The Case for a Stalemate With Iran: America Can Win If It Stays the Course

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Verdict Mixed Largely Reliable — expert opinion/analysis with a well-sourced factual base, but with advocacy framing, selective...

The text is verbatim the opening of 'The Case for a Stalemate With Iran' by Ambassador James F.

✓ 18 checks out ✕ 4 disputed ? 9 unverified

☰ Full analysis The complete summary ⌄

The text is verbatim the opening of 'The Case for a Stalemate With Iran' by Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, published by Foreign Affairs on/around 3 September 2026 and cross-posted by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. It is a signed policy-advocacy essay, not a news report, and should be judged as argument supported by facts rather than as neutral reporting. Nearly all of its hard, checkable data points survive verification against primary and high-quality secondary sources: the 28 February 2026 start of US-Israeli operations; 18 US service members killed; Defense Secretary Hegseth's $37.5bn official cost figure; the IMF's July 2026 downgrade of 2026 global growth from 3.1% to 3.0% together with the 'limited evidence of second-round effects' formulation; the 17 June 2026 (Islamabad) memorandum of understanding with its 60-day clock and highly enriched uranium provisions; the 30 August 2026 US strike on IRGC launchers preparing rocket-delivered sea mines; Iranian year-on-year inflation above 80% in August; the rial's record lows; and the ~500,000-plus US troop level of Desert Storm. Three areas weaken the score. First, one economic claim is contradicted by a primary source: the assertion that US growth 'remains steady' conflicts with BEA data showing real GDP decelerating from 2.1% in Q1 2026 to 1.5% in Q2 2026. Second, several framing claims are one-sided: the collapse of the MoU is attributed largely to Iran, whereas contemporaneous reporting records mutual blame and unresolved US commitments including frozen funds; 'nearly the entirety' of Iranian oil exports being cut off overstates a documented decline of roughly 80–85%; and 'minimal damage' to the global economy understates documented energy-importer stress. Third, the essay omits context a reader needs: the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the opening strikes and the accession of Mojtaba Khamenei in March 2026, Iranian civilian casualty estimates in the thousands, and US wounded (approaching 800). Predictive and strategic claims — that time favours Washington, that the blockade's value to Iran will decline after November, that a land invasion has been ruled out — are unfalsifiable or only partly supported and are marked Unverified rather than false.

What checked out (18)

The US and Israel launched military operations against Iran on 28 February 2026, making the article's 'six months in' framing accurate as of early September 2026 (Congressional Research Service R45281; Britannica '2026 Iran war').
18 American service members have been killed in the conflict; TIME reported the figure on 20–22 July 2026 and casualty trackers citing DCAS still record 18 killed (with c. 794 wounded) as of 4 September 2026.
Official US war costs were put at about $37.5 billion by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in Senate testimony on 21 July 2026, consistent with the article's 'as of mid-July' lower bound.
Independent estimates place costs far higher — AEI cites $50–100 billion in direct costs and Harvard's Linda Bilmes projects at least $1 trillion long-term — supporting the article's 'to over $100 billion' upper bound.
The IMF's July 2026 WEO Update projects 2026 global growth at 3.0%, down 0.1 percentage point from the 3.1% reference forecast in the April 2026 WEO.
The IMF's chief economist stated at the 8 July 2026 press briefing that the world economy had weathered the war shock better than feared, 'with limited evidence of second-round effects' — the phrase quoted in the article.
A memorandum of understanding was signed on 17 June 2026 (the Islamabad Memorandum), a 14-point framework providing for phased removal of the US naval blockade, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and a 60-day negotiating window for a final deal.
The MoU addressed Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile, including a 'minimum methodology' for neutralisation/dilution, matching the article's description of a vague commitment.
The MoU's 60-day deadline expired on 17 August 2026 with the two sides deadlocked over the Strait and frozen Iranian funds.
On 30 August 2026, US forces struck IRGC rocket launchers on Larak Island after detecting preparations to fire rockets carrying sea mines toward the Strait of Hormuz — matching the article's mine-laying example.
President Masoud Pezeshkian said on 1 September 2026 that Iran would 'immediately reciprocate' if Washington returned to its MoU commitments, supporting the claim that political leaders have signalled a return to the memorandum's terms.
Iranian year-on-year inflation exceeded 80% in August 2026 (point-to-point 84.4% per the Statistical Centre of Iran, reported by IranWire; Iran International reported above 80%).
The Iranian rial has fallen rapidly to record lows — about 2.02 million per dollar in late August and 2.2 million on 2 September 2026, from roughly 1.53 million in early March.
Operation Desert Storm involved more than 500,000 US troops (NIH/Institute of Medicine: over 500,000 deployed by 24 February 1991; AUSA cites 540,000).
Iran ended the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 by formally accepting UN Security Council Resolution 598 on 17 July 1988, which required ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to international boundaries, following the 1988 naval confrontation with the United States.
Millions of barrels per day still transit the Strait despite the closure: the EIA estimated 4.9 million b/d of crude and liquids in Q2 2026 (down from 21.6 million b/d in Q4 2025), while the US energy secretary claimed a 9 million b/d seven-day average in mid-August 2026.
US gasoline prices have risen roughly in the range the article states: AAA's national average was $4.14–$4.17 in early September 2026 against a pre-war baseline near $2.96 (late February 2026), and NBC's tracker described prices as up 'more than 30%' as of 7 September 2026 — though prices peaked substantially higher (c. 50%) in May and August.
The United States remains a net exporter of petroleum, with EIA forecasting crude production of about 13.5 million b/d in 2026 and net petroleum-product export status maintained in long-term outlooks — supporting the claim of ample domestic supply, on a total-liquids/net-trade basis.

✕ Disputed claims 4 claims ⌄

DISPUTED (contradicted by a primary source): 'the country's economic growth rate remains steady'. The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports real GDP growth slowing from 2.1% annualised in Q1 2026 to 1.5% in Q2 2026 — a deceleration, not steadiness.
DISPUTED (contested framing): 'the global economy is suffering minimal damage'. The IMF's April 2026 WEO was explicitly framed around a war shock, the July update notes the disinflation trend has stalled with inflation elevated, and documented downstream crises (e.g. the 2026 Philippine energy crisis) indicate significant, unevenly distributed damage even if aggregate growth held up.
DISPUTED (chronological imprecision): the implication that the June MoU was the instrument that first 'establish[ed] a cease-fire'. CRS records a US-Iran ceasefire agreed in April 2026, with the June MoU addressing blockade removal, passage arrangements and a 60-day negotiating window.
DISPUTED (understated magnitude): the single figure of 'about 38 percent' for US gasoline price rises presents the mildest available reading. It approximates the early-September level versus the pre-war baseline, but AAA-based reporting recorded rises of about 50% in May 2026 and record nominal highs during August 2026, and state-level increases as high as 69%.

? Unverified claims 9 claims ⌄

That 'foreign military sources' revealed a US-Israeli plan for a massive August air offensive 'far larger and more damaging than earlier bombings': only the public cancellation is confirmed (CNN, 1 August 2026, reporting Trump saying Iran and 'other Middle Eastern countries' asked him to hold off). The claimed scale and the specific attribution to Gulf Arab retaliation fears are not independently corroborated.
That the June MoU collapsed 'largely because Iran failed to fully open the strait': contested. CRS and Britannica document Iranian attacks on shipping in early July, but Al Jazeera's 17 August 2026 account records both sides accusing each other of violations, and unresolved US obligations on frozen funds were also central.
That the Trump administration 'appears to have ruled out' a land invasion 'months ago': no policy statement confirms this, and in June 2026 the president publicly threatened to 'take' Kharg Island before walking the threat back — an ambiguity the article does not acknowledge.
That 'nearly the entirety' of Iran's oil exports have been cut off: Kpler data reported by CNBC (28 August 2026) show roughly 260,000 b/d still loading, a fall of more than 80% from 1.7 million b/d a year earlier — a severe but not near-total cut.
That Tehran's position will weaken faster than Washington's and that 'time is on the side' of the United States: a forward-looking strategic judgement not testable against current evidence.
That the strait closure's strategic value to Iran will decline after November as travel falls and buyers adapt: a prediction; no dated source confirms it.
That IRGC leaders 'ultimately call the shots' and are 'poised to stay in power indefinitely': an interpretive characterisation of an opaque decision-making system; open sources record Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader since 8 March 2026, which the article does not address.
That Iran 'is likely to insist on installing some kind of tolling system in perpetuity' if the US withdrew: speculative, though consistent with the MoU's 'no charge, for 60 days only' language implying future charging.
That the United States 'has already used up many critical munitions and strained its troops': directionally supported by CSIS analysis of munitions expenditure and diversion risks, but the article gives no figures and none were located that quantify the specific claim.

⌕ Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄

Confidence

Medium-High (0.78) — Confidence is high on provenance and on the discrete, dated factual claims, which were checked against primary institutional sources (IMF, BEA, EIA, CRS, AAA, UN) with independent secondary corroboration. It is reduced below 0.85 by four factors: paywalled access to several key originals; genuine source disagreement over the petrol-price baseline, which prevents a definitive ruling on the '38 percent' figure; the inherent unverifiability of anonymously sourced war-planning claims and of the essay's forward-looking strategic judgements; and the volatility of the underlying situation, in which casualty counts, prices and diplomatic positions may have moved since the most recent sources dated 6–8 September 2026.

Search journal

Strait of Hormuz status closed blockade 2025

Israel Iran war June 2025 ceasefire twelve day war

US strikes Iran nuclear sites Fordow June 2025

Iran inflation rate 2025 rial value

US Iran memorandum of understanding June 2026 Strait of Hormuz ceasefire 60 days

US service members killed Iran war 2026 casualties total

cost of US war with Iran 2026 estimate billions

IMF World Economic Outlook July 2026 global growth 3.0 percent oil shock

US gasoline prices increase 2026 Hormuz war average price

Iran inflation August 2026 year-over-year percent

IMF April 2026 WEO global growth 3.1 percent 2026 forecast

Iran mines Strait of Hormuz August 30 2026 US strike

Pezeshkian return to memorandum of understanding talks September 2026

Iran oil exports cut off 2026 blockade barrels per day

AAA national average gas price September 2026 record

Trump administration rules out ground invasion Iran 2026

"37.5 billion" Iran war cost July 2026

US service members killed Iran war September 2026 death toll rises

canceled US Israeli air offensive Iran August 2026 Gulf states concerns

US crude oil production exceeds consumption 2026 EIA net exporter

Desert Storm 1991 number of US troops deployed 500,000

Strait of Hormuz daily oil transit volume August 2026 barrels

IMF July 2026 update "second-round" effects oil shock inflation limited evidence

https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/08/tr070826-weo-press-briefing-transcript-july-8-2026

why US Iran memorandum of understanding collapsed July 2026 blame strait

US GDP growth rate second quarter 2026 BEA

Iranian rial exchange rate September 2026 record low

Islamabad Memorandum text highly enriched uranium dilute paragraph

Iran 1988 accepted UN Resolution 598 ceasefire Operation Praying Mantis withdrawal

Iran war cost 100 billion estimate Bilmes total economic cost 2026

Iran proxies Hezbollah Houthis weakened 2026 regional network

Mojtaba Khamenei supreme leader IRGC control Iran 2026

Kharg Island invasion plan Trump ground forces Iran June 2026

Foreign Affairs essay mutual blockade Iran stalemate winning the war September 2026

gas prices percent higher than before Iran war September 2026 AAA comparison

James F. Jeffrey Washington Institute current role 2026 Iran

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Emotion 14% · Reading grade 13.2 · 2052 words

≡ The article we checked Full text as retrieved ⌄

Six months in, the U.S. and Israeli war on Iran has settled into a stalemate. Neither Washington nor Tehran can achieve a clear military or diplomatic victory. Instead, the two sides have found themselves locked in a mutual blockade of oil and other shipments through the Strait of Hormuz and into Iranian ports, with no obvious way to change the status quo. The costs of accommodating the other side’s demands to end the stalemate are so high, and the costs of the stalemate sufficiently low, that a mutual blockade has emerged as the least bad option for both the United States and Iran for the foreseeable future.

This situation may not be ideal for Washington, but it avoids both defeat and escalation. It also works to the United States’ advantage over time: as the blockade drags on, Tehran’s position is likely to weaken faster than Washington’s. The [United States]( has its own ample oil supplies to draw from, whereas nearly the entirety of Iran’s oil exports—and therefore much of its hard currency—has been cut off. An ongoing blockade that gradually ratchets up pressure on Iran could make Tehran more flexible in negotiations with the United States, leading to a compromise that Washington could accept. The challenge is to ensure that Tehran does not choose to respond to its worsening position by escalating its attacks and starting another regionwide conflict that ensnares the United States.

U.S. policy should focus on avoiding the most disruptive contingencies, especially Iranian escalation, and settle for maintaining dual blockades indefinitely. If [Iran]( is unwilling to concede, Washington can slowly erode the Iranian economy and military while ensuring that Tehran cannot rebuild the strong regional position it enjoyed before the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. At this stage, maintaining the current U.S. position is the most effective way of fighting—and winning—this war.

### BEST OF THE WORST

In June, Washington and Tehran agreed to a memorandum of understanding to first establish a cease-fire and open the Strait of Hormuz and then to sign a permanent deal within 60 days to resolve long-term issues in the bilateral relationship, including restricting Iran’s nuclear program and removing U.S. and international sanctions and other financial penalties on Iran. But it fell apart before a final deal could be reached largely because Iran failed to fully open the strait. With diplomatic solutions going nowhere, both Washington and Tehran are now hoping that the economic pressure each can put on the other—and in the case of Iran, on the global economy—will force its counterpart back to the negotiating table on terms that will resolve the blockade in its favor.

A blockade comes with costs for Washington. Keeping the strait closed is raising gas prices and increasing inflation in the United States, an especially sensitive issue as the November midterm elections approach. Prices could rise further if Iran finds a way to limit the millions of barrels of oil that bypass its blockade and are transported through the Strait of Hormuz daily. And the United States has already used up many critical munitions and strained its troops in the region by keeping the war going.

But the operation has been relatively affordable compared with past conflicts. The United States lost thousands of lives and spent trillions of dollars in Afghanistan and Iraq, whereas the ongoing conflict with Iran has resulted in 18 American service members killed and has likely cost tens of billions of dollars. (As of mid-July, estimates ranged from $37.5 billion to over $100 billion.) Most important, the mutual blockade has the advantage of being more palatable to political leaders in Washington than any of the alternative options.

A full U.S. withdrawal from the [Strait of Hormuz]( without gaining concessions from Iran, including ending its blockade, would be unthinkable even for the unorthodox Trump administration. It would allow Iran to tout a complete victory and give the regime in Tehran a powerful psychological boost that would undo much of the progress that the United States and Israel made in the past three years decimating Iran’s network of regional proxies. And it would probably not lead Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz for free passage—Tehran is likely to insist on installing some kind of tolling system in perpetuity. With Washington in retreat, Iran could also revive and rebuild its nuclear program, which would be a stunning failure for the United States.

> The United States can continue the mutual blockade at relatively low cost.

Military escalation is an even less appealing option for Washington. The Iranian regime has already survived a massive bombing campaign; a new, even more aggressive offensive could take out much of Iran’s remaining military capabilities and its energy, transportation, and communications infrastructure, but such an offensive could not guarantee that Tehran would accept American terms on opening the strait or curtailing its nuclear program. Having already weathered so many attacks aimed at diminishing its power, the remaining Iranian leadership,which learned to tolerate hardship in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s,is unlikely to be cowed by further aggression.Moreover, it could retaliate by targeting Gulf Arab states’ infrastructure and depleting remaining U.S. air defense missiles, which would raise the costs of the war to the United States and its partners.

The other option for the United States is a land invasion aimed at forcibly ousting the Iranian regime. This would require a military effort likely as large as the 1991 Desert Storm operation, which involved more than 500,000 American troops. Such an operation risks the significant loss of American life, huge costs to Iranian civilians, and disorder across the entire region. The Trump administration, which has consistently derided prior U.S. “forever wars” in the Middle East, appears to have ruled this option out months ago.

Washington’s calculation, then, is that a blockade is preferable to any other alternative. The blockade serves as a slow-moving pressure campaign either to bring Iran back to the negotiating table to agree to something along the lines of the compromise outlined in the June memorandum of understanding or to gradually weaken the Islamic Republic’s economic and military strength and eventually its internal stability. This type of campaign has a mixed historical record, but it worked in 1988 when, after eight years of war with Iraq and a failed naval confrontation with the United States in the Persian Gulf, Iran ended hostilities by withdrawing its troops from Iraq.

So far, the costs of the mutual blockade have been tolerable for the United States. Despite six months of an almost continuous Gulf oil and natural gas embargo by Iran, the global economy is suffering minimal damage. In July, five months into the war, the International Monetary Fund revised its 2026 global GDP growth estimates downward only 0.1 percentage point—from 3.1 percent to 3.0 percent—“with limited evidence of second round effects” of the oil shock. American gasoline prices have risen about 38 percent over the course of the war, but the country’s economic growth rate remains steady. Deeper shortages could push gas prices higher, but because the United States now produces more oil than it consumes, Washington could intervene in the market to keep prices down. In this context, the United States can continue the mutual blockade at relatively low cost.

### STUCK IN THE MIDDLE WITH YOU

The leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have held on to power so far—and seem poised to stay in power indefinitely. They have shifted Iran to a crisis economy,tightening their grip on the population and protecting their military programs at the expense of the Iranian people. They do not want to concede to terms like those in the memorandum of understanding because doing so would cost them their last major weapon—the ability to close the strait—and make them face possible new restrictions on their nuclear program. (In the June memorandum, for example, Tehran only vaguely committed to dilute its highly enriched uranium, which is Washington’s priority in reducing the Iranian nuclear threat.)

The United States, however, has time on its side. If Washington maintains its blockade through November’s election, the strategic value of the closure to Iran will decline as flights and tourist travel drop from summer highs and as countries improve their coping strategies by finding alternative energy suppliers. And in Iran, the effects of the blockade on its oil exports are already being felt. Inflation rose to over 80 percent year-over-year in August, and the value of the currency has been dropping rapidly. Iran’s leadership may be hardened by war, but the country’s economy will eventually need oil exports and reduced sanctions to survive. The economic pressure has pushed some political leaders, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, to suggest a return to the terms of the memorandum of understanding with the United States.

> Iran’s economy will eventually need oil exports and reduced sanctions to survive.

But if the pressure on the economy makes Tehran desperate, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders who ultimately call the shots could choose to escalate the situation rather than seek compromise. Iran could crack down further on any U.S. efforts to squeeze ships through the strait, including by laying new mines (as it was preparing to do on August 30, prompting a U.S. strike), and it could attempt to shut down Saudi and Emirati pipelines that bypass the strait and channel millions of barrels of oil daily from the Gulf. Alternatively, in addition to its current sporadic attacks, Tehran could launch a major military offensive, using its remaining stocks of missiles and drones to destroy much of the Gulf Arab states’ infrastructure, damage U.S. bases and ships, and even strike Israel. If such an attack succeeds, Gulf Arab states’ need to save their huge oil infrastructure investments could knock them out of their informal American coalition or force Washington to accept Iranian terms on reopening the strait.

If Iran escalated in this way, the [Trump administration]( would have to retaliate militarily despite its reluctance to do so. According to foreign military sources, the United States and Israel had planned just such a massive air offensive in early August that would have been far larger and more damaging than earlier bombings. But Washington canceled the attack in part because of Gulf Arab states’ concerns about potential retaliation.

Any of the scenarios is possible. Iran has traditionally chosen to escalate, but given how hard its economy and its proxies have been hit since 2023, it is possible that it is willing to negotiate rather than surrender. As the stalemate drags on, and if Washington does not budge, Iran’s leadership thus will eventually have to decide which of the three available options it wants to pursue: negotiating a compromise similar to the memorandum of understanding, raising the stakes with aggressive action, or prolonging the blockade while finding itself in an increasingly disadvantageous position.

### WINNING BY STALEMATE

When the United States and [Israel]( launched their attack on Iran in February, they could not foresee that six months later the result would be a double blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Israeli and American leaders likely thought they would have destroyed the regime or forced Tehran to compromise. But now, given the alternatives, embracing the stalemate is the best possible option for the United States. The United States was unable to quickly defeat Iran, but it remains better able to absorb the costs of the current blockade as Iran’s economy slowly buckles under the strain.

The biggest risk to an ongoing stalemate is if Iran decides to escalate. Washington needs to warn Iran of the severe consequences it would face if it were to launch a large offensive or restart its nuclear program. Only American power can deter Iran. Washington thus should play to a stalemate but be ready to respond with a truly devastating counteroffensive if Iran raises the stakes. With the U.S. position getting stronger over time, Iran’s only real advantages lie in pushing back just enough to avoid triggering such a U.S. response.

A stalemate accompanied by the right threats can be a strategy for not only winning the war but also for solidifying and building on the essential gains Washington has made in its larger three-year conflict with Iran and its proxies. It will not transform the Middle East on its own, but by putting Iran in a weaker position, it could encourage much-needed restraint from Tehran.

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The Case for a Stalemate With Iran: America Can Win If It Stays the Course

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