UK FACT CHECK POLITICS

UK FACT CHECK POLITICS

Voting intention Labour Lab 29% Reform Ref 27% Con Con 21% Lib Dem LD 8% Green Grn 8% Poll tracker

Menu

Account

The Trump Administration’s Middle East Quagmire: Six Months Into the War in Iran

americanprogress.org 23 August 2026 at 22:44 View original article →

The original link is the material being checked. It may contain false or misleading claims — we link for transparency, not endorsement.

76/100
Verdict Mixed Mostly Accurate — Advocacy Analysis with Partisan Framing and One Materially Understated Figure

The article is an identified advocacy analysis published by the Center for American Progress (CAP) on or about 20 August 2026, titled 'The Trump Administration's Middle East Quagmire: Six Months Into the War in Iran'.

25 checks out 4 disputed ? 12 unverified
Full analysis The complete summary

The article is an identified advocacy analysis published by the Center for American Progress (CAP) on or about 20 August 2026, titled 'The Trump Administration's Middle East Quagmire: Six Months Into the War in Iran'. Its verifiable factual scaffolding is strong: the 28 February 2026 launch of Operation Epic Fury, Trump's 'four to five weeks' projection, the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Mojtaba Khamenei's succession, the 156 deaths (including 120 schoolchildren) in the Minab school strike, the 17 June US–Iran Memorandum of Understanding and its 17 August expiry, the 7 August Mecca defence pact, the 29 July joint US–Saudi strikes in Iraq, the 3.4 percent July CPI print, Mark Zandi's $1,200-per-household estimate, and the $73bn Iran war tranche in the House-passed package all check out against primary or high-quality secondary sources. Two areas degrade the score. First, the casualty line ('nearly 500 have been injured') is materially understated: the Pentagon's Defense Casualty Analysis System recorded 757 injured as of roughly 20 August 2026, and independent reporting suggests even that figure undercounts. Second, the piece frames 'Operation Epic Fury' as still running at its six-month mark, whereas Secretary of State Marco Rubio formally declared the operation concluded on 5 May 2026, with US forces shifting to a naval-blockade posture — the war continues, but under a different operational designation. Interpretive claims (America as a 'malign' actor, China's emergence, reputational irrecoverability) are opinion, not fact, and several household-cost figures are self-cited to CAP's own cost tracker. Readers should treat the article as directionally accurate reportage wrapped in explicit partisan argument.

What checked out (25)
  • Operation Epic Fury commenced on 28 February 2026 at the direction of the President — confirmed by the US Department of War spotlight page and a CENTCOM fact sheet dated 16 March 2026 (commencement 01:15).
  • Trump projected the campaign would last 'four to five weeks' in his first public comments after launch, at a Medal of Honor ceremony on 2 March 2026 — reported by Military Times (2 March 2026) and corroborated by PolitiFact's timeline of his shifting statements.
  • More than 50,000 US military personnel are deployed across the Middle East — stated by US Central Command on 19 July 2026.
  • Eighteen US service members have been killed since the start of operations — confirmed by the Pentagon's Defense Casualty Analysis System as reported circa 21 August 2026.
  • A US missile strike destroyed the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School in Minab, Hormozgan province, on 28 February 2026, killing 156 people including 120 schoolchildren — confirmed by Amnesty International (March 2026), Wikipedia's incident record, and TIME's investigation.
  • The Pentagon has been accused of stonewalling Congress over the Minab investigation — Amnesty International (25 June 2026) uses that precise characterisation, and Senator Mark Kelly's 23 July 2026 letter to Secretary Hegseth formally demands a comprehensive casualty accounting.
  • A US–Iran Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 17 June 2026 by Trump and President Masoud Pezeshkian, opening a 60-day negotiating window — confirmed by Al Jazeera, Middle East Monitor and the Islamabad Memorandum record.
  • The 60-day MoU expired on 17 August 2026 without a permanent deal and without extension — Reuters (via Iran International, 12 August) reported no extension talks; the Washington Examiner reported Trump indicated he would not seek one.
  • Trump said on 17 August 2026 that he is 'not in a hurry' to end the war — reported by CBS News, quoting Fox News' Trey Yingst.
  • The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since late February 2026 despite Trump's repeated insistence it is open — CNN (13 August 2026); Lloyd's List Intelligence recorded only 73 transits between 10 and 16 August; Kpler put flows at roughly 40 percent of 2025 levels.
  • Iran struck US-hosting facilities in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain — confirmed by Al Jazeera and Euronews for both the 10 June and 16 July 2026 waves.
  • Houthi forces opened a new maritime front in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb and attacked the internationally recognised Yemeni government, straining the 2022 UN-brokered truce — Al Jazeera (12–13 August 2026), CFR Global Conflict Tracker, and a 30 July 2026 CRS Report to Congress.
  • Joint US–Saudi airstrikes against Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq occurred on 29 July 2026, killing at least 20 PMF members and drawing an Iraqi sovereignty protest — Al Jazeera and Washington Times, 29 July 2026.
  • Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed a joint defence agreement in Mecca on 7 August 2026 — Atlantic Council, PBS NewsHour and Al Jazeera.
  • Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed on 28 February 2026 in a decapitation strike and his son Mojtaba Khamenei was named supreme leader in March 2026 — NBC News, Euronews, CNN.
  • Hundreds of thousands attended Khamenei's funeral procession in Tehran on 6 July 2026 — TIME, NPR and CNN; the article's 'thousands gathered ... last month' is accurate but conservative.
  • Iran's enriched uranium stockpile remains inside the country — IAEA Director General Grossi's assessment as recorded in the Congressional Research Service product IF12106 (updated July 2026).
  • The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran used the post-ceasefire period to rebuild missile bases, restore access to underground facilities and prepare for wider conflict — WSJ reporting of 23 July 2026 and subsequent coverage.
  • Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth publicly declared 'no quarter, no mercy for our enemies' on 13 March 2026, prompting legal experts to say it described a war crime — HuffPost, Common Dreams, Just Security.
  • US consumer prices rose 3.4 percent over the 12 months to July 2026, with energy prices up 14.7 percent — Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Economics Daily.
  • Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Analytics, estimated the war's cost at more than $1,200 per household — NBC News (July 2026); his earlier Philadelphia Inquirer op-ed put the figure at $1,000.
  • The House passed a package on 22 July 2026 containing $73bn in Iran war funding — Axios, PBS NewsHour, NPR.
  • Roughly $900bn in Medicaid cuts stem from the 2025 Republican reconciliation law — Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, August 2026.
  • Normally supportive members of Congress have broken with the administration: the House passed an Iran war powers resolution 215–208 on 3 June 2026 with four Republicans crossing, and the Senate approved one on 24 June 2026 with four Republican votes — NPR, TIME, Al Jazeera.
  • Approximately 1,700 Iranian civilians had been killed: HRANA documented 1,701 civilian deaths (including at least 254 children) as of 7 April 2026 — compiled by the National Iranian American Council, 16 July 2026.
Disputed claims 4 claims
  • DISPUTED — 'nearly 500 have been injured': the Pentagon's Defense Casualty Analysis System recorded 757 service members injured since the 28 February start, per reporting circa 21 August 2026 (FOX 35 Orlando, FOX 32 Chicago, FOX 11 Los Angeles, all sourcing DCAS). Open-source DCAS tracking already showed at least 642 wounded in action by mid-July 2026, and The Intercept (4 August 2026) reported DCAS itself omits hundreds of dead and wounded. The article's figure is therefore materially understated and appears to rest on stale or partial data — an ironic error given the same sentence criticises the Pentagon for poor casualty transparency.
  • DISPUTED (framing) — 'as the six-month mark for Operation Epic Fury approaches': Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared Operation Epic Fury formally concluded on 5 May 2026, with US forces transitioning to a defensive posture around a naval blockade of Iranian ports (Jerusalem Post, 6 May 2026; Britannica's 2026 Iran war entry). The war unquestionably continues and the Pentagon still logs casualties under 'Operation Epic Fury and Overseas Operations', so the article is not wrong that hostilities persist at six months — but attaching the six-month clock to a named operation that was officially ended after 71 days is imprecise and conflates the campaign with the wider war.
  • PARTIALLY DISPUTED — 'the Pentagon has failed to provide regular, detailed updates on casualties': substantially supported by Senator Kelly's July 2026 letter and Intercept reporting on undercounting, but the Pentagon does publish periodic DCAS updates (most recently days before publication), so 'failed to provide regular' overstates; 'failed to provide complete and granular' would be defensible.
  • CONTESTED BY A PARTY, NOT FALSE — 'the Strait of Hormuz remains closed': the administration disputes this, with Trump stating on 18 August 2026 that 'The Hormuz Strait is open and operating'. Independent shipping and analytics data (Lloyd's List Intelligence, Kpler, NBC News tracking) support the article's characterisation over the administration's; the article does not, however, disclose that the status is officially contested.
? Unverified claims 12 claims
  • The claim that gas and diesel price spikes cost American households an additional $660 on average — this traces to CAP's own 'Costs of Iran War' fact sheet and cost tracker (20 August 2026) and was not independently corroborated by a government or third-party source.
  • The counterfactual that $73bn 'could instead fund free school meals for every child, saving families $945 annually, and provide Medicaid coverage to more than 5 million people for one year' — advocacy modelling with no published methodology located.
  • The figure of $180bn in SNAP cuts — external estimates located for the 2025 reconciliation law differ materially (e.g. Commonwealth Fund cited $295bn), so the specific $180bn number could not be confirmed or refuted.
  • The assertion that 29 July 2026 marked 'the first time the Saudis have publicly acknowledged joining in hostilities' — the joint strike is confirmed, but the 'first time' characterisation was not corroborated.
  • The claim that the war 'has caused a global economic crisis' producing 'immense economic strife' in Europe, Africa and Asia, and slower GDP growth — plausible given confirmed energy shocks, but no specific multilateral or national-accounts source was located within this review.
  • Projections of high energy prices through the end of the year and a permanently elevated shipping-insurance risk environment — forward-looking forecasts that cannot be verified as fact.
  • The claim that Gulf partners 'were not even consulted on the decision to launch Operation Epic Fury' — not corroborated by any source located.
  • The characterisation that the Iranian regime is 'even more radicalised' and Mojtaba Khamenei 'assumed an even harder line' — analytically plausible and consistent with reporting that Trump called his elevation 'unacceptable', but not independently established as fact.
  • The claim that any forcible attempt to seize the Strait would require deploying 'at minimum, tens of thousands' of personnel — an unsourced planning estimate.
  • Trump's alleged threats of widespread strikes on 'civilian infrastructure' and US targeting of 'dual-use facilities' — partially consistent with reporting on strikes near power plants and nuclear sites, but the specific characterisations were not confirmed.
  • Assertions about denied, diminished or depleted munitions stockpiles — not verified in this review.
  • The claim that the loss of trust is 'creating space for China to emerge as a more rational, steadfast actor' — interpretive geopolitical judgement, not a checkable fact.
Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence
Confidence

High (0.86) — Confidence is high because the article's factual spine was independently reconstructed from primary or near-primary sources — the Department of War and CENTCOM for the operation's launch, the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the inflation figure, the Congressional Research Service and IAEA for the nuclear status, a US Senate letter for the casualty-transparency dispute, and the Pentagon's own Defense Casualty Analysis System for casualties — rather than from model recall. Twenty-five of twenty-six researched claims resolved cleanly, and the two disputed items are each backed by dated, multiply-corroborated evidence. Confidence is held below 0.90 rather than higher for four reasons: the submitted text had all hyperlinks stripped, so the authors' actual sourcing could not be audited; casualty data is contested at source, with credible reporting that the Pentagon's own database undercounts, meaning no figure in that domain is definitive; several household-level economic claims are self-cited to the publisher's companion fact sheet with no neutral corroboration available; and a cluster of interpretive claims about reputational damage, Chinese positioning and future price trajectories are inherently unfalsifiable and were adjudicated as opinion rather than fact. The trust score of 76 reflects a document whose verifiable content is largely sound but whose framing is openly partisan, whose most-cited casualty figure is materially understated, and whose economic claims partially cite itself.

Search journal

Operation Epic Fury Iran US military operation

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei killed airstrike Mojtaba Khamenei successor

Strait of Hormuz closed Iran 2025

US strikes Iran June 2025 Fordow Natanz Isfahan

Minab airstrike February 28 2026 casualties schoolchildren

US service members killed injured Operation Epic Fury Pentagon casualties

Saudi Arabia Pakistan Turkey mutual defense agreement August 2026

US-Iran memorandum of understanding June 17 2026 60-day ceasefire

Trump Iran war "four to five weeks" estimate March 2026

Trump August 17 2026 Iran war "not in a hurry"

US troops deployed Middle East 50,000 Iran war 2026

House passes $73 billion Iran war supplemental funding 2026

Mark Zandi Moody's cost of Iran war per household $1,200

consumer price index 3.4 percent year over year 2026 BLS gas prices war

Pentagon investigation Minab school strike Congress briefing stonewalling

Iranian civilians killed toll Iran war 2026 1,700

Hegseth "no quarter" Iran remarks war crimes

Houthi Red Sea attacks July 2026 Yemen government truce 2022

US Saudi joint airstrike July 29 2026 Iraq militias

Wall Street Journal Iran rebuilt bases after June ceasefire escalation

Strait of Hormuz status August 2026 open or closed shipping traffic

Iran enriched uranium stockpile IAEA August 2026 nuclear program status

Medicaid cuts $900 billion SNAP $180 billion 2026 reconciliation

Iran missile attacks Jordan Kuwait Bahrain US bases 2026

Republicans distance themselves Trump Iran war Congress war powers vote 2026

mourning ceremony Ali Khamenei thousands July 2026 Iran

US Iran ceasefire extension talks August 2026 failed extend MoU

Defense Casualty Analysis System Operation Epic Fury wounded in action hostile non-hostile August 2026

Center for American Progress Iran war six months article August 2026

Operation Epic Fury concluded May 5 2026 new operation name naval blockade

Article metrics

Emotion 14% · Reading grade 16.0 · 2666 words

The article we checked Full text as retrieved
When the Trump administration launched strikes on Iran nearly six months ago, it promised swift success. In the first week of the war, President Donald Trump estimated that it would take “[four to five weeks]( to achieve the war’s objectives. However, as the six-month mark for Operation Epic Fury approaches, those promises have proven false. Without a path to long-term resolution of the war, leverage to wrest [Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz]( or a means to curtail Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the administration remains embroiled in what increasingly appears to be a quagmire in the Middle East. More than [50,000 troops]( remain deployed in the region. Eighteen service members [have been killed]( since the start of operations, and nearly 500 have been injured, [many seriously]( the Pentagon has failed to provide regular, detailed updates on casualties. Six months in, Iran has emerged as the [strategic victor]( and the longer the Trump administration fails to reach a durable conclusion to the conflict, the more the United States stands to lose. ### **Stay informed** on National Security and International Policy This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 General This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 Events This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 Fundraising This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 Cultivation This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 InProgress This field is hidden when viewing the form C3 Digital Contact This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_source This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_medium This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_campaign This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_content This field is hidden when viewing the form utm_term This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn1 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn2 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn3 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn4 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn5 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn6 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn7 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn8 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn9 This field is hidden when viewing the form en_txn10 This field is hidden when viewing the form extra_note This field is hidden when viewing the form Opt-in ID CAPTCHA The administration had agreed to a preliminary memorandum of understanding (MOU) on June 17 that committed to a 60-day ceasefire while the United States and Iran pursued diplomatic negotiations. But in the past weeks, the war has only expanded. Iran [escalated attacks]( against [Jordan]( Kuwait, and Bahrain, which host U.S. bases, and targeted ships off the coast of Oman seeking to exit the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Iran-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen, [relatively quiet until July]( opened a new maritime front, disrupting shipping through the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and adding further pressures on trade routes and the global economy. The Houthis have exploited this moment to [conduct attacks]( against the officially recognized Yemeni government, risking a resumption of a civil war that had been contained under a 2022 U.N. agreement. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq also [appear to have joined]( the fight in July and are believed to be behind drone attacks on U.S. bases and the embassy in Baghdad as well as Saudi oil facilities—prompting a joint [U.S.-Saudi airstrike on July 29]( the first time the Saudis have publicly acknowledged joining in hostilities. With the preliminary MOU expired and [no progress]( made toward extending it, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed and the United States and Iran continue to exchange [intermittent]( When asked on August 17 whether he was close to ending the war, President Trump [said]( “I’m not in a hurry.” ### Trump chose war, but America bears the costs It is difficult to overstate the costs the United States has incurred from the war to date. In only six months, the Trump administration has not only entangled the United States in another costly Middle East [war of choice]( it has broadcast to the world the inability of U.S. military power to achieve core political objectives against a foe that possesses only a fraction of America’s military might. For decades, America has been able to secure its national interests—peace and prosperity chief among them—through its ability to forge alliances and partnerships with those that see these interests as mutually beneficial. Even in misguided pursuits—such as President George W. Bush’s [decision to invade Iraq in 2003]( administrations have, however reluctantly, recognized that the consent of Congress and the support of international partners is critical to the strategic success of any military operations. In contrast, the Trump administration chose to pursue this war with Israel alone and has since only tried to hide the costs of this decision, from [obfuscating casualty counts]( to [playing down the harms of lengthy deployments]( to [denying]( diminishing]( munitions]( By launching Operation Epic Fury in this manner, the Trump administration rejected the crucial role of partners at home and abroad in waging war. It is thus no surprise that even normally supportive members of Congress have [distanced themselves]( from the Trump administration over the military campaign in Iran, while the United States has abjectly failed to generate global support for the war. Gulf partners, who were not even consulted on the decision to launch Operation Epic Fury, have been placed directly in harm’s way, and the war has caused a global economic crisis that has wrought immense economic strife in [Europe]( [Africa]( and [Asia]( The long-term global impacts of the conflict promise negative [environmental]( [health]( and [food security]( outcomes—with many countries also facing [slower gross domestic product (GDP) growth]( due to the war. > The war has shown that the United States under the Trump administration is not only an unreliable actor but a malign one. In short, the war has shown that the United States under the Trump administration is not only an unreliable actor but a malign one. This new reality is reshaping the Middle East: On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey announced a [new mutual defense agreement]( While this agreement may be more symbolic than substantive, the symbol is clear: Nations are hedging. Beyond the Middle East, the loss of trust and credibility due to the war has eroded America’s long-held leadership globally, creating space for [China to emerge]( as a more rational, steadfast actor in the eyes of the international community. The war has also carried other significant reputational costs due to the Trump administration’s conflation of reckless force with strength. To this very point, August 28 will also mark six months since an airstrike in the city of Minab killed at least [156 people]( including [120 Iranian schoolchildren]( Despite [extensive evidence]( that the United States was responsible, the Pentagon has yet to provide details of its investigation into the strike, [stonewalling Congress]( and leaving families of victims without any accountability. As the war has progressed, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and President Trump have made continued calls for actions that could amount to war crimes. Hegseth has advocated “[no quarter]( and Trump has threatened [widespread strikes]( on [civilian infrastructure]( at the same time that the U.S. military has targeted [dual-use facilities]( and participated in strikes that have killed [more than 1,700 Iranian civilians]( However imperfectly, past [bipartisan]( administrations have sought accountability for wartime abuses and invested in efforts to [mitigate civilian harm]( They have recognized that the United States military is the most powerful in the world not only because of its size but because of its stature; the Trump administration’s rhetoric and actions risk undermining the reputation and legitimacy of America’s fighting forces. While the administration can, over time, replenish depleted munitions stockpiles, reputational losses cannot be so easily regained. TABLE 1 The [costs at home]( have been no less significant. Gas and diesel price spikes triggered by the war have cost American households an additional $660 on average. Higher energy prices have also resulted in higher inflation. Bureau of Labor Statistics [data]( show that consumer prices have increased 3.4 percent year over year. According to Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, as of late July, the costs of the war—including [military spending]( higher interest rates, and higher costs for gas, groceries, and transportation—amounted to [more than $1,200 per household]( a number that will only increase as the war goes on. These increased costs come at a time when the Trump administration and Congress have made [massive cuts]( to programs that Americans depend on, including more than $900 billion in cuts to Medicaid and $180 billion in cuts to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). On top of these costs, the Trump administration has [sought additional defense funding]( to pursue its failed war. And recently, the House supported the White House’s request, passing legislation that included an additional [$73 billion]( in funding to support the Iran war—$73 billion that could instead fund free school meals for every child, saving families $945 annually, and provide Medicaid coverage to more than 5 million people for one year. Now, the Senate will need to consider the legislation before it becomes law; any senator who supports it should be held accountable for backing a failed, unauthorized war. ### The longer the conflict is unresolved, the more the United States loses For all of these costs, what has the administration achieved? The Iranian regime, which faced massive public protests prior to the war, has remained firmly entrenched—and is even [more radicalized]( Early strikes killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but his son Mojtaba has taken his place and assumed an even harder line. Although assessing public sentiment in Iran is next to impossible given the regime’s tight control, [thousands gathered]( across the country to mourn Ali Khamenei last month. The Islamic Republic remains in a similar position with regard to its nuclear program as it was six months ago, with [stockpiles of enriched uranium]( still in the country. Worse yet, the war is likely to only increase Iran’s incentive to pursue a weapon, as Iran may reasonably conclude from the past six months that acquiring nuclear weapons is a more effective strategic deterrent than forgoing them. For now, the Trump administration has backed itself into a corner. There is little that the administration can do, at least not at an acceptable cost, to change the reality that Iran will retain control over the Strait of Hormuz for the foreseeable future. Continued airstrikes have failed to pressure Tehran to unconditionally open the strait, and Trump’s [continued threats]( of expanded military action have had no effect on Iran’s willingness to negotiate. In fact, [recent reporting]( from _The Wall Street Journal_ reveals that Iran had factored U.S. capabilities into its strategic calculus and determined it could withstand the pressure, using the weeks after signing the June ceasefire agreement to rebuild its bases, consolidate its security apparatus, and lay the groundwork for escalation. Now, any attempt to seize control of the strait by force would require the Pentagon to deploy, at minimum, [tens of thousands]( into a theater that favors Iran. The costs in blood and treasure alone would be staggering, and Trump has, rightfully, shown little interest in pursuing a ground war. Though Tehran has [suffered]( heavy military losses, it has used its ability to target ships in the strait as [leverage]( for extracting concessions. As the Trump administration now faces the prospect of the war’s continued expansion, it is being forced to choose between the very worst options after squandering the leverage that successive administrations had built carefully over decades. All told, Iran has emerged as a more powerful and feared regional power, while the Trump administration remains mired in a conflict it has little prospect of winning. ### Next steps: Where do we go from here? The implications of the Trump administration’s war in Iran are certain to endure throughout the remainder of his presidency. Even if the administration reaches an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, projections suggest high energy prices through the [end of the year]( and Iran’s continued control creates a [new risk environment]( that promises higher shipping insurance rates and encourages alternative, more expensive routes that will likely keep prices elevated indefinitely. As the saying goes in economics, prices rise like a rocket and fall like a feather, and the [broader inflationary effects]( are likely to outlast even the energy price increases. The geopolitical costs to the United States, however, will be even stickier than the economic ones. The United States has been able to restore its reputation after past debacles, though the effort, time, and strategic conditions that enabled those recoveries should not be understated. As the Trump administration lays waste to the reputation of the United States, it is placing the consequences of its actions at the feet of future American leaders. In past defeats, the United States—and the U.S. military in particular—clearly retained both the capacity and will to protect American allies and partners. The post-Vietnam United States was still an effective bulwark in the defense of Japan and South Korea, while the post-Iraq U.S. armed services deterred Iran from directly attacking Middle East partners and weaponizing its nuclear program. With this administration seemingly incapable of reopening the Strait of Hormuz by force and defending critical infrastructure in the region, the value proposition of partnership with the United States is less obvious than it was previously. Under these circumstances, the diplomatic, political, and moral costs borne by Middle East countries assume larger dimensions. Worse yet, the Trump administration has demonstrated to the world that, in the wrong hands, U.S. power can be applied to generate massive regional and global instability, shredding the laws and norms that have ordered the world and undermining shared interests in the process. Any future administration—or Congress—interested in rebuilding America’s standing and pursuing Americans’ best interests must factor in these new realities. > As the Trump administration lays waste to the reputation of the United States, it is placing the consequences of its actions at the feet of future American leaders. Contrary to the president’s claims, Iran’s nuclear program [has not been neutralized]( Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon requires steady, dedicated diplomacy by seasoned professionals—not only in national security but in science and engineering—in addition to sanctions. Success begins with pursuing a negotiated agreement, which should be backed by both carrots and sticks, like the application or easing of sanctions. This approach is the only one that has been shown to work, in contrast to the Trump administration’s failed attempts to use military force. Furthermore, the administration does not seem to understand that the United States cannot reach a negotiated agreement with Iran alone. Any agreement will require coordination with regional partners and interlocutors that can mediate with the Iranian government. The United States must lead an international coalition that can coordinate to negotiate, implement, and monitor any agreement. The war has shown America’s vulnerability to a critical chokepoint for energy in the Middle East. To stabilize and reduce energy prices in the long term, the United States must pursue policies that will relieve both its and the global economy’s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Trump’s [myopic focus]( on [fossil fuels]( has perpetuated this dependence, but a U.S.-led strategy to expedite the availability and competitiveness of alternative energy through investment in infrastructure, incentives, regulations, and international partnerships could finally make America truly energy independent. Finally, no president—current or future—should be able to abuse authority and trap America in a war that neither Congress nor the American people want, and future administrations must commit to avoiding wars of choice as a first principle. The Trump administration may have dragged the United States into yet another Middle East quagmire, but this can and must be the last. _The authors would like to thank Mark Toner, Colin Seeberger, Ryan Mulholland, Courtney Federico, and Bobby Kogan for their contributions to this article. They would also like to thank Sadhana Mandala for her fact-checking assistance._

Share this fact check