On the 23rd May 2025, Guerrilla History Podcast released a podcast episode on the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO [(source)]( This episode featured two guests: Nemanja Lukić and Kit Klarenberg. The following article is a transcription and commentary based on the notes I made whilst listening to Klarenberg’s introduction to the bombing, which concluded at 24:06. Initially, the notes were taken without citations, as they served merely as a personal reference; however, I now believe it is necessary to provide citations in order to lend credibility to the information presented - even if the podcast itself does not provide sources - since the narrative aligns closely with the anti-American sentiment prevalent among some Western leftists. I also consider it important to respond substantively to the dissemination of falsehoods, given Klarenberg’s considerable influence in shaping Western perceptions of Yugoslavia, particularly in his capacity as a journalist for The Grayzone. Although many individuals have commented on Yugoslavia, especially Albanians, such perspectives are frequently dismissed as irredentist or dishonest, while Serbian nationalist narratives continue to circulate largely unchallenged. If you wish for me to respond to the rest of the episode let me know but do not expect it to be quick as I have real life commitments and as Brandolini’s Law states it takes a lot of effort to challenge these lies.

To be transparent, I have not listened to any other episodes of the _Guerrilla History Podcast_; therefore, my comments concern their guest, Klarenburg, rather than the podcast as a whole. Nonetheless, I feel it is necessary to address certain aspects of the introduction prior to Klarenburg's contribution. The podcast claims to focus on proletarian history; however, discussing the bombing appears incongruous, as it primarily represents a conflict between the Serbian and Western bourgeoisie. Furthermore, Lukić identifies himself as Yugoslav. Whilst I am confident that he is Yugo-nostalgic, he employs this identity to obscure his Serbian nationalist views. The podcast seeks to draw a parallel between the bombing of Yugoslavia and the current situation in Palestine. I find this comparison deeply problematic, as it conflates two fundamentally different countries and circumstances. To illustrate this point, I shall compare Israel and Serbia throughout this discussion, thereby demonstrating that individuals can be equally genocidal and colonial, even when such actions are conducted under the banner of socialism.

The primary reason I became willing to respond to Klarenberg was his initial substantive statement on the podcast, as he had already presented incorrect information. However, I naively assumed that the remainder would be more consistent with the historiographical understanding of the war. Unfortunately, his second sentence was also incorrect; hence, we find ourselves here:

> ‘So, Kosovo was uh regarded for centuries as um the uh effectively Serbia's Jerusalem. Okay. And it was it was a key hub of culture, of science, of religion, um etc.’

The idea that Kosova was Serbia’s ‘Jerusalem’ gained prominence in the 1980s, following Tito’s death and the emergence of latent nationalism within organisations such as the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Association of Serbian Writers and Serbian Orthodox Church.[1] It is curious that Klarenberg, as an investigative journalist, did not question why Jerusalem was chosen above all other cities. This was a deliberate choice by Serbian nationalists, who sought to draw a parallel between themselves and the Jewish people and Israel.[2] The Kosovan Myth and the foundation of Serbian nationalism is meant to link the Serbs to the suffering of the Jews and their aims to reclaim their ancestral homeland. Serbian nationalists have been very open about this belief:

‘Kosovo and Metohija, the Holy Land of the Serbian people. What Jerusalem means to the Jewish people, that is Kosovo for the Serbs. Moreover, Kosovo, like Jerusalem, is not just a matter of geography or demography. It is a question of identity.’ - Serbian Orthodox Church[3]

‘An area that sublimes the collective identity of the Serbian people just as Jerusalem does for the Jewish Nation.’ - Predrag Simić [4]

‘Serbs are the thirteenth, lost and most ill-fated tribe of Israel.’ - Vuk Drašković[5]

‘Once again the Serbian nation is on the cross in Kosovo-Metohija and in Dalmatia and in the Krajina and in Slavonia and in Banija, Lika, Kordun, Srem, Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a nation which has gotten accustomed to carrying a cross, because we are condemned to carry this cross. In this hour we ask God to give us the strength to carry our cross with dignity, as we have carried it in the past. And in order to say other than what the wise Jewess [Golda Meir] said to the malicious and aggressive Muslims: “Forgive us for killing you, but we cannot forgive you if you force us to kill you.”’ – Serbian Orthodox Church[6]

This ideology sought to cultivate a national psyche grounded in victimhood and a militant belief that reclaiming their land would resolve their problems.[7] Their beliefs were closely aligned with those of Zionists and included support for genocide against the Albanian ‘occupiers’.[8] One may compare the mentality of Serbian nationalists to that of the Nazis, given their justification of aggressive policies under the pretext of protecting a minority population, as was claimed in Danzig or the Sudetenland.[9] However, the most apt comparison remains with Israel, as Israel armed Serbian forces during the Yugoslav Wars in exchange for assistance from Yugoslav authorities in facilitating the Aliyah of the Bosnian Jewish population.[10]

> ‘And it but it always had a mixed um population between uh Serbs and Albanians and also other um uh minorities including um Slavic Muslims uh or or also known as Bosniaks, um Egyptians, uh you know, and other um Slav Slav minorities. [then jumps to 1980s]’

It is noteworthy that Klarenberg omits several centuries of history in his introduction when providing context for the bombing. This omission gives the impression that these events do not align with his narrative of Serb persecution and claims to ancestral homeland. He states that the population was mixed between Serbs and Albanians, implying an even split; however, this has never been the case. Serbs have historically been a minority in Kosova. The notion that they have had an equally long and significant impact on the region as Albanians originates from the work of Serbian nationalists such as Dusan Bataković, who, much like certain Israeli scholars, seek to legitimise nationalist myths.[11] Bataković would say without Kosova, Serbia would not exist, as well paralleling Serbs to Jews.[12] It is important to note that modern understandings of ethnicity and nationhood did not exist in the medieval period, when religious affiliation was often the primary means of classification.[13] Serbian scholars have actively distorted medieval sources to promote pseudo-ethnic classifications and erase Albanian history.[14] The Albanians can trace their ancestry to the Illyrians who inhabited the region prior to the Slavic migrations.[15] Whilst the evidence for this is limited and the origins of the Albanians remain a subject of significant debate, linguistic and historical analyses generally support this consensus. Serbian nationalists often refer to names found in historical tax records; however, these names were influenced by prevailing trends rather than indicating uninterrupted ethnic continuity.[16] When reliable data does emerge in the end of the 1800s it is shows the Muslims majority in the region, with the majority of them Albanians. To account for this, many Serbian scholars have put forward two main theories: the first is the Arnautaš theory (the Albanianisation of Serbs), and the second relies on claims of exaggerated persecution. Whilst some degree of Albanianisation of Serbs certainly occurred, it was nowhere near the extent described by these scholars; no records exist of large-scale Albanianisation. On the contrary, the assimilation of Albanians through Serbianisation also is present; however, the idea that people who live together and diffuse their own language and culture with each other would not give the ability to class all Albanians as Serbs and justify its reconquest.[17] The second explanation is that the migration of Serbs in the 1690s was far greater than previously thought. It is claimed that 37,000 families joined Arsenije, with 'family' interpreted as extended kinship groups, allegedly totalling between 500,000 and 800,000 people; this, they argue, explains the loss of the Serb majority. However, contemporary sources such as news reports, diplomatic correspondence, and religious records indicate that it was individuals, not families, who migrated.[18] Having given a very brief overview of the region’s demographic history, I shall now provide a summary of significant events omitted by Klarenberg. In 1878, during its war against the Ottomans, the Serbian Army expelled 130,000 Albanians from Niš.[19] In 1912, Serbia initiated its first official settler-colonial project alongside acts of genocide against Albanians, with land seized for redistribution to new settlers. The goal of the Serbian bourgeoisie during the Balkan Wars was to gain sea access for greater capitalist development. Whole villages were destroyed ‘with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians.’[20] Accounts by Dimitrije Tucović and Leon Trotsky, highlight this deliberate policy of destroying the Albanian population:

‘Blind and deaf to the brutal colonial extermination practices of the military, raised a hellish outcry against “Albanian savagery.” This cry grew louder as the government became increasingly powerless to withstand the pressure from its powerful rivals in Albania.’[21]

‘The bourgeois press called for their extermination without mercy, and the army carried it out. The Albanian villages […] were reduced to ashes. The villages served as barbaric crematoria where hundreds of women and children were burned alive.’[22]

‘The Serbs in Old Serbia, in their national endeavour to correct data in the ethnographical statistics that are not quite favourable to them, are engaged quite simply in systematic extermination of the Muslim popu­lation.’[23]

The inter-war period marked one of the most blatant periods of colonial occupation in Kosova. All education was conducted in Serbian in order to hinder the development of national consciousness, resulting in 90 per cent of Albanians being illiterate by 1941.[24] By 1940, 150,000 acres of land were seized from Albanians for Serb settlers, and census data was even manipulated.[25] More than 85,000 settlers arrived in Kosova, and one third of agricultural land was seized, Yugoslavia carried out planned deportations of Albanians to Turkey in accordance with the Čubrilović memorandum, which regarded traditional Western methods of colonisation as ineffective.[26] The memorandum recommended that abuses be as systematic as possible, including the arming of settlers. The violence was intended to mimic the expulsions of 1878, and Albanians were to be incited to riot so that they could be massacred.[27] Even under Titoite Yugoslavia, Albanians continued to face persecution. Beginning in 1944, the Yugoslav Partisans suppressed Albanian resistance to Yugoslav rule, including the killing of Albanian Partisans.[28] The 1946 Constitution represented a betrayal of the Albanian people, with Tito abandoning the agreement made at Bujan in order to support Serbian nationalists.[29] The Yugoslav Partisans orchestrated systematic executions of Albanians, resulting in the deaths of 47,000 individuals over a two-year period.[30] During the Aleksandar Ranković era, Kosova was administered as a police state, with Serbian policies implemented through systematic terror and harassment.[31] Torture was commonplace, and the killing of ‘irredentists’ occurred regularly.[32] The police were tasked with promoting the displacement of Albanians, often targeting them under the pretext of counterterrorism and weapons seizures.[33] In one infamous case, Radoje Milošević and Miladin Mitrović were found guilty of beating a 75-year-old Albanian to death.[34] The century of terror inflicted upon the Albanians engendered deep resentment towards Serbs. When Ranković was found to be spying on the Communist Party, he was made a scapegoat for the genocide in Kosova, and while abuses subsequently became less overt, little fundamentally changed.[35]

> ‘Now, when Joseph Broz Tito who was the founder of socialist Yugoslavia um died in uh May 1980. It precipitated an upsurge of demands from Kosovo Albanian nationalists for secession from uh Yugoslavia um and uh union with uh Albania um which neighbours um neighbours Kosovo.’

This serves the same purpose as Zionists focusing on October 7th rather than the entire struggle: it aims to shift blame from the oppressors to the oppressed. As previously mentioned, Tito had recognised Kosova as Albanian but later betrayed this position through his collaboration with nationalist elements within Yugoslavia. Thus, the desire for Albanian unification was not a new phenomenon. Klarenberg refers to Albanians as ‘nationalists’ but does not apply the same label to Serbian nationalists. This continuation of Serbian propaganda portrays Albanians as nationalists and irredentists in order to justify widespread abuses and demonise their cause. Prior to Tito’s death, Kosova remained one of the poorest regions in Yugoslavia, with per capita income falling to 27 per cent of the Yugoslav average by 1980.[36] The economic policies introduced deliberately avoided investment in labour-intensive industries, resulting in the region having the highest unemployment rates. The Yugoslav government attempted to obscure this reality by opening higher educational institutions.[37] Pristina University, founded in 1970, provided instruction in Albanian and facilitated collaboration with Tirana’s intelligentsia.[38] The result of continued exploitation and abuses in Kosova and the attempt of the state to passively overcome Albanian resistance through political concession led to development of a more coherent liberation movement, and a more hostile Serbian nationalist opposition.[39] In 1976, a commission established by Serbian communists released the so-called Blue Book, which advocated for the abolition of Kosovan autonomy, with policing and economic policy returning to Belgrade’s control, as had been the case under Ranković.[40] In 1981, student protests erupted in response to economic and social conditions. Slogans such as ‘while some of you are sitting in soft chairs - others of us don’t have anything to eat’ and ‘down with red bourgeoisie’ became more common the police responded with brutality.[41] The economic recession that began in 1980 affected Kosova particularly severely, and by 1981, unemployment had already reached 40 per cent.[42] The police carried out severe beatings on students, which fuelled the protests further.[43] The Serbian communists mobilised police in major Serbian cities and moved them to the border.[44] Special units were used to disperse protestors and to carry out indiscriminate raids on student housing.[45] The use of Serbian forces in Kosova was strictly prohibited in Kosovan constitutional rights, let alone their use to occupy homes and maiming students.[46] By April, 30,000 troops had been deployed to Kosova, and a state of emergency was declared.[47] The presence of tanks on the streets escalated the violence against Albanians, who responded by throwing stones (very similar to Palestinian resistance).[48] Approximately 300 Albanians were killed by firearms or torture during the unrest, and hundreds more were arrested for ‘hostile slogans’.[49] Although an apartheid system existed prior to 1981, its violation of the constitution saw the apartheid in Kosova reach its zenith in the 1980s and 1990s.[50] Unemployment rose to 60 per cent by 1988; by 1986, 4,000 young Albanians had been imprisoned for slogans, and the proportion of political prisoners who were Albanian increased from 41.8 per cent to 75 per cent of all Yugoslav political prisoners between 1983 and 1985.[51] The Albanian language was banned, thousands of teachers were dismissed, and the Yugoslav media disseminated racist messages, together with myths of mass rape and genocide.[52] This propaganda was so persuasive that the Serbian pornography industry published depictions of ‘rapes’ of Serbian women by Albanians.[53] 584,373 Albanians were interrogated by the police, comprising over half of the population.[54] The state routinely employed plainclothes police and checkpoints to monitor the Albanian population, which is strikingly similar to how Israel controls the Palestinian population.[55] The police carried out widespread acts of violence against Albanians, including cases where Serbian police cut Serbian symbols into the victims’ chests (another parallel with Israel).[56] The systematic violence perpetrated by the state against Albanians fundamentally transformed their political messaging. Notably, the protestors of 1981 sought only Republic status within Yugoslavia, which directly contradicts Klarenberg’s assertion.[57]

> ‘Now throughout the 1980s there was what the New York Times branded a war of terror by Albanian nationalists in um in Kosovo against non-Albanian residents.’

Klarenberg cited the New York Times in order to lend credibility to his argument, suggesting that the publication was revealing an uncomfortable truth. However, at the time, there was a ban on foreign reporting regarding the protests, and the only source of information was from Yugoslav officials. [58] Consequently, the _New York Times_ article [(source)]( relied entirely on accounts provided by Yugoslav officials, including the propagation of myths of genocide, and quoted the Minister of Information, Ismail Bajra. Therefore, this article is just Yugoslav propaganda, and the title is a representative of this not the uncomfortable truth of Western media.

> ‘You know, they were specifically seeking to create a Slav free Kosovo in the late 1980s’

This is highly misleading on his part, as he is quoting the _New York Times_ article without clarifying that this statement originates not from the protestors, but from the Minister of Information: ‘Mr Bajra said that, along with seeking either a separate republic or incorporation into a "Greater Albania", they were demanding a "pure", that is, Albanian, Kosovo, cleansed of all Slavs.' This is analogous to the manner in which the Israeli government claims that Hamas seeks to exterminate all Jews.

> ‘because uh there were all sorts of atrocities uh occurring on a regular basis such as the burning of uh Serb villages, um you know, knife attacks on young Serbs, the rape of um uh uh teenage Serbs girls. Um the Yugoslav federal government, which I might add at the time was led by a Kosovo Albanian, moved the army in to try and keep the peace and um prevent the exodus of Serbs um from Kosovo.’

This is Klarenberg simply reciting Yugoslav atrocity propaganda, which is no different from Zionists talking about mass rapes on October 7th or Nazis discussing abuses against Germans in Danzig. This propaganda was spread by the government and the Orthodox Church. However, it had no basis in reality.[59] During the year Đorđe Vuković claimed that rape was widespread, there was only one recorded rape of a Serb in Kosova.[60] Kosova had the lowest murder and rape rates in Yugoslavia.[61] A study by the _Committee of Serbian Lawyers for the Defence of Human Rights_ noted that while Serbia had, on average, 2.43 cases per year for every 10,000 men in the population, the corresponding figure in Kosova was 0.96. They found that in the vast majority of cases in Kosova, the assailant and the victim were of the same ethnicity.[62] The myth of atrocities was mobilised by the media to generate a more violent form of Serbian nationalism, which sought to take Kosova from its current ‘occupiers’.[63] The reality of violence was the inverse; just as in Bosnia, it was Serbs who carried out unprecedented numbers of rapes and killings.[64] The Army had already intervened in 1981, prior to its intervention in 1989, which was intended to shut down Kosovan autonomy rather than to end violence.[65] This was done by Milošević as part of his anti-bureaucratic revolution, rather than by direct order from the central government (though they would later support it).[66] The ‘leader’ of Yugoslavia was not a Kosovar Albanian, but a Bosnian.[67] However, the most ironic aspect is that Klarenberg uses the term ‘exodus’. This is a common term employed when describing Serbs leaving Kosova, yet he cannot comprehend why it is used. There is a religious connection to the infamous narrative of the exodus of the Israelites found in the Old Testament.[68] Nothing major just another comparison between Serbs and Jews and their settler colonial desires to return to their ancestral homeland.

> ‘So um the the the spark that ignited in many ways that the the breakup of Yugoslavia were it started in in Kosovo.’

Obviously, this is not the case with any genuine analysis. The situation was the consequence of decades of oppression from Belgrade not something that just appeared in Kosova.

> ‘Now uh there is a a lot of claims and counter claims that this was an issue that Slobodan Milošević exploited for um or or a a false hysteria that he whipped up for political purposes. No, the reality was that every Yugoslav republic as it was then at at the time was concerned about what was happening in in Kosovo and like even um the uh communist leaders of Slovenia who were pushing for secession in the late 80s from Yugoslavia were concerned about what was happening in um uh Kosovo’

Milošević definitely stirred up ethnic tensions, as it benefited his support for Serbian nationalism and reinforced his image as a defender of Serbia following the 1974 constitution. He publicly fuelled the idea of genocide against Serbs, notably stating, ‘No one should dare to beat you.’[69] He distorted history in his Gazimestan speech to invoke Serbian nationalism and a sense of victimhood.[70] State media continually promoted the myth of genocide against Serbs, which he exploited to terminate Kosovan autonomy. This included the expansion of violence against Albanians. His most significant policy was the revival of Serbian colonialism under the ‘Decree for the Colonisation of Kosovo of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.’ The aim was to reduce the Albanian population through displacement and to lower birth rates.[71] Apartheid and economic marginalisation were enforced through violence.[72] Serbianisation occurred, with oaths of loyalty to Serbia required for employment There was a mass dismissal of Albanian workers and the privatisation of socially-owned businesses to Serbian investors; 146,025 workers were dismissed out of 164,210.[73] Albanians were banned from purchasing property, and funds were established for Serb settlers to purchase land.[74] In total, this plan aimed for 100,000 settlers to arrive during the initial phase of colonisation.[75] His excuse on why Milošević did not incite ethnic conflict is that other republics supported the oppression of Albanians. This is a lazy logical fallacy that assumes that the other republics believed that Albanians deserved rights, which they did not. They were equally prejudiced and supported Milošević’s crackdown, influenced by Yugoslav propaganda and economic interests. The President of Yugoslavia warned that international attention on Kosova would legitimise the Albanian struggle and should therefore be suppressed.[76] After the 1981 student protests, Croatian authorities conducted indiscriminate raids on Albanian homes and businesses in Croatia under the pretext of counterterrorism.[77] To suggest that these republics cared about Albanians is misleading, as their attitudes mirrored those of Serbia. However, the Slovenian government actually condemned Milošević’s closure of the Kosovan parliament, with half the population signing a petition in support of the government's statement.[78] So, while racism towards Albanians was widespread in Yugoslavia, Klarenberg nevertheless selected the most stupendous example to highlight.

> ‘Now, throughout the '90s, uh, well, for the first half of the '90s, you had grinding and brutal wars of independence in Croatia and Bosnia, which were, um, uh, supported, prolonged, uh, backed, financed by the US.’

It is unsurprising that Klarenberg has reduced the entire Yugoslav Wars to the actions of the United States; such anti-American stupidity is to be expected. However, the situation is obviously far more complex than he suggests. The primary reason the Yugoslav Wars occurred was Tito’s collaboration with nationalist elements, which led to the idea of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia as separate nations. This latent nationalism emerged at the forefront of politics after Tito’s death and during the economic depression.[79] President Bush’s foreign policy towards the conflict was characterised by non-intervention, as the United States felt it did not have ‘a dog in the fight’.[80] This stance involved opposition to secession, as it was seen as a risk to the post-Soviet status quo.[81] Although President Clinton developed US foreign policy to be more interventionist, there remained significant opposition to intervening in Yugoslavia.[82] It is true that the United States became involved in Yugoslavia, but this only became significant after 1994. However, the United States also collaborated with Serbia and the Republika Srpska during this period, yet Klarenberg would not describe the RS as a US-backed independence movement. The United States offered them to join their plans to partition Bosnia, demonstrating apparent indifference to the genocide occurring there.[83] When questioned by the media, the United States denied the existence of concentration camps it knew to be real.[84] The United States bombed RS artillery positions at Sarajevo, not to support the Bosnians, but to pressure Belgrade into accepting the partition plan.[85] It pressured Bosnia to dismiss politicians in exchange for aid, which ultimately proved to be negligible.[86] The United States also armed and trained the Croatian military; this is perhaps as close as Klarenberg can get to substantiating claims of significant US support for such movements.[87] However, he uses the term ‘US-backed’ to imply these movements were externally imposed on Yugoslavia, rather than a consequence of Titoist revisionism. Ironically, Milošević was even labelled ‘American’ for agreeing to relinquish Kosova.[88] In 1990, the United States and the European Community issued statements supporting Yugoslav unity.[89] The CSCE provided aid to Yugoslavia and explicitly prohibited independence for Slovenia and Croatia.[90] The United States helped to conceal abuses against Albanians at international meetings.[91] It maintained substantial industrial links with Milošević, including involvement in Serbian armament production.[92] The United States initially supported Milošević as an agent of change in Yugoslavia, a stance that included the strengthening of central authority and the oppression of Albanians.[93] The US media became involved in disseminating atrocity propaganda against Albanians (see Klarenberg’s own references to western media). The United States explicitly condemned violence by Albanians; in particular, Balkan envoy Robert Gelbard described the KLA as terrorists and affirmed support for Milošević’s crackdown in Kosova.[94] The collaboration between Belgrade and Washington was so strong that Milošević reportedly wished for the United States to take the lead in the Yugoslav crisis as early as 1991.[95] The role of the United States in the Yugoslav Wars was fundamentally that of an imperialist power; it identified an opportunity to advance its interests. The same can be said of Kosova: the United States will use Kosova to justify its involvement but undermine the Kosovan liberation movement when it does not align with American interests.

> ‘And, uh, this all came to a head in 1995 where you have what was known as Operation Storm, which was the total genocide of um, Croatia's Serb population. Um, hundreds of thousands of people forced from lands that they had occupied for centuries. Um uh they in many cases had to walk on foot to Serbia.’

This could very easily describe the expulsion of Albanians by Serb forces, yet he does not believe that that is genocide. Serb victimhood is the same as Israeli victimhood, only they can be genocided and no one else can.

> ‘Now um up until this point um Yugoslavia had been an international what remained of Yugoslavia which was Serbia and um uh Montenegro but also contained uh Kosovo were was an international pariah. They weren't even recognized by the UN. Um and they were subject to absolutely crippling sanctions which destroyed their economy. Um led to the an explosion in the power of organized crime. Um uh and that suicide, alcoholism and drug use skyrocketed as a direct result.’

The United Nations did not recognise the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as it had formed the federation in 1992 while engaging in hostilities against other republics; consequently, it was not recognised as the successor state to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Yugoslavia was sanctioned during the Yugoslav Wars, although these sanctions were far less crippling than he claims. As previously stated, after Tito’s death, Yugoslavia entered an economic depression from which it never recovered. This crisis resulted in mass unemployment and significant labour unrest.[96] There was a collapse in GDP, accompanied by concerns about the potential for Yugoslavia's economic disintegration.[97] Inflation rose from 36 to 2,685 per cent between 1981 and 1989.[98] The economy became increasingly reliant on foreign debt, leading to the implementation of austerity measures with gross investment at only two-thirds of what it had been two decades earlier, public confidence in the government declined.[99] This loss of legitimacy fuelled the rise of nationalist figures such as Milošević.[100] These developments were a consequence of Titoite revisionism and the reliance Yugoslavia had placed on Western markets. Even if the earlier economic collapse is disregarded, the sanctions were still not as devastating as Klarenberg suggests. Restrictions were monitored in the Adriatic; however, more imports entered via the Danube, which was not subject to oversight.[101] Albania alone helped meet over 50 per cent of Belgrade’s oil requirements.[102] The sanctions were primarily a tool used by the United States to pressure Milošević into supporting the partition of Bosnia, and they were relaxed as he collaborated with them.[103] Therefore, it is reasonable to question the validity of his claims regarding the consequences of the sanctions; particularly questionable is his assertion regarding organised crime. Yugoslav organised crime began in the 1960s with the _Balkan Express_ and expanded with migration to the West in the 1970s. The State Security Service supported these gangs by supplying them with weapons in exchange for assistance with overseas operations. By the 1980s, these groups had become powerful in the West and returned to Yugoslavia during the depression. The 1990s saw their activities become mainstream, though not for the reasons Klarenberg proposes. Gangs were hired by the state to participate in the Yugoslav Wars as paramilitary forces, often operating alongside the police and training each other.[104] There was a ‘mafiaisation’ of the economy, with Milošević incorporating criminals into his reforms, notably within the banking sector.[105] This close relationship between the state and organised crime led to many ministers becoming actively involved in criminal enterprises.[106] While the sanctions contributed to the power of these gangs, state support, in the form of arming and protecting these groups, was far more significant in enabling their operations.

> ‘Now um it towards the end of the '90s you have the emergence of a group called the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army.’

The UÇK/KLA was founded in 1993, emerging from the Marxist-Leninist group _Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës_ (LPK).[107] The LPK had played a pivotal role in establishing guerilla operations at the beginning of the 1990s, with the concept of armed insurgency taking shape in response to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia.[108] The UÇK remained highly secretive as it established its logistics and recruitment centres.[109] Serbian officials and the _Democratic League of Kosovo_ even questioned whether the group actually existed.[110] The precise date of the UÇK’s first actions is disputed; Adem Demaçi claims that they occurred in 1993 with operations against Serbian spies. However, by 1995 the UÇK was fully active, carrying out assassinations of Serb policemen.[111] The influence of the UÇK spread rapidly: while they had only 150 soldiers for their 1996 attacks, by 1997 they controlled the majority of rural areas.[112] The collapse of the Albanian state was significant in facilitating the arming of the UÇK, which became the fastest growing guerrilla movement in the world.[113] This was further strengthened by the oppression carried out by the Yugoslav regime against Albanians. Using such passive language as ‘emerges’ masks the long history that preceded armed resistance.

> ‘Now this was a CIA, MIA6 and BND, that's the German Foreign Intelligence Service backed terror group, um, and which had connections and received funding from Al-Qaida, including um, you know, Osama Bin Laden.’

As previously mentioned, the United States supported Milošević in his crackdowns in Kosova, viewing the UÇK as a terrorist organisation. The United States provided Milošević with intelligence reports to assist in his suppression of Albanian resistance, which proved far more significant and effective than anything the UÇK would later receive.[114] Moreover, the United States used the prospect of aid to the UÇK as leverage, pressuring them to remove members whom it considered 'un-American'. However, as was the case in Bosnia, once the internal coup was complete, the United States provided only minimal assistance.[115] This aid notably did not include the weapons the UÇK sought; instead, they received only satellite phones.[116] Consequently, the UÇK supplied intelligence to the United States during the bombing campaign. Overall, the UÇK provided more assistance to the United States than it ever received in return.[117] During the bombing campaign, UÇK infrastructure was targeted by NATO forces, who regarded it as an active threat, particularly in the post-war period.[118] The complete lack of meaningful support is evident: the vast majority of photographs of UÇK members show them armed with Albanian AK-47s and wearing commercially purchased camouflage.[119] For this reason, much of the UÇK leadership has stated that they could have prevailed in Kosova even without American support, as the United States arguably did more harm to the UÇK than to Serbia.[120] The United States continued to oppose Kosovan independence, let alone the idea of Albanian reunification.[121] Ed Soyster, for example, stated, ‘[the UÇK] is something we simply do not associate with’.[122] The narrative that the UÇK was funded by the West originates from Yugoslav propaganda, much like claims made by Israel referring to Hamas as being backed by Iran; its sole purpose is to delegitimise their struggle.[123] Today, the principal proponents of this myth are the Serbian government and nationalists, who also believe that Tito committed genocide against Serbs.[124] In the West, it is John Whitley, a far right conspiracy theorist that believes Clinton and Kissinger were involved in the final plan of Marxist world order.[125] Even if one were to accept this falsehood, why would seeking assistance in fighting apartheid and genocide be objectionable? Was it wrong for the Yugoslav Partisans to accept British aid in their fight against the Nazis? In reality, this was not the case: the NATO Secretary-General explicitly stated that NATO 'did not want to serve as the UÇK’s air force' and refrained from targeting Serbian positions so as not to advantage the UÇK.[126] The United States cited alleged links between the UÇK and organised crime as justification for denying them aid.[127] Western countries actively hindered UÇK funding: Switzerland blocked financial transfers, while Germany banned all fundraising activities.[128] The FBI harassed anyone suspected of supporting the UÇK, and Germany prevented Albanians from leaving the country to join the fight.[129] Germany was particularly effective in obstructing UÇK funding, with $260 million diverted to alternative groups.[130] At Rambouillet, Western powers used the threat of a NATO deployment to Albania, coupled with the restriction of arms and financial support, to force the UÇK to sign the agreement. Regarding allegations concerning Osama Bin Laden, there is little difference between these claims and Israel's labelling of Hamas as Islamists. The UÇK deliberately avoided association with Islamic fundamentalists to prevent Serbian propaganda from exploiting such links; indeed, the group was secular, having originated from a Marxist-Leninist organisation.[131] This demonisation campaign became so exaggerated that, at one point, it was claimed that Osama Bin Laden was actively fighting in Kosova.[132] The only individuals who still believe such absurdities are far-right, Islamophobic conspiracy theorists such as the John Birch Society.[133] It is evident that Klarenberg is using the term ‘terror group’ to delegitimise the UÇK’s struggle, just as Hamas and the Houthis are currently described as terrorist organisations.

> ‘Um, and they started carrying out assassinations of Serb politicians and policemen. They started um, kidnapping Serbs, harvesting their organs to finance their their war of terror on um, on Serb authorities.’

Why does the killing of policemen and politicians matter? They actively uphold the apartheid regime in Kosova, just as the ANC killed police officers. Does Klarenberg object to this, but not to similar actions when Hamas targets Shin Bet officials? The police in Kosova were barely distinguishable from soldiers in both equipment and duties. The UÇK were highly selective in choosing their targets, focusing on police officers who were either particularly abusive or had active combat roles.[134] The attacks carried out by the UÇK weakened the apartheid infrastructure, which provoked severe retaliation from Serbian forces.[135] This, in turn, led to increased recruitment for the UÇK, with the Jashari massacre proving to be pivotal in this process.[136] The UÇK, like Hamas, also engaged in kidnapping, and, similarly, they are often unfairly blamed for the deaths of hostages. Overall, the majority of the UÇK's victims were soldiers and agents of the genocidal regime; this is why Klarenberg is compelled to focus on them rather than on civilians. The accusations of organ harvesting by the UÇK are entirely baseless; Dick Marty himself was obliged to state this explicitly following his Council of Europe report.[137] He was subsequently targeted by the Serbian secret service.[138]

> ‘Um, And at the same uh at the same time um you had uh US politicians like Madeleine Albright saying well we didn't do enough during the wars of the the the Yugoslav wars of independence in the '90s. Um this is an opportunity to put things right and act and intervene.’

Yes, Albright said there should be greater intervention, but she also had sympathies to Serbia, so using this as a way to demonise to Kosovan cause is stupid unless he also wishes to demonise the Serbians.[139]

> ‘You also had um the uh insertion into Kosovo of what known as the uh the the OSCE that's the uh organisation the security and cooperation in Europe um the Kosovo verification mission…’

The KVM arrived in Kosova in 1998, whereas the CSCE had been present there well before that time. [140] The KVM was permitted entry into Kosova by Milošević, in contrast to Klarenberg’s portrayal of it as a shadowy ‘insertion’.[141] The KVM deployed 2,000 unarmed verifiers to ensure that both parties were complying with the resolutions established by the UN Security Council.[142] The OSCE had particularly emphasised that responsibility lay with both sides, rather than suggesting any deep state subversion of Serbian sovereignty.[143]

> ‘…which was led by a veteran deep state uh operative called William Walker who was a subject of interest in the Iran Contra um uh affair and um was at the forefront of the Reagan administration's dirty wars in um uh Latin America throughout the 1980s.’

Yes, Walker was a senior United States foreign policy official; however, he is not a member of any so-called 'deep state' conspiracy, but rather just US imperialism. Nevertheless, this does not mean that everything he says is incorrect, and people should undertake their own independent research into any claims he makes. To assume that he is automatically wrong simply because he is a tool of US imperialism is nothing more than uncritical anti-Americanism, rather than a position of any real merit.

> ‘Now um the in in November 1998 um which is when this is when the the affected counterinsurgency between Yugoslav authorities and the KLA had reached a a crescendo so to speak. There was a UN negotiated ceasefire um between um uh the KLA and uh Belgrade and under its terms Yugoslavia withdrew military forces from Kosovo but there were no co-combatant obligations imposed upon the KLA and they of course exploited the Yugoslav army's absence to continue rampaging across the province.’

Yes, prior to the ceasefire 2,000 Albanians were killed and 300,000 were displaced by the Serbian forces.[144] This prompted the UNSC to pass Resolution 1199 on 23rd September 1998 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[145] The resolution called for an immediate ceasefire, required Serbian forces to halt attacks on civilians, and demanded that the UÇK cease its operations. However, three days later, Serbian forces mortared Abri e Epërme, resulting in the deaths of at least 18 women, children, and elderly people.[146] The violation of the ceasefire led the United States to enter into negotiations with Milošević in an effort to reach a new agreement.[147] Since this new agreement was between the United States and Milošević, the UÇK was excluded from the negotiations and therefore not bound by its terms.[148] However, the UÇK continued to observe the ceasefire and was threatened with airstrikes by the United States should it violate the agreement. The new ceasefire called for an end to all violence and repression, as well as the withdrawal of the JNA and paramilitary forces. Refugees were permitted to return, and Albanian detainees were to be released from prison. There were also provisions for an extended peace process, with access granted to investigators and a timetable established for discussions on Kosovan autonomy.[149] As a result, violence in the region was reduced, which the UÇK used as an opportunity to reorganise and return to territories previously occupied by Serbian forces.[150] However, this situation is identical to that of Hamas, yet Klarenberg expresses concern only in one case. Furthermore, it is incorrect to claim that only the UÇK reorganised during the ceasefire, the Serbian forces also prepared for the resumption of hostilities. There was a purge of non-hardliner nationalist officers, a mobilisation of forces along the border, and the government armed reservists and settlers.[151] During the ceasefire, Serbian paramilitaries continued to attack Albanian civilians.[152]

> ‘Now, I might add that um it wasn't just Serbs in their crosshairs. They also targeted Roma. Uh they targeted uh the uh other Albanians who rejected their violence or supported multiethnic Yugoslavia.’

Yes, the UÇK killed Roma, but this was not because they were Roma but were seen as collaborators with the genocidal regime.[153]

> ‘Um this all leads to an incident in January 1999 known as the Racak Massacre. Now, Racak is a strate was a um a uh strategically kind of vital vantage point. It was a village um situated on a mountain range at the terminus of this this major highway between Pristina, which is Kosovo’s capital, and other major cities and towns throughout the province. The KLA took over uh Racak and um used it to shoot at uh uh Yugoslav government vehicles or police um cars like driving through the area for um as they often did and they specifically hoped to draw police and security uh services into direct battle [… next quote …] Now, what happened was the Yugoslav security um forces and police got into a shootout with the Kerala in in Racak. Um and they openly advertised that they were carrying out a quote unquote counterterror um effort in the village. Um and this was captured on film by um French journalists. Um this was subsequently reported and framed in the western media as a massacre of innocent defenceless civilians. And it was claimed that like that that children and women had been dragged to a uh gullied by the Yugoslav authorities and and executed, shot in the head, beheaded, you know, blah blah blah blah blah. And this this started to manufacture consent for international intervention in Yugoslavia to in order to prevent a supposed looming genocide. The reality was that as I stated um like Racak was overrun by the KLA um and uh it didn't have any civilian inhabitants. The victims of this did not include women and children. It was uh males of fighting age who had been engaged in shooting battles with the uh Yugoslav authorities. But it was so potent the propaganda at the time and the lack of push back um in in the mainstream at all. Um that uh a large number of people were led to believe well um okay so this is this is what's what's planned. They're going to go from village to village, town to town and just like kill innocent civilians on mass and there are lots of illusions drawn to the purported genocide in um the Srebrenica in Bosnia in um in 1995.’

I have previously challenged Klarenberg regarding his understanding of Reçak; however, he continues to cite it as a key example, as it is the only massacre he can plausibly deny owing to Serbian cover-ups. Were he to attempt this approach with any of the other massacres, his arguments would fail to find an audience. He now asserts that the UÇK were shooting at government vehicles, which is a tacit admission that the ceasefire was broken; yet, he deliberately avoids acknowledging that it was Serbian forces who breached it. The JNA had already vacated its garrison barracks, and Serbia had increased the number of soldiers present, both in clear violation of the agreement.[154] Yes, Reçak held strategic significance due to the proximity of a power plant.[155] There was indeed fighting between Serbian forces and the UÇK in the area, which is not unusual considering their legitimate right to rebel.[156] This conflict involved UÇK fighters in Reçak itself; however, they had withdrawn following shelling prior to the massacre. Whilst the Serbian government had declared a ‘counterterrorism’ operation beforehand, this fact alone does not negate the reality that a massacre occurred. For example, when Israel bombs a hospital under the pretext of targeting Hamas, it does not mean the action is unrelated to a broader policy of genocide. As previously mentioned, the rhetoric of 'combating terrorism' has often been employed to justify abuses against Albanians. It was not, in fact, French journalists who initially captured footage of the events, but rather the _Associated Press_; this footage was later shown to French journalists working for _Le Figaro_ and _Le Monde_, who then said it was up for interpretation as part of their broader dismissal of issues in Kosova.[157] Klarenberg seeks to depict those who describe Reçak as a massacre as merely engaging in a media crusade; this is simply untrue. The incident was designated a massacre by investigators, including those whom Klarenberg himself frequently cites in attempts to suggest the victims were not massacred.[158] Whilst it is true that Reçak was used as a casus belli, this does not imply that there was no genocide. As previously stated, Milošević dismantled local government by military force, enforced active apartheid and colonisation programmes, and sanctioned extensive police brutality with the aim of depopulating the Albanian population. These actions culminated in the widespread implementation of ethnic cleansing, which constitutes genocide. In this particular instance, civilian presence in Reçak is corroborated by both eyewitness testimony and forensic investigations, with Dr Ranta confirming that the victims were unarmed civilians.[159] Thus, when Klarenberg suggests that those killed were 'fighting men' to justify the massacre, not only is this inaccurate, but it also fails to negate their civilian status. This rationale is similar to the justification used for Srebrenica; however, the claim that fighting-age men are legitimate military targets would, by that logic, excuse actions such as those carried out by Israel, which similarly claims to be targeting valid military objectives.[160] However, the Yugoslav-Byelorussian investigation into the massacre admitted that among the autopsied bodies were those of a woman and a child.

Klarenberg frequently refers to the work of Dr Ranta and Dr Rainio in order to assert that the autopsied bodies were killed in a prolonged battle rather than executed However, he does so because he lacks a proper understanding of forensic science. He asserts that the presence of a close-range or contact discharge in one of the autopsied bodies demonstrates that these deaths did not constitute executions. In reality, all that contact discharge signifies is that the shot was fired from approximately 0 to 30 centimetres away from the victim, leaving evidence of the proximity of the barrel. Such evidence includes tearing of clothing or skin, burning or singeing of cloth or hair, melted tips of synthetic fibres, and pronounced deposits of vaporous lead around the entry wound (gunshot residue, or GSR).[161] This information determines only the cause of death, not its manner. For example, if an Israeli sniper killed a Palestinian child from a distance of 500 metres, it would not be a contact discharge, and according to Klarenberg’s reasoning, this would not be considered an execution either. Cross-examining the autopsy findings with witness testimonies reveals why contact discharge was not detected: witnesses report that the police opened fire on civilians from a distance of approximately 20 metres.[162] Now that this matter has been clarified, the following section will address the remaining autopsy findings to demonstrate why Klarenberg focuses on Reçak and not other massacres. The journal article cited by Klarenberg examined only the bodies, rather than the crime scene in its entirety.[163] It collaborated with Yugoslav experts, with sixteen bodies being investigated by them, ten by Dr Ranta’s team, and fourteen together.[164] These forty bodies were fewer than anticipated, as initial reports indicated that forty-five had died. [165] Thirty-nine of the bodies were male, and one was female, with an average age of forty-three.[166] All died from gunshot wounds, with most sustaining between one and ten wounds.[167] The presence of extensive internal injuries indicates the use of high-velocity rifle rounds; however, ballistic analysis was outside the scope of this investigation, so the specific weapons used were not identified.[168] Eleven of the bodies were killed by sustained, uniform gunfire.[169] The absence of vitality signs on six of the bodies shows that they faced post-mortem injuries, with two being decapitated, this was likely caused by animals.[170] All of the bodies died around the same time at ten days prior to the autopsy.[171] However, manner of death was not determined in the investigation, due to the limitations of their mandate such as not being present at the crime scene, but was also hindered through Serbian authorities not maintaining chain of custody on the bodies, so it is unknown if the bodies are from Reçak.[172] This hindrance by Serbian authorities raises questions regarding their involvement in the massacre. They deliberately did not halt investigations until independent teams arrived, with sixteen bodies already being autopsied.[173] Authorities ‘wilfully obstructed’ forensic efforts, as the crime scene was not isolated and evidence collection procedures were unclear.[174] Intercepted telephone communications have revealed that Serbian officials discussed ways to present Reçak as a battle, rather than a massacre, including the removal of bodies. [175] Such actions were not unprecedented, as during the Kosovan War, Serbian forces relocated massacred Albanians into Serbia for mass burials in an attempt to conceal these crimes.[176] This reasoning can also be applied to other contexts; for example, if Hamas had genuinely committed mass rape on 7th October, why would Israel impede a United Nations investigation into these allegations? As a result of this massacre the international community did fear there would be a worsening humanitarian situation, as Serbia had carried out massacres prior to Reçak, there was a genocide in 1912 and 1946, universal oppression of Albanians under Milošević with 300,000 already fleeing, and widespread retaliation attacks against civilians by Serbian forces.

This final section will present a brief discussion of Klarenberg’s denial of genocide and the motivations behind his stance. He has previously referred to Operation Storm as ‘total genocide’, whereas he describes Srebrenica as merely ‘purported’. As noted earlier, if Operation Storm constitutes genocide, then so too do the events in both Bosnia and Kosova. However, Klarenberg engages in strained logic to justify his position: Bosnia, according to him, does not qualify as genocide simply because it was recognised as such by the ICTY, which, he claims, sought to demonise Serbia in the service of US imperialism. Meanwhile, he argues that Kosova does not meet the definition of genocide as Kosovan courts have only referred to it as ethnic cleansing. Would Klarenberg use this anti-American scepticism to the Nuremberg trials? Although such a comparison may appear far-fetched even for him, it underscores his selective reliance on bourgeois courts when it serves his arguments. Israel has not yet been tried for genocide, yet he will nevertheless characterise events in Gaza as genocide. The fact that these courts may not always represent true ‘justice’ does not mean that all of their judgments are without merit; independent investigations are possible. Through this analysis, it becomes apparent that the concept of ethnic cleansing is not formally defined in international law. The United Nations Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia describes it as the intentional and violent removal of a particular group from a given area. [177] This definition differs little from genocide, except that ethnic cleansing does not necessarily entail the group’s total destruction, only partial, which is also included in genocide. Whilst some might argue that ethnic cleansing emphasises forced displacement through violence or terror, this is explicitly addressed in Article 2(b) of the Genocide Convention: ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’.[178] Although Operation Storm likely constitutes genocide, given that Croatian officials knew the attack would result in the effective removal of Croatia’s Serb population, under the legal frameworks established for Yugoslavia it is classified as ethnic cleansing.[179] However, if Klarenberg were to accept that ethnic cleansing is simply a sanitised term for genocide, he would also have to acknowledge that Kosova qualifies as genocide. Whilst he refers to the displacement of 200,000 Serbs, he omits mention of the 21,000 displaced Bosniaks. This omission forms part of his narrative supporting Serbian victimhood, exemplified by his claim that Operation Storm constitutes the sole act of genocide. This is the idea that only Serbs can face hardship and struggle, which is similar to Zionists calling Palestine not a genocide based on it diluting the meaning of the Holocaust.

> ‘[Previous quote…] Now um in 2000 there was a BBC documentary called um uh uh Moral Combat uh which was uh it was about the the bombing of um of Yugoslavia. Uh there was a Kosovo Albanian independence campaigner who was unconnected to the KLA who openly stated the more civilians that were killed, the chances of international intervention became bigger. And the KLA realised that. And there was this foreign diplomat who once told me, "Look, unless you pass the quota of 5,000 deaths, you'll never have anybody permanently in Kosovo from foreign diplomacy." So, in effect, the KLA had been given a target of civilian casualties to reach in order to precipitate um Western intervention. And um they specifically sought to um yes uh uh uh cause uh civilian deaths. In March 1999 um the then British defence secretary Geoffrey Robinson who became then became um the head of NATO um he admitted to parliament that up until Racak the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than Yugoslav authorities. [previous quote…]’

I separated this tangent because he uses it to try to convince the audience that the UÇK would have a motive to fake civilian deaths or to kill civilians themselves. So, whilst there is a 2000 documentary called Moral Combat ([source]( which interviews Dugi Gorani claiming he was told that 5,000 civilian deaths would be needed. However, Klarenberg is selectively quoting and interpreting what Gorani said: he also said that he did not believe the UÇK knew that Serbian forces would massacre civilians in retaliation for their attacks. This places the focus of responsibility for civilian deaths on the Serbian forces, not the UÇK. It is well documented that UÇK leadership actively avoided putting civilians at risk of retribution.[180] Therefore, Gorani’s statement that a minimum number of civilian deaths was necessary before there would be international intervention is logical, as the international community rarely becomes involved in isolated cases of abuse. Klarenberg, however, ignores other interviews within the documentary which he cannot misinterpret, or which contradict his worldview. For instance, following Gorani’s interview is one with James Rubin, who states that the USA regarded the UÇK as terrorists and did not wish to be associated with their military operations. The reason Klarenberg fails to acknowledge these other statements is probably because he has not watched the documentary in its entirety, relying only on clips shared by Serbian nationalists. An example of one such individual is Devilito02, a far-right, antisemitic conspiracy theorist, who believes that Josip Broz Tito was Jewish and responsible for the largest per capita genocide after the Second World War, and who considers Tito's destruction of the Ustaše to be a war crime as it allowed him to demonise the Nazi-collaborating Chetniks.[181] The UÇK deliberately avoided targeting civilians, having observed that the PLO and IRA struggled to gain international support due to the ease with which they were demonised[182] Another reason for not targeting civilians was to avoid providing Belgrade with material for their propaganda efforts.[183] UÇK soldiers at Llap would read books by Zejnullah Grada on the rules of war as part of their training.[184] Luftar Braha would declare that the UÇK were trained on the Geneva Convention.[185] Sixteen civilians were killed by the UÇK, a figure lower than that of a single Serbian massacre.[186] The majority of ‘anti-civilian’ activities involved the burning of settlers’ homes, and kidnap victims were generally released unharmed.[187] The only major instance of unjustified violence by the UÇK occurred when they accidentally fired on an OSCE vehicle.[188] However, the rarity of such events demonstrates the absence of a systemic policy of attacking civilians. Even if such a policy had existed, it should be of little concern to Klarenberg, given his support for Hamas as they have killed the same style of ‘civilian’. Klarenberg continues to misuse primary sources. Both Robertson and Cook did state that the UÇK was responsible for more deaths than the Serbian authorities [(source)]( but the key word is ‘deaths’; they did not specify civilian deaths, referring instead to deaths in general. Klarenberg’s use of these statements in discussions about civilian deaths serves to conflate the two and present the UÇK as worse than the Serbian forces. Whilst it is understandable why Klarenberg thought they meant civilian deaths, as they use this statement in the same way as Klarenberg: to demonise the UÇK. In the rest of the statements, they both claim that the UÇK was a terrorist group and enemy of NATO, that NATO did not agree with their goals, and that the UÇK should be disarmed. ‘We are not siding with the KLA […] [but Albanians] who have been principal victims of repression and violence.’ This echoes Rubin’s statement, yet Klarenberg ignores such broader statements to suggest these are candid admissions, rather than recognition that the West also opposed the UÇK. However, Klarenberg cannot accept that the UÇK was not a Western-backed terrorist group, as that would contradict his anti-American worldview. This claim that more civilians were killed by the UÇK with a report on civilian deaths claiming: ‘The vast majority of these abuses were committed by Yugoslav government forces.’ Like other conspiracy theorists, Klarenberg exclusively relies on primary sources, stripping them of context in order to impose his own interpretation and fit his narrative. If these individuals attempted to engage with the considerable amount of secondary literature available, their worldview could not be sustained, even if they dismissed sources they regarded as propaganda.

> ‘This this um in turn led to the Rambouillet conference in France um in I believe it was March 1999 or late February 1999 and the ostensibly this was meant to be a um a peace conference where a um a deal was hammered out between the two sides to prevent um western intervention. Um as numerous uh US officials later admitted Rambouillet was always intended to be a war conference. Um there were the the Belgrade was was presented with a set of completely non-negotiable terms which i.e. accept this will be bombed um which amounted to uh NATO occupation of Yugoslavia and effective uh secession um for Kosovo. Um then there was a secret annex of this agreement which covered um total privatisation of uh of Kosovo and and it the breaking open of its vast uh mineral resources to western rape and pillage. Um I might add as well that under Rambouillet ter non-negotiable terms um NATO personnel and vehicles would enjoy free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access anywhere in the country. NATO would be permitted to commandeer any areas or facilities it wished in Yugoslavia. If NATO wanted to make improve movements or modifications to infrastructure in Yugoslavia. Belgrade had to foot the bill and NATO personnel would be immune from arrest or prosecution if they committed any crime whatsoever.’

Whilst much of the Rambouillet terms were not negotiable, the clause with which Milošević disagreed most, Chapter 7 Appendix B, was open to debate, but he did not wish to participate.[189] He did not pursue negotiations for a number of reasons. He believed that NATO would lose unity if talks stalled and also believed he could survive a bombing campaign.[190] He was emboldened by Operation Desert Fox, which had lasted only 70 hours, and believed that a similar attack would not be too detrimental to his forces.[191] He recognised that conceding on Kosova would destroy his domestic reputation, as he had been riling up ethnic tensions, and this would leave him vulnerable to a coup.[192] If he were to be bombed, he believed it would strengthen his domestic position against more hard-line rivals such as Šešelj, and contribute to the narrative of Serbian victimhood.[193] Therefore, Milošević was not forced into war but rather actively pursued the bombing campaign himself. Whilst Yugoslavia was threatened with bombing if they did not accept, this is not how Klarenberg presented it. Yugoslavia would be bombed if the UÇK signed the agreement and Yugoslavia did not, but the UÇK did not sign during the first round of talks.[194] His points regarding NATO troops in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are accurate, and Milošević would characterise this as an occupation, but he deliberately portrayed this as uniquely evil and as the primary reason for the bombing campaign. However, as previously mentioned, this Appendix was open to negotiation since it was essentially a copy and paste from the UN peacekeeping terms in the Bosnian SoFA.[195] Unfortunately, Klarenberg misrepresents the rest of the Rambouillet Agreement. Rambouillet did not include Kosovan secession, only autonomy.[196] The West explicitly opposed independence, which was one of the significant reasons why the UÇK rejected the agreement.[197] The speech by Robertson, which Klarenberg cites, would have confirmed this if he had not distorted primary sources. The UÇK saw giving up on independence, and having no clear future in post-war politics, as a capitulation of their cause to NATO occupation.[198] These terms were non-negotiable, as NATO sought to destroy the UÇK through an occupation force and forced disarmament.[199] Curiously, by the time of the second round of talks, the UÇK was willing to sign the agreement. This was due to an internal coup by Western-backed figures and the ousting of the traditional communist leaders.[200] The old guard, who believed they could win in Kosova without Western help, through the creation of Serbia’s Vietnam, and commonly joked about how they would take Belgrade with only a few Kalashnikovs, were blackmailed and forced to resign by the West.[201] The LPK journal used to be openly communist with articles on Enver Hoxha was transformed into a NATO praising rag piece.[202] The West thus successfully destroyed the national liberation movement so that post-war Kosova would be under their influence rather than united with Albania. Klarenberg’s claim that Kosova was being opened up for ‘rape and pillage’ through privatisation is even more preposterous. Chapter 4 Article II relocated ownership of Kosovan industries to Kosova under a free market. Few socially owned enterprises still existed, as Milošević had already privatised the vast majority. He shifted enterprises away from worker self-management into the hands of the ruling bourgeoisie so that they could profit from privatisation.[203] By 1994, half of Serbia’s economy was privatised. The effects of Milošević’s economic programme were even more pronounced in Kosova. The removal of local autonomy allowed Milošević to carry out ‘ownership transformation’, transferring socially owned enterprises to his associates.[204] All of Kosova was put up for sale at bargain prices, including the Trepča Mine, resulting in the majority of assets being in private hands before Rambouillet.[205] This privatisation was particularly significant in Kosova as part of Milošević’s plan to economically marginalise Albanians; these reforms led to the mass dismissal of Albanians from jobs and made it virtually impossible for them to acquire assets or shares.[206] However, if Klarenberg had spoken the truth about privatisation, he would not have been able to provoke an emotional reaction from leftists, who respond to the notion of privatisation as evidence of the USA destroying the last European bastion of socialism. If he admitted that Yugoslavia was not socialist under Milošević (indeed, if it ever was) he would not be able to attract sympathetic views. The SFRY was already linked with US imperialism under Tito, who abandoned socialist principles by putting small proprietors in charge of industries (Lenin discusses this in ‘The Democratisation and Socialist Nature of Soviet Power’), promoted private property, and dismantled collective farms.[207] Yugoslavia betrayed both communism and its people, with Tito accepting US aid that required him to support US imperialist policies and integrating Yugoslavia into Western markets, providing cheap labour and goods.[208] This capitalist nature of Yugoslavia is the core reason why Klarenberg cannot credibly complain about ‘western rape and pillage’. As noted, the Trepča mine was privatised under Milošević to a company, giving it control over minerals worth $5 billion.[209] This was a continuation of previous forms of exploitation in Kosova. Kosova was the only region in Yugoslavia to suffer a decrease in GDP per capita between 1953 and 1989, losing around 50 per cent and ending up about 7.7 times poorer than Slovenia.[210] The raw resources in the region were major contributors to the Yugoslav economy, yet most of the population remained poor and agricultural.[211] This was because the high-paying jobs associated with processing minerals were established in other republics.[212] Between 1952 and 1980, Kosova’s GMP dropped from 44 to 29 per cent.[213] Yugoslavia actively avoided investing in labour-intensive industries in Kosova, leaving many unemployed or in poorly paid jobs to maximise exploitation.[214] Kosova had about double the unemployment of any other region in 1987, and by 1989 it had soared to 57 per cent.[215] Klarenberg pretends to care about Kosova, but in reality, he is more concerned with ensuring that the profits of Kosovan exploitation remain in the hands of the Serbian bourgeoisie rather than the Americans. His use of ‘rape and pillage’ merely aims to evoke an emotional response to privatisation, but is disingenuous, given that he ignores both the longstanding exploitation of Kosova and his denial of Serbian crimes in Bosnia and Kosova, including rape camps.[216]

> ‘I might add that the um uh on while uh US officials referred to the Yugoslav negotiating team universally as the Serbs, Serbs are in fact a minority. It was primarily composed of Albanians, Bosniaks, Roma, Turks and other minorities living in Kosovo.’

Whilst there were non-Serbs in the negotiating team, Klarenberg tries to use this to hint that there was not real oppression, only western propaganda. This talking point originates with Milošević and has been used by figures such as Gregory Ellich.[217] However, Milošević deliberately invited sympathetic non-Serbs to support his claims that Yugoslavia was tolerant, even if these figures were not important or had any meaningful role in the negotiations.[218] This is the same tactic that Israel uses when they bring up Arabs in the IDF, to pretend they are not an apartheid state.

> ‘Madeleine Albright um was very dismissive um towards them. You know, the saviour of the Albanians doesn't actually give a shit about what um Alban Albanians actually wanted or thought.’

This is true, but not in the way Klarenberg wants you to believe. Albright was against what Albanians wanted because she opposed independence and Albanian unification.[219] She would say: ‘Here is the greatest nation on earth pleading with some nothing balls to do something entirely in their own interest . . . and they defy us the whole way,’ when the UÇK delegation rejected the agreement at Rambouillet.[220] Ironically, Klarenberg is guilty of the exact claim he makes against Albright, as he believes that Fark Jashari speaks for all Albanians, which is why he thinks this talking point has any legs.

> ‘Now, fast forward to to 2000 and there was a British parliamentary um report which concluded that the NATO bombing actually encouraged Yugoslav authorities to start waging a heavy-handed war against the KLA and there was no intent to displace, let alone genocide the general Albanian population.’

Klarenberg once again refers to the British Parliament for primary evidence, rather than relying on any secondary analysis. As with Robertson’s speech, this report was intended to demonise the UÇK, but Klarenberg maintains that they were supported by MI6. The report characterises the displacement of approximately 300,000 Albanians as anti-insurgency operations, thereby justifying NATO’s bombing of UÇK positions and undermining the aspirations of the Albanian population.[221] The report claims that mass displacement did not occur until after the commencement of the bombing campaign, arguing that this justified the avoidance of United Nations Security Council authorisation. However, it does not deny that operations were planned prior to the bombing. It states that these plans were accelerated once the NATO bombing campaign began. Whilst this report is of interest, there is clearly more to the situation than it suggests. Certainly, the NATO bombing exacerbated the genocide against the Albanians, as NATO’s actions triggered their threat, fostered an upsurge in nationalism, and prompted the withdrawal of the OSCE from the region.[222] However, the genocide was meticulously pre-planned through the continuation and intensification of operations such as _Horseshoe_.[223] The escalation of the humanitarian crisis also fulfilled a secondary purpose beyond the removal of Albanians; Milošević hoped that the influx of refugees into neighbouring countries would distract NATO and weaken its resolve.[224] There was deliberate intent to alter the demographics of Kosova, both by removing Albanians and encouraging the settlement of Serbs.[225] Milošević had stated that war was inevitable and had deliberately revised history in his speeches to fuel Serbian nationalism and ambitions to reclaim the region.[226] Had NATO not intervened, the genocide would still have occurred; however, just as the Allied bombing of Nazi Germany accelerated the Holocaust without attributing blame to the Allies for the crimes of the Germans, the increased violence following NATO’s involvement should not shift responsibility for the genocide away from those who orchestrated it.

> ‘conducted without um UN Security Council clearance and therefore making it completely illegal’

As stated in the British Parliamentary report, they did not get UNSC clearance. NATO believed that the existing resolutions conferred sufficient authority for intervention, and anticipated resistance from Russia and China. [227] This reflects Klarenberg’s tendency to selectively utilise bourgeois institutions in order to construct a particular narrative, rather than recognising the UN as an organisation created by imperialist powers for their own interests. He is compelled to invoke the UN selectively, as a subsequent vote to condemn the bombing was overwhelmingly rejected.[228] Russia had already participated in the Contact Group, which organised the Rambouillet negotiations.[229] Thus, whilst Klarenberg attempts to argue that the bombing prompted the pursuit of a multipolar world, this is merely an inherent aspect of imperialism and the continual ambition of rival imperialist powers to repartition former colonies-.[230]

The host eventually interrupts Klarenberg’s introduction in order to discuss sanctions and other efforts to promote the notion of Serbian victimhood. Serbia was not a victim with respect to the NATO intervention, except as a consequence of its own hubris and actions. The true victims of US imperialism were Kosova and the destruction of the UÇK. When the bombing was over, the UÇK soldiers who refused to surrender to NATO, were threatened by Cobra Helicopters.[231] However, this reality does not fit within Klarenberg’s worldview, which he has adopted from far-right conspiracy theorists. If readers would like me to review the remainder of the podcast or address specific claims, please contact me through my social media channels.

[1] Radina Vučetić, ‘Kosovo 1989: The (Ab)use of the Kosovo Myth in Media and Popular Culture’, Contemporary Southeast European Studies, 69.2 (2021), 223-243 (pp. 225-27); Mike Karadjis, Bosnia, Kosova, and the West: The Yugoslav Tragedy (London: Resistance Books, 2000), p. 20.

[2] Karadjis, p. 20; Dejan Djokić, ‘Whose Myth? Which Nation? The Serbian Kosovo Myth Revisited’ (2009), p. 8.

[3] Emil Hilton Saggu, ‘Kosovo Crucified – Narratives in the Contemporary Serbian Orthodox Perception of Kosovo’, Religions, 10.578 (2019), 1-18 (p. 12).

[4] Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. xii.

[5] Djokić, p. 8.

[6] Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 271.

[7] James Ron, Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 14; Ramet, pp. 149-50.

[8] Ron, p. 94.

[9] Gales Stokes, ‘Indepedence and the Fate of Minorities, 1991-1992’ in Confronting the Yugoslav Controveries: A Scholars’ Initiative, ed. by Charles Ingrao and Thomas Allan Emmert (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2010), pp. 82-113 (p. 112).

[10] Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-1995: The Role of the Intelligence and Security Services (Amsterdam: Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 2003), pp. 180-81.

[11] Melle Havermans, Myths of Kosovo: The History of Kosovo Through the Eyes of Dusan T. Batakovic (Leiden: Leiden University, 2020), p. 21.

[12] Havermans, p. 25.

[13] Atdhe Hetemi, Student Movements for the Republic of Kosovo, 1968, 1981 and 1997 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 61.

[14] Noel Malcolm, Rebels, Believers, Survivors: Studies in the History of Albanians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 29.

[15] Sylë Ukshini, ‘Kosovo: From the Ottoman Empire through Yugoslavia to Independence’, Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies, 4.6 (2021), 239-286 (p. 243); Vickers, p. xiii; Malcolm, pp. 314-15.

[16] Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Pac Books, 2002), p. 56.

[17] Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 196-199.

[18] Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 161.

[19] Islam Qerimi, ‘Some of the Crimes of the Serb-Yugoslav State Against Albanians During the Twentieth Century - Politically Motivated Crime’, European Journal of Economics, Law and Social Sciences, 5.2 (2021) 224-239 (p. 228).

[20] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington: The Endowment, 1914), p. 151.

[21] Dimitrije Tucovic, Serbia and Albania: A Contribution to the Critique of the Conquering Policy of the Serbian Bourgeoisie (Toronto: November 8th Publishing House, 2024), p. 124.

[22] Tucovic, p. 128.

[23] Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 253.

[24] Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 74.

[25] Research Directorate, The History, Culture and Identity of Albanians in Kosovo (Toronto: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1997), para. 5-6. < [accessed 1 July 2025].

[26] Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 284-85; Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 10-11.

[27] Clark, p. 11.

[28] Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92 (London: Verso, 1993), p. 34.

[29] Enver Hoxha, ‘Kosova is Albanian, Remains Albanian and Belongs to Albania’ in Kosova is Albania (Ottawa: The November 8th Publishing House, 2023), pp. 52-59 (p. 56); Ukshini, p. 257.

[30] Vickers, p. 148.

[31] Isabel Ströhle, ‘The Yugoslav State Security Service and Physical Violence in Socialist Kosovo’, Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies, 4.6 (2021), 101-130 (p. 120); Clark, p. 12.

[32] Clark, p. 38; Ströhle, p. 111.

[33] Rory Archer, ‘Albanian Labor Migration, the Yugoslav Private Sector and its Cold War Context’, Labor History, 64.4 (2023), 425-442 (p. 428); Ströhle, p. 111.

[34] Ströhle, p. 112.

[35] Anton Logoreci, ‘Riots and Trials in Kosovo: Why the Albanian Population in Yugoslavia took to the Streets’, Index on Censorship, 2.82 (1982), 23-40 (p. 24).

[36] Sell, p. 69.

[37] Vickers, pp. 188-89.

[38] Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 326.

[39] Dale C. Tatum, Genocide at the Dawn of the 21st Century: Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 117.

[40] Magas, pp. 193-94.

[41] Hetemi, pp. 3, 133.

[42] Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 53.

[43] Hetemi, p. 133.

[44] Hetemi, p. 136.

[45] Hetemi, p. 138.

[46] Hetemi, pp. 138-39.

[47] Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 335.

[48] Hemeti, p. 144.

[49] Ken Booth, The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimension (Abingdon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005), p. 162.

[50] Momcilo Pavlovic, ‘Kosovo Under Autonomy, 1974-1990’ Emmert, in Confronting the Yugoslav Controveries: A Scholars’ Initiative, ed. by Charles Ingrao and Thomas Allan Emmert (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2010), pp. 49-81 (p. 50); Booth, p. 10.

[51] Woodward, p. 53; Qerimi, p. 234; Booth, p. 162; Magas, p. 63.

[52] Karadjis, p. 40; Booth, p. 167-68; Vučetić, pp. 225, 227.

[53] Catherine A. MacKinnon, ‘Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights’ in Violence Against Women: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. by Stanley French, Wanda Teays, and Laura Purdy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 43-56 (p. 52).

[54] Clark, p. 43.

[55] Pavlovic, p. 62.

[56] Booth, p. 173.

[57] Hetemi, p. 2.

[58] Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 31.

[59] Florian Bieber, ‘Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo Myth from 600th Anniversary to the Present’, Rethinking History, 6.1 (2002), 95-110 (p. 105); Saggu, p. 11.

[60] Hetemi, p. 184.

[61] Sell, p. 79.

[62] Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 339.

[63] Vučetić, p. 227.

[64] Clark, p. 193.

[65] Aleksandar Marsavelski, Furtuna Sheremeti, and John Braithwaite, ‘Did Nonviolent Resistance Fail in Kosovo?’, The British Journal of Criminology, 58 (2018), 218-236 (p. 222).

[66] Henry H. Perritt, The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 25.

[67] [accessed 1 July 2025]

[68] Saggu, p. 15.

[69] Tatum, p. 69.

[70] Vučetić, p. 228.

[71] Booth, p. 169.

[72] Perritt, p. 27.

[73] Perritt, p. 25; Clark, p. 74.

[74] Tatum, p. 121.

[75] Reneo Lukić and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 154.

[76] Hetemi, p. 172.

[77] Archer, p. 426.

[78] Magas, p. 210.

[79] Milica Uvalić, ‘Economic Nationalism in Yugoslavia: Reflections on its impact 30 Years Later’, Tragovi, 7 (2024), 7-36 (p. 21).

[80] Tatum, p. 61.

[81] Tatum, p. 27.

[82] Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. xi.

[83] Karadjis, p. 59.

[84] Karadjis, p. 66.

[85] Karadjis, p. 116.

[86] Karadjis, pp. 124-25.

[87] Karadjis, p. 115.

[88] RTCG 1, Peć 1999, Srbi i Crnogorci napuštaju grad Peć, ed. by Anno Domini (2023) , < [accessed 1 July 2025), 1:32-46.

[89] Karadjis, p. 46.

[90] Karadjis, p. 45.

[91] Karadjis, p. 45.

[92] Karadjis, p. 25.

[93] Karadjis, p. 36.

[94] Sell, pp. 278-79.

[95] Sell, p. 144.

[96] Magas, p. 53.

[97] Magas, p. 115.

[98] Roberto De Rezende Rocha, ‘Inflation and Stabilization in Yugoslavia’, Contemporary Economic Policy, 10.4 (1992), 21-38 (p. 23).

[99] Saumya Mitra, Kosovo: Economic and Social Reform for Peace and Reconciliation (Washington: World Bank, 2001) p. 2; Tatum, p. 68.

[100] Uvalić, p. 9.

[101] Karadjis, p. 69.

[102] Karadjis, p. 69.

[103] Karadjis, p. 69.

[104] Ron, p. 45; Sell, p. 390.

[105] Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 351.

[106] Sell, p. 180.

[107] Karadjis, p. 138

[108] Naomi Head, Justifying Violence: Communicative Ethics and the Use of Force in Kosovo (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), p .59.

[109] Henry Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside of an Insurgency (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), p. 8.

[110] Perritt, Independence, pp. 34-35.

[111] Sell, p. 279.

[112] Perritt, KLA, p. 110; Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), p. 36.

[113] Perritt, Independence, p. 35; O. N. Mehrotra, ‘The Kosovo Crisis: Perception and Problem’, Strategic Analysis, 22.7 (1998), < para. 31.

[114] Karadjis, p. 140.

[115] Karadjis, p. 166; Perritt, KLA, pp. 141-42.

[116] Karadjis, p. 166.

[117] Karadjis, p. 166.

[118] Perritt, KLA, p. 59.

[119] Karadjis, p. 166.

[120] Perritt, Independence, p. 44.

[121] Hetemi, pp. 205-06.

[122] Karadjis, p. 167.

[123] Karadjis, pp. 165, 167; Perritt, KLA, p. 93.

[124] Vučetić, p. 225; Andrew Wachtel and Christopher Bennett, ‘The Dissolution of Yugoslavia’ in Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative, ed. by Charles Ingrao and Thomas Allan Emmert (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2010), pp. 13-47 (p. 22).

[125] Karadjis, p. 167.

[126] Karadjis, pp. 145, 165.

[127] Perritt, KLA, pp. 141-42.

[128] Perritt, KLA, p. 98; Karadjis, p. 165.

[129] Perritt, KLA, p. 99; Karadjis, p. 165.

[130] Perritt, KLA, p. 90.

[131] Perritt, KLA, p. 144.

[132] Karadjis, p. 140.

[133] Karadjis, p. 190.

[134] Perritt, KLA, p. 61.

[135] Perritt, KLA, p. 8; Perritt, Independence, p. 2.

[136] Perritt, Independence, p. 36.

[137] Petrit Çollaku, ‘Dick Marty Clarifies Organ Harvesting Allegations’, Balkan Insight, < [accessed 1 July 2025], para. 6.

[138] Milica Stojanovic, ‘Serbian Spy Agency Denies Swiss Report of Assassination Plot’, Balkan Insight, < [accessed 1 July 2025].

[139] James Gow, ‘The War in Kosovo, 1998-1999’ in Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative, ed. by Charles Ingrao and Thomas Allan Emmert (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2010), pp. 302-345 (p. 332)

[140] Clark, p. 91.

[141] Booth, p. 188.

[142] Booth, p. 189.

[143] Booth, p. 500.

[144] Booth, p. 178.

[145] Lawrence Freedman, ‘Victims and Victors: Reflections on the Kosovo War’, Review of International Studies, 26 (2000), 335-358 (p. 348).

[146] Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report (Reliefweb, 2000) < [accessed 1 July 2025], p. 26.

[147] IICK, p. 53.

[148] Sell, pp. 289-90.

[149] Perritt, Independence, p. 39.

[150] Sell, p. 289; IICK, p. 54.

[151] IICK, p. 28, 83; Magas, p. 323.

[152] Perritt, Independence, p. 42.

[153] Karadjis, p. 203.

[154] Malcolm, Kosovo, p. xxxiv.

[155] OSCE, Kosovo as Seen, as Told (OCSE: Warsaw, 2003), p. 603.

[156] OSCE, p. 603.

[157] Hetemi, p. 189.

[158] Gow, p. 311.

[159] David Walls, ‘Dubious Sources: How Project Censored Joined the Whitewash of Serb Atrocities’, New Politics, 9 (2002), 165-176 (p. 167).

[160] HRW, p. 120.

[161] National Institute of Justice, Firearm Examiner Training: Distance Determination, < [accessed 1 July 2025], para. 6-8.

[162] Human Rights Watch, Yugoslav Forces Guilty of War Crimes in Racak (New York: HRW, 1999) < [accessed 1 July 2025], para. 9.

[163] Juha Rainio, Kaisa Lalu, and Anja Penttila, ‘Independent Forensic Autopsies in an Armed Conflict: Investigation of the Victims from Racak, Kosovo’, Forensic Science International, 116 (2001), 171-185 (p. 172).

[164] Rainio, p. 172.

[165] Rainio, p. 183.

[166] Rainio, p. 177.

[167] Rainio, pp. 171, 179.

[168] Rainio, p. 183.

[169] Rainio, p. 183.

[170] Rainio, p. 183.

[171] Rainio, p. 183.

[172] Rainio, p. 183.

[173] Gow, p. 311.

[174] Gow, p. 311.

[175] HRW, Under Orders, p. 80.

[176] Balkan Insight, Bitter Land: Batajnica, < [accessed 27 June 2025].

[177] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Defining the Four Mass Atrocity Crimes’, globalr2p.org, < para. 14.

[178] United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Geneva: Refworld, 1948), p. 1.

[179] Mile Bjelajac and Ozren Žunec, ‘The War in Croatia, 1991-1995’, in Confronting the Yugoslav Controveries: A Scholars’ Initiative, ed. by Charles Ingrao and Thomas Allan Emmert (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2010), pp. 230-271 (p. 255).

[180] Perritt, KLA, p. 144.

[181] Devilito02, <

< [accessed 1 July 2025].

[182] Perritt, KLA, p. 145.

[183] Perritt, KLA, p. 66.

[184] Perritt, KLA, p. 107.

[185] Perritt, KLA, p. 108.

[186] Gow, p. 304.

[187] Gow, p. 304.

[188] Gow, p. 304.

[189] Gow, p. 332.

[190] Freedman, p. 355; Sell, p. 301; Stephen Hosmer, The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Arlington: RAND, 2001), p. 12.

[191] Sell, p. 300.

[192] Sell, p. 283.

[193] Bacevich, p. 10; Andrew Fear, ‘Looking Neither Forward Nor Back: NATO’s Balkan Adventure’ in Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, ed. By Michael Waller, Kyril Drezov and Bulent Gokay (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 90-94 (p. 92); Malcolm, Kosovo, ; Perritt, Independence, p. 261.

[194] Waller, p. 175.

[195] Gow, p. 331.

[196] Booth, Ironically, it is likely that the United States did not want Kosovo

[197] Freedman, p. 349.

[198] Gow, p. 327.

[199] IICK, p. 55.

[200] Karadjis, p. 146.

[201] IICK, p. 30.

[202] Karadjis, p. 146.

[203] Perritt, Independence, p. 25.

[204] Karadjis, p. 134; Clark, pp. 64, 112.

[205] Karadjis, p. 136.

[206] Clark, p. 74; Vickers, pp. 273-74.

[207] Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU(III), Marxist Internet Archive (Beijing: Renmin Ribao, 1963), para. 56; Leonard Kukić, ‘Regional Development Under Socialism: Evidence From Yugoslavia’, Economic History, 267 (2017), 1-55 (p. 27).

[208] Magas, p. 104; Henry Brands, ‘Redefining the Cold War: American Foreign Policy towards Yugoslavia, 1948-1960’, Diplomatic History, 11 (1987), 41-53 (pp. 41-42).

[209] Karadjis, p. 136.

[210] Dragomir Vojnić, ‘Ekonomija i Politika Tranzicije Pola Stoljeća Povijesti Reforme Socijalizma i Tranzicije 1962 – 2012’, Hrčak, (2013), 153-186 (p. 175).

[211] Vickers, p. 155.

[212] Kujtim Millaku, ‘Economic Position of Kosovo in the ex-federation of Yugoslavia between 1945-1990’, European Journal for Economics, Law and Social Sciences, 1.2 (2017), 142-148 (p. 145).

[213] IICK, p. 12.

[214] Vickers, pp. 188-89.

[215] Clark, p. 14; Vickers, pp. 25, 223.

[216] Albert Doja, ‘Rethinking the Politics of Mass Rape as a Military Strategy and Instrument of Ethnic Cleansing’, in Rape Culture and Survivors: An International Perspective, ed. by Tuba Inal and Merril D. Smith (Boston: Greenwood Publishing, 2018), pp. 23-62 (p. 44).

[217] Gregory Ellich, _How Madeleine Albright got the War the US Wanted_, <[ [accessed 1 July 2025], para. 6-7.

[218] Sell, p. 296.

[219] Gow, p. 329.

[220] Sell, p. 298.

[221] Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, _Fourth Report_(London: House of Commons, 2000) <[ [accessed 1 July 2025], para. 87.

[222] Freedman, p. 346.

[223] Gow, p. 312.

[224] Booth, p. 313; Ron, p. 106.

[225] Perritt,_KLA_, p. 47.

[226] Vučetić, p. 236.

[227] Booth, p. 223.

[228] Gow, p. 339.

[229] Perritt, _Independence_, p. 80.

[230] Vladimir Lenin, ‘Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism’ in _Collected Works_, vols. 45 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963), XXII, pp. 185-304 (pp. 299-300).

[231] Karadjis, p. 194.