_The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and \_The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute\_ are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period._

ISW-CTP is monitoring reports of additional US strikes in Iran as of 4:15 PM ET on July 8.[1] ISW-CTP will provide more details on the US strikes in its July 9 update.

## Key Takeaways

1. Iran is willing to return to a large-scale conflict with the United States if necessary to secure its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s behavior after the latest US strikes indicates that the Iranian regime values control over the strait more than avoiding renewed escalation with the United States. 2. The present pattern of US strikes does not appear to be changing Iran’s calculus on controlling the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on July 7 that it struck over 80 targets in Iran in response to repeated Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the strait. 3. Iran is attempting to coerce Gulf states and others to acquiesce to Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz after Iran failed to secure recognition of its control over the strait through diplomacy. 4. Iran is attempting to unilaterally impose a vision for the strait’s ”arrangements,” which are supposed to be created in dialogue with the Gulf states, not through coercing the Gulf states. Iranian coercion of the Gulf states is an effort to circumvent the intent of Clause 5, which administration officials noted was designed so that Gulf states would moderate Iranian positions about controlling the strait. 5. Iran is using the ceasefire to reconstitute its military capabilities, as ISW-CTP has previously assessed. 6. The Lebanese government announced on July 8 that it will participate in negotiations with the US and Israel in Rome, Italy, on July 15 and 16. The Lebanese government earlier claimed that its participation in negotiations would be contingent on an Israeli withdrawal from “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.

## Toplines

**Iran is willing to return to a large-scale conflict with the United States if necessary to secure its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s behavior after the latest US strikes indicates that the Iranian regime values control over the strait more than avoiding renewed escalation with the United States.** Iran has, in recent weeks, repeatedly attacked commercial shipping vessels that used alternative routes through the strait rather than the Iranian-designated traffic separation scheme.[2] It has conducted these attacks to maintain Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz through Iranian-dictated traffic lanes. Iran also responded to US strikes against more than 80 targets on July 7 (more on the US strikes below) by attacking US military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait.[3] The Iranian response caused no casualties.[4] US President Donald Trump has reportedly told his advisers that he will not “resume the war“ unless Iran kills US servicemembers.[5] Iran’s willingness to flaunt the ceasefire by attacking shipping and risk US casualties by attacking US bases nonetheless demonstrates that Iran is willing to risk a resumption of large-scale operations.

The Iranian regime’s media apparatus has repeatedly emphasized the strategic importance of the strait, and that military action may be necessary to ensure Iran maintains control over the strait. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News Agency argued on July 8 that Iran should respond to US actions by disrupting Gulf oil exports, damaging regional energy infrastructure, asserting control over Bab al Mandab, and conducting asymmetric attacks on US forces.[6] Iranian regime’s English-language media outlet, Press TV, separately argued on July 8 that Iran would strike “enemy” targets at a minimum two-to-one ratio and close the Strait of Hormuz following any future strike on Iranian territory or interests.[7] Regime-aligned outlets’ rhetoric intends to normalize a broader coercive campaign in the strait and signals that any US effort to challenge Iranian control over the strait can trigger costs against US forces, Gulf states, energy infrastructure, and other regional chokepoints.

[[]( "Recent US and Iranian Activity between July 7, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and July 8, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET")

**The present pattern of US strikes does not appear to be changing Iran’s calculus on controlling the Strait of Hormuz.** US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on July 7 that it struck over 80 targets in Iran in response to repeated Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the strait.[8] CENTCOM stated that it struck coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, drone launch sites, command-and-control networks, and more than 60 IRGC fast attack crafts (FAC) near and in the Strait of Hormuz.[9] These strikes aimed to degrade Iran’s capability to threaten shipping, lay naval mines, and coordinate maritime operations in the strait, according to CENTCOM. Strikes similar to those conducted by CENTCOM on July 7 have had no visible effect on Iran’s ability to threaten shipping, however, and it is unclear when these strikes would have such an effect on Iran’s ability to threaten shipping. Iran’s strategy relies on its ability to fire small numbers of projectiles into the Strait of Hormuz to hit individual ships. Iran has continued to fire small numbers of projectiles into the Strait of Hormuz, seemingly as it pleases. There is presumably a point at which Iran would be unable to fire small numbers of projectiles into the Strait of Hormuz, but it is impossible to determine when Iran would be unable to fire projectiles without a complete understanding of the number of Iranian systems and launchers available to regime forces. There is similarly a point at which launch crews would be unwilling to fire their systems. It is unlikely, however, that these crews will lose cohesion and refuse to fight now–under relatively insignificant pressure–after having weathered the large-scale strike campaign in March and April. These strikes are certainly not changing Iran’s willingness to control the strait, as evidenced by the ongoing Iranian strikes and regime media comments described above.

The Trump administration also revoked Iran’s oil waiver in response to Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels, which deprives Iran of one of the main economic benefits for the regime under the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU).[10] The effects of the revocation on Iranian strategic calculus remain unclear.

Iran is also almost certainly observing leaks and public comments about the Trump administration’s reticence to resume large-scale operations, which will affect the regime’s willingness to use force to attempt to secure the strait. Trump threatened on July 8 that the United States would “probably hit” Iran hard again and suggested that the US military could “finish the job,” but later softened this statement by noting that the latest strikes will not lead to “long-term” military action.[11] Persistent leaks from the White House have similarly indicated that the Trump administration is deeply hesitant to reengage in a ”full-scale” war.

**Iran is attempting to coerce Gulf states and others to acquiesce to Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz after Iran failed to secure recognition of its control over the strait through diplomacy.** The recent attacks—including one on a Saudi-flagged tanker and another on a tanker carrying Qatari natural liquid gas (LNG)—support this effort.[12] This effort is designed to alter the meaning of Clause 5 of the MoU. Clause 5 of the US-Iran MoU requires Iran to arrange safe, fee-free commercial passage through the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days and to restore traffic within 30 days after removing technical and military obstacles, including mines.[13] It also requires Iran to discuss the future administration and maritime services of the strait with Oman and other Persian Gulf littoral states under applicable international law.[14] Iranian officials attempted briefly to use diplomacy to secure diplomatic recognition of their control of the strait, including recognition of Iranian-led fee mechanisms. This ultimately failed when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and United States released a joint statement refusing Iran’s demands to control the strait.[15] Iran is now attempting to use force to coerce the Gulf states into recognizing Iranian control.

**Iran is attempting to unilaterally impose a vision for the strait’s ”arrangements,” which are supposed to be created in dialogue with the Gulf states, not through coercing the Gulf states. Iranian coercion of the Gulf states is an effort to circumvent the intent of Clause 5, which administration officials noted was designed so that Gulf states would moderate Iranian positions about controlling the strait.**Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission member Alaeddin Boroujerdi stated on July 8 that commercial vessel traffic through the strait must occur under Iranian oversight and management, specifically through the IRGC Navy.[16] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei similarly argued that Clause 5 confirmed Iran’s responsibility to determine arrangements for safe passage of vessels and that US challenges to those arrangements violated the MoU.[17]

**Iran is using the ceasefire to reconstitute its military capabilities, as ISW-CTP has previously assessed.[18]**A US official told the _Wall Street Journal_ on July 7 that Iran has restored some military capabilities around the Strait of Hormuz since the April 7 ceasefire, including by moving small, portable radars to replace fixed radar sites destroyed during the war.[19] The official also said Iran has dug out or repaired hundreds of missiles and launchers damaged or buried in US strikes and now has access to more than half of its pre-war missile and launcher stockpile.[20] Iran’s reconstitution during the ceasefire likely makes the regime more willing to sustain risk around the strait because Tehran is rebuilding the capabilities it would need if the conflict resumes. The ceasefire gives Iranian forces time to repair launchers, recover missiles, restore command networks, and rebuild the strike capacity that underpins its strategy of attacking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s escalation around the strait preserves leverage over shipping and Gulf energy flows while strengthening its position for a potential future conflict.

## US-Iran Negotiations

See topline section.

## **Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf**

See topline section.

## US and Israeli Air Campaign

See topline section.

## Iranian Domestic Affairs

See topline section.

## Iran’s Axis of Resistance

_Nothing significant to report._

### Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon

**The Lebanese government announced on July 8 that it will participate in negotiations with the US and Israel in Rome, Italy, on July 15 and 16. The Lebanese government earlier claimed that its participation in negotiations would be contingent on an Israeli withdrawal from “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.[21]**An unspecified diplomatic source told French media on July 8 that Lebanon would only attend the Rome talks if Israeli forces withdrew from the two pilot zones established by the June 26 Trilateral Agreement Framework.[22] The June 26 framework stipulates that Israeli forces will eventually withdraw from their positions in Zawtar el Gharbiyeh and territory surrounding Ghandouriyeh and Froun, Nabtatieh Governorate, after which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would secure the areas and disarm and dismantle local armed groups.[23] ISW-CTP has not observed any Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawals or Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployments to the pilot zones, which makes it unclear whether Beirut conceded on its reported condition for Lebanese participation in the Rome talks. Lebanese and Israeli officials have previously expressed different opinions over the implementation of the framework. Unspecified sources told Lebanese media on July 6 that the LAF refused to deploy to the pilot zones and disarm Hezbollah in those areas north of the Litani River until Israeli forces withdraw from southern Lebanon, while Israeli officials stated in recent days that the IDF would remain in southern Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[24]

### Other Axis of Resistance Activity

##### Iraq

**Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani will likely meet with Shia Framework leaders and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders during his July 8 visit to attend former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s funeral in Najaf, Iraq.[25]**Ghaani typically meets with Framework and militia leaders when he travels to Iraq. Iraqi media reported that Ghaani met Framework and militia leaders in Iraq in May 2026 to discuss US pressure to disarm the militias.[26]

**Some Shia Coordination Framework members may be attempting to limit the scope of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s recently launched anti-corruption campaign**. Several sources told Saudi media on July 7 that the framework intends to “engineer the prosecution procedures” and make “settlements” with individuals accused of corruption.[27] An informed source also told Iraqi media on July 7 that some unspecified framework members discussed adopting a new process to apprehend individuals accused of corruption that does not involve Iraqi security forces, which is likely a reference to recent Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) operations to apprehend corrupt militia leaders.[28] This report comes after unspecified framework leaders refused Zaydi’s request to arrest senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders involved in corruption, according to Qatari media on July 1.[29] Iraqi authorities, including the CTS, which reports directly to the prime minister, have arrested about 50 people across Iraq since June 28 as part of Zaydi’s anti-corruption campaign.[30] This campaign follows US pressure on Baghdad to dismantle Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-linked financial networks and combat corruption.[31]

[1]

[2] ;

;

;

[3] ;

[4]

[5]

[6] dot ir/Fars_Plus/1783505943570647053

[7] dot ir/Detail/2026/07/08/771848/iran-close-strait-hormuz-strike-twice-many-targets-response-new-us-attack-source

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12] ;

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16] dot com/بخش-سایت-خوان-62/4280924-ایران-مذاکرات-با-آمریکا-را-ادامه-خواهد-داد

[17] dot ir/portal/newsview/790842

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21] dot com/news/mena/2026/07/08/lebanon-accepts-us-invitation-for-direct-israel-talks-in-rome-after-initial-refusal/?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1783520037 ; ; dot com/lebanon/politics/282150/إسرائيل-تشن-غارات-عقب-إطلاق-صواريخ-من-لبنان-النهار-في-تغطية-مباشرة

[22] dot com/lebanon/politics/282150/إسرائيل-تشن-غارات-عقب-إطلاق-صواريخ-من-لبنان-النهار-في-تغطية-مباشرة

[23] ; ; ; ; ;

[24] dot com/lebanon/326878/لقا-بري-وهيكل-رسائل-تتجاوز-الجنوب ; dot com/stories/en/321023-israel-defense-minister-says-troops-to-stay-indefinitely-in-lebanon-syria-gaza ; ; ;

[25] dot com/ar/سیاسة/بعد-تكهنات-وجدل-ق-اني-يتقدم-المشاركين-بتشييع-خامن-ي-في-النجف

[26] dot net/434016/ ;

[27] DNGTS: dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5293315-الحكومة-العراقية-تصطدم-بممانعة-سياسية-في-مكافحة-الفساد

[28] dot com/ar/سیاسة/ال-طار-يطالب-ب-لية-جديدة-لاعتقال-الفاسدين-بلا-دبابات-ويترقب-زيارة-الزيدي-لواشنطن

[29] ; dot co.uk/politics/علي-الزيدي-يطلب-غطاء-الإطار-لملاحقة-جهات-مسلحة-متورطة-بالفساد

[30] ; dot com/ar/سیاسة/حصري-حملة-مكافحة-الفساد-تستهدف-كثر-من-200-شخصية-خلال-72-ساعة-وتستمر-ستة-شهر ; dot net/441193/ ; dot iq/ar/political/266920-47.html

[31] ; dot net/441014/ ; dot uk/economy/خاص-وصول-دفعتين-من-الدولار-نقداً-إلى-بغداد-تزامنا-مع-زيارة-توم-براك