The article is a Persian-language analytical OSINT piece dated 26 August 2026 that reframes the Strait of Hormuz from a simple 'traffic collapse' story into a multi-regime maritime ecosystem (real traffic decline + deliberate AIS darkness + identity manipulation + STS + rerouting + satellite-only detection). Targeted research confirms the overwhelming majority of its externally checkable, attributable claims. Verified against primary/near-primary sources: the IMO's own operational FAQ (Iran manages the northern route, Oman the southern route; the TSS should not be used owing to reported mines); Kpler's 26 June 2026 study (895 crossings between 1 March and 19 May 2026, 58 of them — 6.4% — on the IMO TSS, 53.0% on the Iranian-defined corridor, 40.6% dark/unknown); Kpler's 19 August 2026 MoU retrospective (unattributed share ~28% pre-MoU, falling to 5% at the Week 3 peak, ratcheting back to 66% in the expiry week, with dark/unknown never below 44% and exceeding 80% by the end of the 60-day window); Windward's 19 August Kharg observations (new ~140m dark contact at the Sulphur and LPG terminal, first activity there in 23 consecutive days since 27 July; waiting area down to 18 dark tankers from 21 on 17 August); the AXON I / SALUTE false-Angola-flag STS off Oman on 10–11 August with a destination change toward China/Sri Lanka, assessed as the first Iran-origin tanker to break the US blockade; the Yanbu 16 August observation of 20 vessels (17 tankers, 3 bulk carriers) fully AIS-dark; China-linked tankers aborting Hormuz transits; the Iranian seizure of a tanker following a boarding near Qeshm on 17 August; the Iran–Oman temporary corridor and joint mine-clearing framework announced 25 August; and the Reuters/Kpler weekend figure of fewer than 20 transits with AIS-detected traffic ~90% below pre-conflict baselines. Defects are real but bounded: (1) the article renders the Reuters/Kpler weekend figure as 'under 20 ships per day', whereas the source reported fewer than 20 vessels in total across the weekend (13 on 22 August, 4 on 23 August); (2) the '16 transits — 10 inbound / 6 outbound' figure attributed to Windward for 19 August closely matches Argus's Windward-sourced figure for 23 August but with the directions reversed (6 inbound / 10 outbound), suggesting a date or direction transposition; (3) the striking '24 of 74 vessels (32%) AIS identity mismatch versus a 1–2/day baseline' claim could not be independently located and remains Unverified; (4) the article's inline citations are broken/truncated stubs ('[Kpler+2Windward Insights+2](') with no clickable URLs, which materially degrades reproducibility; (5) despite carrying a 26 August dateline, it omits Trump's 25 August claim that all mines have been removed from the strait and the contemporaneous JMIC and allied-government pushback — a significant currency gap for a piece whose map hinges on mine risk; and (6) it does not flag that Windward and Kpler transit counts diverged sharply for the same weekend (Windward via Argus: 34 on 22 August and 16 on 23 August; Kpler via Reuters: 13 and 4), even though vendor divergence is central to its own methodological thesis. Editorially, the piece is unusually self-disciplined: it explicitly refuses to equate AIS-dark status with smuggling, introduces a three-tier shadow-fleet taxonomy to prevent inflation, separates GNSS interference from identity deception, warns against the 'anything America cannot see is Iran' fallacy, and declines to publish a suspect-vessel list. Emotional loading is near-zero (emotion_score 0.01). The residual risk is not deception but false precision: vendor-derived numbers are relayed with more confidence than the vendors' own multi-sensor caveats warrant, and the colour-coded map implies granularity the underlying data cannot support.

What checked out (17)

• IMO framework: the northern Hormuz route falls under Iranian management and the southern route under Omani management, and the TSS should not be used owing to the reported presence of mines — confirmed by the IMO's own operational FAQ page (https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/faqs-strait-of-hormuz-evacuation-plan.aspx).
• Kpler tracked 895 vessel crossings through the Strait of Hormuz between 1 March and 19 May 2026, of which only 58 (6.4%) used the IMO-designated TSS, 53.0% used the Iranian-defined alternative corridor and 40.6% were dark or unknown routing — confirmed verbatim by Kpler (https://www.kpler.com/blog/hormuz-transits-are-now-outside-the-imo-lane-what-that-means-for-risk-assessment).
• Kpler's MoU trajectory: the unattributed share ran at roughly 28% before the MoU, fell to 5% at the Week 3 peak as vessels loaded openly with AIS on, then ratcheted back from Week 4 to reach 66% of a shrinking total in the expiry week; the dark or unknown share never fell below 44% and exceeded 80% by the end of the 60-day period — confirmed by Kpler's 19 August 2026 analysis (https://www.kpler.com/blog/60-days-of-a-broken-us-iran-mou-the-market-stopped-waiting-for-hormuz) and secondary reporting (https://safety4sea.com/kpler-the-market-has-stopped-waiting-for-full-reopening-of-strait-of-hormuz/, https://cyprusshippingnews.com/2026/08/25/60-days-of-a-broken-us-iran-mou-the-market-stopped-waiting-for-hormuz/).
• The 60-day Islamabad MoU window lapsed on 17 August 2026 without a deal, extension or active talks — confirmed by Kpler and Hellenic Shipping News (https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/60-days-of-a-broken-us-iran-mou-the-market-stopped-waiting-for-hormuz/).
• Kharg Island, 19 August 2026: SAR imagery identified a new dark contact of approximately 140 metres berthed at the Sulphur and LPG terminal, the first activity there in 23 consecutive days since 27 July, and the waiting area held 18 dark tankers, down from 21 on 17 August — confirmed by Windward (https://windward.ai/blog/a-fatal-hormuz-strike-and-irans-first-seizure-since-june/). The article's '23-day pause' and '21 to 18' figures are exact matches.
• Kharg western terminal reactivated on 12 August 2026 after a multi-week shutdown, with satellite imagery showing a dark VLCC berthed and loading for the first time since 18 July — confirmed by Windward (https://windward.ai/blog/kharg-reactivates-as-irans-caspian-corridor-expands/) and The National (https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/08/16/iran-reroutes-oil-flow-as-loading-resumes-at-kharg-island-terminal/).
• An Iran-flagged, NITC-operated, OFAC-sanctioned VLCC of approximately 330 metres was identified berthed and loading dark at Kharg's western terminal on 8 July 2026 — confirmed by Windward (https://windward.ai/blog/the-ceasefire-collapses-strikes-sanctions-and-u-turns/) and HSToday (https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/maritime-security/iran-tightens-grip-on-strait-of-hormuz-as-shipping-forced-into-controlled-routes/). This substantiates the article's NITC/Kharg anchor case in substance.
• AXON I, a US-sanctioned LPG carrier signalling a false Angola flag, took a ship-to-ship transfer from the sanctioned carrier SALUTE off Oman on 10–11 August 2026 and then changed its declared destination toward China/Sri Lanka, assessed as the first Iran-origin tanker to break the US blockade — confirmed by Windward Daily Intelligence (https://insights.windward.ai/) and corroborated independently by UANI, which records AXON I (IMO 9005053) receiving Iranian LPG from SALUTE (IMO 8912546) via STS on 10 August and departing the Gulf of Oman laden with 490,000 barrels on 13 August (https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/analysis/iran-shipping-update-august-14-2026).
• The US reimposed a blockade of Iranian ports on 13 July 2026 — confirmed by CNN/CENTCOM reporting (https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/11/world/live-news/iran-war-trump) and NBC News (https://www.nbcnews.com/business/markets/oil-rises-trump-reimposes-hormuz-blockade-rcna587297). The article's '13 July' anchor date for the reimposed blockade is correct.
• Yanbu, 16 August 2026: a Windward collection showed 20 vessels — 17 tankers and 3 bulk carriers — all AIS-dark and stationary — confirmed by Windward (https://windward.ai/blog/a-second-adnoc-strike-and-an-evasion-hub-at-koh-e-mubarak/) and by Windward Daily Intelligence (https://insights.windward.ai/).
• China-linked risk avoidance: Windward observed two China-linked tankers aborting Strait of Hormuz transits within a 24-hour window, including a Hong Kong-flagged VLCC of approximately 318,000 DWT under Chinese commercial management broadcasting 'CHINESE CREW OWNER' in its AIS destination field — confirmed by Windward (https://windward.ai/blog/a-fatal-hormuz-strike-and-irans-first-seizure-since-june/) and corroborated by The Maritime Executive (https://maritime-executive.com/article/iran-claims-to-turn-back-chinese-tanker-and-continues-to-detain-uae-vessel).
• A vessel was assessed as seized rather than merely boarded following an Iranian boarding near Qeshm Island on 17 August 2026 — the first confirmed Iranian seizure since two container vessels were taken on 22 June — confirmed by Windward (https://windward.ai/blog/a-fatal-hormuz-strike-and-irans-first-seizure-since-june/), HSToday (https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/maritime-security/iran-tightens-grip-on-strait-of-hormuz-as-shipping-forced-into-controlled-routes/) and The Maritime Executive (https://maritime-executive.com/article/iran-claims-to-have-seized-uae-tanker-after-multiple-attacks-last-week).
• Iran and Oman discussed a framework including a joint temporary navigational corridor through the Strait of Hormuz and a joint mine-clearing project, announced 25 August 2026, with technical negotiations continuing on a permanent corridor and future administration of the strait — confirmed by Arab News/Reuters (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2655830/middle-east), CNBC (https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/25/iran-oman-strait-hormuz-oil.html) and The Korea Times (https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/world/20260826/iran-oman-say-discussed-temporary-hormuz-corridor-mine-clearing).
• Hormuz traffic remains roughly 90% below pre-conflict levels, with fewer than 20 commodity vessels transiting over the 22–23 August weekend per Kpler data reported by Reuters — confirmed (https://safety4sea.com/hormuz-traffic-falls-approximately-90-below-pre-conflict-levels/, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2655666/amp, https://www.deccanherald.com/world/middle-east/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-slumps-as-fewer-than-20-vessels-cross-over-weekend-data-4121849).
• Attacks continue against vessels in and around the southern/Omani corridor, including an oil tanker struck by an unidentified projectile off Oman on 24–25 August 2026 — confirmed by UKMTO-sourced reporting (https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/08/24/oman-Hormuz-tanker-attacked/9311787626785/, https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/unknown-projectile-hits-oil-tanker-off-oman-ukmto-1.500651171) and Argus (https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2869419-outbound-hormuz-transits-drop-to-zero).
• Widespread GNSS interference/spoofing around Hormuz is a distinct phenomenon from deliberate AIS identity deception, and Kpler has implemented enhanced monitoring protocols to filter out erroneous signals such as false strait crossings or incorrect port calls — confirmed by gCaptain (https://gcaptain.com/electronic-fog-of-war-gps-spoofing-distorts-ship-traffic-near-hormuz/) and France 24 (https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260306-surge-gps-interference-strait-hormuz-increases-shipping-risks). The article's methodological warning is well founded.
• The structural premise that AIS-visible traffic no longer reflects total movement and that satellite/multi-sensor detection is required is supported by Windward's own published methodology and observations (https://windward.ai/blog/resolving-charter-disputes-over-dark-periods-in-hormuz/, https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-traffic-near-zero-as-dark-exports-continue/).

• UNVERIFIED — '24 of 74 matched vessels (32%) carried an AIS identity inconsistent with their commercial profile on 19 August, against a normal baseline of 1–2 per day (Windward)'. This is the article's single most consequential analytical claim and could not be located in any indexed Windward blog, Windward Daily Intelligence excerpt, or secondary report. Windward publishes identity-manipulation findings elsewhere (e.g. a June 2026 counter-narcotics report using a 15% high-risk baseline, https://windward.ai/knowledge-base/windward-counter-narcotics-intelligence-report-june-2026/), but no 24/74 or 32% figure was retrievable. It may originate from a paywalled or subscriber-only daily brief. Not marked False — absence of an indexed copy is not disconfirmation.
• UNVERIFIED / PROBABLE TRANSPOSITION — 'On 19 August Windward identified 16 transits: 10 inbound, 6 outbound, of which 9 were dark and 5 visible only via imagery.' Argus, citing Windward, reports that on 23 August Hormuz transits dropped to 16, split between six inbound and 10 outbound, mostly on the southern lane (https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2869419-outbound-hormuz-transits-drop-to-zero, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2869183-iran-s-pgsa-blacklist-deepens-hormuz-shipping-concerns). The total matches exactly but the date and the inbound/outbound split are reversed. Either the article used a separate 19 August Windward brief with coincidentally identical totals, or it conflated dates and inverted direction. The '9 dark' and '5 imagery-only' sub-figures were not independently retrievable.
• UNVERIFIED — 'On 23 August Windward linked a sanctioned NITC tanker, AIS-dark since 8 July, via visual fingerprint matching to a covert loading operation at Kharg's western terminal on 12 August.' The constituent facts are separately verified (an OFAC-sanctioned NITC VLCC loading dark at Kharg on 8 July; western terminal reactivation on 12 August with a dark VLCC berthed), and Windward Daily Intelligence describes analogous IMO-based matching of reflagged tankers to previously sanctioned Iranian crude carriers at Kharg (https://insights.windward.ai/). However, the specific end-to-end attribution chain asserted for 23 August was not independently confirmed.
• UNVERIFIED — the claim that the 16 August Yanbu darkness cluster was 'above the port's usual level'. Windward Daily Intelligence frames 20 vessels as sitting against a usual 16–21 vessel band, meaning the anomaly is the 100% AIS-dark posture rather than the vessel count itself (https://insights.windward.ai/). The article's phrasing overstates the count anomaly while correctly identifying it as a darkness cluster rather than proof of Saudi complicity.
• UNVERIFIED — the article's characterisation of the two China-linked aborts as specifically 'two Hong Kong-flagged and Chinese-managed' tankers both signalling Chinese crew/ownership in AIS. Windward confirms one Hong Kong-flagged VLCC under Chinese commercial management broadcasting 'CHINESE CREW OWNER'; the flag/management detail for the second vessel was not confirmed. Separately, Bloomberg-sourced reporting counted three China-linked supertankers U-turning by 19 August (https://www.rigzone.com/news/wire/3_chinese_supertankers_abort_hormuz_attempt-19-aug-2026-184406-article/), so the article's count may be an undercount rather than an error.
• UNVERIFIED — the article's dating of its own evidence base ('Kpler and Windward data up to 23–24 August') against a 26 August 2026 dateline. Several underlying observations are from 16–19 August, and at least one Kpler dataset runs to 19 May. The framing implies greater recency than the cited evidence supports.
• UNVERIFIED / NOT ASSESSED — all normative and methodological constructs proposed by the author (the three-tier shadow-fleet taxonomy, the Hormuz Reopening Index and its six components, Dark Route Continuity, Identity Persistence, draft logic, loitering and impossible-voyage indicators, the five-level beneficial-ownership ladder, and the detection matrix). These are analytical proposals, not empirical assertions, and are outside the scope of factual adjudication. They are internally coherent and consistent with standard maritime-domain-awareness practice, but they are the author's own framework and are presented as such.

Confidence

Medium-High (0.79) — Confidence is supported by an unusually high verification yield: 17 of 24 extracted claims were confirmed, several of them matching the originating vendor publications to the exact figure (895 crossings, 6.4%, 53.0%, 40.6%, 5%/66%/80%+, 23-day berth pause, 21→18 waiting-area draw, 20 vessels/17 tankers at Yanbu, AXON I/SALUTE with IMO numbers). Both principal vendors' own publications and the IMO's primary FAQ page were reached directly rather than through intermediaries, and key claims were corroborated across independent outlets (Reuters syndication, Argus, Lloyd's List Intelligence, The National, HSToday, UANI, Bloomberg/Rigzone). Confidence is held below high for five reasons. First, the article's most analytically load-bearing datapoint — the 32% AIS identity mismatch — could not be located anywhere in the indexed record, and its provenance (a rolling, frequently overwritten daily feed) makes retrospective verification structurally difficult; the piece's central 'identity layer' thesis therefore rests on an unreproducible figure. Second, a confirmed date/direction discrepancy in the 19 August transit split indicates at least one transcription error in the handling of vendor data, which raises the prior probability of similar undetected errors elsewhere. Third, the domain is a live armed conflict in which the underlying variables change within hours, so any assessment is inherently time-bounded. Fourth, paywalls limited access to several vendor briefs that would likely have resolved the outstanding items. Fifth, the article's broken citation apparatus prevents claim-by-claim tracing, forcing reverse-engineering of sources and leaving residual uncertainty as to whether a given figure was drawn from the brief this assessment located or from a different, unretrieved one. The trust score of 78 reflects a substantively accurate, methodologically self-aware and emotionally unloaded analysis that is let down by citation hygiene, one unit-level misstatement of a Reuters figure, one unverifiable headline statistic and a material currency gap on the mine question.

Search journal

Strait of Hormuz mines closed shipping August 2026

• https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/13/world/live-news/iran-war-trump
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_campaign
• https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/26/why-hormuz-remains-high-risk-for-ships-despite-us-claims-of-mine-clearing
• https://straits.live/

Iran Oman temporary corridor mine clearing Hormuz Reuters

• https://www.arabnews.com/node/2655830/middle-east
• https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/world/20260826/iran-oman-say-discussed-temporary-hormuz-corridor-mine-clearing
• https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/25/iran-oman-strait-hormuz-oil.html
• https://www.businesstoday.in/world/story/iran-oman-discuss-temporary-corridor-through-hormuz-to-clear-it-of...

Windward Hormuz dark transits August 2026

• https://windward.ai/blog/resolving-charter-disputes-over-dark-periods-in-hormuz/
• https://insights.windward.ai/
• https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-5-august-2026
• https://x.com/WindwardAI/status/2085181835727065303

Kpler Strait of Hormuz TSS transits Iranian alternative route dark unknown

• https://www.kpler.com/blog/hormuz-transits-are-now-outside-the-imo-lane-what-that-means-for-risk-assessment
• https://www.agbi.com/analysis/shipping/2026/07/iran-pushing-hormuz-traffic-north-as-vessels-attacked/
• https://maritime-executive.com/article/dark-transits-of-hormuz-and-spoofing-increase-as-ships-avoid-omani-route
• https://x.com/Kpler/status/2089306298487562343

AXON I LPG carrier sanctioned Iran STS SALUTE

• https://insights.windward.ai/
• https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/analysis/iran-shipping-update-august-14-2026
• https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1152724/Shadow-LPG-carrier-fleet-swells-as-Iran-crackdown-looms
• https://www.rivieramm.com/news-content-hub/us-issues-new-iran-related-sanctions-targeting-12-vessels-with-f...

US blockade Iran oil July 13 reimposed

• https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/11/world/live-news/iran-war-trump
• https://www.nbcnews.com/business/markets/oil-rises-trump-reimposes-hormuz-blockade-rcna587297
• https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/13/world/live-news/iran-war-trump
• https://www.breitbart.com/middle-east/2026/08/21/irans-oil-exports-to-china-crumble-under-u-s-blockade/

Windward 19 August 2026 Hormuz 16 transits 9 dark identity mismatch 74 vessels

• https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-19-august-2026
• https://insights.windward.ai/
• https://windward.ai/blog/resolving-charter-disputes-over-dark-periods-in-hormuz/
• https://windward.ai/blog/commercial-shipping-around-hormuz-is-increasingly-going-dark/

Windward Kharg Island dark tanker NITC covert loading 12 August 2026 western terminal

• https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/08/16/iran-reroutes-oil-flow-as-loading-resumes-at-kha...
• https://windward.ai/blog/kharg-reactivates-as-irans-caspian-corridor-expands/
• https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/khargs-western-terminal-reactivates-as-the-caspian-corridor-structural...
• https://windward.ai/blog/kharg-standstill-and-a-russian-convoy-on-the-arctic-route/

Kpler 895 transits 1 March 19 May Hormuz TSS 6.4%

• https://www.kpler.com/blog/hormuz-transits-are-now-outside-the-imo-lane-what-that-means-for-risk-assessment
• https://x.com/Kpler/status/2089306298487562343
• https://x.com/Kpler/status/2088204108410835334
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_campaign

Kpler MoU week clearances unattributed upstream dark unknown 80% Hormuz

• https://www.kpler.com/blog/60-days-of-a-broken-us-iran-mou-the-market-stopped-waiting-for-hormuz
• https://safety4sea.com/kpler-the-market-has-stopped-waiting-for-full-reopening-of-strait-of-hormuz/
• https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/60-days-of-a-broken-us-iran-mou-the-market-stopped-waiting-for-hormuz/
• https://cyprusshippingnews.com/2026/08/25/60-days-of-a-broken-us-iran-mou-the-market-stopped-waiting-for-hormuz/

Hong Kong flagged Chinese managed tankers turn back before Strait of Hormuz August 2026

• https://maritime-executive.com/article/iran-claims-to-turn-back-chinese-tanker-and-continues-to-detain-uae-vessel
• https://windward.ai/blog/a-fatal-hormuz-strike-and-irans-first-seizure-since-june/
• https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Chinese-Oil-Tankers-Turn-Back-as-Hormuz-Risks-Mount.html
• https://www.rigzone.com/news/wire/3_chinese_supertankers_abort_hormuz_attempt-19-aug-2026-184406-article/

Iran seizes tanker Khasab Qeshm boarding August 2026

• https://windward.ai/blog/a-fatal-hormuz-strike-and-irans-first-seizure-since-june/
• https://maritime-executive.com/article/iran-claims-to-have-seized-uae-tanker-after-multiple-attacks-last-week
• https://ground.news/article/iran-has-seized-a-uae-oil-tanker-in-the-strait-of-hormuz
• https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/maritime-security/iran-tightens-grip-on-strait-of-hormuz-as-shi...

IMO Strait of Hormuz northern southern corridor Iranian Omani waters TSS not recommended mines

• https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/faqs-strait-of-hormuz-evacuation-plan.aspx
• https://www.crisisgroup.org/visual-explainers/hormuz/
• https://www.agbi.com/analysis/shipping/2026/07/hormuz-crossings-resume-via-omani-corridor-despite-irgc-patrols/
• https://maritime-executive.com/article/iran-publishes-redrawn-traffic-scheme-for-strait-of-hormuz

Kpler GNSS interference AIS spoofing Hormuz different phenomena

• https://gcaptain.com/electronic-fog-of-war-gps-spoofing-distorts-ship-traffic-near-hormuz/
• https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260306-surge-gps-interference-strait-hormuz-increases-shipping-risks
• https://www.rics.org/news-insights/gnss-spoofing-and-mitigation-in-the-arabian-gulf
• https://malaysia.news.yahoo.com/surge-gps-interference-around-strait-144523897.html

Windward Kharg LPG sulphur berth first activity 23 days August 19 2026 dark tanker waiting area 21 18

• https://windward.ai/blog/a-fatal-hormuz-strike-and-irans-first-seizure-since-june/
• https://windward.ai/blog/kharg-reactivates-as-irans-caspian-corridor-expands/
• https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/khargs-western-terminal-reactivates-as-the-caspian-corridor-structural...
• https://windward.ai/blog/kharg-standstill-and-a-russian-convoy-on-the-arctic-route/

Windward 74 vessels AIS identity mismatch commercial profile baseline one to two per day Hormuz

• https://blogs.tradlinx.com/ais-data-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-may-be-missing-half-the-picture-here-is-why-tha...
• https://windward.ai/blog/resolving-charter-disputes-over-dark-periods-in-hormuz/
• https://windward.ai/blog/one-month-into-the-ceasefire/
• https://windward.ai/blog/march-10-maritime-intelligence-daily/

Windward Yanbu August 16 2026 20 vessels 17 tankers dark AIS anchorage

• https://windward.ai/blog/a-second-adnoc-strike-and-an-evasion-hub-at-koh-e-mubarak/
• https://insights.windward.ai/
• https://windward.ai/blog/the-houthis-strike-a-saudi-tanker-off-yanbu/
• https://windward.ai/blog/maritime-terms-explained-iran-war/

Windward August 19 2026 Hormuz 16 transits 10 inbound 6 outbound

• https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2869533-outbound-hormuz-transits-drop-to-zero
• https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2869419-outbound-hormuz-transits-drop-to-zero
• https://x.com/WindwardAI/status/2085181835727065303
• https://insights.windward.ai/

Trump all mines removed Strait of Hormuz claim disputed August 2026

• https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-906564
• https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/security/warning-of-mines-in-hormuz-after-trump-claimed-it-was-clear
• https://www.axios.com/2026/08/25/hormuz-mines-remove-oil-iran-trump
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-26/us-allies-cast-doubt-on-trump-s-claim-hormuz-has-been-demined

Windward NITC sanctioned tanker dark 8 July covert loading Kharg 12 August satellite fingerprint

• https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/maritime-security/iran-tightens-grip-on-strait-of-hormuz-as-shi...
• https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/08/16/iran-reroutes-oil-flow-as-loading-resumes-at-kha...
• https://windward.ai/blog/the-ceasefire-collapses-strikes-sanctions-and-u-turns/
• https://windward.ai/blog/one-month-into-the-ceasefire/

Reuters Kpler four vessels crossed Saturday Hormuz weekend August 22 23 2026

• https://www.arabnews.com/node/2655666/amp
• https://indiashippingnews.com/international-shipping/fewer-than-20-ships-transit-key-strait-of-hormuz-over-weekend/
• https://tass.com/world/2176885
• https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-08-20/hormuz-ship-crossings-hover-in-single-digits-data-shows

Argus Hormuz outbound transits drop to zero 25 August 2026 Windward

• https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2869533-outbound-hormuz-transits-drop-to-zero
• https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2869081-hormuz-weekend-traffic-mixed-wit...
• https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2869183-iran-s-pgsa-blacklist-deepens-ho...
• https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2869419-outbound-hormuz-transits-drop-to-zero

attacks on dark vessels Gulf of Oman southern Hormuz August 2026 tanker struck projectile

• https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/08/24/oman-Hormuz-tanker-attacked/9311787626785/
• https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/unknown-projectile-hits-oil-tanker-off-oman-ukmto-1.500651171
• https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/27/us-iran-war-trump-hormuz-attack-mine-.html
• https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/7/ships-attacked-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-what-that-means-for-ongoing-talks

Lloyd's List Intelligence Hormuz brief 26 August 2026 transits / insights.windward.ai daily intelligence identity mismatch baseline / Windward false flag Angola AXON I blockade breaker

• https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-19-august-2026
• https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-29-july-2026
• https://windward.ai/knowledge-base/windward-counter-narcotics-intelligence-report-june-2026/
• https://insights.windward.ai/
• https://hejon07.substack.com/p/the-strait-that-feeds-the-world

Article metrics

Emotion 1% · Reading grade 7.1 · 2920 words