What Can the United States and Israel Accomplish in Iran?

84~~/100~~

Verdict High Trust Largely Reliable — expert analytical commentary with a verified factual base; contains contested battle-damage...

✓ 13 checks out ✕ 3 disputed ? 7 unverified

☰ Full analysis The complete summary ⌄

This is a genuine CSIS commentary ('What Can the United States and Israel Accomplish in Iran?') attributed to Emily Harding, whose stated CSIS roles (Director, Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program; Vice President, Defense and Security Department) are confirmed by CSIS's own biography page. Its core factual scaffolding checks out against primary and reputable secondary sources: Secretary Hegseth's three stated objectives for Operation Epic Fury are reproduced almost verbatim as quoted in a White House release citing his 10 March 2026 remarks; Trump's 2 January 2026 'locked and loaded / come to their rescue' warning over Iranian protesters is confirmed by CBS, CNN, Al Jazeera and PBS; Israeli strikes on Hezbollah's al-Qard al-Hassan financial network are documented by the Jerusalem Post and Amnesty International; reports of arms flowing to Iranian Kurdish groups are corroborated by CNN; and Pickaxe Mountain (Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La) is a documented suspected alternative enrichment-related site. The piece is explicitly labelled commentary and is transparent about the speculative nature of its strategic judgements. Two weaknesses reduce the score: (a) the '80 percent of missile launchers destroyed' figure is a contested Israeli assessment later undercut by US intelligence reporting and independent analysis, and the article does not flag the source or contestation; (b) the assertion that Iraqi militias have been 'largely quiet' is contradicted by contemporaneous reporting of sustained Iraqi militia attacks, although Houthi restraint is corroborated. The version supplied had all hyperlinks stripped ('No embedded sources extracted'), so the reader-facing evidence trail could not be assessed as published. Framing is analytically balanced on costs and feasibility but adopts a US/Israeli strategic vantage point, with limited representation of Iranian, Lebanese or civilian-harm perspectives.

What checked out (13)

Hegseth's three stated goals — (1) destroy missile stockpiles, launchers and defence industrial base, (2) destroy Iran's navy, (3) permanently deny Iran nuclear weapons — are quoted almost verbatim from his 10 March 2026 remarks (https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/04/president-trumps-clear-and-unchanging-objectives-drive-decisive-success-against-iranian-regime/ ; https://www.army.mil/article/290823/hegseth_says_epic_fury_goals_in_iran_are_laser_focused ).
Operation Epic Fury is the US code name for joint US–Israeli operations against Iran begun on 28 February 2026, paired with Israel's Operation Roaring Lion (https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war ; https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/operation-roaring-lion-initial-insights/ ).
Hegseth publicly denied the campaign is a regime-change war ('This is not a so-called regime change war'), consistent with the article (https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hegseth-says-military-campaign-against-iran-not-endless-hails-us-israeli-cooperation/ ; https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense/4476532/hegseth-disputes-iraq-war-comparisons-iran-regime-change/ ).
Trump publicly favoured an 'internal' change of leadership and drew an explicit Venezuela parallel in his Iran remarks of 9–10 March 2026 (https://www.rev.com/transcripts/trump-gives-iran-update ; https://www.npr.org/2026/03/10/nx-s1-5742587/trump-hails-iran-successes-doesnt-give-wars-time-frame ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/03/middleeast/iran-venezuela-trump-regime-change-parallels-intl ).
Trump's 2 January 2026 statement that the US 'will come to their rescue' and is 'locked and loaded and ready to go' if Iran kills peaceful protesters is confirmed (https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-iran-protests-us-will-come-to-their-rescue/ ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/01/middleeast/iran-protests-deadly-clashes-latam-intl ; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/trump-threatens-to-intervene-in-iran-if-regime-continues-to-kill-protesters ).
The 'completely and totally obliterated' characterisation originates with Trump after the June 2025 strikes on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan (https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-launches-strikes-iranian-nuclear-facilities-trump-says/ ; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/fact-checking-statements-made-by-trump-to-justify-u-s-strikes-on-iran ).
Pickaxe Mountain (Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La), adjacent to Natanz, is a real deeply buried site assessed as a possible alternative enrichment-related facility and publicly threatened as a target (https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/what-to-know-about-pickaxe-mountain ; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-to-know-about-irans-pickaxe-mountain-home-to-an-underground-nuclear-site-threatened-by-trump ).
Iran retains a substantial stock of up to 60 percent enriched uranium (c. 440.9 kg per IAEA reporting), much of it assessed to be at Isfahan and outside inspector access — supporting the HEU/rudimentary-weapon and 'locating and removing it' points (https://www.timesofisrael.com/un-nuclear-chief-irans-highly-enriched-uranium-likely-still-buried-at-isfahan-site/ ; https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-and-npt-safeguards-reports-june-2026 ).
Israel struck Hezbollah's financial infrastructure, including al-Qard al-Hassan branches described as holding the group's financial reserves, on 2 and 9 March 2026 (https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-888583 ; https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/03/lebanon-israeli-air-strikes-on-al-qard-al-hassan-financial-institution-must-be-investigated-as-war-crimes/ ).
Reports of weapons flowing to Iranian Kurdish groups, with Israeli strikes along the Iraq–Iran border preparing the ground, are corroborated (https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/03/politics/cia-arming-kurds-iran ; https://theconversation.com/arming-a-kurdish-insurgency-would-be-a-risky-endeavor-for-both-the-us-and-irans-minority-kurds-277779 ).
Iran's navy has been heavily degraded, including mine-laying vessels near the Strait of Hormuz, supporting the premise that naval destruction is militarily achievable (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/18/10-major-iranian-naval-targets-struck-in-operation-epic-fury/ ; https://gulfif.org/operation-epic-fury-and-the-collapse-of-irans-layered-naval-defense/ ; https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/iran-conflict-2026-the-demise-of-the-iranian-navies ).
Author identity and institutional role as stated in the byline are accurate (https://www.csis.org/people/emily-harding ; https://www.csis.org/news/csis-launches-program-intelligence-national-security-and-technology ).
The article is genuinely published by CSIS under the stated title and author (https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-can-united-states-and-israel-accomplish-iran ).

✕ Disputed claims 3 claims ⌄

CONTESTED (not adjudged false): 'upward of 80 percent of its missile launchers have been destroyed'. An Israeli assessment of 11 March 2026 claimed >80 percent of launch capability aimed at Israel destroyed (https://www.algemeiner.com/2026/03/11/iran-has-one-third-missile-launchers-left-idf-assesses/ ), but later reporting held launcher numbers largely unchanged (https://tribune.com.pk/story/2597456/irans-missile-launcher-numbers-hold-steady-despite-us-israeli-strikes-report ), that US intelligence assessed roughly half intact (https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-intelligence-said-to-assess-around-half-of-irans-missile-launchers-still-intact/ ), and that about half of launchers were lost (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/26/evaluating-the-damage-to-irans-ballistic-missile-arsenal/ ). The article's hedging is defensible, but the figure is a belligerent claim presented without attribution.
CONTESTED (not adjudged false): 'the groups in Iraq and the Houthis have been largely quiet'. Houthi restraint is corroborated (https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-irans-other-proxy-groups-join-war-houthi-rebels-in-yemen-hold-back-for-now/ ), but the Iraqi element is contradicted by reporting of immediate, sustained militia activity (https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-overlooked-resilience-of-iraqi-militias-and-houthi-forces-in-the-iran-war/ ; https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war ). Contradicting evidence includes an opinion blog, so this is contested rather than false.
CONTESTED (framing, not adjudged false): the implication that the missile, navy and nuclear goals are 'all at least largely militarily achievable' understates expert doubt about dispersed launchers and locating HEU (https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-and-npt-safeguards-reports-june-2026 ).

? Unverified claims 7 claims ⌄

That eliminating external support for Iran's proxies is 'not an explicitly stated objective' of Epic Fury/Roaring Lion: a White House release lists severing proxy support among campaign objectives (https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/operation-epic-fury-decisive-american-power-to-crush-irans-terror-regime/ ), so the framing could not be confirmed; treated as Unverified because Hegseth's own three-point formulation omits proxies.
That Trump 'later backed off' the January 2026 comment 'probably because he received a piece of excellent advice': the motive is explicitly speculative and unconfirmed.
That Israel's operative goal is 'the destruction or breakup of the Islamic Republic' as policy: argued by partisan analysis (https://mondoweiss.net/2026/03/israels-objective-in-iran-is-not-merely-regime-change-but-total-societal-collapse/ ) but later publicly denied by Netanyahu (https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-claims-iran-wars-main-goals-achieved-says-they-never-included-regime-change-but-there-are-cracks-in-irans-rule/ ).
That Israel 'has made clear that it holds the Iranian regime at fault for the October 7 attacks' as a formal current justification: Iran is routinely described as Hamas's sponsor, but this specific causal war-aim framing is not confirmed by located sources.
Date precision of the Trump 'I like the idea of internal… Venezuela' quotation: attributed to Monday 9 March 2026; a Doral news conference occurred 9 March (https://www.c-span.org/program/white-house-event/president-trump-holds-news-conference-on-iran-war/675037 ) while the matching transcript is dated 10 March (https://www.rev.com/transcripts/trump-gives-iran-update ). Substance verified; exact date Unverified.
Forward-looking judgements — rapid coup risk for a 'tame' leader, Israeli tolerance of chaos, bombing's inability to compel internal decisions — are predictions, not verifiable facts.
Publication timing: internal references point to on/after 10–11 March 2026, whereas the indexed CSIS page carries a 6 May 2026 stamp; whether the piece was updated could not be established.

⌕ Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄

Confidence

Medium-High (0.78) — Confidence is high on provenance, authorship and the verbatim accuracy of the quoted official statements, all matched to primary or near-primary records (White House releases, C-SPAN, transcripts, CSIS's own pages). Confidence is lower on the battlefield and proxy-activity characterisations, which rest on contested wartime assessments where belligerent claims, US intelligence leaks and independent analysts diverge, and where only search snippets rather than full documents were reviewed. Two further limitations restrain confidence: the supplied copy had every hyperlink stripped, so the author's own evidence trail could not be inspected, and the precise publication date could not be fixed (internal references point to c. 10–11 March 2026 while the indexed page carries a May 2026 stamp), which matters when judging what the author could reasonably have known. Consistent with the guardrails, no claim was marked False; items with conflicting reputable evidence were recorded as contested and speculative or unconfirmable items as Unverified.

Search journal

Operation Epic Fury Iran

Operation Epic Fury Iran Hegseth goals press conference

Hegseth destroy Iran navy missile stockpiles "permanently deny Iran nuclear weapons"

Emily Harding CSIS director Intelligence National Security Technology Program

Operation Roaring Lion Israel Iran 2026

Hegseth March 10 2026 press conference three goals destroy missile stockpiles launchers defense industrial base navy

Trump "locked and loaded" Iran protesters January 2 2026 "come to their rescue"

Trump March 9 2026 regime change Iran "internal" Venezuela quote

Iran 80 percent missile launchers destroyed 2026 estimate

Pickaxe Mountain Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La enrichment site Iran 2026 target

Iran highly enriched uranium 60 percent stockpile location IAEA 2026 access

Israel strike Hezbollah cash reserves al-Qard al-Hassan bombed

arms flowing to Kurdish groups inside Iran 2026 Israel covert support ethnic minorities

Israel Netanyahu Iran root cause October 7 attacks blame 2026 statements

Iran navy destroyed 2026 Epic Fury IRGC navy vessels sunk Strait of Hormuz mining

Houthis Iraqi militias quiet during 2026 Iran war restraint attacks

Trump "obliterated" Iran nuclear sites June 2025 Fordow statement

Hegseth says regime change not a goal Iran 2026 / Netanyahu Israel goal Iran regime collapse Balkanization / Trump news conference March 9 2026 Venezuela model

Article metrics

Emotion 13% · Reading grade 11.1 · 1700 words

≡ The article we checked Full text as retrieved ⌄

In his press conference on the morning of March 10, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made sure to define the goals of Operation Epic Fury. He [said]( the goals were “straightforward” and “the same as the day . . . [he] gave . . . [his] first briefing.” They are as follows: “One, destroy their missile stockpiles, their missile launchers and their defense industrial base; missiles and their ability to make them. Two: destroy their Navy. And three: permanently deny Iran nuclear weapons forever.”

This intentional and direct assertion is notable because of reported daylight between the president, his staff, and Israel on the goals of this mission. In addition to the above goals, President Trump has said he seeks a change in the Iranian regime. Meanwhile, Israel has made clear that it holds the Iranian regime at fault for the October 7 attacks, and thus the destruction or breakup of the Islamic Republic is their goal.

How are these goals consistent or inconsistent? More importantly, which are achievable? A big goal with no accompanying plan is a dream, not a strategy. Experienced strategists will tell you that the key to success is knowing what you want, analyzing the costs of achieving it with clear eyes, and measuring resources against those costs.

The goals identified by the Pentagon, White House, and Israel span a spectrum. On one end, some are achievable at only the cost of an air campaign; at least half are not and occupy the other, political end of the spectrum. Even for some of the militarily achievable aims, the results will only be temporary without associated political change. Bombs can destroy physical objects like missile launchers, storage sites, and production facilities. Military force can destroy the Iranian navy, making the Strait of Hormuz far safer. Exceptionally large bombs can collapse buried nuclear facilities. But none of these weapons can destroy knowledge. Things can be rebuilt, if the regime chooses. Further, political changes require political decisions. The very nature of the regime would need to change to stop support to terrorist proxies or no longer threaten protestors.

This commentary will take apart the apparent goals of these campaigns and evaluate the costs required to achieve each. The list includes Secretary Hegseth’s stated goals, along with those suggested by President Trump and implied by the Israeli government. The below list is ordered from largely achievable with an air-focused military campaign to those requiring the most political change.

1.   **Destroy Iran’s navy.**

Iran’s navy has been the regime’s leverage over the region and the global economy. Iran uses its navy to harass ships and has consistently threatened to mine the strait and end oil shipments. Elements of the navy have been a tool for spreading weapons to the Houthis in Yemen and other Iranian proxies. To end Iran’s strangle grip on the Persian Gulf, its navy must rest at the bottom of it.

The U.S. military has spent decades tracking Iranian ships, and its capabilities are well matched to sinking them. Eliminating the Iranian navy is measurable and achievable, and the United States has the tools to accomplish it with relatively minimal military cost. The longer the fight, however, the greater the cost to the global economy.

2.   **End Iran’s missile program.**

Israel views Iran’s missile program as an immediate and potentially existential threat. A nuclear-tipped missile could destroy the thin strip of land that is the state of Israel, and Iran has used its ballistic missile capabilities to hit targets across the Gulf.

The United States and Israel have been mapping and tracking Iranian missile systems for years, and initial reports suggest strikes against those targets have been effective. Iran’s launch rate has dropped precipitously in recent days, with estimates suggesting that [upward of 80 percent]( of its missile launchers have been destroyed. At this rate, Iran could be left with only remnants of a program, including the plans for reconstitution.

3.   **End Iran’s nuclear program.**

The United States and Israel emerged from the 12-day war claiming that Iran’s nuclear program was “[completely and totally obliterated]( Yet, Operation Epic Fury has named permanent destruction of the nuclear program as one of its goals. Pickaxe Mountain is a potential target, following [indications]( Iran might have been working to establish it as an alternative site for enrichment and perhaps other nuclear-related activities. Iran likely still has [control]( of enough highly enriched uranium to make a small, [rudimentary nuclear weapon]( Locating and removing it will be key to the actual destruction of the nuclear program.

These are the three goals Secretary Hegseth referenced in his press conference. All are at least largely militarily achievable, and all are underway. The next three, however, depend on political decisions, not the prowess of the U.S. and Israeli militaries.

1.   **Eliminate external support for Iran’s terrorist proxy groups.**

This has been a longstanding goal of U.S. and Israeli policy but is not an explicitly stated objective of Operation Epic Fury/Roaring Lion. Iran has poured money and weaponry into a formidable regional proxy network of groups the United States classifies as terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, a range of groups in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. Over the last two years, Israel has worked to largely neutralize Hamas and Hezbollah. In the current conflict, the groups in Iraq and the Houthis have been largely quiet, perhaps out of a keen sense of self-preservation.

Israel literally [bombed Hezbollah’s cash reserves]( but that is not the same as ending financial support to these groups. Iran’s infusions of cash have given these groups a large bang for their buck over the last decades, and ending this support will require a political decision inside the regime.

2.   **End massacres of protestors.**

On January 2, 2026, President Trump [said]( that if Iran continued to massacre protestors, the United States would “come to their rescue” and is “locked and loaded and ready to go.” He later backed off that comment, probably because he received a piece of excellent advice: Military action is a poor tool for this goal. The United States could bomb the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Basij, the internal police service responsible for putting down unrest, but these are vast and decentralized organizations that are true believers in the regime. Hitting a headquarters building will not end these organizations or their brutal torture of protestors. The Islamic Republic viewed these protests as a potentially regime-ending threat; no amount of U.S. military pressure would convince them to allow what they saw as a brewing revolution.

A decisive political transformation would need to take place inside Tehran to accomplish this goal, including addressing the protestors’ demands: real economic reforms and legitimate democratic elections that reflect the will of the people, not the stranglehold of the clerical establishment.

3.   **End the Islamic Republic and establish a replacement that no longer threatens Israel and the United States.**

This is the big one. Despite Hegseth’s insistence that regime change is not one of the U.S. goals, President Trump has strongly suggested that he wants new leadership in Tehran. As recently as Monday, March 9, he [said]( “I like the idea of internal [regime change] because it works well . . . I mean, I think we’ve proven that so far in Venezuela.” The Israelis have [repeatedly said]( that Iran was the root cause behind the brutal October 7 attacks and that they would not feel secure until Iran could no longer pose a threat.

Here is where U.S. and Israeli interests are likely to diverge. President Trump seemingly would be satisfied with a tame version of the current leadership—one that submits to U.S. preferences but can also restore stability quickly. This approach is likely to bring down oil prices and might result in renewed negotiations, although the balancing act of satisfying both the United States and the remaining elements of an angry regime is nearly impossible. This tame leader may find themselves the recipient of a very quick coup.

Israel would not be satisfied with such an outcome. It prefers a far more definitive fix—either the complete removal of the structures of the current regime or the Balkanization of Iran. Israel estimates that the chaos likely to ensure from either upheaval is worth it, because even if Iran is highly unstable, Israel would no longer be under threat. That is a greater concern to them than sky-high oil prices.

Oddly, here the argument comes full circle. President Trump’s preferred outcome is a political move inside the regime. Bombing can create immense levels of pressure to make that decision but cannot create those facts on the ground. An exceptionally brave leader would need to step up to take the big risk and engage in the necessary political maneuvering to survive. Conversely, Israel could go a long way toward Balkanizing Iran with a military-centric covert action campaign. Already, reports are emerging of [arms flowing to Kurdish groups]( inside Iran and perhaps to other ethnic minorities in the hopes that provinces break from the center, forever ending the power of the regime. In this scenario, the United States would need to make a hard choice: End the economic pain and try to create stability, despite incomplete change, or finish the job the United States and Israel started together.

It is also worth restating the obvious: The enemy gets a vote. Iranian leadership has built a nearly 50-year-old regime on the back of a radical ideology. Some may consider betraying that ideology a fate worse than death. It takes two sides to end the fighting. What’s left of the Iranian leadership can decide to capitulate, negotiate, or fight on, no matter what.

War involves a million choices, but the biggest one is always what the protagonists seek to accomplish. The United States and Israel will need to take a step back from tactical decisions and seriously evaluate their strategic goals. Is destruction of missiles, the navy, and the nuclear program enough, even if that outcome is temporary? Or are they willing to commit to the immense economic and military costs of going further?

_Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies._

← Check another article or image

UK FACT CHECK POLITICS

Menu

Topics

About

Get Involved

Follow Us

Account

What Can the United States and Israel Accomplish in Iran?

What checked out (13)

Confidence

Search journal

Article metrics

Menu

Topics

About

Get Involved

Follow Us

Account

Popular Categories

What checked out (13)

Confidence

Search journal

Article metrics

Share this fact check