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belfercenter.org 15 July 2026 at 08:01

Offense–Defense Balance and Sanctions Backfire: A Theory of US Sanctions Doctrines

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88
Trust Score

Highly Credible / Authentic Academic Content

Confidence: High

Standard
Emotional Tone Low
How emotionally charged the language is (low is neutral)
Reading Level Academic
Suitable for age 20+ readers (grade 15)
Article Length Medium
382 words
Caps & Emphasis Normal
1.0% of words are capitalised (high can indicate sensationalism)

Executive Summary

The submitted text is the abstract, key-findings summary, and citation block of a genuine, verifiable peer-reviewed article: Paul Silva, 'Offense–Defense Balance and Sanctions Backfire: A Theory of US Sanctions Doctrines,' Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2026). Independent research confirms the journal (published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association), the bibliographic metadata (Volume 22, Issue 3 is indeed the July 2026 issue), the author's identity and research focus (a University of Pennsylvania PhD candidate and Belfer Center predoctoral fellow working on economic coercion and sanctions), and the matching title of the article. The related linked report ('The Degradation of Iran's Proxy Model,' April 2026, by Lina Khatib) is also confirmed as a genuine Belfer Center publication. The content is scholarly, hedged, and non-sensational; the substantive theoretical claims are the author's own analytical framework rather than empirical assertions requiring external verification. The single empirical background claim (Obama vs Trump divergence on Iran sanctions) is consistent with the documented 2018 US JCPOA withdrawal and 'maximum pressure' campaign. Trust is high; the small deduction reflects the inability to open the specific article's full landing page to confirm the exact DOI/author-listed byline, and the truncated/garbled 'related links' block at the end of the submission.

Factual Verification

Verified Claims

  • Foreign Policy Analysis is a genuine, quarterly peer-reviewed academic journal published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association (established 2005).
  • Volume 22, Issue 3 of Foreign Policy Analysis corresponds to the July 2026 issue, making the citation's 'Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2026)' bibliographically consistent.
  • The article title 'Offense–Defense Balance and Sanctions Backfire: A Theory of US Sanctions Doctrines' appears associated with Foreign Policy Analysis content, matching the submitted title verbatim.
  • Paul Silva is a real scholar (University of Pennsylvania PhD candidate; Belfer Center / Harvard Kennedy School predoctoral fellow) whose stated research agenda centres on economic coercion, sanctions, grand strategy and alliance politics — fully consistent with the article's subject matter.
  • The related linked publication 'The Degradation of Iran's Proxy Model' (April 2026) by Lina Khatib is a genuine Belfer Center report.
  • The historical background implicit in the plausibility probe — a sharp Obama-to-Trump shift on Iran sanctions — aligns with the documented US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the subsequent 'maximum pressure' campaign.

Unverified Claims

  • The exact DOI and the article's individual Oxford Academic landing page (with formal byline and page numbers) could not be directly opened to confirm every citation detail.
  • The three enumerated 'key findings' and the abstract's theoretical typology (Liberal Internationalism, Conservative Primacy, Deep Engagement, Restraint linked to distinct sanctions doctrines) are the author's original analytical arguments and are not independently 'verifiable' as external facts; they are presented as the article's thesis, not as adjudicable factual assertions.
  • The precise claim that the United States 'increasingly treats economic sanctions as a tool of first resort' is a widely held characterisation but is stated as framing rather than a discretely sourced statistic in the text.

Bias & Presentation

Detected Biases:

  • Minimal ideological bias: the framing is analytical and academic rather than partisan.
  • Mild author-agenda framing typical of scholarship — the piece foregrounds the author's own 'sanctions doctrine' concept as a novel contribution ('I introduce the concept...').
  • US-centric analytical lens (focus exclusively on US grand strategy and US sanctions behaviour), which is scope-appropriate but narrows generalisability.
  • Selection framing in the empirical illustration: a single Obama–Trump/Iran 'plausibility probe' is used to illustrate the theory rather than to test it comprehensively (the author explicitly labels it a plausibility probe).

Language Patterns

Emotional manipulation: 0.05

Quality Assurance

Limitations: ['The individual article landing page/DOI was not directly opened; confirmation of the title in Vol 22/3 rests on search-index snippets plus strong corroborating author and journal evidence.', 'Full-text content behind the paywall was not assessed; adjudication is limited to the abstract, key findings and citation.']

Confidence

Level: High

Multiple independent, authoritative sources (Oxford Academic, ISA/OUP journal pages, Wikipedia, and three institutional profiles of the author) converge to confirm the journal, the bibliographic metadata, the article title, and the author's identity and research area. The only residual uncertainty is the un-opened individual article DOI page and the paywalled full text, which lowers confidence from 'Very High' to 'High' but does not raise any authenticity red flags.

Search Journal

Query: Foreign Policy Analysis journal Oxford University Press International Studies Association

Query: "Foreign Policy Analysis" journal volume 22 2026

Query: Paul Silva "Offense-Defense Balance and Sanctions Backfire" US Sanctions Doctrines

Query: Lina Khatib "The Degradation of Iran's Proxy Model" 2026

Query: Silva sanctions doctrine Foreign Policy Analysis Volume 22 Issue 3 2026 offense-defense

Query: Obama Trump Iran sanctions JCPOA maximum pressure withdrawal 2018

Query: Paul Silva sanctions doctrine grand strategy article publication

Article Content

Article

from **Foreign Policy Analysis**

The United States increasingly treats economic sanctions as a tool of first resort, yet existing scholarship has not fully explained why sanctions policy varies sharply across presidential administrations. This article argues that such variation stems from leaders’ causal beliefs about two sanctions-specific factors: the offense–defense balance of economic sanctions and the risk of sanctions backfire.

Published:July 2026

1. Different grand strategies rest on different assumptions about economic sanctions. Ideal-type US grand strategies vary in how they assess the offense-defense balance of sanctions and the risks of sanctions backfire. 2. These assumptions produce distinct sanctions doctrines. Beliefs about whether sanctions are likely to succeed, and the extent to which they are likely to generate blowback shape how policymakers think sanctions should be designed, implemented, and paired with other tools of statecraft. 3. Leaders’ causal beliefs help explain variation in sanctions policy across administrations. Even leaders pursuing similar grand strategies may differ in how they understand sanctions’ effectiveness and risks, producing doctrinal divergence in practice and problematizing the implementation of a coherent grand strategy.

## **Abstract**

The United States increasingly treats economic sanctions as a tool of first resort, yet existing scholarship has not fully explained why sanctions policy varies sharply across presidential administrations. This article argues that such variation stems from leaders’ causal beliefs about two sanctions-specific factors: the offense–defense balance of economic sanctions and the risk of sanctions backfire. I introduce the concept of a sanctions doctrine—a subcomponent of grand strategy that structures how states design and employ economic coercion—and develop a typology linking four prominent US grand strategies—Liberal Internationalism, Conservative Primacy, Deep Engagement, and Restraint—to distinct sanctions doctrines. While grand strategies define broad strategic aims, leaders’ causal beliefs explain variation in sanctions activism and doctrinal divergence in practice. A plausibility probe comparing US sanctions against Iran under the Obama and Trump administrations illustrates how differences in perceived efficacy and costs generate predictable variation in sanctions policy.

Silva, Paul. “Offense–Defense Balance and Sanctions Backfire: A Theory of US Sanctions Doctrines.” _Foreign Policy Analysis_, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2026).

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The full text of this publication is available via Foreign Policy Analysis.

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* Reports & Papers

### [The Degradation of Iran’s Proxy Model](

April 2026 by Lina Khatib *

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