Addressing the so-called “Iran deal” in 2015, President Barack Obama defended the value of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) constraining Iranian nuclear activities in stark terms. “Let’s not mince words,” [he said]( “The choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy or some form of war.” Eleven years later and following President Donald Trump’s [2018 unilateral withdrawal]( from a JCPOA that had successfully capped the Iranian nuclear program, Obama’s assessment proved correct, and the Trump administration is now mired in a quagmire entirely of its own making. ### **Stay informed** on Iran This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 General This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 Events This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 Fundraising This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 Cultivation This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 InProgress This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 Digital Contact This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_source This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_medium This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_campaign This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_content This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_term This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn1 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn2 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn3 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn4 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn5 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn6 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn7 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn8 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn9 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn10 This field is hidden when viewing the form extra_note This field is hidden when viewing the form Opt-in ID CAPTCHA Trump’s war against Iran, [unconstitutional]( and unjustified, has singularly failed to achieve the objectives that the Trump administration set out for the ill-conceived military intervention. The costs of this war of choice, in contrast, have been immense and continue to accumulate daily. Simply put, the American people and the United States would have unquestionably been better off had Trump followed in the footsteps of his predecessors and [rejected]( Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s arguments for war. Instead, President Trump’s Iran war has proved to be a strategic blunder that will characterize his presidency as did President George W. Bush’s disastrous 2003 invasion of Iraq. ### Trump’s war of choice is a war of failure At the outset of the war, the Trump administration [identified five ambitious goals]( vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic. Thirteen weeks into [what was supposed to be a four- to six-week war]( and with no end clearly in sight, none have been fully achieved, and any marginal progress is subject to rapid reversal. The first objective was the total elimination of Iran’s nuclear program, on which it is hard to identify even incremental gains. Most significantly, the 972 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity—a short step from weapons-grade material—[remains in Iran]( There is no firm evidence that newer nuclear sites that were not hit during 2025’s 12-Day War, such as [Pickaxe Mountain]( were damaged. The second objective was the destruction and dismantlement of Iran’s ballistic missile program, which threatens Israel, U.S. facilities in the region, and the countries that host them. While the United States [struck over 13,000 targets]( during the war, the impact on the country’s arsenal has been comparatively modest. [Early claims]( by the United States and Israel that Iran’s ballistic missiles had been decimated quickly gave way to more sobering assessments. Leaked U.S. Intelligence Community assessments [estimate]( that Iran retains 70 percent of its ballistic missile stockpile and 70 percent of its mobile launchers. Russia also is reportedly supplying additional missiles, which would help to backfill Iran’s lost production capability. And, beyond ballistic missiles, [Iran’s effective use of drones]( that are cheaper and easier to produce suggests Iran retains the capacity to harass and harm regional targets at will. Eliminating Iran’s navy, the third objective, is the one on which the Trump administration has recorded the most success. In the early days of the war, the United States either sank or destroyed Iran’s conventional naval vessels, including [a “drone” carrier]( [a warship]( and [guided-missile boats]( In one sense, Iran’s traditional navy has been incapacitated. But, as in other areas, Iran’s ability to improvise has ensured that it retains a naval presence in the Persian Gulf. [Relying on fast-attack craft and even commercial vessels]( the Iranian military has continued to mine strategic waterways. Similarly, Iran has used smaller vessels to launch drones against ships in the Gulf. Iran may not possess a formal navy, but it clearly has naval power, rendering U.S. success in this domain more than a little hollow. Rounding up Iran’s regional proxy network was the Trump administration’s fourth objective. As with Iran’s nuclear program, there is little evidence of progress against Iranian proxies. If anything, many affiliated militias are benefiting from the war. Hezbollah, which, as of January 2026, appeared to be at the weakest point since its establishment, has regrouped, working with Iran to [revise its tactics]( and [employing first-person view drones]( with deadly effect. Though [condemned by Lebanon’s government]( and many Lebanese citizens, Hezbollah has [bolstered its popularity with other parts of the population]( The Houthis have largely stayed out of the way, but [a March missile attack on Israel]( has been enough to remind regional leaders of their relevance. Iraqi Shia militias, meanwhile, have [exchanged fire with the United States and regional countries]( without suffering grievous damage. Amid reports that the Trump administration has not prioritized regional proxies in negotiation with Iran, it seems all but certain that these militias will emerge from the war intact. President Trump’s final objective was to overthrow the brutal Islamic Republic that has terrorized Iranians and bedeviled the United States and its partners for nearly 50 years. Despite killing dozens of senior Iranian officials—[most notably Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei]( administration’s inability to topple the regime may be the biggest failure of all. The regime’s new leadership, [as many predicted]( has [emerged from the hardened Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its allies]( Strong advocates of Iran’s nuclear program and opponents of any accommodation with the West, they have acquired new levels of influence under Khamenei’s son and successor, Mojtaba. Emboldened and belligerent, the IRGC-dominated Iranian government may ultimately represent a greater threat to regional security and U.S. interests than its predecessor. ### Failure comes at a high cost for the American people As the promised achievements of Operation Epic Fury have failed to materialize, the costs incurred have rapidly mounted, imposing gratuitous financial strain on the American public and needlessly exposing U.S. service members and civilians to harm. Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz—[through which 25 percent of oil and 20 percent of natural gas global supplies transit]( along with other commodities critical to the global economy—has caused prices to skyrocket for consumers and businesses alike. As of June 1, the price of Brent crude, the international benchmark for oil, was $97 per barrel, or 34 percent over its February 27 price. (See Table 1) The U.S. national average price for a gallon of regular gasoline on June 1 was [$4.32]( or 45 percent above the prewar price. Researchers from Brown University [estimated]( that as of June 1, the war in Iran had already cost Americans an extra $51.8 billion in higher energy costs, or $395 per household. TABLE 1 Besides turmoil in energy markets, the disruption to supply chains and heightened geopolitical uncertainty have driven up other prices. Expectations of higher inflation have pushed up interest rates, raising the cost of new [mortgages]( for American homebuyers. One-third of global seaborne fertilizer transits through the strait; higher fertilizer prices, combined with higher costs for diesel, will squeeze margins for [American farmers]( and increase prices for consumers at the grocery store. Tragically, [13 American service members have lost their lives]( due to President Trump’s war of choice in Iran. On top of the death toll, [over 400 other service members]( have been injured, some grievously, in the conflict. And at least [an additional 10,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen have been deployed]( to the Middle East, disrupting their lives and those of their families. Within the Middle East, conservative estimates place the number of civilians killed in [Iran]( [the Gulf]( [Lebanon]( and [Israel]( at over 3,000 people, including [over 150 Iranian schoolgirls]( in a single U.S. strike. The war also has wrought [terrible ecological consequences]( degradation, heightened water scarcity, and intensified health impacts—that will endure long after the conflict has ended. To be clear, all of their hardship was avoidable, and, in the absence of substantial military or political achievements, it is even more important to hold the Trump administration to account for its foolish war. In addition to the harm caused to the American people, Trump’s war has inflicted significant and almost certainly lasting damage to U.S. national security interests. The administration’s decisions have not only negatively affected individual service members and their families but also left the U.S. military weaker than before the war. Contrary to the [official $29 billion figure]( released by the administration, U.S. officials have privately told CBS News that [closer to $50 billion]( of the Department of Defense’s budget (roughly 5 percent of the annual budget for fiscal year 2026) has been expended on the failed war. The opportunity costs of this funding for domestic spending are enormous. The Center for American Progress estimates that a similar level of funding would cover Medicaid costs for 6.2 million people; provide free school lunches for all school children; or support childcare for 3.6 million children for an entire year.* Unfortunately, the munitions and equipment expended and lost during the war—from [air defense systems and interceptors]( to [KC-135 refueling jets]( and [Tomahawk missiles]( be replaced quickly. In the meantime, the U.S. military will be less capable of contending with an increasingly sophisticated Chinese military or even Iran’s ability to suffocate the global economy. As long as additional U.S. military assets are required in the Middle East, fewer resources will be available to deploy to the Asia-Pacific and other hotspots. And every time the United States engages in real combat, adversaries can learn about U.S. military doctrine and tactics and the capabilities of U.S. platforms, opportunities that should not be provided unnecessarily. The biggest gift to America’s adversaries, and Iran in particular, was the Trump administration’s inexplicable failure to prepare for—and prevent—the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This development was far from a Black Swan; [U.S. intelligence assessments going back decades warned that Iran would likely move to control the strait]( and underscored the catastrophic impact if it succeeded in doing so. A big reason past administrations opted against war with Iran was a concern that it would block the strait. Yet, there is no evidence the Trump administration had even planned for this contingency, leaving the United States, the Gulf, and the global economy in an extended state of extreme vulnerability. It is no exaggeration to say that Iran’s success in controlling access to the strait completely altered the power dynamics in the war. Iran turned what was an open international waterway prior to the war into a stranglehold on global economic activity and a critical point of leverage in any future negotiations. What is most concerning is that, even if the strait reopens, the specter of the blockade [will continue to hover over the region and the international system]( In short order, the Islamic Republic of Iran went from what looked like an endangered regime back to a regional heavyweight. The balance of power in the Middle East has shifted toward Iran and away from U.S. partners in ways that will be difficult to reverse in the near term. And, in the process, the Trump administration’s careless handling of the crisis has enabled a U.S. competitor [like President Xi Jinping of China]( to portray himself as a responsible global actor. The war in Iran, launched against the advice of most partners in the Middle East and other parts of the world, also undermined another source of American strength: our global system of alliances and partnerships. Indeed, U.S. partners are incurring even greater costs from Operation Epic Fury. American partners in the Gulf have [suffered extensive damage to their petroleum industries both physically and reputationally]( raising questions about the long-term viability of their economic model. While the U.S. military assisted in defending these countries, the Trump administration’s inability to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and protect key Gulf infrastructure in response to a war it started has led to doubts about the value of American partnership. Similarly, U.S. partners in Asia, which are more directly dependent on exports from the Persian Gulf, have struggled to cope with the fallout of the war. [Genuine shortages of key imports]( including energy supplies, have hurt these countries far more than in the United States. Extraordinary measures have been taken to [ration supplies]( [prompting unrest in the streets and growing anger at Washington]( To a lesser extent, European partners have also been hurt by the economic impact of the war. Despite their clear interest in seeing the Strait of Hormuz reopened, Asian and European partners have tellingly [refused to join American initiatives to do so]( Reflecting diminished confidence in the United States and indignation among America’s European allies that they were not consulted before the United States launched airstrikes, German Chancellor [Friedrich Merz]( said the United States was “being humiliated by the Iranian leadership”; lamented he had not conveyed his skepticism of the war “more emphatically” to Trump; and drew comparisons to the U.S. “forever wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan. These countries are unlikely to abandon the United States entirely, but a weakened alliance system makes it harder for America to exert its military power around the globe. ### Trump’s “Iraq War” It remains to be seen whether President Trump can conclude an enduring ceasefire with Iran and on what terms. Even if he manages to reach a deal, however, the costs and losses described above will persist in whole or in part. An agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz will not undo the recognition that it can be closed—and Iran may very well try again—any more than energy prices will immediately return to prewar levels. Based on procurement patterns, it will take the U.S. military years, and perhaps over a decade, to replenish depleted stocks. Of course, there is no way to bring back those who have perished, whether American service members, residents of Israel and Arab countries, or the thousands of Iranian civilians who died in strikes against regime targets. No two wars are exactly alike—and hopefully the Iran war will not last as long as those in Iraq or Afghanistan. But, make no mistake, Trump’s unnecessary war of choice in Iran could prove as devastating to the United States as those two wars. The total financial and human toll of the war in Iran may not rival Iraq and Afghanistan, but the war in Iran has fundamentally altered the Middle East, changed global trade relations, thrust hundreds of millions into instability and suffering, and undermined U.S. leadership in the world. In mere months, President Trump has sealed his reputation and fate as a failed wartime president. _The author thanks Emily Gee, Leo Banks, Bobby Kogan, and Allison McManus for their contributions._ _* Author’s note: The estimates of alternatives for $50 billion in federal funding use the methodology described in a previous Center for American Progress [column](