Polls | Gaza | Fact Checker | Support Us
Sign In | Join Free |
UK FACT CHECK POLITICS

UK FACT CHECK POLITICS

 Voting intention Labour Lab 29% Reform Ref 27% Con Con 21% Lib Dem LD 8% Green Grn 8% Poll tracker

Menu

Topics
About
Get Involved
Follow Us

Account

Inside Iran’s Information War on the US – AI, Propaganda, and Perception Management

rsis.edu.sg 25 August 2026 at 05:08 View original article →

The original link is the material being checked. It may contain false or misleading claims — we link for transparency, not endorsement.

79/100
Verdict Mixed Largely Reliable – Credible analysis with minor sourcing and attribution caveats

This is an expert commentary (published by RSIS on 6 May 2026, authored by ORF fellow Dr Soumya Awasthi) analysing the information-warfare dimension of the 2026 Iran-Israel-US conflict.

✓ 11 checks out ✕ 3 disputed ? 8 unverified
☰ Full analysis The complete summary ⌄

This is an expert commentary (published by RSIS on 6 May 2026, authored by ORF fellow Dr Soumya Awasthi) analysing the information-warfare dimension of the 2026 Iran-Israel-US conflict. Its core factual scaffolding checks out against primary and reputable secondary reporting: US-Israeli strikes on Iran began on 28 February 2026; Iran-linked actors produced viral AI 'Lego-style' videos mocking Trump and Netanyahu with rap soundtracks; a Trump-as-Teletubby clip circulated; military spokesman Ebrahim Zolfaghari delivered the 'Hey Trump, you are fired' line in English in March 2026; Iranian state media claimed mobilisation of over one million troops and warned of 'historic hell' for US forces; footage of armed Iranian women circulated as resilience messaging; and the White House posted movie/video-game 'hype' montages (Braveheart, Mortal Kombat 'Perfect Victory', GTA 'wasted') that drew widespread criticism. The main weaknesses are interpretive rather than factual: the piece asserts a tighter 'state-directed' command chain over the Lego/meme output than open-source attribution currently supports (Canada's RRM assesses state linkage, while RFE/RL and fact-checkers note it is unclear whether creators take direct orders from Tehran); it describes Zolfaghari as an 'IRGC spokesman' and later an 'IRGC general' when most sources identify him as spokesperson for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters with disputed rank; the Ipsos characterisation of US opinion as 'overwhelmingly' anti-war overstates contemporaneous polling (majority opposition, not overwhelming, in March-April 2026); and the 'Brooking's' attribution is ambiguous, since the quoted line traces to Emerson T. Brooking of the Atlantic Council's DFRLab via NPR, not the Brookings Institution. Hyperlinks in the supplied text are truncated/empty, so embedded sourcing could not be inspected as published.

What checked out (11)
  • The United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran in February 2026 – confirmed for 28 February 2026 by the UK House of Commons Library, US Congressional Research Service, Just Security and Britannica.
  • AI-generated 'Lego-style' videos depicting Trump and Netanyahu as minifigures circulated widely from March 2026, using bespoke rap/trap soundtracks and anti-US messaging – confirmed by France 24, TIME, Forbes, Al Jazeera, IranWire and the Christian Science Monitor.
  • A satirical clip depicting Trump as a Teletubby in an American-flag outfit playing with toy fighter jets in the Oval Office was part of the Iranian meme output – confirmed by NPR (26 March 2026) and affiliate broadcasters.
  • Iranian military spokesman Ebrahim Zolfaghari mocked Trump in English with the line 'Hey Trump, you are fired' in a March 2026 video – confirmed by The Jerusalem Post (23 March 2026) and multiple video records.
  • Iranian state media claimed mobilisation of more than one million troops and warned of a 'historic hell' for US forces – confirmed by CNN, The New Arab and other outlets (26-27 March 2026).
  • Footage of Iranian women undergoing weapons/combat training was promoted by state-linked media as evidence of national resilience – confirmed by Euronews (28 April 2026) and Indian outlets, with authenticity of some clips questioned.
  • The White House posted montages splicing real strike footage with film, TV and video-game clips (including Braveheart, Iron Man 2, Gladiator, Mortal Kombat's 'Perfect victory' and GTA's 'wasted'), attracting significant criticism – confirmed by ABC News, NBC News, France 24 and Ynet.
  • Major platforms (X, Meta, TikTok) were reported as largely silent on takedowns or labelling of pro-Iran AI videos – confirmed by Forbes (28 March 2026), citing Graphika's tracing of one Lego video to the Telegram account Akhbar Enfejari.
  • France 24 reported an Iranian online influence campaign using AI-generated photographs, videos and memes aimed at shaping US public opinion and amplifying anti-war sentiment – confirmed by France 24 (25-26 March 2026).
  • The author biography is accurate: Dr Soumya Awasthi is a Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation – confirmed by ORF's own expert page.
  • US public support for the Iran war was low and declining through 2026 – confirmed by Reuters/Ipsos tracking (37% support in March, ~33% approval in mid-year, 31% by late August 2026) and Marist (56% opposition, March 2026).
✕ Disputed claims 3 claims ⌄
  • DISPUTED (not false): Ebrahim Zolfaghari is described as an 'IRGC spokesman' and later as an 'IRGC general'. Most sources identify him as spokesperson for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (a joint armed-forces command); reported rank varies between Lieutenant Colonel and Brigadier General across sources. Insufficient primary evidence to declare False; flagged as imprecise.
  • DISPUTED (attribution ambiguity): the quotation 'Americans are not used to seeing messages from a country the US is bombing that are directed at them' is rendered as 'Brooking's' observation. The quote traces to Emerson T. Brooking of the Atlantic Council's DFRLab via NPR (26 March 2026), not the Brookings Institution; the possessive form risks institutional misattribution.
  • DISPUTED (overstatement): the claim that Ipsos polling shows US opinion 'overwhelmingly' against the war. At publication (early May 2026), Ipsos/Reuters and Marist data showed clear majority opposition (roughly 56-62% opposed/disapproving) rather than overwhelming opposition.
? Unverified claims 8 claims ⌄
  • That the Iranian meme/AI output is 'state-directed' in a chain-of-command sense: RRM Canada links the Explosive Media network to the Iranian state and TIME/JPost tie some Lego content to the state-run Revayat-e Fath institute, but RFE/RL and fact-checking outlets note it remains unclear whether creators receive direct orders from Tehran; treated as Unverified in its strongest formulation.
  • That Iran's doctrine is characterised by 'reflexive control' feeding adversaries curated information to induce favourable decisions – a plausible analytical framing, but no cited primary doctrinal source was located.
  • That the United States has focused its propaganda 'primarily on domestic audiences' while Iranian content is deliberately global – directionally consistent with reporting on White House 'hype' videos and Iran's English-language targeting, but no quantitative audience-targeting study was located to confirm the asymmetry as stated.
  • That Iran's messaging is measurably more effective than the US counter-narrative – engagement figures reported by Foreign Policy and CSMonitor support relative virality, but no independent effectiveness study confirming persuasive impact was located.
  • That the demographic 'least likely to encounter institutional media is the one most saturated with Iranian propaganda' – no audience-measurement source located to verify this specific saturation claim.
  • That platform non-intervention should be read as a deliberate 'policy choice with strategic consequences' – normative/policy inference, not a verifiable fact.
  • The exact framing that this is 'the first conflict in which AI has been used intentionally and at scale to sow chaos' – France 24's reporting supports large-scale intentional AI use, but the 'first' claim is contested, since EDMO and other researchers applied similar 'first AI war' language to the 2024-2025 Israel-Iran exchanges.
  • Iran's characterisation as targeting Gulf/Arab states specifically to deter support for the US-Israel coalition – consistent with INSS analysis of covert Gulf channels, but the deterrence-of-partners mechanism as described was not independently confirmed.
⌕ Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄
Confidence

High (0.83) on artefact-level factual claims; Moderate (0.55) on doctrinal, attribution and effectiveness claims. — Confidence is high for the article's verifiable factual spine because it was corroborated by at least one primary or governmental source plus multiple independent, dated secondary outlets across several jurisdictions (CRS, House of Commons Library, RRM Canada, NPR, France 24, Forbes, ABC/NBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, RFE/RL). Confidence is reduced to moderate for the interpretive layer because attribution of the AI video ecosystem to a directed state apparatus remains contested in the open-source record, no measurement study substantiates the comparative-effectiveness and audience-saturation claims, and the article's own hyperlinks were truncated in the supplied text, preventing an audit of its declared evidence base. Two role- and figure-sensitive items (Zolfaghari's post and rank; the strength of anti-war polling) were handled conservatively under the fast-changing-facts guardrail and marked Disputed rather than False.

Search journal

United States Israel strikes Iran February 2026

Iran AI propaganda Lego video Trump Netanyahu

Ebrahim Zolfaghari IRGC spokesman "you are fired" Trump video

France 24 investigation Iran information war AI disinformation

Iran propaganda Trump Teletubby video Oval Office AI

Ipsos poll Americans oppose war with Iran 2026

Brookings "Americans are not used to seeing messages" Iran propaganda

Emerson Brooking Atlantic Council DFRLab senior fellow Iran propaganda NPR

White House video Braveheart Mortal Kombat Iran strikes slopaganda

White House hype videos criticism no casualties sanitised strikes Iran experts propaganda

Tehran Times one million troops "historic hell" US forces Iran

Iranian women training combat video propaganda Middle East Monitor 2026

Forbes pro-Iran videos X Meta TikTok silent Graphika attribution state

Iran Lego video rap music warning message United States Nour News state media

attribution pro-Iran AI videos unclear whether state directed influence operation 2026

Iranian state media Revayat-e Fath Explosive Media Lego videos state television broadcast

Soumya Awasthi Observer Research Foundation fellow Centre for Security Strategy Technology

Iran information war Gulf states audiences reflexive control state media covert social media networks 2026 report

Article metrics

Emotion 14% · Reading grade 17.5 · 1287 words

≡ The article we checked Full text as retrieved ⌄
## SYNOPSIS _Iran’s information war against the United States employs AI-driven propaganda, cyber operations, and perception management to exploit societal divisions. Through strategic timing and platform-specific tactics, Iran contrasts US communication models with an objective to influence public opinion, undermine trust, and achieve cognitive and geopolitical advantages._ ## COMMENTARY When the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran in February 2026, they initiated not only kinetic but also cognitive operations. Alongside missiles and drone formations, these nations have engaged in a sustained and increasingly sophisticated information campaign that is reshaping how audiences worldwide perceive, process, and assign moral weight to the war. What distinguishes this conflict from its predecessors is not merely the presence of propaganda but the unprecedented integration of generative artificial intelligence, platform-native content formats, and[state-directed memetic operations]( a coherent, real-time information warfare doctrine. The world is witnessing an[AI Slop Propaganda War,]( the information domain constituting part of the conflict, alongside land, sea, air, and cyber operations. In the Iran-Israel-US war, this dimension has found its most operationally mature expression to date. ### The Architecture of State-Directed Cognitive Warfare Iran’s approach is particularly instructive, with its strategic communications reflecting a multilayered doctrine that has shifted from religious-ideological propaganda to operational, multidimensional information warfare. Iran’s approach combines official state media, covert social media influence networks, and an increasing use of AI tools for audiences in the US, Israel, the Arab states, especially its Gulf neighbours, and the Iranian public itself. This multi-audience architecture is characterised by reflexive control, which seems to feed adversaries carefully curated information to induce decisions favourable to the Iranians and to deter regional partners from supporting the US-Israel coalition. While the United States has focused its propaganda primarily on domestic audiences, Iranian content is deliberately aimed at spreading its messages globally. This strategic asymmetry reveals Tehran’s sophisticated understanding of how it could fracture the political will of its adversaries from within. The most analytically underappreciated dimension of the current information campaigns is the creative sophistication of propaganda outputs. Iran’s information apparatus has produced a documented and catalogued body of content that warrants close examination, given the strategic nature of its format choices. ### Military Messaging via Memes Iran has deployed a range of striking propaganda formats during the conflict, many powered by AI and tailored for global audiences. One widely discussed example is a Lego-style “multiverse” video showing miniature figures of US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu being attacked by Iranian forces, set to AI-generated rap music and ending with a warning message aimed at the United States. Similarly, a satirical clip portrays Trump as a Teletubby playing with toy jets in the Oval Office, deliberately framing US leadership as childish and unserious. Alongside these, a real (non-AI) video of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) spokesman Ebrahim Zolfaghari declaring “Hey Trump, you are fired!” uses American pop-culture language to deliver a direct political message, making it highly shareable across global social media platforms. []( _Source:_[_Iran Wire_]( []( _Source:_[_Times Now_]( []( _Source: [Facebook]( _Source: [The New York Times]( At the same time, Iran has pushed more traditional deterrence narratives through state media. Claims that the country could mobilise more than one million troops, alongside warnings of “historic hell” for US forces, aim to inflate the perceived cost of escalation. []( _Source:_[_Tehran Times_]( Parallel campaigns, such as footage of Iranian women training for combat, project national unity and resilience. Together, these outputs form a coordinated information warfare strategy. []( _Source:_[_Middle East Monitor_]( **The American Counter-Narrative: “Slopaganda” from the White House** The US has also used pop culture in its messaging, but this approach has been widely [criticised]( The White House released videos [mixing war footage with clips from movies]( TV shows, and video games, along with music and dramatic effects. These videos show only successful strikes, with no damage or casualties, and focus heavily on American weapons and leadership. This style has been dubbed “[_slopaganda_]( because it comes across as exaggerated and unrealistic. []( _Source:_[_Instagram_]( ### Audience Impact and the Attention Economy of War In terms of effectiveness, the American counter-narrative appears weaker than Iran’s. US messaging is mainly aimed at its own people to build support for the war, but this has had limited success. In contrast, Iran’s content is more targeted and uses humour effectively. As a result, Iran’s propaganda feels more relevant and engaging, whereas the US approach appears outdated and less impactful. The downstream effects of memes and Artificial Intelligence Generated propaganda on audiences are politically consequential. War itself is being absorbed into the attention economy by becoming part of the same algorithmic stream as clips from shows, movies, and games. The White House’s own _Braveheart_ and _Mortal Kombat_ propaganda productions, and Iran’s Lego and Teletubby videos, inhabit the same platform spaces, and are governed by the same recommendation algorithms as entertainment content. The trolling has shifted from grassroots internet culture to the centre of global politics, a shift that began with Trump. [Ipsos polling]( that US public opinion is “overwhelmingly” against the war in Iran. Targeting younger audiences through formats optimised for TikTok and short-form video consumption ensures that the demographic least likely to encounter institutional media is the one most saturated with Iranian propaganda. []( _Source:_[_Instagram_]( [Brooking’s]( that “Americans are not used to seeing messages from a country the US is bombing that are directed at them” is itself a strategic insight that Iran’s information apparatus has operationalised with considerable skill. ### Policy Implications The information environment of the Iran-Israel-US conflict demands a structural response across three domains. First, platform accountability must be redesigned for conflict contexts. The current posture of X, Meta, and TikTok – effectively one of non-intervention during an active war featuring [documented state influence operations]( is not neutral. It is a policy choice with strategic consequences, and democratic governments must be prepared to demand emergency content governance protocols verified through independent civil society monitoring. Second, media literacy must be reconceptualised for the AI age. Traditional fact-checking literacy, focused on identifying misattributed or recycled content, is insufficient when adversaries produce original synthetic media in the visual style of beloved Western animation and pop culture. The [France 24 investigation]( Iran’s information war found that disinformation researchers consider this the first conflict in which AI has been used intentionally and at scale to sow chaos, underscoring that the public’s existing media literacy tools are structurally inadequate for this environment. Third, states must develop a counter-influence doctrine without replicating the epistemic damage caused by the actors they seek to counter. The White House’s gamification of war communication may achieve short-term domestic mobilisation. But credibility, once degraded, is extraordinarily difficult to restore, and America’s long-term information power rests on the perception that its communications are more trustworthy, not merely louder, than its adversaries’. ### Conclusion The Iran-Israel-US conflict has established a new benchmark for the integration of artificial intelligence, memetic satire, and narrative warfare with the conduct of interstate conflict. A [Lego-animated Trump]( an [IRGC general delivering a corporate dismissal in English]( not fringe curiosities but data points in a structured, deliberate, and empirically measurable information campaign with clearly identifiable strategic objectives. The cognitive battlefield is no longer a secondary theatre; it is a primary arena where political will, public legitimacy, and epistemic trust are the objectives of sustained and sophisticated attack. ## About the Author _Dr Soumya Awasthi is a Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation, India. Her work focuses on the intersection of technology and national security, counterterrorism, de-radicalisation, South Asian strategic studies, Afghanistan, and India’s defence and strategic policy. She holds a Doctorate from the School of International Studies (SIS) at Jawaharlal Nehru University. She is the author of several books, including the most recent, “Diverse Narratives and Shared Beliefs –Classical to Hybrid Deoband Islam in South Asia (Routledge, 2025)”._

Share this fact check

← Check another article or image