_The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and \_The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute\_ are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period._

## Toplines

**Iran and Hezbollah are continuing to try to transform negotiations about ending the war over the Strait of Hormuz into negotiations about ending the war in Lebanon, which Iran and Hezbollah seek to end in Israel’s capitulation.**US President Donald Trump announced on June 1 a partial ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah in which Israel would not attack Hezbollah targets in Beirut and Hezbollah would halt attacks against Israel.[1] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu subsequently announced that Israel would attack Hezbollah targets in Beirut if Hezbollah continued to attack Israel, suggesting that he agreed not to strike Beirut if Hezbollah ceased attacks on Israel.[2] The Lebanese Embassy in Washington claimed on June 1 that Hezbollah had agreed to cease attacks on northern Israel.[3] Hezbollah officials claimed after Trump’s announcement that the group would not adhere to a partial ceasefire, however.[4] Hezbollah conducted rocket attacks targeting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in northern Israel on June 3 for the first time since June 1.[5] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets targeting IDF soldiers near the Israel-Lebanon border on June 3, several hours after the IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a vehicle in Khalde, eight miles south of Beirut.[6] Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter called Hezbollah’s June 3 attack a violation of the partial ceasefire and suggested that Israel could respond by attacking Hezbollah targets in Beirut.[7] An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 3 that Netanyahu is set to meet with senior Israeli officials to determine Israel’s response to Hezbollah’s attack.[8]

[]( "Israeli Strikes and Hezbollah Attacks in Lebanon Between June 2, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET and June 3, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET")[](

**Senior Hezbollah officials have continued to demand a complete ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.** Hezbollah Political Council member Mahmoud Qamati told Western media that Hezbollah will not accept a partial ceasefire and later said that “there was no ceasefire agreement.”[9] Hezbollah officials have demanded that the IDF cease all military operations in Lebanon and fully withdraw from southern Lebanon and claimed that the group will make “whatever sacrifices are required” to expel Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.[10] A Hezbollah parliamentarian said on June 2 that one of Hezbollah’s primary objectives is to obtain a timeframe for a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.[11] These positions are consistent with Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s demands that the IDF halt all operations against Hezbollah and withdraw from Lebanon.[12]

**Iranian officials have echoed Hezbollah’s maximalist demands for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon as part of Iran’s effort to create a protracted discussion about the Lebanon issue and thereby deflect attention from negotiations about the Strait of Hormuz and other key points of disagreement.** Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Hezbollah-affiliated media on June 3 that Iran and Lebanon are “linked” and that conflict with the United States and Israel will not end unless Israeli forces withdraw from southern Lebanon.[13] Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Chairman Ebrahim Azizi told Hezbollah officials on June 3 that ending the war with the United States and Israel on all fronts, “especially in Lebanon,” is at the “forefront” of Iran’s ceasefire agreement with the United States.[14] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media outlet Tasnim News Agency argued on June 3 that there must be a complete ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel and a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. The outlet also highlighted how Iran can use Hezbollah to deter and preserve its leverage against Israel and the United States.[15] A political analyst close to the regime also noted on June 3 that the preservation of Hezbollah is “a geopolitical, strategic, and national security imperative for Iran.”[16]

**The Iranian regime also likely calculates that it can preserve its leverage on other issues in negotiations with the United States, such as its nuclear program and control of the Strait of Hormuz, by deflecting talks to the war in Lebanon.** The US-sanctioned Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) continued to post data on June 3 about ships requesting Iranian permission to pass through the strait.[17] Tasnim News Agency argued on June 3 that the PGSA’s reports “show the stabilization of Iranian sovereignty over the strait.” This comment is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that Iran is using the ceasefire period to try to normalize Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.[18] Tasnim also stated that the Iranian regime is prioritizing achieving sovereignty over the strait over collecting tolls from vessels that transit through Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme. ISW-CTP assessed on May 14 that Iran may be prioritizing upholding the “legitimacy” of its claims to the Strait of Hormuz over toll collection.[19] These comments reflect how Iranian decision-makers are using the current situation to try to solidify de facto Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. A protracted discussion about Lebanon also deflects from negotiations over Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and ability to enrich uranium on Iranian territory, which Iranian decision-makers have refused to make concessions on.

**The Iranian regime is trying to impose costs on the United States for continuing to enforce its blockade while also trying to strain Gulf states’ relations with the United States.** US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated on June 2 that US naval forces disabled an Iranian-affiliated tanker, the Botswana-flagged M/T _Lexie_, that was transiting toward Iran’s Kharg Island in violation of the US blockade.[20] Iranian forces then launched attack drones at civilian ships trying to transit the Persian Gulf. US forces intercepted three of the drones.[21] The IRGC also claimed that it launched anti-ship missiles at the Liberia-flagged MSC _Panaya_, which it claimed belongs to the United States and Israel.[22] US forces subsequently conducted self-defense strikes against drone ground control stations on Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz.[23] Iranian forces then retaliated by firing ballistic missiles and drones at US bases in Kuwait and Bahrain.[24] The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry stated on June 3 that Kuwaiti forces intercepted 13 ballistic missiles and 17 drones.[25] Two Iranian missiles hit Kuwait International Airport, however, killing one person, injuring at least 63 others, and causing significant damage.[26] US and Bahraini air defenses also intercepted three ballistic missiles, one of which targeted the US Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Manama.[27] The Iranian regime’s English-language media outlet, Press TV, claimed that Iran’s attacks sent a message to Gulf countries that their “territory is not safe” if they continue to host US forces.[28] This comment reflects Iran’s efforts to drive a wedge between the Gulf states and the United States by threatening to attack the Gulf states if they cooperate with the United States. Iran’s efforts to sow divisions between the Gulf states and the United States are part of Iran’s broader strategic objective to expel the United States from the Middle East.

[]( "Recent US and Iranian Activity in the Persian Gulf as of June 3, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET")[](

**Iranian officials and media responded to these attacks with further threats, probably to try to deter the United States from enforcing its blockade on Iranian ports.** Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s military adviser, Mohsen Rezaei, stated on X on June 3 that Iran will not allow the United States to make “excessive demands” in negotiations and will respond to any US military action with a “barrage of missiles and drones.”[29] Press TV also argued that Iran will intensify its responses to US military action to deter the United States from taking such action.[30]

**Iranian Parliament Speaker and Iran’s Special Representative for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Affairs, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, appears to be performing an executive-level role in Iran’s economic and foreign policy.** Ghalibaf convened the Iranian Central Bank governor, Planning and Budget Organization head, and oil, economy, and industry ministers on June 3 to coordinate Iran’s economic policy toward the PRC.[31] This meeting marks the first meeting that Ghalibaf has convened as Iran’s special representative for PRC affairs since Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed him to this position on May 17.[32] The meeting was unusual because parliament speakers in Iran do not normally convene government officials to coordinate and implement foreign economic policy. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency previously emphasized on May 17 that Ghalibaf’s new role carries a different “level of authority” than previous PRC-related representative roles.[33] The meeting to discuss Iran’s economic policy toward the PRC also highlights how Ghalibaf seeks to deepen cooperation with US adversaries such as the PRC.

Ghalibaf’s meeting notably comes as President Masoud Pezeshkian appears to have been sidelined in the regime. Anti-regime media reported on May 31 that Pezeshkian recently submitted his resignation letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei due to IRGC officials’ growing dominance in the regime.[34] ISW-CTP continues to assess that IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle are dominating regime decision-making and have gained the upper hand over Ghalibaf.[35] The fact that Ghalibaf appears to be playing an executive-level role does not mean that Ghalibaf holds the same influence over regime decision-making that Vahidi does.

**Eighty-five Iranian parliamentarians implicitly called for the development of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities in a letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on May 31.[36]** The parliamentarians stated that Parliament will support Iran’s military forces and defense industry until Iranian missiles can reach the United States.[37] Iran’s known longest-range missiles are the Emad, Sejjil, and Shahab-3, which have a reported range of 2,000 kilometers.[38] Iran attempted to launch two ballistic missiles targeting Diego Garcia in March 2026, which is approximately 3,700 kilometers from Iran’s southern border, marking the furthest ever attempted Iranian missile strike.[39] One of the missiles failed in flight, while US forces intercepted the other.[40]

## Iran’s Axis of Resistance

### Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon

**Hezbollah has continued to use first-person view (FPV) drones equipped with thermal cameras to conduct nighttime attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, likely in response to the IDF ground forces’ own tactical adjustments to operate at night to avoid Hezbollah FPV drone reconnaissance and attacks.** Hezbollah posted footage from several FPV drones using thermal cameras to identify and strike Israeli positions at night on June 1 and 2.[44] Hezbollah has likely begun equipping FPV drones with thermal cameras for nighttime attacks on Israeli forces since at least May 23.[45] Hezbollah has primarily conducted nighttime FPV drone attacks on Israeli forces advancing north of the Litani River in recent days.[46] Hezbollah is also likely using FPV drones at night to degrade Israeli forces’ morale and maximize psychological distress, as these capabilities increase the risk of more frequent and unpredictable attacks.[47] Hezbollah may have posted footage of its nighttime FPV attacks to increase fear among the Israeli public and generate popular domestic pressure on Israeli political leaders to end the IDF’s campaign in Lebanon as well.[48]

### Other Axis of Resistance Activity

_Nothing significant to report._