Highly Credible / Authentic Academic Content
Confidence: High
StandardThe submitted text is the abstract, key-findings summary, and citation block of a genuine, verifiable peer-reviewed article: Paul Silva, 'Offense–Defense Balance and Sanctions Backfire: A Theory of US Sanctions Doctrines,' Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2026). Independent research confirms the journal (published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association), the bibliographic metadata (Volume 22, Issue 3 is indeed the July 2026 issue), the author's identity and research focus (a University of Pennsylvania PhD candidate and Belfer Center predoctoral fellow working on economic coercion and sanctions), and the matching title of the article. The related linked report ('The Degradation of Iran's Proxy Model,' April 2026, by Lina Khatib) is also confirmed as a genuine Belfer Center publication. The content is scholarly, hedged, and non-sensational; the substantive theoretical claims are the author's own analytical framework rather than empirical assertions requiring external verification. The single empirical background claim (Obama vs Trump divergence on Iran sanctions) is consistent with the documented 2018 US JCPOA withdrawal and 'maximum pressure' campaign. Trust is high; the small deduction reflects the inability to open the specific article's full landing page to confirm the exact DOI/author-listed byline, and the truncated/garbled 'related links' block at the end of the submission.
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Emotional manipulation: 0.05
Limitations: ['The individual article landing page/DOI was not directly opened; confirmation of the title in Vol 22/3 rests on search-index snippets plus strong corroborating author and journal evidence.', 'Full-text content behind the paywall was not assessed; adjudication is limited to the abstract, key findings and citation.']
Level: High
Multiple independent, authoritative sources (Oxford Academic, ISA/OUP journal pages, Wikipedia, and three institutional profiles of the author) converge to confirm the journal, the bibliographic metadata, the article title, and the author's identity and research area. The only residual uncertainty is the un-opened individual article DOI page and the paywalled full text, which lowers confidence from 'Very High' to 'High' but does not raise any authenticity red flags.
Query: Foreign Policy Analysis journal Oxford University Press International Studies Association
Query: "Foreign Policy Analysis" journal volume 22 2026
Query: Paul Silva "Offense-Defense Balance and Sanctions Backfire" US Sanctions Doctrines
Query: Lina Khatib "The Degradation of Iran's Proxy Model" 2026
Query: Silva sanctions doctrine Foreign Policy Analysis Volume 22 Issue 3 2026 offense-defense
Query: Obama Trump Iran sanctions JCPOA maximum pressure withdrawal 2018
Query: Paul Silva sanctions doctrine grand strategy article publication
Article
from **Foreign Policy Analysis**
The United States increasingly treats economic sanctions as a tool of first resort, yet existing scholarship has not fully explained why sanctions policy varies sharply across presidential administrations. This article argues that such variation stems from leaders’ causal beliefs about two sanctions-specific factors: the offense–defense balance of economic sanctions and the risk of sanctions backfire.
Published:July 2026
1. Different grand strategies rest on different assumptions about economic sanctions. Ideal-type US grand strategies vary in how they assess the offense-defense balance of sanctions and the risks of sanctions backfire. 2. These assumptions produce distinct sanctions doctrines. Beliefs about whether sanctions are likely to succeed, and the extent to which they are likely to generate blowback shape how policymakers think sanctions should be designed, implemented, and paired with other tools of statecraft. 3. Leaders’ causal beliefs help explain variation in sanctions policy across administrations. Even leaders pursuing similar grand strategies may differ in how they understand sanctions’ effectiveness and risks, producing doctrinal divergence in practice and problematizing the implementation of a coherent grand strategy.
## **Abstract**
The United States increasingly treats economic sanctions as a tool of first resort, yet existing scholarship has not fully explained why sanctions policy varies sharply across presidential administrations. This article argues that such variation stems from leaders’ causal beliefs about two sanctions-specific factors: the offense–defense balance of economic sanctions and the risk of sanctions backfire. I introduce the concept of a sanctions doctrine—a subcomponent of grand strategy that structures how states design and employ economic coercion—and develop a typology linking four prominent US grand strategies—Liberal Internationalism, Conservative Primacy, Deep Engagement, and Restraint—to distinct sanctions doctrines. While grand strategies define broad strategic aims, leaders’ causal beliefs explain variation in sanctions activism and doctrinal divergence in practice. A plausibility probe comparing US sanctions against Iran under the Obama and Trump administrations illustrates how differences in perceived efficacy and costs generate predictable variation in sanctions policy.
Silva, Paul. “Offense–Defense Balance and Sanctions Backfire: A Theory of US Sanctions Doctrines.” _Foreign Policy Analysis_, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2026).
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