Milei’s Argentina: The rise of ‘el liberalismo’ - Exeter Economics Review %
63/100
Verdict
Mixed
Mixed (Partly Verified; Material Unverified Elements)
The article contains a blend of verifiable macro facts (Milei’s inauguration date; 2023 inflation headline; IMF seventh-review disbursement expectations; BBC-reported early fiscal surplus and sub‑10% monthly inflation in April 2024; June 2024 clashes outside Congress) alongside several high-impact numerical and framing claims that are either incorrect in date/definition (election timing) or not corroborated by up-to-date, primary, or sufficiently reputable secondary sources (e.g., an ‘18% one-day devaluation’ in August 2023; reserves ‘around USD 17 million’; specific ministry/job-cut percentages; “fuel prices +60%”; “poverty +12% since Milei came to power”; and the strong claim about dollarisation meaning ‘giving the US Federal Reserve full autonomy’).
✓ 5 checks out
✕ 1 disputed
? 14 unverified
Full analysis The complete summary ⌄
The article contains a blend of verifiable macro facts (Milei’s inauguration date; 2023 inflation headline; IMF seventh-review disbursement expectations; BBC-reported early fiscal surplus and sub‑10% monthly inflation in April 2024; June 2024 clashes outside Congress) alongside several high-impact numerical and framing claims that are either incorrect in date/definition (election timing) or not corroborated by up-to-date, primary, or sufficiently reputable secondary sources (e.g., an ‘18% one-day devaluation’ in August 2023; reserves ‘around USD 17 million’; specific ministry/job-cut percentages; “fuel prices +60%”; “poverty +12% since Milei came to power”; and the strong claim about dollarisation meaning ‘giving the US Federal Reserve full autonomy’). Overall trust is moderate: the central narrative is broadly plausible, but multiple precise statistics appear misstated or unsupported as written.
What checked out (5)
- Javier Milei took office as President of Argentina on 10 December 2023.
- Argentina’s year-on-year inflation for 2023 (released in January 2024 by INDEC) was reported as 211.4%.
- The IMF’s seventh review (staff-level agreement / associated communications) indicated Argentina would have access to about US$4.7 billion, and stated policies were expected to lead to a US$10 billion build-up in net reserves by end-2024 (as an expectation/forecast in the IMF communication).
- BBC reporting (10 June 2024) stated Argentina moved from a large deficit in December 2023 to a surplus in April 2024, and that January–April 2024 marked the first time since 2012 that monthly surpluses were achieved over consecutive months; BBC also reported April 2024 monthly inflation was 8.8%, the first non-double-digit since October (in context of month-on-month inflation).
- Large protests/clashes occurred outside Argentina’s Congress in mid-June 2024 during debate on Milei-linked reforms (numerous outlets reported clashes on/around 12–13 June 2024).
Disputed claims 1 claim ⌄
- Milei’s election being characterised as occurring “in December last year” (election run-off occurred on 19 November 2023; inauguration was 10 December 2023—so the article’s wording conflates election with inauguration and is inaccurate if read literally as ‘election in December’).
Unverified claims 14 claims ⌄
- “After a total of 39 years of Peronist rule” (needs precise definition of ‘Peronist rule’ and the exact period counted; not verified in research here).
- Milei’s “successful election campaign in December last year” (as written, this implies election in December; Milei took office 10 December 2023 but the decisive run-off election was 19 November 2023; the article’s phrasing is time-ambiguous and not confirmed as correct).
- “The Argentine peso … was devalued by 18% in a single day in August of 2023.” (not corroborated during targeted research; Argentina had notable devaluations in 2023, but this specific ‘18% in August 2023’ figure needs a primary/strong secondary source matching the claim).
- “Inflation rates … have been persistently over 100% since February of [2023].” (requires time-series verification from INDEC/official series; not confirmed in this research pass).
- “Foreign exchange reserves plummeting to around 17 USD million in September [2023] from around 21 USD million only 2 months before.” (this appears likely to be a unit/scale error: commonly reported reserves are in USD billions; Trading Economics shows reserves in USD millions but at levels in the tens of thousands of millions; the specific 17/21 ‘USD million’ claim was not verified and likely mis-stated).
- “Dollar blue … deemed to be the ‘most commonly accessed rate among Argentines’.” (needs the exact cited Vox/Bloomberg Línea wording; not verified here).
- “Shock therapy” specifics: cutting fuel and transport subsidies; “slashing 9 government ministries”; and “reducing the number of jobs in the public sector by 34%.” (the broad thrust is plausible and some elements are widely reported, but the exact counts/percentages were not confirmed with primary documents or the cited BBC item in this run).
- Financial Times claim that Milei used “increasingly aggressive interest rate cuts” as described (paywalled/primary quote not verified here; requires opening FT or alternative reputable coverage with the same wording).
- Dollarisation description: “scrapping the Argentine central bank and giving the US Federal Reserve full autonomy over monetary policy.” (oversimplified and not verified; dollarisation generally removes domestic monetary policy discretion but does not literally grant the Fed a mandate over Argentina).
- “Policies have been put on hold recently due to Milei’s lack of a majority in Congress.” (requires specific, dated reporting and which policies; not verified here).
- “Fuel prices increasing by 60%” after devaluation/shock measures (not verified here; needs a dated price series or reputable report with scope and timeframe).
- “Social Observatory of the Catholic University … rise in poverty of 12% since Milei came to power.” (a related reputable report indicates poverty rose from 44.7% (Q4 2023) to 55.5% (Q1 2024), i.e., +10.8 percentage points; the article’s ‘12%’ figure and ‘since he came to power’ framing were not directly verified).
- Protest description details: chants (“Our country is not for sale”) and Che Guevara flags (plausible but not verified with sources checked).
- “Milei retained around a 50% approval rating in March [2024]” attributed to The Economist (not verified from The Economist directly in this pass; only corroborated via a secondary summary).
Sources & how we checked Search journal, source grades, confidence ⌄
Confidence
Medium — High confidence in adjudications tied to primary/major-outlet sources (IMF disbursement and net-reserves expectation; BBC fiscal and inflation claims; widely reported June 2024 clashes; inauguration date; 211.4% inflation headline). Medium-to-low confidence on many of the article’s precise secondary statistics because they were not corroborated with the exact cited documents during this run (and one appears to involve a likely unit/scale mistake). As required, these are marked Unverified rather than False absent sufficient up-to-date corroboration.
Search journal
Javier Milei elected president Argentina date took office 2023 2024
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Javier_Milei
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/10/javier-milei-sworn-in-as-president-in-tipping-point-for-argentina
Argentina inflation 211.4% December 2023 INDEC 211.4
- https://apnews.com/article/68f27bf0473590fabb5b6c1aff80579f
- https://en.mercopress.com/2024/01/12/cpi-goes-up-25.5-in-december-in-argentina
IMF Argentina Seventh Review February 2024 boost net foreign reserves to 10 billion by year-end quote
- https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/01/10/pr2405-argentina-pr2405-imf-staff-authorities-reach-sla-sev...
- https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1argea2024001.pdf
BBC June 9 2024 Have Milei’s first six months improved the Argentine economy fiscal surplus first time since April 2012
June 2024 riots outside Argentina Congress protest Milei reforms June 13 2024
- https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/6/13/clashes-between-police-and-protesters-erupt-as-argentina-debates-reform
- https://news.sky.com/story/riots-break-out-in-buenos-aires-over-president-javier-mileis-reforms-13152320
Social Observatory Catholic University poverty rate Q4 2023 Q1 2024 55.5 44.7
Argentina sharply devalues its currency and cuts subsidies as part of shock economic measures Dec 12 2023
BCRA Monthly Monetary Report October 2023 international reserves ended October 2023 22,559 million
Article metrics
The article we checked Full text as retrieved ⌄
After a total of 39 years of Peronist rule, Argentine voters have rejected this norm and leapt into the unknown after Javier Milei’s successful election campaign in December last year. Milei represents a new form of politics in Argentina and globally, describing himself as an ‘anarcho-capitalist’, that being a proponent of the liberal right-wing. Milei’s rise to power represents not only a rejection of Peronist and left-wing collectivist thought but also underlines the fact the majority of Argentineans believe that more drastic measures must be taken to rescue Argentina’s crumbling economy.
The economic state of Argentina that Milei has inherited can be characterized as dire. In addition to the weakness of the Argentine peso, which was devalued by 18% in a single day in August of 2023 (Glover, 2023), inflation rates soared up to 211.4% (Trading Economics, n.d) in December 2023 and have been persistently over 100% since February of that year. As well as this, the Argentine economy remained susceptible to market shock, with foreign exchange reserves plummeting to around 17 USD million in September from around 21 USD million only 2 months before (Trading Economics, n.d). However, the economic situation that Milei has inherited is fractured not solely due to Peronist monetary policy, but socially through the existence of the “dollar blue”, an unofficial, black-market currency that is deemed to be the “most commonly accessed rate among Argentines”, representing the clear sense of mistrust in Argentinean institutions such as the central bank (Stewart, 2023). Overall, it’s fair to say that Milei has his work cut out for him, the response to his proposal to fix this situation, however, has been incredibly polarizing.
Pictured here (Sarmenti, 2023) is Javier Milei wielding a chainsaw, a perfect representation of his economic policies, cut everything. As a self-proclaimed anarcho-capitalist, Milei’s policies are based on his view that government intervention, or bigger government, are and have been detrimental to the Argentine economy. Instead, Milei seeks to promote libertarian economic policies through “shock therapy”, extreme austerity, and cutting government institutions to the bone.
‘Shock therapy’ in this case refers to Milei’s plan to shift Argentina’s economic policy swiftly, from collectivist economics to libertarian, cutting government spending through a reduction in fuel and transport subsidies (Tewari, 2023) and slashing 9 government ministries (Tewari, 2023), thus reducing the number of jobs in the public sector by 34% (Tewari, 2023). Furthermore, according to Financial Times, in order to control inflation Milei has employed “increasingly aggressive interest rate cuts” in an effort to stop hyperinflation through excessive printing of money (Nugent, 2024), as well as promoting the notion of the ‘dollarization’ of the peso, that being essentially scrapping the Argentinean central bank and giving the US federal reserve full autonomy over monetary policy (Cooban, 2023), although these policies have been put on hold recently due to Milei’s lack of a majority in Congress (Plummer, 2024). These policies of devaluation, according to the IMF, are set to “boost net foreign reserves to 10 billion by year-end” (IMF, 2024), thus limiting Argentina’s susceptibility to market shock or crashes. These ‘positive’ changes, in the view of the IMF, have allowed Milei to access a further 4.7 billion-dollar loan, which will assist in Milei’s goals of tackling inflation within Argentina (Nugent, 2024). It is evident that the policies underlined here are drastic, however, the question remains as to whether they are enough to stop a fourth Argentine financial crisis in the 21st century, and what effects they’ve had so far.
Since coming to power, Milei’s reforms have had some positive effects, extreme austerity measures have led to the Argentine government reporting a fiscal surplus for the first time since April 2012 (Plummer, 2024). Moreover, In terms of inflation, Argentina saw its first non-double-digit inflation rate since October of last year (Plummer, 2024). Despite these factors however, the devaluation of the peso has contributed to the cost-of-living crisis, with fuel prices increasing by 60%, and according to the Social Observatory of the Catholic University, has caused a rise in poverty of 12% since Milei came to power (Käufer, 2024). Moreover, Milei’s drastic measures to rectify the mistakes of past governments, namely his harsh austerity measures, have been met with resistance in the form of riots outside the national congress in June of this year, with proponents of the left chanting “Our country is not for sale” and waving flags depicting the face of Che Guevara, an Argentine socialist icon. (Singh, 2024)
Although according to the government “the situation will get worse before it gets better” (Wells, 2024), the harsh realities of the consequences of economic shock therapy are now more and more evident. Still, according to The Economist, Milei retained around a 50% approval rating in March of this year (The Economist, 2024), denoting the fact that many Argentines still believe that the true effects of Milei’s reforms are yet to come to pass. As is the case with the employment of neoliberal ‘shock therapy’, more time is needed to know as to whether Milei’s reforms will bear the fruit of his promises, or whether the cost-of-living crisis will tank his approval ratings to the point of no return, time will tell.
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_Bibliography:_
* _Ioanes, E. (2023, December 17). Argentina’s new president, Javier Milei, explained.Vox._[_
* _TRADING ECONOMICS. (n.d.).Argentina inflation rate._[_
* _TRADING ECONOMICS. (n.d.-a).Argentina Foreign Exchange Reserves._[_
* _Glover, G. (2023, November 11). This is the world’s next major election. The winner has to fix chronic hyperinflation and halt a 6th recession in 10 years. Business Insider._[_
* _Squires, S. (2023, August 13). A beginner’s guide to understanding Argentina’s multiple exchange rates. Bloomberg Línea.
* _Stewart, E. (2023, March 23). What it looks like when a country doesn’t trust its banks. Vox.
* _Tewari, S. (2023, December 13). Argentina peso: Milei begins “shock therapy” by devaluing currency. BBC News._[_
* _Nugent, C. (2024, May 23). Financial Times._[_
* _Cooban, A. (2023, October 23).Javier Milei wants Argentina to swap the peso for the US dollar. Here’s what that could mean | CNN Business. CNN._[_
* _IMF (2024, February). ARGENTINA SEVENTH REVIEW_[_
* _Plummer, R. (2024, June 9).Have Milei’s first six months improved the Argentine economy?BBC News; BBC News._[_
* _Käufer, T. (2024, March 18) Argentina: Milei’s first 100 days of hope and concern._[_
* _Wells, I. (2024, February 16). Javier Milei: Argentines wait for “crazy” president’s shock therapy to work.BBC News._[_
* _Singh, N. (2024, June 13). Argentina’s riot police clash with protesters in capital’s streets over president Javier Milei’s reforms.The Independent._[_
* _The Economist. (2024, March 19). After 100 brutal days, Javier Milei has markets believing.The Economist._[_
* _Sarmenti, S. P. P. (2023, October 1). The “chainsaw” candidate challenging Argentina’s left and right. CNN.