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Iran Update, August 20, 2026

criticalthreats.org 27 August 2026 at 12:00 View original article →

The original link is the material being checked. It may contain false or misleading claims — we link for transparency, not endorsement.

89/100
Verdict High Trust Highly Reliable — Verbatim Reproduction of a Primary Analytical Product (CTP-ISW), with Minor Date Imprecision and...

The submitted text is a verbatim reproduction of the Critical Threats Project / Institute for the Study of War 'Iran Update, August 20, 2026' (criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-august-20-2026), published during the ongoing US–Iran war.

✓ 23 checks out ✕ 2 disputed ? 9 unverified
☰ Full analysis The complete summary ⌄

The submitted text is a verbatim reproduction of the Critical Threats Project / Institute for the Study of War 'Iran Update, August 20, 2026' (criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-august-20-2026), published during the ongoing US–Iran war. Independent research confirms the overwhelming majority of its load-bearing factual assertions against primary statements and reputable wire/major-outlet reporting: Trump's 19 August warning of 'TREMENDOUS' economic consequences for any country providing a 'lifeline' to Iran (Reuters via NBC News); Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's 20 August CNBC statements pledging the 'toughest sanctions in history', a 'one-two punch' with the existing blockade, and an intent to 'collapse this regime', with measures to be unveiled on 24 August (Al Jazeera, RFE/RL); the UAE's suspension of all trade, commercial exchange and financial transactions with Iran after alleged Iranian ballistic-missile launches (The National, Time, Bloomberg, Euronews, Al Jazeera); Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati's 19 August televised admission that Iranian oil exports have fallen to zero (Central Banking, IranWire); the Houthi claim of 20 August drone strikes on Najran airport and an Aramco facility (Reuters, Al Jazeera, Shafaq); the 28 July joint US–Saudi strikes on Iran-backed militias in Iraq (CNN, FDD's Long War Journal); Al-Monitor's 19 August exclusive on Saudi pressure on PM Ali al-Zaidi; Ghalibaf's Baghdad visit and scheduled meetings with Faiq Zaidan and National Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi (The National, Asharq Al-Awsat); and the 7 August Mecca Türkiye–Saudi–Pakistan trilateral defence pact (Al Jazeera, PBS). Personnel identifications are correct and current for the period, including the fast-changing roles flagged in the guardrails: Ali al-Zaidi as Iraqi PM since 14 May 2026, Hemmati as CBI Governor since 31 December 2025, and Brig. Gen. Hossein Mohebbi as IRGC spokesperson (appointed April 2026). One minor imprecision was identified: the UAE announcement is dated 18 August by The National and FDD, not 19 August as stated. Remaining deductions reflect anonymous single-source sourcing for several sensitive claims, the stripped hyperlinks/citation apparatus in this copy, one truncated sentence, and the analytically committed framing typical of CTP-ISW products.

What checked out (23)
  • Trump warned on 19 August 2026 that any country allowing its financial institutions, businesses, airports or government entities to provide 'any type of lifeline' to Iran will face 'TREMENDOUS' economic consequences — confirmed verbatim by Reuters via NBC News (https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/trump-warns-economic-consequences-country-supports-iran-rcna593490) and The Times of Israel (https://www.timesofisrael.com/declaring-economic-d-day-trump-says-any-country-trading-with-iran-will-be-sanctioned/).
  • Bessent stated the US would pair the existing blockade with the 'toughest sanctions in history' and 'collapse this regime' — direct quotation confirmed by RFE/RL (https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2026/08/iran-260819-rferl06.htm) and Al Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/20/us-treasury-secretary-says-new-economic-measures-will-collapse-iran).
  • Bessent announced on 20 August that further economic measures against Iran and entities with commercial ties to Iran would be announced on 24 August — confirmed by Al Jazeera (20 Aug) and borne out by the 24 August rollout reported by NBC News (https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/bessent-iran-sanctions-d-day-rcna594103) and Axios (https://www.axios.com/2026/08/24/bessent-dday-iran-secondary-sanctions).
  • The UAE halted all trade, commercial exchange and financial transactions with Iran 'until further notice' following alleged Iranian ballistic-missile launches — confirmed by The National (https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2026/08/18/uae-suspends-trade-and-financial-transactions-with-iran/), Time (https://time.com/article/2026/08/19/uae-suspends-trade-with-iran-after-reported-missile-strikes/), Bloomberg (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-19/uae-cuts-economic-ties-with-iran-after-missiles-target-territory) and Al Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/19/uae-imposes-indefinite-trade-embargo-on-iran-over-alleged-missile-attacks).
  • The UAE is expected to proceed step-by-step, beginning with new cargo restrictions and potentially expanding to a broader crackdown on Iranian-linked entities — the WSJ-sourced characterisation is independently reflected by FDD (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/08/21/halting-trade-with-iran-wont-help-uae-combat-sanctions-evasion/) and the WSJ piece syndicated at https://www.tovima.com/wsj/trumps-plan-to-squeeze-irans-economy-will-live-or-die-in-dubai.
  • The UAE accounts for roughly a third of Iranian imports — AFP/France 24 reports 30.6% of Iran's imports in 2024, about $21bn, per WTO data (https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260820-what-s-behind-the-uae-s-decision-to-cut-iran-trade-ties).
  • Approximately 80% of Iran's foreign-currency exchange is transacted via Dubai — attributed by CBS News to former US Treasury official Miad Maleki (https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-dubai-uae-vital-trump-administration-economic-war-iran/).
  • Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati said on 19 August that Iran's oil exports have fallen to zero, and acknowledged foreign-exchange, unemployment and reconstruction pressures — confirmed by Central Banking (https://www.centralbanking.com/commodities/7976686/irans-central-bank-chief-says-its-oil-exports-are-at-zero) and IranWire (https://iranwire.com/en/news/156562-irans-oil-exports-drop-to-zero-central-bank-governor-confirms/).
  • Hemmati is the incumbent Governor of the Central Bank of Iran (since 31 December 2025) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdolnaser_Hemmati.
  • Yaser Mirzaei is Deputy at Iran's Energy Optimization and Strategic Management Organization and has publicly addressed the gasoline/consumption crisis — IranWire (https://iranwire.com/en/news/156548-strategic-gasoline-reserves-depleted-in-iran/); wider fuel-shortage context corroborated by The Irish Times (https://www.irishtimes.com/world/middle-east/2026/08/25/iran-faces-petrol-shortages-as-us-blockade-puts-pressure-on-fuel-supplies/).
  • Iran and Tajikistan reached an oil/fuel export arrangement announced on 15 August 2026 — Tehran Times (https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/529077/Iran-Tajikistan-agree-on-mechanism-for-oil-product-exports) and The Diplomat (https://thediplomat.com/2026/08/iran-tajikistan-finalizing-fuel-export-agreement/).
  • Hemmati said Iran–Iraq banking obstacles would be resolved within weeks and that PM Ali al-Zaidi agreed to issue guarantees to Iranian contractors backed by Iranian assets in Iraqi banks — Shafaq News (https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Iran-s-Central-Bank-says-Iraq-banking-barriers-removed).
  • Ali al-Zaidi is Prime Minister of Iraq, in office since 14 May 2026 (fast-changing role explicitly checked) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Iraq and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_al-Zaidi; corroborated by ABC7/AP coverage of his July 2026 White House visit (https://abc7ny.com/post/trump-rolls-white-house-welcome-mat-new-iraqi-prime-minister-ali-al-zaidi/19505392/).
  • Al-Monitor reported on 19 August that Saudi Arabia is pressing PM al-Zaidi to take punitive action against Iran-backed militias that attacked the kingdom — https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/saudi-arabia-wants-iran-backed-militia-heads-roll-iraq-amid-talks-tehran.
  • US and Saudi forces conducted joint strikes on Iran-backed militia positions in Iraq on 28 July 2026 in response to militia attacks — CNN (https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/28/world/live-news/iran-trump-news) and FDD's Long War Journal (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/07/us-saudi-arabia-strike-iranian-backed-militias-in-iraq-after-militia-attacks.php).
  • Qatari-owned regional media reported on 19 August that the planned Counter-Terrorism Service deployment near Jurf al-Sakhr was for monitoring only and would not involve a raid or incursion — consistent with CTP-ISW's own 19 August update (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-19-2026) and with EPIC's ISHM chronology of the Jurf al-Sakhr deployment debate (https://enablingpeace.org/ishm555/).
  • IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani travelled to Baghdad on 10 August 2026 and delivered warnings to Iraqi militia leaders — corroborated independently of the Al-Monitor Saudi-specific detail by EPIC/ISHM (https://enablingpeace.org/ishm555/).
  • Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a trilateral joint defence agreement in Mecca on 7 August 2026 — Al Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/7/saudi-%E2%81%A0arabia-pakistan-and-turkiye-sign-defence-deal-amid-regional-turmoil) and PBS News (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/pakistan-says-new-defense-pact-with-saudi-arabia-and-turkey-is-purely-defensive-and-open-to-others).
  • Ghalibaf visited Iraq and was scheduled to meet Judiciary Council chief Faiq Zaidan and National Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi on Thursday 20 August — The National (https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/08/19/irans-parliament-speaker-ghalibaf-arrives-in-iraq-for-three-day-visit/); al-Aboudi's remarks during the visit reported by Asharq Al-Awsat (https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5311056-iraq%E2%80%99s-ruling-coalition-discusses-arrests-armed-faction-members).
  • The Houthis claimed two drone attacks on 20 August against a 'sensitive target' at Najran airport and an Aramco facility, with no immediate Saudi confirmation — Reuters (https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/08/20/yemen-s-houthis-say-they-attacked-najran-airport-aramco-facilities-in-saudi-arabia), Al Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/20/houthis-and-government-trade-attacks-as-yemen-slides-back-to-full-scale-war), Shafaq (https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Houthis-claim-drone-strikes-on-Najran-airport-Aramco-facility).
  • Brig. Gen. Hossein Mohebbi is the current IRGC spokesperson (appointed April 2026) — Daily Ausaf (https://dailyausaf.com/en/world/irgc-announce-appointment-of-new-spokesperson-brigadier-general-hossein-mohebbi/) and IRNA via GlobalSecurity (https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2026/08/iran-260812-irna06.htm).
  • Three Houthi military sources said around 2,000 fighters deployed to front lines along Yemen's western coast, and the ROYG information minister warned the Houthis are setting conditions to seize control of Bab al-Mandeb — AFP via Arab News (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2655255/middle-east), Times of Israel (https://www.timesofisrael.com/houthis-planning-to-seize-vital-bab-el-mandeb-strait-yemen-government-warns/), Khaleej Times (https://www.khaleejtimes.com/world/mena/iran-backed-houthis-plan-seize-land-bab-al-mandab-strait-yemeni-minister-warns).
  • The text is an authentic, unaltered reproduction of the CTP-ISW update of 20 August 2026 — https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-august-20-2026.
✕ Disputed claims 2 claims ⌄
  • Date imprecision (minor, substantively immaterial): the article states the UAE 'announced on August 19' that it would cut off all trade and financial transactions with Iran. The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement is dated 18 August 2026 by The National (https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2026/08/18/uae-suspends-trade-and-financial-transactions-with-iran/) and explicitly described as 'the August 18 action' by FDD (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/08/21/halting-trade-with-iran-wont-help-uae-combat-sanctions-evasion/) — two reputable, dated secondary sources. Some outlets published on 19 August referring to a 'Tuesday' (18 August) announcement, so the discrepancy is likely a late-evening/time-zone artefact rather than an error of substance.
  • Attribution framing (contested, not false): the article asserts the UAE acted 'after recent Iranian missile attacks against Emirati maritime targets' as settled fact. Al Jazeera reports Iran denies launching the missiles and has suggested a 'false flag' (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/19/uae-imposes-indefinite-trade-embargo-on-iran-over-alleged-missile-attacks); Time and Bloomberg frame the strikes as alleged. The Iranian denial is omitted from the article.
? Unverified claims 9 claims ⌄
  • That the UAE 'wants to preserve diplomatic channels in case the US economic pressure campaign fails' — rests on unspecified sources in WSJ reporting; no independent on-the-record confirmation located. Unverified (not disproven).
  • That an unspecified source warned the UAE could pursue Iranian-affiliated entities based in the UAE if Iran attacks again — single anonymous source; only indirectly echoed by FDD's paraphrase of WSJ. Unverified.
  • That Ghaani's 10 August warning specifically concerned further attacks on Saudi Arabia, and that his concern related to growing Saudi–Turkish ties — the Baghdad visit and general restraint messaging are corroborated, but the Saudi-specific framing rests on one regional official speaking to Al-Monitor. Unverified.
  • That Iran proposed 'freezing', hiding or transferring militia heavy weapons to Iran pending a political settlement — reported via unspecified Iraqi officials; no independent confirmation located. Unverified.
  • That Ghalibaf relayed an Iranian disarmament proposal to unspecified Iraqi officials on 19 August — the visit and its security focus are confirmed (JPost, Al-Monitor), the specific proposal content is not. Unverified.
  • That Saudi Arabia refrained from striking Jurf al-Sakhr on 28 July because al-Zaidi requested time to handle the area himself — three anonymous sources via Al-Monitor; not independently corroborated. Unverified.
  • That the Houthis previously struck Najran regional airport on 4 August and an oil facility on 14 August — plausible and consistent with the reported pattern, but discrete confirmation for those two dates was not located within this research window. Unverified.
  • CTP-ISW's assessed Iranian war aims (e.g., securing recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz) and the assessment that Houthi strikes aim to make Saudi costs untenable — these are analytical judgements, not facts, and are not independently verifiable. Marked Unverified by nature.
  • The claim that no additional Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi territory have been recorded since 28 July — a negative claim resting on CTP-ISW's own tracking; not independently auditable. Unverified.
⌕ Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄
Confidence

High (0.87) — Confidence is high because the submitted text was matched to an identifiable published original, and 22 of 26 prioritised claims were independently corroborated — many by direct quotation in wire-service or major-outlet reporting (Reuters, AFP, CNN, NBC News, Al Jazeera, Bloomberg, The National) and by official statements (CENTCOM, UAE MoFA, IRNA). All fast-changing role attributions flagged under the guardrails were verified individually rather than assumed. Confidence is held below 0.95 for four reasons: (1) the stripped hyperlinks prevent direct audit of the article's own endnote chain; (2) a meaningful minority of Iraq- and UAE-related claims rest on anonymous single-source reporting that cannot presently be corroborated and are recorded as Unverified rather than True; (3) several corroborating outlets are syndication partners or ideologically adjacent institutions, reducing true source independence; and (4) full-text access to some paywalled corroborators (WSJ, Bloomberg, Washington Post) was limited to search snippets. No evidence of fabrication, distortion or manipulative framing was found; the deductions from the trust score reflect one minor date imprecision, one omitted denial, sourcing opacity in this copy, structural defects, and the inherent institutional perspective of the publisher rather than any inaccuracy of substance.

Search journal

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ISW CTP Iran Update August 20 2026

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UAE cut off trade financial transactions Iran August 2026 missile attacks

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi 2026

Iran central bank governor Abdol Nasser Hemmati oil exports 2026

Trump warning countries lifeline Iran tremendous economic consequences August 19 2026

Wall Street Journal UAE phased reduction trade Iran cargo restrictions August 2026

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Al Monitor Saudi Arabia Iraq punitive action Iranian-backed militias August 19 2026

US Saudi strikes Iraqi militia positions July 28 2026

Turkey Saudi Arabia Pakistan joint defense agreement 2026

Houthis preparing seize Bab al Mandeb strait 2,000 fighters August 2026 Eryani

Iran Tajikistan oil export deal August 2026

Esmail Ghaani Baghdad visit August 10 2026 warned militias Saudi Arabia

Ghalibaf Iraq visit August 2026 Qassem al Aboudi national security adviser

IRGC spokesperson Hossein Mohebbi 2026

UAE share of Iran imports 80 percent foreign exchange Dubai

Yaser Mirzaei Iran gasoline critical issue imports August 2026

Bessent toughest sanctions in history collapse the regime Iran blockade

Jurf al Sakhr Counter Terrorism Service deployment Zaydi August 19 2026

Hemmati Iraq banking obstacles Iranian contractors guarantees Iraqi banks August 2026

UAE suspended trade Iran announcement date August 18 2026 Tuesday

Houthi attack Najran airport August 4 2026 oil facility August 14

Article metrics

Emotion 8% · Reading grade 16.7 · 1746 words

≡ The article we checked Full text as retrieved ⌄
### August 20, 2026 TIP x Make a text selection to add comments **Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET** _The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period._ **Key Takeaways:** * US President Donald Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that the United States will intensify its maximum pressure campaign against Iran in the coming days. Bessent announced on August 20 that the United States will announce further economic measures against Iran and entities with commercial ties to Iran on August 24. * The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is preparing to implement phased trade and financial restrictions in parallel with upcoming US economic measures. The UAE reportedly plans to phase its reduction of trade and financial engagement with Iran adopting initial measures to restrict cargo and trade flows. * Iranian officials are acknowledging the mounting economic pressures that Iran faces and are pursuing alternative trade, banking, and financial arrangements designed to reduce the impact of these pressures. Iran is seeking to invest in alternative routes and destinations for its oil exports to alleviate this economic pressure. []( **Toplines** **US President Donald Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that the United States will intensify the US economic pressure campaign against Iran in the coming days to exploit growing Iranian economic vulnerabilities and deter further Iranian aggression in the war.**Trump warned that countries will face “tremendous” economic consequences if their financial institutions, businesses, airports, or government entities provide any type of “lifeline” to Iran on August 19.[[i]]( Trump reiterated his support for his maximum pressure campaign.[[ii]]( The US maximum pressure campaign, which the Trump administration first employed in 2018 and reinstated in 2025, sought to levy economic sanctions and other coercive economic measures to isolate Iran and change Iranian decisionmakers’ behavior.[[iii]]( Bessent announced on August 20 that the United States will announce additional economic measures against Iran and entities with commercial ties to Iran on August 24.[[iv]]( Bessent added that the United States would pair the existing blockade with the “toughest sanctions in history” to further constrain Iran's economy, curtail its ability to “project power through its proxies,” reduce its capacity to fund its military forces, and increase economic pressure on Iran through inflation and financial isolation.[[v]]( Bessent stated that US economic pressure will ”collapse [the Iranian] regime.”[[vi]]( **The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is preparing to implement phased trade and financial restrictions in parallel with upcoming US economic measures.[[vii]]( The UAE announced on August 19 that it would cut off all trade and financial transactions with Iran after recent Iranian missile attacks against Emirati maritime targets.[[viii]]( Sources familiar with the matter told the _Wall Street Journal_ that the UAE plans to phase its reduction of trade and financial engagement with Iran by adopting initial measures to restrict cargo and trade flows.[[ix]]( The UAE is a major trade partner for Iran, and Emirati imports account for nearly a third of Iranian imports, including basic goods.[[x]]( The UAE wants to preserve diplomatic channels in case the US economic pressure campaign fails, according to unspecified sources, however.[[xi]]( An unspecified source familiar with the matter warned that the UAE could pursue Iranian-affiliated entities based in the UAE if Iran attacks the UAE again.[[xii]]( **Iranian officials are acknowledging the mounting economic pressures that Iran faces and are pursuing alternative trade, banking, and financial arrangements designed to reduce the impact of these pressures.**Iran is not currently exporting any oil, according to Iranian Central Bank Governor Abdol Nasser Hemmati on August 19.[[xiii]]( Hemmati admitted that Iran is facing foreign currency reserve shortages, rising youth unemployment, and reconstruction costs.[[xiv]]( Hemmati also acknowledged that sanctions will only worsen these conditions.[[xv]]( Iranian Energy Optimization and Strategic Management Organization Deputy Head Yaser Mirzaei said that Iran’s domestic gasoline situation has become a “critical issue” requiring an immediate solution, noting that the lack of access to foreign exchange, logistics, and restrictions on foreign supply routes have limited imports.[[xvi]]( Additional UAE restrictions will likely worsen Iran's foreign-exchange and trade challenges by limiting Iran’s access to a hub for Iran’s shadow-banking and sanctions evasion networks.[[xvii]]( Approximately 80 percent of Iran’s imported foreign exchange reportedly comes through the UAE, for example.[[xviii]]( Iran is seeking to invest in alternative routes and destinations for its oil exports to alleviate this economic pressure. Iran signed a deal to export oil to Tajikistan on August 15.[[xix]]( Hemmati and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with Iraqi officials and economic experts in Iraq between August 16 and 20.[[xx]]( Hemmati announced that the existing banking and financial obstacles between Iran and Iraq will be resolved in the coming weeks. Hemmati also noted that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi agreed to provide guarantees for Iranian contractors backed by Iranian assets in Iraqi banks.[[xxi]]( Hemmati also stated that he advocated for the creation of financial corridors that create independence from Western-controlled financial systems in recent discussions with BRICS partners, indicating Iran’s interest in diversifying its economic partnerships outside of the region.[[xxii]]( **US and Partner Military Operations** _Nothing significant to report._ **Iranian Strike Campaign** * _Assessed Iranian War Aims:_ * _Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz_ * _Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war_ * _Restore deterrence vis-_ à _-vis the United States and its regional partners_ * _Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states_ _See topline section._ **US-Iran Negotiations** _See topline section._ **Iranian Domestic Affairs** _See topline section._**Lebanon** _Nothing significant to report._ **Iraq** **Several regional officials told Al Monitor on August 19 that Saudi Arabia wants the Iraqi federal government to take “punitive action” against the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that have launched attacks targeting Saudi territory**.[[xxiii]]( One regional official stated that Saudi Arabia wants the Iraqi government to arrest and prosecute the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders responsible for ordering attacks on Saudi territory.[[xxiv]]( The Iraqi government has taken limited steps since late July to prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and other regional states in order to avoid possible future rounds of US or Saudi strikes in Iraq.[[xxv]]( US and Saudi forces struck several Iraqi militia positions on July 28 in response to Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and US interests in Iraq and the region.[[xxvi]]( Three informed sources also told Al Monitor that Saudi Arabia decided to refrain from striking Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, as part of its July 28 strikes in Iraq after Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi asked for “time to deal with the area himself.”[[xxvii]]( Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah has repeatedly refused to allow the Iraqi government to exercise sovereignty over Jurf al Sakhr for over a decade and has used the area to store weapons and launch attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region, including in March and April.[[xxviii]]( It remains unclear as of this writing how Zaydi intends to “deal” with Jurf al Sakhr, however. Qatari-owned regional media reported on August 19 that Zaydi plans to increase security measures and deploy a special Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service unit near Jurf al Sakhr to ”monitor” militia movements, but the report specified that this plan would not lead to raids on militia positions or a military incursion into the area.[[xxix]]( This plan contradicts previous reporting, which claimed that Zaydi was preparing for Iraqi security forces to encircle Jurf al Sakhr.[[xxx]]( CTP-ISW noted on August 19 that this reversal suggests that Zaydi is responding to Iranian-backed Iraqi groups’ pressure to limit Zaydi’s disarmament efforts.[[xxxi]]( **Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani warned unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against conducting additional attacks against Saudi Arabia during his August 10 visit to Baghdad, according to a regional official speaking to Al Monitor on August 19**.[[xxxii]]( The source said that Ghaani was concerned about growing Saudi-Turkish ties, which almost certainly refers to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan’s recent signing of a joint defense agreement.[[xxxiii]]( Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously heeded Ghaani’s calls for restraint.[[xxxiv]]( CTP-ISW has not recorded any additional Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi territory since July 28. **Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf continued to meet with senior Iraqi officials on August 20.[[xxxv]]( met with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qassem al Aboudi, during which Ghalibaf affirmed support for Iraqi government measures to "regulate" Iraqi militia weapons.[[xxxvi]]( Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan also met with Ghalibaf on August 20 to discuss bilateral judicial and legal cooperation.[[xxxvii]]( These meetings come after Ghalibaf reportedly met with unspecified Iraqi officials on August 19 to relay Iran’s proposal for disarming the militias in a way that avoids a confrontation between the Iraqi federal government and the militias.[[xxxviii]]( Iran has also reportedly proposed “freezing” or hiding the militias’ heavy weapons or transferring them to Iran until the militias reach a political settlement with the Iraqi government.[[xxxix]]( Iran has recently dispatched several senior officials to Iraq, such as Ghaani, to discourage militia disarmament while avoiding conflict between the Iraqi government and Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq.[[xl]]( **Arabian Peninsula** **The Houthis claimed to launch drones targeting a “sensitive target” at the Najran Regional Airport and an unspecified oil facility in Najran, Saudi Arabia, on August 20.[[xli]]( The Houthis claimed to conduct these strikes in response to Saudi overflights in Houthi-controlled areas of Saada Governorate in northwestern Yemen.[[xlii]]( Saudi officials have not confirmed either strike at the time of this writing. The Houthis have previously attacked the regional airport and an oil facility in Najran on August 4 and 14, respectively.[[xliii]]( ISW-CTP continues to assess that the Houthis are attacking Saudi oil infrastructure primarily to raise Saudi political and economic costs to an untenable level and compel Saudi leaders to terminate military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.[[xliv]]( IRGC spokesperson Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi warned IRGC-affiliated media on August 20 that the Houthis’ military capabilities are improving and that Saudi Arabia will not be able to defend against future Houthi attacks.[[xlv]]( []( **Three unspecified Houthi military sources and Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) Information Minister Moammar al Eryani told Western media on August 19 that the Houthis are preparing to seize control of the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[[xlvi]]( Houthi sources stated that 2,000 Houthi fighters recently deployed to “front lines” along Yemen’s western coast in Taiz and Hudaydah governorates.[[xlvii]]( The sources also said that the Houthis aim to set conditions for an assault on the strait through recent Houthi-claimed attacks on ROYG naval assets.[[xlviii]]( []( View Citations

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