPIC-FURY-FACT-SHEET.PDF).
On 28 February 2026 Trump urged Iranians to take over their government, and Netanyahu publicly echoed a regime-collapse message the same night, calling on Iranians to free themselves from the regime (https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/2026-02-28/ty-article/trump-to-iranians-following-israel-u-s-operation-take-over-your-government/0000019c-a3a8-db44-a1dd-a7ec38ec0000 ; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/watch-this-is-your-time-to-join-forces-netanyahu-says-to-iranians-after-u-s-israel-attack ; https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-netanyahus-message-as-israel-us-strike-iran-we-will-remove-existential-threat/).
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening hours of the conflict on 28 February 2026 in joint US-Israeli strikes; Mojtaba Khamenei was subsequently named supreme leader (https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/live-blog/israel-iran-live-updates-rcna261099 ; https://www.cbsnews.com/tag/ayatollah-ali-khamenei/ ; https://www.britannica.com/question/What-is-Operation-Epic-Fury).
Iran responded with a large-scale missile and drone campaign against US bases and Gulf states across the Middle East, including strikes on Kuwait and on British facilities (https://acleddata.com/update/middle-east-special-issue-march-2026 ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iranian_strikes_on_Kuwait ; https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war).
The June memorandum of understanding contains the clause obliging Iran to 'make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels' with no charge for 60 days (https://www.axios.com/2026/06/17/read-full-us-iran-deal-memorandum-understanding ; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/text-iran-us-memorandum-understanding-rcna350582 ; https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/us-iran-memorandum-understanding-nods-international-law-can-be-taken-seriously).
The MOU was intended to extend the ceasefire, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and frame a 60-day window in which sanctions relief and access to frozen funds would track negotiating progress (https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/strait-hormuz-reopen-us-lift-iran-sanctions-14-point-deal-seeking-end-rcna350513 ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/06/president-trumps-iran-agreement-is-america-first-in-action/ ; https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/full-text-us-iran-deal-promises-sanctions-relief-and-phased-access-frozen-funds ; https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/us-iran-war-deal-strait-of-hormuz/).
Iran's deputy foreign minister (Kazem Gharibabadi) stated on social media on 26 June 2026 that safe passage through the strait could not be guaranteed through vague arrangements or parallel routes decided outside Iran's considerations as a coastal state (https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/hormuz-traffic-flows-ship-attack-iran-trade-route-rcna351885 ; https://thehill.com/policy/international/5942784-iran-asserts-strait-hormuz/ ; https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2026/06/iran-260626-rferl07.htm).
The United States treated the attacks on shipping as ceasefire violations and struck Iran in response, with a further round in July 2026; CENTCOM described 'unwarranted aggression by Iranian forces' as a violation of the ceasefire (https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5958488-centcom-us-strikes-iran-resume/ ; https://abcnews.com/Politics/us-iran-ceasefire-mou-broke-timeline/story?id=134622392).
A July 2026 Washington Post-Ipsos poll found 68 percent of Americans said the Iran war was not 'worth fighting' (https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/20/politics/iran-war-unpopularity-iraq-vietnam ; https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/7-10-americans-say-iran-war-not-worth-fighting).
In April 2026 the US and Iran agreed a two-week ceasefire whose applicability to Israel's operations in Lebanon was disputed: Iran said the truce covered Hezbollah, while Trump and Netanyahu said Lebanon was not included, and Israeli strikes in Lebanon escalated on 8 April (https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IN12678.html ; https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/live-blog/live-updates-iran-war-ceasefire-trump-hormuz-israel-lebanon-rcna267205 ; https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-trump-ceasefire-strait-hormuz-israel-war-hezbollah-continues/ ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8_April_2026_Israeli_attacks_on_Lebanon).
The April ceasefire's agreed terms were never released publicly: CRS records that no text reflecting mutual agreement on ceasefire terms was published (https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12678).
Weeks after the April ceasefire, on 7 May 2026, Iranian forces attacked US warships transiting the Strait of Hormuz with missiles, drones and small boats; Trump said Iran 'trifled with us' and called the US retaliation 'just a love tap', maintaining the ceasefire held (https://www.foxnews.com/live-news/iran-war-news-trump-strait-hormuz-blockade-ceasefire-may-8 ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/07/world/live-news/trump-iran-war-news ; https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/trump-iran-war-peace-deal-strait-of-hormuz/).
Iran's stated negotiating objectives include release of frozen assets and sanctions relief, alongside control/revenue arrangements over the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-898328 ; https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/05/26/the-24bn-question-iran-pushes-us-to-release-frozen-funds-in-qatar-talks/ ; https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm).
The historical comparison used in the essay is accurate in outline: Iran launched a large missile and drone barrage at Israel on 13-14 April 2024, after which Israel conducted limited retaliatory strikes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_2024_Iranian_strikes_on_Israel).

✕ Disputed claims 5 claims ⌄

Partially accurate — imprecise: 'declare that the waterway must be free to everyone'. Trump's July 2026 statement was that all countries other than Iran would have fair and open use of the strait, i.e. open to all except Iranian vessels (https://abcnews.com/Politics/trumps-strait-hormuz-blockade-erases-concession-iran-preliminary/story?id=134717418 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/07/16/trump-has-declared-strait-hormuz-open-facts-say-otherwise/).
Partially accurate — imprecise: 'unleashing thousands of missiles and drones'. Reference reporting describes hundreds of retaliatory missiles and thousands of drones (https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war). The aggregate figure is defensible but the composition is compressed.
Partially accurate — context omitted: 'At the end of June, Iran began shooting at commercial vessels'. Iranian attacks on commercial shipping were documented from March 2026 onwards; late June marked a resumption/intensification after the MOU rather than an onset (https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-004-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-and-gulf-oman-iranian-attacks-commercial-vessels ; https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45281).
Partially accurate — attribution nuance: the article says 'airstrikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei', leaving agency implicit; sources variously describe a joint US-Israeli attack, with some Iranian and regional reporting attributing the killing to Israel (https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/live-blog/israel-iran-live-updates-rcna261099 ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/8/how-lebanon-became-the-breaking-point-for-the-iran-war-ceasefire).
Temporal drift (not an error at publication): the essay's closing statement that fighting 'continues today' reflects late July 2026; by mid-to-late August 2026 reporting described a pause in direct US-Iran strikes alongside continued regional hostilities and Iran-Oman corridor talks (https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/16/world/live-news/iran-war-trump ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/26/world/live-news/iran-war-trump).

? Unverified claims 7 claims ⌄

The attributed CENTCOM statement that it did 'not seek escalation' in the May 2026 context could not be confirmed; the closest located match is a July 2026 statement in which Saudi Arabia's Defence Ministry, acting in coordination with CENTCOM, said it does not seek escalation (https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/29/us-iran-war-hormuz-centcom.html). CENTCOM's own May messaging located so far frames strikes as self-defence rather than using this wording (https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/trump-iran-war-peace-deal-strait-of-hormuz/). Marked Unverified, not false.
Interpretive claim that Iranian officials 'assumed the worst' and read the war in existential terms because of US mixed messaging: motivations are not directly observable and no primary Iranian decision-making record was located. Unverified analytical inference.
Counterfactual claim that clearer US signalling against regime change would have produced a more restrained Iranian response and a more limited conflict: inherently untestable; no source can confirm or refute it.
Claim that the two sides' divergent readings of the MOU clause (US = all traffic; Iran = partial authority/partial opening) were the operative cause of the deal's collapse: the divergence is documented in reporting and in Iranian statements about coordination and parallel routes (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/7/ships-attacked-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-what-that-means-for-ongoing-talks), but the causal weight assigned by the author is an analytical judgement rather than a verified fact.
Claim that Iran specifically wants shipping routed through the portion of the strait closest to its territory: partially supported by reporting on Iranian insistence on coordination with the IRGC and on suspension of a 'parallel route', but the precise geographic formulation was not confirmed by a primary source (https://thehill.com/policy/international/5942784-iran-asserts-strait-hormuz/).
Claim that Tehran concluded the US was not a credible negotiating partner because it could not restrain Israel, and the attribution of the phrase 'oath-breaking' to Iranian leaders: Iranian accusations of US and Israeli ceasefire violations are documented (https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-trump-ceasefire-strait-hormuz-israel-war-hezbollah-continues/), but the specific quoted term was not located in a retrievable source. Unverified quotation.
Claim that Washington claimed success on destroying Iran's missile capacity, degrading its navy and limiting proxy reach upon signing the June memorandum: the White House did issue a triumphal statement on the MOU (https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/06/president-trumps-iran-agreement-is-america-first-in-action/) and independent assessments describe mixed achievement against stated goals (https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2026/0828/iran-war-trump-objectives-six-months), but the exact bundle of claimed wins at signing was not verified line-by-line.

⌕ Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄

Confidence

High (0.85) — Confidence is high because the article's distinctive, checkable particulars — an operation code name, a treaty clause verbatim, dated presidential statements and reversals, a named Iranian official's quotation, and a specific poll figure — were each corroborated by primary government documents or by two or more independent, dated reputable outlets, and because the piece's provenance in Foreign Affairs was directly confirmed. Confidence is held below 0.95 by four residual uncertainties: two quotations that could not be traced to retrievable records; the fast-moving nature of the conflict, which means the article's end-state framing has already drifted since publication; reliance on snippets for two paywalled originals; and the inherent unverifiability of the essay's central causal and counterfactual claims, which constitute a substantial share of its argumentative content and can be neither confirmed nor refuted by evidence.

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Article metrics

Emotion 16% · Reading grade 12.1 · 1705 words

≡ The article we checked Full text as retrieved ⌄

Ambiguity—vague language, mixed messaging, frequent policy shifts—has been a hallmark of the United States’ approach to the war in Iran. From almost the moment the conflict began, U.S. President Donald Trump has vacillated over its purpose, what risks he might be willing to take, and what the United States would consider victory. He has threatened to destroy Iranian civilization, then promptly signed a cease-fire agreement. He has floated the possibility of taking Kharg Island, the hub of Iran’s oil industry, only to quickly walk it back. And he has discussed imposing a 20 percent toll on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, only to declare that the waterway must be free to everyone.

In some cases, ambiguity can help countries settle wars. Leaders, for example, can leverage uncertainty to de-escalate a conflict or reach a stable peace agreement by letting both sides claim victory. If governments avoid drawing clear redlines, they can avoid pressure to escalate in response to attacks, creating space to cool tensions.

But Washington’s mixed messaging about the war in Iran has done more harm than good. Trump’s spectrum of threats, for example, prompted Tehran to see the war in existential terms and maximally fight back. The lack of clarity over the status of the [Strait of Hormuz]( made the June memorandum of understanding negotiated by the two countries impossibly frail. To reach a more durable truce, the Trump administration needs to be clearer about its goals and more consistent in pursuing them. Otherwise, Iran and the United States will continue to get their wires crossed—and the next cease-fire could again collapse.

### CAN’T GET A READ

When coercing a rival, a government must decide how to convey intent, capabilities, and redlines. One option is to be clear: explicitly and consistently defining a goal, identifying consequences for noncompliance, and articulating what the other side can count on if demands are met. Such clarity can let a rival state know what is at stake and encourage it to limit its response. But too much of it can do the opposite. If the rival knows just how far it can go toward a threshold without triggering retaliation, it will often escalate all the way to that point.

The other option is to be vague. Yet this can also have mixed consequences. If a state does not know how its adversary will respond to a certain action, it might hold back for fear of triggering painful counterattacks. But too many mixed signals can throw off an opponent’s risk calculus, giving rise to misunderstandings that can produce or worsen a crisis.

This is what happened with the United States’ Operation Epic Fury—its military operation against [Iran]( Trump has variously said, at different times, that the goal of the campaign is to degrade Iran’s missile capabilities and navy, prevent the country from obtaining nuclear weapons, and end Iran’s support of its regional proxy network. On the first day of the conflict, he even suggested he wanted to dismantle the Islamic Republic. (On February 28, Trump encouraged Iranians to “take over” their government, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has carried out military strikes alongside Trump, echoed that sentiment.) Other Trump administration officials, meanwhile, avoided explicit mention of a political transformation for Iran, focusing on narrower military objectives.

For Iran, this mixed messaging was the opposite of reassuring. Uncertain of U.S. intentions, its officials assumed the worst—particularly given that airstrikes killed Supreme Leader [Ali Khamenei]( in the conflict’s opening hours. The country thus escalated massively, unleashing thousands of missiles and drones at infrastructure and U.S. military bases across the Middle East. If the United States had been clear from the outset that it was not gunning for regime change, Iran might have responded with more restraint and the conflict might have stayed more limited, as it had after U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iran in June 2025.

Ambiguity has not only ramped up the conflict. It has also undermined efforts at ending it. The June memorandum of understanding was meant to pause fighting, open the Strait of Hormuz, and start a 60-day period for further negotiations. But it failed, in part because of its unclear wording. The memorandum obliged Iran to “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels.” The Americans interpreted this clause to mean that Iran would let all traffic through, as it did before the war. The Iranians, on the other hand, took it as a confirmation that they had authority over the waterway and only needed to open parts of it. (Iran wants shipping to pass through the part of the strait closest to its territory). At the end of June, Iran began shooting at commercial vessels for taking what it deemed to be unauthorized routes through the channel. As these attacks unfolded, Iran’s deputy foreign minister took to social media to announce that safe passage was “not guaranteed under vague arrangements.” The United States interpreted these strikes as violations of the cease-fire, so it responded by firing at Iran. A similar tit for tat played out in mid-July, resulting in the fighting that continues today.

### **FOG OF WAR**

Although all conflicts are confusing and chaotic to some degree—hence the term “fog of war”—the one in Iran seems particularly ambiguous. Much of this ambiguity stems not from a calculated strategy to leverage obscurity for military or political gain, but from Washington’s struggle to settle on a desired end state. Deliberate ambiguity increases uncertainty by keeping opponents guessing. But when a country is ambiguous about its direction because of internal indecision, it tends to routinely back down from threats only to reissue them, eroding its credibility instead of merely throwing off opponents.

Still, the [Trump administration]( is not fully to blame for the United States’ ambiguous posture. There are factors outside its control that undercut the White House’s ability to send clear and credible signals to Iran. Weak domestic support for the war, for example, makes it harder to convincingly threaten Tehran. According to July polling by The Washington Post and Ipsos, 68 percent of Americans believe that the war is “not worth fighting.” Tehran is well aware of this fact, which functions as a caveat to all of Trump’s statements. Even when the president makes seemingly clear and direct threats, Iranian officials cannot be sure he will follow through, given his domestic political constraints. Iran, in turn, may feel emboldened to brush off the administration’s threats and demands.

The United States’ relationship with its partners in the region also clouds its messaging and invites escalation. American armed forces launched the war alongside Israel, which has different interests, redlines, and objectives. In April, for example, Washington and Tehran signed a two-week cease-fire to stop the fighting, but Israel’s obligations under the pact were unclear. The Iranians said the deal required Israel to halt attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon; Israel argued that operations in Lebanon fell outside the pact’s remit. Washington backed its ally, and Israel ramped up strikes on Hezbollah targets. Tehran in turn accused American leaders of “oath-breaking” and likely concluded that the United States was not a credible negotiating partner because it could not stop its regional ally. Iran retaliated with missile attacks on Israel weeks later.

### CLOUDY WITH A CHANCE OF PEACE

Although ambiguity has been an escalatory force in the war with Iran, that does not mean it always worsens conflict. At times, it provides policymakers with room to maneuver, to downplay hostility, or to exaggerate their own accomplishments. Indeed, U.S. officials have, on occasion, leveraged ambiguity to achieve this very effect. Weeks after the April cease-fire was signed, Tehran launched drones and missiles at American warships in the Strait of Hormuz. This could easily have triggered a descent back into full-scale conflict. Yet because the exact terms of the April cease-fire were never publicly released, Trump was able to downplay the incident. The president told reporters that Iran had merely “trifled with us,” insisting the truce remained intact. When the United States launched retaliatory strikes, Trump soft-pedaled their significance, referring to them as “just a love tap.” Central Command similarly announced that it did “not seek escalation.” Iran appeared to accept that narrative and held off on more strikes.

Moreover, whether intentional or the result of incoherent policy, ambiguity can allow both Washington and Tehran to claim wins. For instance, because the Trump administration has offered a variety of aims for its war, it was able to claim it had successfully achieved several core objectives upon signing the June memorandum—destroying Iran’s missile capacity, degrading its navy, and limiting the reach of Tehran’s proxies—even though the military campaign had failed to compel Iran to change regimes or abandon its nuclear pursuits. Iranian leaders, for their part, could declare that they succeeded by virtue of staying in power, inflicting damage on U.S. and Gulf infrastructure, and demonstrating their chokehold over the Strait of Hormuz.

> Since the conflict began, Trump has vacillated over its purpose.

These mutual declarations of victory ultimately could not save the memorandum. But similar assertions have de-escalated past crises. When Iran launched a barrage of missiles and drones at Israel in April 2024, Israel highlighted its success at defending its territory before retaliating with precision strikes against Iranian military targets. Iran’s government and media glossed over the damage caused by Israeli attacks and focused public attention on the fact that it had directly struck Israel for the first time. The lack of a clear outcome meant both sides could claim success, averting escalation.

A deliberate degree of ambiguity could also help end this conflict. If American and Iranian leaders keep their redlines vague when dealing with low-level military interactions, they will create off-ramps. But on the whole, the best way for the United States to settle the war with Iran is to be clearer about its objectives. The goals of Iran’s regime are evident: to maintain its grip on power at home, deter future attacks from its enemies, keep control over the Strait of Hormuz, secure release of frozen funds, and gain relief from sanctions. If Washington can sharpen its demands and communicate them consistently, both sides will be better able to focus negotiations and develop more viable plans for implementation—leading to a more durable agreement.

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The Ambiguity Spiral in Iran: How Washington’s Lack of Clarity Leads to Escalation

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