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To Win a War, Know What You’re Fighting For - Middle East Institute

mei.edu 29 August 2026 at 23:12 View original article →

The original link is the material being checked. It may contain false or misleading claims — we link for transparency, not endorsement.

87/100
Verdict High Trust Largely Reliable — Attributed Expert Opinion/Analysis (verified factual anchors; interpretive claims about intent...

The item is a signed commentary, 'To Win a War, Know What You're Fighting For', by Natan Sachs, published by the Middle East Institute on 10 April 2026 (https://mei.edu/commentary/to-win-a-war-know-what-youre-fighting-for/).

12 checks out 1 disputed ? 7 unverified
Full analysis The complete summary

The item is a signed commentary, 'To Win a War, Know What You're Fighting For', by Natan Sachs, published by the Middle East Institute on 10 April 2026 (https://mei.edu/commentary/to-win-a-war-know-what-youre-fighting-for/). It is an analytical opinion piece about the 2026 US/Israel–Iran war, not a reportorial news article, and should be judged on the accuracy of its factual anchors and the transparency of its reasoning rather than on original newsgathering. All four directly quoted Trump statements ('a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again'; 'crazy bastards'; 'unconditional surrender'; 'bring them back to the Stone Ages') are corroborated by multiple reputable outlets dated between 6 March and 7 April 2026. The situational premise — a fragile ceasefire in place (effective 8 April 2026) with a live risk of resumption — was accurate at the time of writing and has been broadly borne out: strikes were subsequently traded, an Iran–Israel exchange occurred on 7 June 2026, and a Pakistan-mediated memorandum of understanding was signed on 17 June 2026 whose implementation has since been strained. The reported US/Israeli cultivation of Iranian Kurdish groups, and Trump's ultimate veto of a Kurdish-led uprising, are corroborated by CNN-sourced reporting, the Atlantic Council, The Jerusalem Post and The Times of Israel. The article's weakest evidentiary points are inherently interpretive: attributions of intent (Israel 'hoped for the rise of a secular regime'; Trump 'appeared content with any change of leadership'), the superlative that Iranians are 'among the most pro-American populations in the Middle East' (directionally supported by GAMAAN's September 2025 online survey showing 53% positive views of the US, but the cross-country ranking is not established by comparable polling), and the assertion about Persian-majority attitudes to minority mobilisation, for which no current representative data was found. No claim in the article met the evidentiary bar for a 'False' rating. Presentation is measured (emotion score 0.16, capital ratio 0.01), the author and his institutional affiliation are disclosed, and MEI publishes an intellectual-independence and donor-disclosure policy. Two transparency deductions apply: the ingested text contains multiple broken/empty hyperlink targets ('[in place](', '[threatening](' etc.), so the reader cannot audit the author's own sourcing; and the piece is now several months stale relative to the current state of the conflict.

What checked out (12)
  • VERIFIED — Trump publicly warned that 'a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again' in relation to Iran on 7 April 2026, ahead of a deadline he had set. Sources: PBS NewsHour (7 Apr 2026) https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/trump-warns-a-whole-civilization-will-die-tonight-if-a-deal-with-iran-isnt-reached ; NBC News (https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-threat-whole-civilization-will-die-iran-war-deadline-hormuz-rcna267059) ; TIME (7 Apr 2026) https://time.com/article/2026/04/07/trump-warns-whole-civilization-will-die-if-iran-misses-deadline/
  • VERIFIED — Trump referred to Iran's leadership as 'crazy bastards' in an expletive-laden Truth Social post on 5 April 2026 demanding the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Sources: NPR (5 Apr 2026) https://www.npr.org/2026/04/05/nx-s1-5774368/iran-war-updates ; Rolling Stone https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-iran-easter-open-the-f-ckin-strait-you-crazy-bastards-1235542031/ ; Middle East Eye https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/trump-tells-crazy-bastards-iran-open-fuckin-strait-or-face-hell-truth-social-rant
  • VERIFIED — Trump demanded Iran's 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER' in a 6 March 2026 social-media post, linking any deal to the selection of an 'acceptable' leadership, which corroborates the article's reference to Iran's refusal to 'surrender'. Sources: Military Times (6 Mar 2026) https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/03/06/no-deal-with-iran-except-unconditional-surrender-trump-says/ ; CNN (25 Mar 2026) https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/25/politics/watch-how-trump-has-shifted-his-stance-over-three-weeks-on-almost-everything-iran ; TIME https://time.com/7382878/trump-iran-war-unconditional-surrender-demand/
  • VERIFIED — Trump said the US would 'bring them back to the Stone Ages, where they belong' in prime-time remarks about striking Iranian infrastructure, provoking anger among Iranians. Sources: Truthout (2 Apr 2026) https://truthout.org/articles/trump-says-us-will-bomb-iran-into-stone-ages-invoking-vietnam-carpet-bombing/ ; Iran International (7 Apr 2026) https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604033654 ; The Hill (26 Jul 2026) https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/5986958-trump-threats-civilian-attacks-iran/
  • VERIFIED — A ceasefire was in place at the time of publication (effective 8 April 2026) and was demonstrably fragile, with unresolved disputes over terms — notably whether Lebanon was covered — and continued Israeli strikes hours after the announcement. Sources: NPR (8–9 Apr 2026) https://www.npr.org/2026/04/08/nx-s1-5777291/iran-war-updates ; Britannica, '2026 Iran war' https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war ; Wikipedia, '2026 Iran war ceasefire' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iran_war_ceasefire
  • VERIFIED — Israel and, reportedly, the United States had been cultivating Iranian Kurdish groups, and Trump ultimately blocked/vetoed a Kurdish-led uprising, consistent with the article's statement that he 'nixed' the effort. Sources: Al Jazeera (4–12 Mar 2026, reporting CNN) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/4/is-the-cia-planning-to-arm-kurdish-forces-to-spark-an-uprising-in-iran ; Atlantic Council (6 Mar 2026) https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-would-a-kurdish-offensive-change-the-war-in-iran/ ; The Jerusalem Post (12 May 2026) https://www.jpost.com/international/article-895828 ; The Times of Israel (11 Jun 2026) https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/trump-claims-he-disagreed-with-arming-kurds-against-iran-ill-remember-that-kurds/
  • VERIFIED — Eliminating/removing Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium was an explicit war aim, particularly for Israel; Netanyahu stated in May 2026 that the uranium must be 'taken out' before the war could be considered over, and the disposition of the ~400kg+ 60%-enriched stock remained unresolved. Sources: France 24 (11 May 2026) https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260511-iran-war-not-over-uranium-must-be-removed-netanyahu ; Times of Israel (10 May 2026) https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-war-with-iran-not-over-enriched-uranium-must-be-taken-out/ ; CRS (9 Apr 2026) https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12106/IF12106.21.pdf ; ISIS (9 Jun 2026) https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-and-npt-safeguards-reports-june-2026
  • VERIFIED — The US operational focus included Iranian naval capacity and the Strait of Hormuz (a dedicated air campaign against Iranian naval vessels and drones from 19 March 2026 and a naval blockade from 13 April 2026), while Iranian ballistic missiles struck Israel during the war, supporting the article's differentiated US/Israeli priority lists. Sources: Wikipedia, '2026 Strait of Hormuz campaign' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_campaign ; Wikipedia, '2026 United States naval blockade of Iran' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_naval_blockade_of_Iran ; Wikipedia, '2026 Iranian strikes on Israel' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iranian_strikes_on_Israel ; Britannica https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war
  • VERIFIED — The war produced a genuine global economic crisis, consistent with the article's description of a 'pending global crisis' becoming 'an actual economic crisis'; the World Bank characterised the Hormuz disruption as triggering an exceptionally large oil-market shock, and the Dallas Fed modelled sharp WTI price increases and GDP effects. Sources: World Bank Data Blog (8 May 2026) https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/strait-of-hormuz-disruption-sends-oil-prices-surging ; Dallas Fed (20 Mar 2026) https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2026/0320 ; Dallas Fed WP 2609 https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/papers/2026/wp2609.pdf
  • VERIFIED — Hizballah's role as the salient Iranian proxy in Israeli priorities is consistent with the record: Hezbollah fired projectiles at Israel from 2 March 2026 and a parallel Lebanon war ran alongside the Iran war. Sources: Wikipedia, 'Timeline of the 2026 Lebanon war' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_2026_Lebanon_war ; Wikipedia, '2026 Israel–Lebanon ceasefire' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Israel%E2%80%93Lebanon_ceasefire
  • VERIFIED — Author identity and affiliation as stated in the byline: Natan Sachs is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute (previously director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings). Sources: MEI profile https://mei.edu/person/natan-sachs/ ; NPR (21 Oct 2025) https://www.npr.org/2025/10/21/nx-s1-5580298/middle-east-institutes-natan-sachs-on-israel-and-the-future-of-the-ceasefire-deal ; Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/people/natan-sachs/
  • VERIFIED — The publisher's boilerplate disclaimer is accurate: MEI publicly states it is non-partisan, does not permit donor influence over research, publishes an annual donor list, and retains editorial control. Sources: MEI Policies https://mei.edu/policies/ ; MEI Intellectual Independence Policy https://www.mei.edu/policies/intellectual-independence ; MEI About https://mei.edu/about/
Disputed claims 1 claim
  • WATCH ITEM (not false) — Temporal staleness rather than error: the article's framing of a 'tenuous cease-fire' reflects 10 April 2026. Since publication, the parties traded strikes over alleged violations, Iran and Israel exchanged fire directly on 7 June 2026 for the first time since the April ceasefire, and a Pakistan-mediated memorandum of understanding was signed by Trump and Pezeshkian on 17 June 2026, whose durability has since been questioned. Readers encountering the piece now should not treat its situational premises as current. Sources: Britannica https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war ; CFR Global Conflict Tracker https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran ; NPR (18 Jun 2026) https://www.npr.org/2026/06/18/nx-s1-5863027/us-iran-trump-memorandum-of-understanding-full-text ; House of Commons Library (28 Jul 2026) https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10637/
? Unverified claims 7 claims
  • UNVERIFIED — 'Israel hoped for the rise of a secular regime in Tehran with a different orientation toward the West.' Israeli regime-change intent is well documented, but the specifically *secular* character of the hoped-for successor regime is an inference; contemporaneous analysis instead reports internal Israeli debate including acceptance of a 'more moderate Islamic replacement'. Limit: no on-record Israeli government statement located specifying a secular outcome. Sources consulted: CS Monitor (12 Mar 2026) https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2026/0312/israel-war-goals-netanyahu-iran-regime-change ; Al Jazeera (3 Mar 2026) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/3/as-bombing-continues-israels-war-aim-in-iran-becomes-clear-regime-change
  • UNVERIFIED — 'Trump appeared content with any change of leadership he could dub “regime change” and open to negotiating with him.' This is a characterisation of the President's private disposition; his public statements are documented as shifting, which is consistent with but does not confirm the author's reading. Sources consulted: CNN (25 Mar 2026) https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/25/politics/watch-how-trump-has-shifted-his-stance-over-three-weeks-on-almost-everything-iran ; RAND (3 Mar 2026) https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/03/who-or-what-will-replace-irans-supreme-leader-ali-khamenei.html
  • UNVERIFIED — 'Iranians are among the most pro-American populations in the Middle East.' Directionally supported by GAMAAN's survey (fielded September 2025, published 5 November 2025) in which the United States received the highest favourability of the countries tested (53% positive, 37% negative) among Iranian respondents; however, the comparative regional superlative is not established, and GAMAAN uses a large non-probability online sample with weighting, which limits generalisability. Sources: GAMAAN https://gamaan.org/2025/11/05/12-day-war-survey-english/ ; Iran International https://www.iranintl.com/en/202511055178
  • UNVERIFIED — 'Most Iranians — and particularly the Persian majority — view such efforts [minority uprisings] as a threat to their country, not the regime.' Plausible and widely asserted by analysts, and the sensitivity of arming Kurdish groups is documented, but no representative polling measuring this specific attitude was located. Sources consulted: The Conversation (16 Jun 2026) https://theconversation.com/its-a-disgrace-the-us-has-abandoned-the-kurds-again-and-this-time-trump-is-insulting-them-to-boot-283967 ; Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-would-a-kurdish-offensive-change-the-war-in-iran/
  • UNVERIFIED — 'Three goals stood out' as the actual, operative war aims of Washington and Jerusalem, in the stated hierarchy. Each individual goal is documented in open sources, but the claim that these were *the* three governing objectives, and the specific ordering ascribed to each capital, is the author's analytical framework rather than a documented policy statement. Sources consulted: Wikipedia, 'Regime change efforts in the 2026 Iran war' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regime_change_efforts_in_the_2026_Iran_war ; Britannica https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war
  • UNVERIFIED — 'He engineered a pending global crisis through the massive pre-war buildup' as a deliberate leverage strategy. The economic crisis is verified; the causal attribution to a premeditated Trump strategy of manufactured crisis is interpretive and not confirmable from available sourcing.
  • UNVERIFIED — Counterfactual and prescriptive propositions ('regime change would happen at the hands of the citizens'; 'a war can be lost even when it is won militarily'; the 'credibility trap' mechanism). These are normative strategic arguments and are not empirically falsifiable claims; they are assessed as reasoned argument rather than fact, and are not scored as accuracy failures.
Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence
Confidence

High (0.86) — Confidence is high because the article was positively identified at source with an exact date (MEI Commentary, 10 April 2026), and because every checkable factual anchor — four direct presidential quotations, the ceasefire status and its disputed terms, the Kurdish cultivation reports and their reversal, the HEU objective, the US naval/Hormuz focus, Iranian strikes on Israel, the economic shock, and the author's affiliation — was independently corroborated by dated primary or multiple reputable secondary sources across several jurisdictions and outlet types, with no contradictions found. Confidence is held below 0.95 for four reasons: first, roughly half the prioritised claims concern the private intentions and internal prioritisation of governments, which open sources cannot resolve and which are therefore permanently Unverified rather than settled; second, the delivered text has stripped hyperlinks and no visible date, so the author's own evidentiary chain could not be inspected and provenance had to be reconstructed externally; third, the single quantitative-style claim about Iranian pro-American sentiment rests on a non-probability online survey with no comparable regional benchmark; and fourth, the subject matter is fast-moving, so the article's situational premises have shifted since publication and any assessment of its predictive accuracy is provisional. No Persian-language sourcing was consulted, which further caps confidence on Iranian domestic-opinion questions.

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Article metrics

Emotion 16% · Reading grade 12.8 · 1098 words

The article we checked Full text as retrieved
With a tenuous cease-fire now [in place]( and the possibility that the fighting may resume, it is worth revisiting what the United States and Israel were actually trying to accomplish in their war with Iran. Despite a jumbled public rollout, three goals stood out: facilitating regime change in Tehran; degrading Iran’s capacity to threaten its neighbors; and gaining leverage to pressure Iran to accept a deal governing its nuclear program that was acceptable to Washington. This multiplicity of goals made the war harder to win for two reasons. First, competing goals can conflict with one another, with the tactics that serve one undermining another. In particular, facilitating regime change would point toward targeted strikes aimed narrowly at the regime itself, while degrading enemy military capabilities suggests much wider ones that support its broader capacity to produce weapons. Second, the desire to maximize leverage in a deal could incline you to dial the crisis up to 11, but doing so can also narrow your own freedom of action, not just that of your adversary. If the enemy does not back down, expansive threats can create a “credibility trap” that forces you into a conflict wider than you intended. If the current cease-fire breaks down and fighting resumes, both problems will return with a vengeance. The US and Israel had somewhat different versions of each goal as well as a different prioritization among them. On regime change, Israel hoped for the rise of a secular regime in Tehran with a different orientation toward the West; President Donald Trump appeared content with any change of leadership he could dub “regime change” and open to negotiating with him. On degradation of Iran’s capacity to threaten its neighbors, both sought to eliminate its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, but they diverged on the rest of the priority list, in line with their different geographies and [strategic postures]( The US focus included Iran’s naval capacity, its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, and the short-range ballistic missiles threatening its Gulf neighbors. For Israel, those were secondary; what mattered most, after the nuclear file, was Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles, which struck Israel throughout the war and remain a threat now, as well as Iran’s proxy network — chiefly Hizballah. The third goal, leverage for a deal, was purely American and vintage Trump. He engineered a pending global crisis through the massive pre-war buildup, which became an actual economic crisis once fighting began. Throughout the war, all the way to the day the cease-fire was announced, he raised the stakes beyond the imaginable, [threatening]( that “a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.” He [appears]( to have assumed leverage would shorten the war, that Iran would fold under superior American firepower. Its refusal to “[surrender]( seems to have baffled him; its leaders were behaving, in his phrase, like “[crazy bastards]( The three goals began to collide almost immediately. If the grand prize was regime change, the central operational task would be to widen the wedge between the regime and the Iranian people. Regime change would happen at the hands of the citizens, or by factions within the elites, and the more unpopular the regime, and the more tolerable the foreign intervention, the better the odds of success. As a general rule, but especially if this is your primary objective, no effort should be spared to minimize damage not only to civilian lives but to civilian infrastructure as well. The distinction between the regime and the people must be made unmistakable to the very people you need as agents of change. This should have dictated the nature and scope of operations — and initially it did. Soon, however, muddled or evolving priorities started to shift the nature of the campaign, thus undermining the prospects of toppling Iran’s ruling structures. Targeting dual-use infrastructure, which airstrikes increasingly went after, can certainly also deprive the regime of capabilities, and could serve the second goal of degrading them, but strategy requires prioritization: if regime change is the primary goal, Iran the country must suffer as little as possible. Iranians are among the most pro-American populations in the Middle East. That is an enormous asset, and one that must be preserved despite an American war. [Threats]( to “bring them back to the Stone Ages where they belong” do the opposite. The same logic ultimately convinced Trump to nix any effort to foment uprisings among ethnic minorities, such as Iranian Kurds, which Israel, and possibly the US, had [reportedly]( been [cultivating]( Most Iranians — and particularly the Persian majority — view such efforts as a threat to their country, not the regime. What if America’s campaign was really about gaining leverage at the negotiating table? Given Trump’s approach to foreign policy, this surely was his aim at times, simultaneously with other ones. Trump prefers to create an enormous crisis as an opening salvo even for modest gains later. Threaten Iran enough, demonstrate your capacity and will to inflict massive damage, and the enemy is supposed to fold. But this is the trap of always striving for maximum leverage. A core principle of conflict is to preserve your own freedom of action — to maintain your ability to shape events and calibrate escalation dynamics. Yet when the US issues bombastic threats, it puts its own credibility on the line and creates expectations that it will follow through, regardless of the wisdom of such action later. Threats can corner your adversary, but they can corner you as well. Pressure is an essential tool of negotiation and conflict. It does not follow, however, that more pressure is always better. Given [disagreements]( over cease-fire terms and the conflicting interests ahead, the war may yet resume. If it does, it would be essential that the United States and Israel agree on clear goals and the priority among them. Fighting without a clear goal makes it easy to get into a war, but nearly impossible to win it. Strategy and tactics must all work in consort toward an objective. If the objective is unclear, you flounder. Indeed, a war can be lost even when it is won militarily. The stakes here are too high for that kind of victory. _Natan Sachs is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute._ Photo by Joe Raedle/Getty Images * * * _The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, not-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click [here](

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