Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and War – Gamaan

79~~/100~~

Verdict Mixed Largely Reliable — Accurate Verbatim Reproduction of a Named Primary Survey, with Significant Methodological and...

✓ 14 checks out ✕ 2 disputed ? 10 unverified

☰ Full analysis The complete summary ⌄

The submitted text is, word-for-word, the public summary of the survey 'Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and [39-Day] War' published by GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran) on 27 July 2026 (https://gamaan.org/2026/07/27/iranians-attitudes-toward-the-2026-protests-and-war/), with the full report available as a PDF (https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GAMAAN-2026-Protests-and-War-Survey-Report-Final-English.pdf). Every headline statistic checked against the primary source matched exactly (25% protest participation ≈ 14 million; 44%/44% Trump; 51%/38% Netanyahu; 73% negative Putin; 34% monarchy vs 28% republic vs 13% Islamic Republic; 47% regime-change orientation; 64% lion-and-sun flag preference; 40.2%/24.0%/19.2% flag breakdown). The real-world events the survey is anchored to are independently corroborated by primary and high-reputation secondary sources: the January 2026 nationwide protests and mass-casualty crackdown (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch), the near-total internet shutdown from 8 January 2026 (Amnesty, CNN, CBC, ABC News), Reza Pahlavi's repeated protest calls (Jerusalem Post), Trump's public backing of protesters (Iran International, CNN, NPR), the 28 February–7/8 April 2026 war and its exact 39-day span (Britannica, CFR, CNN 'Day 39' liveblog), the assassination of Ali Khamenei on 28 February 2026 (Times of Israel, Washington Post, Al Jazeera), the Strait of Hormuz closure (CRS/Congress.gov), and the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding signed 17 June 2026 (CNN, NPR, CBS News, Wikisource full text) — three days before fieldwork began, which makes the agreement question chronologically coherent. Points deducted are not for factual error but for: (a) the excerpt as supplied carries no attribution to GAMAAN and both hyperlinks are broken/empty, so a reader cannot trace the data; (b) the survey rests on a non-probability, opt-in online sample recruited via VPN tools (Psiphon, Lantern, MahsaNet), for which the stated '95% credibility level, ±3 percentage points' is a model-based, contestable construct rather than a classical probability margin of error; (c) documented coverage-bias critiques of GAMAAN's method and contested claims about its independence and funding exist and are not disclosed in the text; (d) framing choices ('the regime', 'transitionists', 'regime-change supporters', 'mass killings') reproduce opposition-adjacent vocabulary. No claim in the text was found to be false. All internal survey percentages are classified Verified-as-reported (i.e., accurately reproduced) but Unverified-as-population-truth, because no independent poll of Iranians in this period exists for triangulation.

What checked out (14)

Survey title, fielding window (20–27 June 2026, seven days), collaboration with Psiphon, Lantern and MahsaNet VPN tools, weighted sample of 31,450 respondents inside Iran, calibration to literate residents aged 15+, and the stated 95% credibility level with ±3 percentage point interval — all reproduced verbatim from the GAMAAN primary source (https://gamaan.org/2026/07/27/iranians-attitudes-toward-the-2026-protests-and-war/).
There were nationwide protests in Iran in January 2026 met with a lethal state crackdown: Human Rights Watch reported (16 January 2026) that security forces scaled up coordinated deadly force after 8 January, causing large-scale killings and injuries across the country (https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/16/iran-growing-evidence-of-countrywide-massacres); Amnesty International documented massacres concentrated on 8–9 January 2026 (https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2026/01/what-happened-at-the-protests-in-iran/).
A nationwide internet shutdown accompanied the crackdown, beginning 8 January 2026, with documented and severe economic consequences — corroborating the article's claim that the shutdown had livelihood as well as communication effects (Amnesty International; https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/30/middleeast/iran-internet-blackout-censorship-intl; https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iran-internet-blackout-economic-toll-9.7193669; https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/irans-monthslong-internet-shutdown-crushing-businesses-battered-economy-132561984).
Reza Pahlavi publicly issued calls to protest during the January 2026 events (including for 8–9 and 10–11 January), making the survey's 'Reza Pahlavi's call to protest' response category a real-world stimulus (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-882570; https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-882881).
Donald Trump publicly declared support for the protesters in January 2026, including urging them to keep protesting (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601080418; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-protests-trump-01-13-26; https://www.npr.org/2026/01/02/g-s1-104265/trump-iran-protests).
The war referred to as the '39-Day War' is factually 39 days long: it began on 28 February 2026 with US–Israeli strikes and ended with a ceasefire agreed 7–8 April 2026 (https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war; https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/07/world/live-news/iran-war-trump-us-israel; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iran_war_ceasefire).
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in an Israeli/US strike in Tehran on 28 February 2026, with his death announced 1 March 2026 — validating the survey item on 'the killing of the Supreme Leader' (https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-khamenei-killed-iran-set-for-largely-opaque-supreme-succession/; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/03/01/iran-succession-supreme-leader-khamenei/; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/4/iranians-to-bid-farewell-to-khamenei-as-israel-threatens-to-kill-successor).
Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed from 28 February 2026, with traffic largely halted — validating the survey item on closing the Strait (https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45281; https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-usisrael-trigger-list/flashpoints/strait-hormuz).
An agreement between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran was indeed signed shortly before fieldwork: the 14-point 'Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding', signed 17 June 2026 and brokered principally by Pakistan (https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl; https://www.npr.org/2026/06/18/nx-s1-5863027/us-iran-trump-memorandum-of-understanding-full-text; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-iran-deal-memorandum-of-understanding-text/; https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Islamabad_Memorandum_of_Understanding_between_the_United_States_of_America_and_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Iran).
The specific numbers on foreign-leader sentiment are correctly transcribed and were independently reported by third parties: 44% positive/44% negative on Trump and 51% positive/38% negative on Netanyahu (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-903934; https://www.jns.org/opinion/column/ben-cohen/amid-war-and-persecution-iranians-remain-hungry-for-change).
The participation figure (25% ≈ 14 million literate people aged 15+, with c. 50% saying they did not participate and c. 25% declining to answer) is accurately reproduced and was reported independently by IranWire (https://iranwire.com/en/news/155612-gamaan-poll-25-of-iranians-joined-january-protests/) and The National Interest (https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/what-iranians-really-think-about-the-war-and-their-regime).
The flag figures are accurate to the primary report's underlying data (40.2% lion-and-sun tricolor, 24.0% lion-sun-and-crown, 19.2% Islamic Republic flag) (https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GAMAAN-2026-Protests-and-War-Survey-Report-Final-English.pdf).
The 47% regime-change / 13% Islamic Republic split, and the 34%-monarchy vs 28%-republic finding with the stated +5 point monarchy shift versus the previous year, are accurately reproduced from the primary PDF and were echoed by FDD/JNS commentary (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/07/31/amid-war-and-persecution-iranians-remain-hungry-for-change/).
GAMAAN is a real, Netherlands-registered research foundation supervised by Dr Ammar Maleki (Tilburg University) and Dr Pooyan Tamimi Arab (Utrecht University), and its work has received formal professional recognition (MRS President's Medal) (https://gamaan.org/about-us/; https://www.uu.nl/en/news/gamaan-research-group-wins-prestigious-mrs-presidents-medal).

✕ Disputed claims 2 claims ⌄

Contested but not false — the reliability of the stated ±3 percentage point credibility interval for an opt-in VPN-recruited sample is disputed by polling methodologists cited in critical coverage (https://www.mintpressnews.com/gamaan-iran-polling-regime-change/290306/), while GAMAAN defends its anonymity/chain-referral design as necessary to avoid fear-of-the-state bias (https://gamaan.org/methodology/; https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/anonymity-sampling-how-gamaan-measured-non-public-opinions-in-ira/).
Contested but not false — whether 'about 25% participated' can be read as ~14 million actual street participants is disputed in interpretation (the report itself hedges that it 'may encompass a range of forms of protest participation over several days').

? Unverified claims 10 claims ⌄

All internal attitudinal percentages (e.g. 71% 'dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic', 62% 'high prices, inflation, corruption', 55% 'Pahlavi's call', 94% 'Long live Iran', 81% 'No to executions', 79% 'Death to the dictator', 74% 'Woman, Life, Freedom', 67%/54%/50% monarchist slogans, 66%/62%/61% opposition to regime slogans) are Unverified as measures of true population opinion: they are traceable only to the single issuing organisation and to media that restate it, with no independent contemporaneous survey of Iranians available for triangulation.
The claim of an 'approximate 95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ±3 percentage points' is Unverified as a validated precision estimate. Because recruitment was opt-in through VPN applications rather than probability sampling, this interval is a model/Bayesian-style construct dependent on unpublished weighting and calibration assumptions; the summary text supplies no design effect, response rate or weighting diagnostics.
The extrapolation from 25% of the target population to 'an estimated 14 million literate people aged 15 and above' is Unverified: it depends on GAMAAN's population base (literate 15+, described in the report as c. 90% of Iranians in that age group) and on self-reported participation, which is vulnerable to self-selection among politically engaged VPN users and to recall/social-desirability effects in a post-crackdown environment.
The year-on-year change figures (+5 pts regime change, +2 pts transition, −3 pts each for reformists and principlists, +5 pts monarchy, +6 pts republic, −7 pts Islamic Republic, −4 pts positive views of Reza Pahlavi) are Unverified as trends: the comparison baselines are GAMAAN's own earlier non-probability surveys with different fieldwork windows and sample sizes, so shifts may partly reflect changes in the achieved sample rather than in the population.
The 40% who reportedly viewed the US–Israeli operation as 'humanitarian intervention (R2P)' versus 42% who called it 'military aggression' is Unverified as population opinion; the framing of both response options is contested terminology and question wording could materially affect the split (the figures themselves are correctly transcribed and were reported by the Jerusalem Post).
The internally reported subgroup figures (e.g. 85% of principlists and 43% of reformists rating the crackdown positively; 95% of 'transitionists'; 98% of regime-change supporters) are Unverified: subgroup cell sizes, definitions and weighting are not disclosed in the excerpt, and small pro-regime subsamples in VPN-recruited panels are especially prone to instability.
The claim that respondents' migration intentions (46% no desire to leave vs 43% wishing to leave) reflect the wider Iranian public is Unverified; the online recruitment base plausibly over-represents younger, urban and internet-capable Iranians.
Whether the January 2026 protest death and arrest totals implied by the phrase 'mass killings and arrests' correspond to any single agreed figure is Unverified: Amnesty referenced a medical-source estimate of up to 20,000 dead while aggregated encyclopaedic tallies cite ranges above 30,000, and no authoritative verified count exists.
Allegations in advocacy and partisan outlets about GAMAAN's funding and independence (e.g. MintPress News, September 2025, https://www.mintpressnews.com/gamaan-iran-polling-regime-change/290306/) are Unverified in both directions: they are contested claims from ideologically committed sources, but the underlying coverage-bias criticism they cite is a legitimate methodological concern.
The provenance of the excerpt as republished (who reposted it, on what date, with what edits) is Unverified: the supplied text contains two empty/broken hyperlinks and no visible byline, publisher or date.

⌕ Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄

Confidence

High on provenance and event context (approximately 0.9); Moderate on the representativeness of the survey findings (approximately 0.45) — Confidence is high that the text is an accurate, unaltered reproduction of GAMAAN's July 2026 publication, because the wording and every checked statistic match the primary source and its full PDF, and because independent outlets restate the same figures. Confidence is likewise high that all real-world premises are true: the January 2026 protests and lethal crackdown (Amnesty, HRW), the 8 January internet shutdown (Amnesty, CNN, CBC, ABC), the 39-day war with its 28 February start and 7–8 April ceasefire (Britannica, CNN, CFR), Khamenei's killing (Times of Israel, Washington Post, Al Jazeera), the Hormuz closure (CRS), and the 17 June Islamabad MoU (CNN, NPR, CBS, Wikisource). Confidence is only moderate that the reported percentages describe the actual Iranian population, for three reasons: the sample is opt-in and recruited through VPN applications, which is known to under-cover offline, rural, older and pro-government Iranians; no independent survey exists to triangulate any figure; and the stated ±3 point credibility interval rests on undisclosed weighting assumptions rather than probability sampling. Nothing was marked False, in line with the guardrails, because no primary source and no two dated reputable secondary sources contradict any statement in the text; the residual uncertainty is about representativeness and precision, not about fabrication.

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Article metrics

Emotion 10% · Reading grade 15.3 · 1588 words

≡ The article we checked Full text as retrieved ⌄

The survey [_“Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and [39-Day] War”_]( conducted across Iran over seven days, from June 20 to 27, 2026, with the voluntary collaboration of the Psiphon, Lantern, and MahsaNet VPN tools. The findings in this report are based on a weighted sample of 31,450 respondents inside Iran. The results are calibrated to the demographic profile of literate residents of Iran aged 15 and above. For estimates referring to this target population, the survey reports an approximate 95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ±3 percentage points.

[The full report is available by clicking here.](

**SURVEY SUMMARY**

## The January 2026 Protests

•About 25% of the target population reported having participated in the January 2026 street protests, corresponding to an estimated 14 million literate people aged 15 and above. This estimate may encompass a range of forms of protest participation over several days. By contrast, about half of respondents said they had not participated in the protests, while about 25% preferred not to answer this question.

•Among those who participated in the January 2026 protests, the most frequently mentioned reason for joining the protests was “dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic,” at about 71%. This was followed by “high prices, inflation, and corruption” at about 62% and “Reza Pahlavi’s call to protest” at about 55%. “Solidarity with the bazaaris’ protests,” at about 19%, and “Donald Trump’s declaration of support for the protesters,” at about 10%, ranked next among the factors respondents mentioned as influencing their participation.

•In light of the mass killings and arrests carried out during the regime’s response to the January 2026 protests, about 80% of the target population regarded the regime’s handling of the protests as “wrong”; this includes about 75% who assessed it as “completely wrong” and about 5% who assessed it as “somewhat wrong.” Only about 14% had a positive assessment of the regime’s response. This assessment was strongly associated with respondents’ political orientation: while about 85% of principlists and 43% of reformists evaluated the regime’s performance positively, around 95% of transitionists and 98% of regime-change supporters considered it wrong.

•Among the slogans raised in gatherings, “Long live Iran” (94% agreement), “No to executions” (81%), “Death to the dictator” (79%), and “Woman, Life, Freedom” (74%) received the highest levels of public acceptance.

•Among slogans associated with monarchist or Pahlavi-oriented tendencies, the pattern of responses was more varied. “Reza Shah, bless your soul” received about 67% agreement and about 21% disagreement. By contrast, “Long live the Shah,” with about 54% agreement, 31% disagreement, and 15% no opinion, received less support than more general slogans in favor of the idea of Iran or against the current regime. “This is the final battle; Pahlavi will return,” with about 50% agreement, 34% disagreement, and 15% no opinion, was among the slogans that created greater division among respondents.

•Slogans closer to the official discourse of the Islamic Republic faced broad opposition in society: about 66% opposed “No compromise, no surrender; fight the United States,” about 62% opposed “Death to Israel,” and about 61% opposed “God’s hand was revealed; Khamenei became young again.”

•On the question of Iran’s flag, about 64% preferred one of the two designs bearing the lion-and-sun emblem: about 40% preferred the tricolor flag with the lion and sun, and about 24% preferred the tricolor flag with the lion, sun, and crown. By contrast, the current official flag of the Islamic Republic received about 19% support.

The 39-Day U.S.–Israeli War with the Islamic Republic of Iran

•Regarding the nature of the 39-day war, society is markedly divided: 42% considered the U.S. and Israeli military action to be “military aggression against Iran,” while nearly the same share disagreed with this assessment. About 40% viewed the U.S. and Israeli military operation as a form of “humanitarian intervention” (R2P), while about 48% disagreed with this interpretation.

•When asked about “foreign military intervention” as a means of effecting change in Iran, about 38% of society reported that they had supported military intervention both before and after the 39-day war. By contrast, about 27% said they had opposed military intervention both before and after the war. Among those whose position changed, a limited decline in support for foreign military intervention is visible: about 8% moved from support to opposition, while about 4% moved from opposition to support.

•In assessing two statements about the consequences of the war for the Islamic Republic, the results indicate that a substantial share of society held an unsympathetic view toward the regime: about 60% felt satisfaction at the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war. Regarding the killing of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, about 52% said they were not saddened, while about 24% said they were saddened and about 24% had no opinion.

•For all three statements concerning the Islamic Republic’s military policies, opposition exceeded agreement: about 51% disagreed that the missile program had increased the country’s security, about 47% did not consider closing the Strait of Hormuz to be the right action, and about 59% opposed Iran building nuclear weapons.

•Regarding the agreement signed between the United States and the Islamic Republic, about 68% of society believes that the agreement did not serve the interests of the Iranian people. This critical view appears across political orientations: about 81% of regime-change supporters, 65% of transitionists, and 62% of principlists oppose the agreement. The lowest level of opposition to the agreement, 48%, is seen among reformists.

•Public attitudes toward Donald Trump are almost evenly split: about 44% held a positive view and about 44% held a negative view of him. Attitudes toward Benjamin Netanyahu are also polarized, but positive views were more common than negative views: about 51% held a positive view and about 38% a negative view. By contrast, Vladimir Putin was the most negatively viewed of the three leaders, with about 73% negative evaluations.

•Reza Pahlavi continues to receive positive evaluations from a substantial share of society: about 45% said their view of him had been positive before the protests and the 39-day war and remained positive. By contrast, about 28% held a consistently negative view. Overall, the data suggest a limited decline, about 4%, in positive views of him.

## Consequences, Concerns, and Public Outlook Following the 39-Day War

•Regarding the economic consequences of the nationwide internet shutdown during the 2026 protests and war, about 36% reported “increased living costs,” 29% “reduced income,” 26% “business disruption or closure,” and 25% “loss of job or main source of income.” These results show that for a significant share of society, the internet shutdown was not merely a communications disruption but also had direct economic and livelihood consequences.

•The most important concern in the days after the protests and the 39-day war was “high prices, inflation, and economic pressures,” selected by 76%. This was followed by “the continuation of the current regime and ongoing repression of dissenters,” at about 60%; “family health and access to medical care and medicine,” at about 42%; and “unemployment or loss of income,” at about 36%. Concerns such as “the resumption of war,” at about 18%, and “political regime change and its possible consequences,” at about 14%, ranked lower.

•If the country’s current situation continues, society is almost divided between staying and wanting to migrate: about 46% have no desire to leave Iran, while about 43% indicated some form of desire to leave. Among the latter, about 32% said they would like to migrate legally but lack the means to do so, about 6% were planning or taking steps toward legal migration, and about 5% were considering seeking asylum. About 11% remained undecided about staying or leaving.

## Political Orientations, Preferred Political System, and Perceived Methods for Bringing Change in the Country

•In this survey, the orientation seeking “regime change as a precondition for change” was the largest political tendency in society, at about 47%, marking an increase of about 5 percentage points compared with the previous year. The orientation seeking “structural transformation and transition from the Islamic Republic” followed at about 23%, showing an increase of about 2 percentage points. By contrast, the share of those identifying as “proponent of gradual reforms within the framework of the Islamic Republic” fell to about 10%, and the share of those identifying as “proponent of the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the Supreme Leader” fell to about 9%, with both declining by about 3 percentage points compared with the previous year.

•Regarding the preferred form of political system, about 34% of society preferred some form of monarchy (25% “non-federal monarchy” and about 9% “federal monarchy”). About 28% preferred a republican system (17% “non-federal republic” and 11% “federal republic”). By contrast, about 13% chose “Islamic Republic.” Compared with last year, preference for monarchy increased by about 5 percentage points and preference for a republic by about 6 percentage points, while support for the Islamic Republic declined by about 7 percentage points. About one-quarter of society either said that the form of the alternative system did not matter to them or stated that they lacked sufficient knowledge and information to choose an alternative system.

•Among methods considered effective for bringing change to the country, with respondents able to select more than one option, “civil protests, such as gatherings, strikes, or street protests” received the greatest support, at about 44%. This was followed by “foreign military intervention,” at about 30%. Next came “participation in elections,” at about 19%; “international pressure and sanctions,” at about 18%; and “violent struggles,” at about 14%. About 18% said “none” of these methods would be effective.

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Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and War – Gamaan

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